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Abstract 
The Chinese social security system is subject to ongoing reforms. The fundamental 
reason for these reforms is that China is experiencing the transition from a command 
economy to a market-oriented one. The old social security system, which was biased 
towards urban people, was the outcome of the rapid-industrialisation development 
strategy adopted before 1978. It had significant disincentive impacts on individuals. 
Reforms during the 1980s and 1990s have attempted to link contributions to social 
security benefits, while providing a safety net for legal urban residents, but they are 
often the short-term responses to financial pressures on the old programs. Many of the 
reformed/new programs still have potential disincentive impacts on economic agents. 
Using payroll tax to finance the pension scheme is not feasible for the coming 
population aging in China. The current, partially funded scheme, however, has a very 
high tax component, and does not appear to be financially viable. The best pension 
scheme for China is a fully funded scheme with individual accounts that are 
individually owned, fully portable, and earning market returns. The 'transition costs' of 
such a pension reform in China imposes only a minor tax burden on the economy. This 
is especially so when the government adopts the optimal taxation rule to spread the tax 
burden over a long period of time, and to collect more taxes when the taxation system 
becomes more efficient. 
. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis is a study of the Chinese social security system. During its economic 
transition from a command economy to a market-oriented one, problems of the old 
social security system have emerged as increasingly important issues for both the 
Chinese government and individual economic agents. However, reforms in this area are 
complicated. At the background, the economic transition itself is extensive, dramatic 
and politically sensitive. Thus it is expected to take a long period of time, and is still far 
from having been completed. In addition, while the government attempts to establish a 
social security system that is in line with the market economy, China's old social 
security system built during the command economy is still in place, especially in cities. 
Given the complexity of the topic, this study focuses on two major goals. One of the 
goals is to provide a good understanding of the old social security system and its recent 
reforms. This provides a sound foundation for future research in this area, when the 
reform becomes deeper. The other goal is to explore one particular aspect of the social 
security system for future reforms-the possible impact of social security programs on 
economic efficiency. This is achieved by examining the efficiency aspects of individual 
programs. A careful study of this aspect is about the pension scheme1• 
This thesis covers the period between 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
took over the power, and 2002. These 53 years are divided into two distinct sub-periods. 
The first one, referred to as the pre-reform period, is from 1949 to 1978. During this 
period, the Chinese economy was centrally planned, and the communist government 
pursued a rapid industrialisation development strategy. The second one, referred to as 
the post-reform, or the economic transition, period, is from 1979 onwards. During this 
period, the focus of the communist government's policy was shifted to establishing a 
market-oriented economy through economic reforms. This division of the whole periods 
is important, since the social security system has to be seen against the broader social 
and economic background, which was very different during the two sub-periods. This 
division also naturally divides the present study into three parts: first, the origin of the 
social security system in contemporary China (the pre-reform period); second, its 
1 The reason for choosing the pension scheme is briefly mentioned in the section 1.2, and will be 
discussed in more details in the introduction of Chapter 6. 
1 
reforms during the economic transition (the transition period) and third, the prospects of 
future reforms of the system (policy implications for further reforms). 
1.1 The Definition of the Social Security System in This Study 
In this study, the 'social security system' is used to refer both the formal government 
programs and to the informal arrangements that, in practice, provide support in cash or 
in kind to people in need. Specifically, the scope of this definition of the social security 
system includes the following categories: 
(1) formal government programs that provide assistance to people in need, that is: 
those in poverty, the elderly and those suffering from unexpected or temporary 
misfortunes, such as illness or redundancy; 
(2) informal arrangements that provide assistance for people in need; 
(3) the provision of fringe benefits and welfare benefits for public sector 
employees. 
Category (1) mainly refers to the programs specified by government regulations, such 
as the public pension program and the medial care program in the Labour Insurance 
Regulations (LIR). Category (2) of the informal arrangements is included because they 
play an important role in providing for people in need. The most important example of 
this category is that the rural collectives were supposed to provide the minimum living 
for all their members during the pre-reform period in China. The third category includes 
many types of arrangements for employees in the public sector in urban China by their 
employers. The most significant example was the provision of free housing. 
Given this definition of social security, some provisions that are usually covered by the 
study of the Chinese social security system are not included; for example, benefits for 
veteran and their families are not covered. By this definition, free education is not 
included, although it can have a great impact on people's future welfare. 
2 
1.2 The Motivation for This Study 
The modem social security systems in many developed economies that have been 
providing people with support during misfortune and old age are undergoing scrutiny 
for reforms. One of the major reasons is that many countries are experiencing 
demographic transitions of unprecedented magnitude, of which population aging is the 
most important (Peterson 1999). According to the United Nation's population projection 
(UN 2001 ); the old-age dependency ratio of the world population, that is, the ratio of the 
number of people aged 60 and over2 to the number of working people aged between 15 
and 59, will rise to 0.363 in 2050. This ratio was only 0.14 in 1950. Population aging is 
most evident in developed regions such as Europe. For the population in the more 
developed regions that include North America, Europe, Japan and Australia/New 
Zealand, the old-age dependency ratio is expected to reach 0.66 in 2050. This means 
that every three people of working age will have to support two elderly people. The 
economic implications of population aging are profound. It imposes financial pressure 
on the conventional public pension system in many of these developed countries. These 
pension systems often are financed on the pay-as-you-go (PA YGO) basis, where 
pension payments are financed out of payroll taxes and income taxes levied mainly on 
the employed. The medical care burden on taxpayers of an aging population can also be 
heavy. 
The speed of population aging in most developing countries is not expected to be as 
dramatic as in the developed nations. The UN's (2001) projection shows that for 
population in less developed regions4 as a whole, excluding China, the old-age 
dependency ratio, as defined previously, will be 0.28 in 2050, well below the world 
level. However, China, which has a larger population than any other country, is an 
exception among this group. The UN's (2001) projection shows that the old-age 
dependency ratio in China will reach 0.56 in 2050, although it is expected to be only 
0.16 in 2005, which is very close to the world level. As Peterson (1999) points out, the 
2 Often the elderly refers to people aged 65 and over. Here the age of 60 is chosen since the official 
retirement age for male workers in China is age 60. 
3 Figures here are calculated by the author based on the UN (2001). See Figure 6-3 in Chapter 6. 4 Theses regions include all regions of Africa, Asia (except Japan), Latin America and the Caribbean plus 
Melanesia and Polynesia. 
3 
problem of population aging in China, a developing country, is as acute as that faced by 
most developed countries. 
So the background of the Chinese social security reform includes ( at least) the 
following features: 1) the dramatic demographic transition and the associated rapid 
population aging; 2) the economic and social transition from a command economy to a 
market one, and 3) the existence of an old social security system that was based on the 
command economy. Future policy designs should be explored with a good 
understanding of all these features. While there are lots of important issues to examine, 
this study intends to focus on the efficiency aspect of the social security system. 
This efficiency aspect of the social security system is especially important during the 
economic transition. In the short run of the transition, many reforms are intertwined, 
and the government often conducts policy changes in response to imminent social, 
political and economic pressures. In the long run, however, the fundamental issue of 
efficiency must be considered in designing all social security programs, if the Chinese 
government is to realize the potential benefits of a market economy. The efficiency 
aspects need to be examined in the context of a particular social security program. In 
this study, more space is devoted to the old age pension scheme than any other single 
program, since this is the one of the largest program in terms of expenses, and the one 
that has experienced the most dramatic reforms during the past two decades. 
In summary, this thesis provides: (1) a relatively comprehensive, up to date (2002) 
study of the social security system in China under the communist government; and (2) 
an analysis of the economic efficiency aspect of pension reforms to provide explicit 
policy implications for further reforms of the pension system. 
1.3 The Structure of This Study 
Perhaps the most distinct feature of the old Chinese social security system is that it was 
composed of two very different, yet closely related sub-systems. One was primitive and 
was applied in rural areas, and the other one was very generous and covered city 
residents. Obviously, in order to maintain this dual social security system, effective 
institutional restrictions on labour mobility were essential. The reviews of the old social 
4 
security system in Chapters 2 and 3 include some discussions of these restrictions. From 
the point of view of market mechanism of resource allocation, both the segregation of 
the social security system and these institutional restrictions on economic decisions 
( especially on labour mobility) can cause huge efficiency losses and therefore are 
difficult to understand. However, the social security system is a part of the whole social 
and economic institutions of a country. It integrates with other institutions in one-way 
or another. How much provisions are provided for people in need reflects the society's 
values; how these provisions are financed often illustrates the economic mechanism of 
the society. In the case of the Chinese social security system, this dual social security 
system was an unavoidable consequence of the government's development strategy 
during the command era 5. 
First and foremost, the Chinese social security system was established while the 
communist government (the central planner) decided to modernise China by promoting 
rapid industrialisation of an economy that was dominated by agriculture. This strategy 
was the outcome of the historical domestic and international circumstances. These 
included the humiliations inflicted on China by foreign powers, the West and Japan, but 
especially Chinese experiences during the early 1950s of the Korean War. On the one 
hand, at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s, immediately after the communist 
takeover, China was underdeveloped and over 80 per cent of population lived in rural 
areas. In 1949, nearly 60% of GDP was contributed by the agriculture sector, 29% by 
the industrial sector and 12 % by the commercial sector (Zhang 1994: 2). On the other 
hand, at the time, the conflict between capitalism and socialism was so intense that most 
western countries refused to recognise China's communist government. The Korean 
War in the early 1950s led to an economic blockade of China by these western 
countries. 
Given the communist party's dislike and distrust of Western capitalist economics, it is 
not surprising that the Chinese government followed the Russian style of modernisation, 
by increasing investments in industry, especially in large-scale, capital-intensive heavy 
industries. Moreover, Russia was the only country, at the time, that China could obtain 
some initial capital to start its modernisation (Wen 2000). To have enough savings for 
5 Lin, Cai and Li (2003) has an excellent analysis of the background of the development strategy and the 
consequent economic institutions during this period. 
5 
investments in industries, the communist party had to channel resources from the 
relatively large sector of the economy, the agricultural sector, to the industrial sector. 
For the reasons just mentioned, this was not done by explicit taxes and subsidies, but by 
off-budget state planning using directives that cross-subsidised industry at the expense 
of agriculture. Compared with explicit taxes, this approach of using 'implicit taxes' also 
had the advantage of reducing resentment of farmers (Yang and Zhou 2000; Liu 1999). 
To speed up industrialisation, workers obviously had to be attracted from rural to urban 
areas. This was done partly by paying relatively attractive urban wages, and partly by 
providing employees in the public sector in cities with relatively generous non-wage 
benefits, such as houses, pensions, health insurance and all the other cash or in-kind 
benefits that will be discussed in this study. Indeed, during the 1950s, the social welfare 
benefits to employees in the state-owned-enterprises (SO Es) and other public 
organisations were so generous that Prime Minister Zhou Enlai commented in 1957 that 
the system had gone too far ahead of the economic and social status of the country at 
the time, and the government had built 'too many' social welfare facilities (Shao and 
Chen 1991: 53). 
The generous social security system for SOE workers in urban China attracted a large 
number of farmers into cities in the early 1950s (Shao and Chen 1991). During the first 
year of the Great Leap Forward, 1958, the number of urban employees increased by 
67 .5% compared with the previous year. This was partly the result of relaxed 
employment policies and partly due to the generous social welfare benefits for urban 
workers (Yang and Zhou 2000). To curb further rural migrants to cities, the government 
adopted the Household Registration System (HRS) in 1958. Combined with other 
policies6, the HRS effectively restricted rural to urban migrants during the pre-reform 
period. 
Of course, to promote rapid industrialisation, the communist government could have 
forced the agricultural sector to cross-subsidise industrialization without giving urban 
workers such generous overall treatment (in terms of wages and non-wage social 
security and housing benefits) that it had to restrict the flow of migrants to urban areas. 
It could have just given urban workers the minimum package of wages and other 
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benefits that were needed to induce the labour movement required to operate the 
factories of the SOEs that the government was building. So why did the Chinese 
government give urban workers a much better overall deal than the minimum needed to 
provide an industrial labour force? 
One possible answer to this question is that the communist party needed the full support 
of the people before it took over power in 1949. In rural areas, it gained the support of 
farmers by distributing land owned by the landlord to every farmer. In factories at the 
areas it had taken over, the CCP provided generous social welfare benefits to all 
workers (Shao and Chen 1991 ). These social welfare provisions formed the basis of the 
national scheme for workers-the LIR, which was drafted in 1950. The draft was then 
open for all urban employees to comment on before it was formally issued in 1951. The 
main regulations remained almost unchanged during the pre-reform period, except for 
the extension of the coverage of the scheme in 1953. As one could imagine, once the 
workers had enjoyed the generosity of the government's social security benefits, it was 
very difficult to reduce the provision of benefits without causing resentment or even a 
threat to the stability of the government from the workers. In general, unlike individual 
rural households who are relatively independent of each other, when workers are 
brought together in factories and cities, they inevitably obtain industrial power whether 
unions are legal or not. To avoid the kind of miscalculation by the communist party like 
those occurred in Europe--Polish urban workers brought down communism, the 
Chinese communist government had to continue the generous social welfare provisions 
that had helped it to gain support from workers before 1949. It therefore offered the 
Chinese urban workers a relatively good deal-at least relative to Chinese rural 
workers. This is why the comments made by Zhou Enlai in 1957 did not actually lead to 
any reduction of the social security benefits of urban workers in China. Selden and You 
( 1997) comment that: 
'For ideological reasons, but also in order to secure an urban political base and to 
transfer the rural surplus to urban industry, China's leaders prioritised the welfare of 
industrial workers over farmers' (1997: 1666). 
6 These policies are discussed in Chapter 2. 
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In this relatively good deal offered by the government to urban workers, part was given 
in the form of the non-wage social security and housing benefits. The study of these 
arrangements is an important part of the present study. The reason for the choice of non-
wage benefits was that the communist government wanted to maximise investments in 
the industrial sector by minimising consumption. High wages paid to workers would 
have induced demand for consumption goods and services. During the pre-reform 
period, the pursuit of rapid industrialisation had led to the rationing of most 
consumption goods in China, from basic food to general household utensils. Paying 
workers by direct benefits in kind was simply part of this rationing system. This also 
explains why the welfare benefits of urban workers covered a wide-range of necessary 
services for households, such as housing and childcare. 
Given the fact that Chinese urban workers received a relatively attractive combination 
of pay and fringe benefits during the pre-reform period compared with farmers, it was 
efficient for the central planner to restrict labour migration to cities. As demonstrated by 
the two-sector migration model by Harris and Todaro (Todaro 1969; Harris and Todaro 
1970; Todaro 1989), an institutionally determined wage in cities that is higher than the 
market level attracts rural migrants to cities. Since farmers make their decision to move 
to cities by comparing the expected lifetime income in cities versus that in villages, the 
wage gap between rural and urban areas tend to attract too many rural migrants and 
cause substantial and prolonged urban unemployment. Unemployment wastes resources 
that would otherwise being used to produce more agricultural products. As a result, 
direct control of the movement of farmers to cities can reduce urban unemployment. 
Such controls can achieve a higher level of agricultural output for the same level of 
industrial output. 
In the case of China, the gap between the labour remunerations of a worker in a publicly 
owned factor and a farmer in a village was significant, as this study will show in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Therefore, there was a strong incentive for Chinese farmers to move 
to cities. To curb potential urban unemployment and the associated social and political 
problems such as crime, the government needed to control rural migration. Moreover, 
the government's development strategy of using the agricultural sector to cross-
subsidise the industrial sector meant that it was optimal to maximise agricultural output, 
so long as there were enough workers in cities. Under the command economy, a higher 
8 
agricultural output provided more subsidies to the industrial sector. In other words, so 
long as the marginal product of rural labor force was positive, it was always efficient for 
the government to have as many farmers engaged in agricultural production as possible. 
As will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the communist government therefore adopted 
a series of policies to curb migration of farmers. These policies included collectivisation 
of farmers, the HRS and other restrictions on domestic travel. The government also 
issued directive that forcibly 'sent down' urban residents to villages at times when there 
was large-scale implicit unemployment in cities. 
During the pre-reform period, the Chinese population suffered two tragic events. Both 
tragedies were caused by economic as well as political factors. The first one was the 
Great Famine from 1959 to 1961, during which millions of people, mainly in villages, 
died of hunger and malnutrition7. It was partly the result of policy mistakes and 
failures-notably the extreme policies used to promote rapid modernisation and partly 
the gross demonstrated failure of the social security system to deal with the famine 
(Ashton 1984; Dreze 1989). The second tragedy was Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). 
During this period, among other events, millions of urban school graduates were sent 
down to villages, as part of the government's policy to cope with the unemployment 
problem in cities. The causes and consequences of these two tragedies are surely 
valuable and interesting issues for research8, but the present study focuses on more 
recent policies: the analysis of the social security system in rural China will focus on the 
situation after the Great Famine, while that in cities will mainly examine policies at the 
end of the 1970s. 
While the ong1n of the Chinese social security system must be seen against the 
background of the communist government's development strategy during the pre-reform 
period, that is, taxing the agriculture sector to cross-subsidise the industrial sector, the 
reform of this system should also be seen against the background of the economic 
transition towards a market-oriented resource allocation mechanism. Firstly, the 
economic transition had led to the abolition of the off-budget subsidy from the 
agricultural to the industrial sector. The transition from a command economy towards a 
market economy has also significantly reduced the central government's capacity of 
7 More discussions of the Great Famine can be found in Chapter 2. 
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mobilising resources in the economy (Wang and Hu 2001 ). This has surely contributed 
to the increasing difficulty of financing social security benefits at the level that urban 
workers had enjoyed during the pre-1978 era. Discussions in Chapter 4 will show that 
budgetary pressure appeared to be the direct causes for most reforms of the social 
security system in cities. Most reforms also have aimed at financing various schemes by 
employer and employee contributions, rather than relying on government budgetary 
revenues. 
Secondly, it is easier to understand why the recent social security reforms have mainly 
occurred in cities in the context of economic transition. The transition had destroyed 
the institutional foundation of the rural social security system in a dramatic fashion9. In 
the meantime, the rural-urban segregation inherited from the command era has not been 
eliminated. This has allowed reforms to be carried out in cities only. The huge gap of 
social security benefits between the rural and the urban system have also contributed to 
the urban-focused social security reform. In this study, the review of recent social 
security reforms (Chapters 4 and 5) looks at those occurred in cities. 
The rural social security system was very primitive and focused on the provision of a 
minimum subsistence to all farmers. During the early 1980s, the government 
abandoned the development strategy of taxing the agricultural sector to subsidise the 
industrial sector, and gave individual rural households access to land and freedom to 
market their produce. These reforms improved the welfare of farmers significantly10. 
There was no immediate pressure on the government from farmers to provide the kind 
of formal social security protections that exist in cities and it has been argued that, in 
effect, the provision of land by the government to farmers is the rural equivalence of the 
urban social security arrangements (Wen 2000). 
The old urban social security system, however, was very generous and included wide-
range of benefits. When real wages of urban workers, especially those in SOEs, 
increased quickly (see Figure 4-4) during economic transition, this contributed to the 
8 For some recent research of this issue, see papers in the Special Issue: China's Great Famine in China Economic Review, Volume 9, No. 2, 1998. 
9 For studies of the rural reform in China, see, for example, Powell (1992), Chen (1998), Huang (1998), Chen, Deng ( et al.) ( eds.) (1992), Lin, Cai and Li (2003), 
10 These reforms also destroyed the foundation of the rural social welfare system-the rural collective 
system. Instead, land became the 'social security' provided by the government to rural residents. 
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rapidly ns1ng financial costs of social security programs. In the meantime, the 
government's capacity to mobilise resources was declining (Wang and Hu 2001 ). The 
financial pressure, as well as the uncertainty brought by the market mechanism that 
threatened social stability in cities 11 , was the main driving force for social security 
reforms in urban areas. In addition, urban social security reform became necessary after 
other reforms in cities, especially those of SOE and of labour market, started ( see 
Chapter 4). As mentioned previously, the demographic transition and population aging 
also generated pressure for social security reforms. Selden and Y ou's ( 1997) comment 
about the urban old-age pension program in China is a good summary of the pressure 
for reform of the urban social security system: 
'But this "advanced" system of costly pensions for a small minority of the labour force 
could not be sustained on the foundations of China's economy, nor could it adequately 
serve the interest of the broader working classes in longer range perspective' 
(1997: 1665) 
Thirdly, social security reforms during the post 1978 period must be seen as part of the 
on-going transition of the Chinese economy. They were often made inevitable by other 
reforms, and their success often depended upon the implementation of complementary 
reforms in other areas. For instance, pension reform was regarded as partly a 
consequence of SOE reform (Zhao and Xu 2002). However, the success of the current 
pension reform also depends on the implementation of changes in areas such as 
financial market and the fiscal system (Xu 1999; Li 1998; Zhou and Wand 1996). Such 
interconnections during economic transition have had important consequences: 
potentially good policies have sometimes been unsuccessful because the government 
often implemented piecemeal reforms that focused only on the short-term financial , 
social or political pressure. As a result, reforms were often incomplete and further 
reforms are needed. The pension reform is a good example. As this study will show, a 
series of pension reforms occurred between the mid-1980s and the late-1990s, as 
responses to imminent financial pressure on the old PA YGO scheme. However, they 
were more of a pragmatic approach than a systematic approach to the fundamental 
problem of the old scheme. The most recent reforms in the late 1990s did attempt to 
11 These include open unemployment in cities and urban poverty. The former is discussed in Chapter 4 
and the latter in Chapter 5. 
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establish a funded scheme; however, as the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 will show, 
there are still lots of scope for further reforms of the pension system. 
Finally, due to the limited space of the thesis, this study does not examine some of the 
important issues of the social security reform in China. For example, issues of rural 
social · security system after the collapse of the old system in the 1980s are not 
discussed. There has been little progress in expanding the coverage of the urban social 
security system to include farmers. This is due to the great difficulties in the financial 
and institutional areas (Zhang, Ding et al. 2000). With the abolishment of old policies 
that restricted factor mobility within the country (as well as across the border), labour 
has become more mobile in China: not only from cities to cities, but also from villages 
to cities. This has generated challenges for the social security system, for example, 
whether and how should the urban system provide a social safety net for rural migrants? 
This study touches upon this issue in reviewing the new social relief program in cities-
the Urban Minimum Living Security (UMLS) program (Chapter 5). It is briefly 
examined from the viewpoint of possible implications on economic efficiency when the 
UMLS program covers only urban residents. Much more studies are needed in this area, 
when the domestic labour market is more integrated and the distinction of rural and 
urban residents is abolished. 
In this study, the term 'urban residents' generally refers to people who live in cities and 
have urban household registration, while 'rural residents' refers to people who have rural 
registration, no matter where they live. 
This background of economic transition indicates that the social security reform in 
China is a complex area, and thus much more research is needed in order to understand 
all relevant issues. This study only focuses on the possible impact on economic 
efficiency of social security programs. The reviews of the pre-reform social security 
system and its recent reforms are important parts of the study, in order to understand the 
current and possible future challenges and policy options. The old-age pension scheme 
is used in this study as an example to examine the advantages and disadvantages of 
various approaches of financing the scheme. This approach--examining individual 
programs instead of the whole system--is considered as necessary, since the efficiency 
impacts of a social security program depends on its specific rules. It is expected that the 
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insights learned from studying of this particular program will help understanding issues 
in reforming other social security programs, both in China and in other economies. 
This study is divided into 8 chapters. The next two chapters review the origin of the 
Chinese social security system during the pre-reform period. Since the rural and urban 
sectors had parallel yet significantly different systems, the review looks at rural and 
urban systems separately. Chapters 4 and 5 review recent reforms of the social security 
system, which have occurred mainly in cities. Chapter 4 looks at the major reforms of 
the employment-based programs, while Chapter 5 examines the new social relief 
program in cities as part of the government's response to all urban poor. The focus of 
Chapters 6 and 7 is the pension reform. Chapter 6 discusses population aging and the 
economic transition factors in China, and incorporates them into an optimal taxation 
model. Based on UN's (2001) population projection, the deadweight losses of financing 
the public liabilities of the old, PA YGO pension scheme in each period are estimated, 
and are compared with those following the optimal intertemporal taxation path. This 
exercise indicates that the old PA YGO pension scheme is not feasible and reforms are 
needed. Chapter 7 then looks at the taxation impact on individual workers of an 
alternative pension scheme-a fully funded scheme, and comments on Chinese pension 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter 8 concludes the study with some policy 
implications for further reforms of the Chinese social security system, especially of the 
public pension scheme. 
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Chapter 2. A Review of the Rural Social Security 
Programs In Rural China during the Pre-reform Period (1949-
1978) 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the social security system in rural China during the pre-reform 
period. This period extends from 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP) took 
over power, to when economic reform was officially launched in 1978. The review 
provides a brief study of the origins of the rural social security system in China. The 
very different urban system will be reviewed in the next chapter. Given the general data 
limitations for Chinese studies, and for the pre-reform period in particular, this chapter 
is based mainly on the literature of Chinese studies and some figures that are available 
from Chinese official sources ( such as statistical yearbooks). 
During this period, in order to control the agricultural sector as part of a centrally 
planned economy, farmers were organized into collectives-the People's Communes. A 
typical People's Commune was composed of a few production brigades, which were 
divided into production teams. Geographically, production brigades were based on 
natural villages, while production teams were based on rural neighbourhood 
households. Land and agricultural production tools were initially owned by the 
commune but later by production teams. 
This People's Commune system integrated government administration and economic 
management. From the economic management point of view, each team organized 
agricultural production according to the government economic plan. It had to pay 
agricultural tax and to sell as much as possible of the yield to the state at prices set by 
the government. As for the role of government administration, an important part of the 
Commune's function was to look after its members, including the provision of a 
minimum living for all, and other social welfare facilities such as the basic medical 
care. 
There was a three-tiered safety net in rural China, based upon the family, the Commune 
(collective) and the state government, where the role of the People's Commune was 
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essential. All team members had access to land owned by the team, which provided the 
basic source of living in the countryside. Individuals were expected to work on the land. 
If an individual could not work the land to earn a living, firstly other family members 
were supposed to support him/her. As a result, families took care of the young, the 
elderly, the sick and the disabled. The collective's role in social security, particularly 
the production team, was to assist poor families, and those in need but with no family 
support. In this regard, the production team provided risk sharing among the local 
community. Government assistance came only when the collective could not cope, such 
as following a natural disaster. 
Figure 2-1 shows the administrative and management structure of the rural society as 
well as the channels through which social security services were delivered. The solid 
line represents the administrative relationship from the top to the bottom. Note that the 
People's Commune was the lowest level of government at the time. The dashed lines 
represent the channels where social security services were delivered. The squares 
represent relevant agents, while the ovals show economic plans or welfare assistance 
delivered. While some social security services were delivered by the production 
brigade, many security services were delivered by the production team. Few of the 
social welfare services available from the state government were delivered by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA)1. The MCA issued financial and/or material assistance 
through its local agencies to the People's Commune, which then delivered services to 
rural households. 
The role of the collective, that is, the production team, the brigade as well as the 
People's Commune, in this rural social welfare system was embodied in its income 
distribution process. In particular, the production team was the key social welfare 
provider for its members during the pre-reform period. The team had the responsibility 
to provide a kind of minimum living for all members. This was done through its income 
distribution among tean1 members. It also contributed welfare funds to the brigade and 
the Commune, to finance other social welfare functions, such as the five-guarantee 
1 The MCA was established in 1978 to take over the functions of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), which 
was disbanded in 1970 during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), when its functions were transferred 
to several other government organizations (Zhang 1989). 
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program2 and the basic health care. This contribution was made during the process of 
dividing income between the team and the members, which was prior to the income 
distribution among team members. This chapter will discuss the structure of the 
People's Commune and its income distribution process in details. 
The above description shows that the social safety net in rural China was an elementary 
system, mainly based on traditional family values and the community mutual support, 
which was in the form of the rural collectives. This is supported by Ahmad and Hussain 
(1991), Selden and You (1997), etc. Such a social safety net had very limited risk 
sharing within the local collectives. At times when a major catastrophe occurred that 
required risk sharing among a larger population, such as at the provincial or regional 
level of the economy, the effectiveness of this collective safety net provision was 
dependant upon the communication from the production team to the brigade, the 
People's Commune, and then the higher levels of government. However, conflict 
interests of the different levels of government reduced the effectiveness of the system3. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The next section discusses the economic and 
social background of the rural social security system during the pre-reform period, 
particularly the People's Commune system. Section three looks at the safety net 
provided by the collectives, especially production brigades and teams, and the 
government. Section four summarizes the chapter and points out its connection to 
subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
2.2 Economic and Social Background and the People's Commune System 
. Over 80 per cent of the Chinese population lived in the countryside during the pre-
reform period. In this respect, China was an agricultural economy and social welfare 
services for farmers were an important part of the entire social welfare system. Between 
1949 and 1978, the institutional setting in rural China changed dramatically. Land was 
evenly distributed to rural households in the early 50s, soon after the CCP took over 
power. The People's Commune system was consolidated in the early 1960s through a 
2 This program provided the basic food and clothes, etc to the elderly and other team members who had 
no families. More details are discussed later in the chapter. 3 The failure to respond adequately to the Great Famine of 1959-1961 provides the most terrible example 
of these inefficiencies. See discussions later in this chapter. However, the social security system discussed 
in this chapter was mainly established after the Great Famine. 
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series of collectivisation policies, and remained the key organization in villages until the 
commencement of economic reform in 1978. The background study in this section 
focuses on the People's Commune system, in particular, the income distribution 
between the Commune and the government as well as within the Commune. 
2.2.1 Formation and Structure of the People's Commune 
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, radical land reforms 
were conducted to ensure all farmers had their own land. This was done by 
redistributing to each rural household, particularly to landless poor peasants, land 
previously concentrated in the hands of landlords and rich peasants (Marsh 1985). This 
land reform was completed by the end of 1953. 
Several problems remained unsolved following this land reform. For example, in some 
regions, the land-population ratio was so low that some households could not produce a 
marketable surplus on their land. The redistribution of capital goods, mainly tools, 
animals and farm equipment, was not parallel with the land redistribution. Also, small-
scale family-based farming could not provide the extensive rural capital constructions 
needed, such as water-control (Marsh 1985). 
Several other economic and political considerations contributed to the government's 
decision to promote the collectivisation of agriculture (Guo 1993; Wen 1994; Wen 
2000). The socialist ideology against possible polarization due to privately owned land 
was one. In addition, with the Western countries' economic blockade of China following 
the Korean War in the early 1950s, the industrialization priority strategy required the 
agricultural sector to be a net contributor to the economy of cheap food, raw production 
materials, and perhaps capital4. It was obviously easier to fulfil this assigned role for 
agriculture by controlling a relatively small number of organizations rather than 
millions of individual rural households. Another concern was to prevent the kind of 
large-scale migration from rural to urban areas, which could create unemployment and 
urban crime. 5 
4 Wen (2000) has an interesting analysis of the collectivisation policy in rural China and the central 
government's plan of rapid industrialization at the early 1950s. 
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It took the government nine years (from 1953 to 1962) to establish and consolidate the 
organizations of the rural collective-the People's Commune system (see Table 2-1 ). 
During the early stage (up until 1957), the process of collectivisations in China went 
relatively smoothly (Hudson 1960; Parish and Whyte 1978). Most regions experienced 
several stages from household farming to collective farming before the establishment 
and consolidation of the People's Commune. The first stage was called the 'mutual-aid 
group'. Individual rural households formed small groups where they could help each 
other with agricultural production. Since the ownership of land and tools was still with 
households, labour or other forms of assistance required remuneration. The second 
stage was the 'lower-stage agricultural producers' cooperatives'. While the ownership of 
land and other production tools did not change, the cooperatives organized major 
agricultural activities. Income distribution was based on labour, land and other inputs 
contributed by households. The third stage was the 'higher-stage agricultural producers' 
cooperatives'. At this stage, land and other major production resources owned by rural 
households were handed over to the cooperatives. The income of members was solely 
determined by their labour contributions (Huang 1976; Parish and Whyte 1978; Marsh 
1985; Liu 1994). 
During the political campaign called the Great Leap Forward, which commenced in 
1957, the government adopted radical policies to eliminate private ownership and 
promote the formation of People's Communes in the countryside. The size of the 
People's Commune became very large, incorporating tens of thousands of people. Not 
only land and major production tools, but previously privately owned small plots, 
domestic animals and small production tools were all communised. Mass halls were 
established to provide free meals to every member of the Commune. Nurseries, schools 
and medical services were provided free of charge to commune members. These 
measures of leaping forward towards communalist villages were not sustainable, and in 
the Great Famine that followed, between 1959-1961 6, perhaps as many as 30 million 
people died7, as a result of a combination of policy mistakes and natural disasters 
(Ashton, Hill et al. 1984). 
5 The next chapter discusses in detail the reasons why the government adopted policies to curb migration, 
especially of rural-urban migrants. 
6 For some discussions about the causes and consequences of the Great Famine, see section 2.3 .2.1. 7 There are disputes about the scale of premature death during the Great Famine. Examples of the studies 
are Ashton and Hill (et al) (1984), Peng (1987), Dreze and Sen (1989). 
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After the famine, the basic structure of the People's Commune was consolidated in 
1962. These consolidated People's Communes organized farmers according to natural 
geographic locations. The size of the Commune was reduced. The ownership of land 
and major production tools was lowered to the production team, which was the basic 
unit of the Commune. The production team was based on the neighbourhood 
community within villages. Several production teams were formed into a production 
brigade, which was usually equivalent to a natural village. A number of production 
brigades were then formed into a People's Commune, which usually corresponded to the 
previous township. The number of people in the three levels of rural organization 
varied from region to region. In 1965, on average, there were 109 people in each 
production team; 8.3 teams in each production brigade and 8.7 brigades in each People's 
Commune. Overall, there were about 7 5 thousand Communes in rural China (SSB 
1981 ). Table 2-1 shows the procedure of the establishment and consolidation of the 
People's Commune system during this period. 
In the consolidated People's Commune system, the production team owned the land and 
most other production materials. It was also the basic accounting unit of the Commune. 
It organized agricultural production according to the government economic plan and 
was responsible for income distribution amongst commune/team members. The 
production brigade was responsible for coordination of production teams in terms of the 
production plan, etc. The brigade also owned small industries and other sideline 
production8 in villages, such as mills, orchards and pig farms. The Commune had some 
functions of government administration, such as ensuring the economic plan was carried 
out (Wen 2000), running upper middle schools and hospitals, and undertaking irrigation 
projects, etc. The Commune town was also the seat for special co-operatives for artisans 
such as barbers and other services. Employees of the Commune government received a 
salary and a monthly allotment of grain from the government. The top leaders of the 
commune were usually appointed by the higher level of the government. In this way, 
the government maintained its economic and political control over communes (Parish 
and Whyte 1978). 
8 In China, this referred to productions as opposed to the main agricultural production in the local area. 
Traditionally, the sideline production included rural productions other than the culture of field crops (Editorial Board of The Great Encyclopaedia of China 1990). 
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The consolidated People's Commune was based on the natural geographical distribution 
of farmers in rural China, where historical connections between neighbours were strong. 
As a result of this system, the government economic plan could be carried out while the 
financial cost to the government of establishing and running the system was low. In 
addition, the People's Commune system provided the institutional foundation for the 
rural social welfare system at the time, particularly through its income distribution 
process. 
2.2.2 The People's Commune and the Government-Division of the Harvest 
between the Commune and the Government 
During the era of the centrally planned economy, the welfare of the farmers in China 
was largely determined by government policies, especially those that determined the 
division of the harvest between the People's Commune and the state. Within the 
distribution of the agricultural harvest, the division of grain was the most important 
issue, since grain was regarded as the principle of agricultural production. As a result, 
grain production dominated agricultural production during most of the period (Zhang 
1994; Wen 2000). The following discussion of the division of harvest will focus on 
gain. Grain will be used in kind unless otherwise stated. 
The total grain harvest of the production team was divided into two categories. The first 
category included grain to meet the team's essential expenses. This included an 
agricultural tax to be paid to the state and 'three retained funds' for the team's 
production. The 'three retained funds' were the team's share of grain, for seed, fodder 
and team members' grain rations9. The second category was the rest of the yield and was 
considered 'surplus grain' (yuliang) by the government (Oi 1989). The government 
obtained the 'surplus grain' by a state monopoly of grain purchase and marketing system 
established in 1953 (Wen 2000). The agricultural tax will now be discussed followed by 
the state monopoly of grain purchase and marketing system. 
9 During the pre-reform period, China adopted ration system to distribute most of consumer goods, 
especially food. See more discussions about this in the next chapter. 
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2.2.2.1 The Agricultural Tax 
The People's Commune system was the organization that maintained the state monopoly 
over grain purchasing and marketing system. It was also responsible for collecting the 
agricultural tax. Instead of dealing with several hundred million individual farmers, the 
government needed only to control about 75 thousand Communes (as in 1965). As the 
lowest level of the government in rural areas, the Commune collected the agricultural 
tax and supervised implementation of the state monopoly of grain purchase and 
marketing. 
The agricultural tax was usually paid in kind as grain. The Commune determined the 
amount of tax on the basis of 'three criteria' (san ding), namely, the average yield per 
mu
10
, land quality, and the amount of arable land owned by the production team. The 
average yield was estimated according to the actual past output, usually the average 
yield during the previous three years. The quality of land was evaluated as good, 
average or poor, each attracting a different tax rate (Oi 1989: 19; Wen 2000). As the 
basic unit of accounting and agricultural production, the production team paid the tax 
and was responsible for the quality and timely delivery of tax grain to the official grain 
station located in the commune town. 
In practice, the agricultural tax was expressed as a fixed amount of grain per mu, rather 
than as a percentage of output (Oi 1989). In the official statistics, the agricultural tax 
was listed as the actual amount of flour and rice (Lou 2000). Table 2-2 shows that 
agricultural tax as a percentage of total grain yield declined during the pre-reform 
period. Oi (1989) also finds the same result in a case study of Minhou county, Fujian 
province. The tax as a percentage of total grain output was 14.4 percent in 1952. The 
rate dropped to 5.5 and 4.3 percent in 1965 and 1979, respectively. 
When actual grain yield was higher than estimated output, the amount of agricultural 
tax did not change. When actual yield was lower than the estimation, the production 
team usually still had to pay the fixed amount of tax. Teams with a very poor yield 
might get a tax remission and receive state relief. However, this could be difficult and 
10 The unit of land area in China, 1 mu= 0.67 hectare. 
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was usually only possible when major disasters occurred (Oi 1989). Government relief 
for natural disasters will be discussed further later in this chapter. 
2.2.2.2 The State Monopoly of Grain Purchasing and Marketing 
In addition to the agricultural tax, the state obtained grain from farmers through the 
state monopoly of grain purchasing and marketing system. This system was set up in 
1953 and guaranteed the state as the sole buyer and seller of grain in China 11 . 
Evidently, the People's Commune system facilitated this state monopoly. Under this 
system, there was a state granary responsible for buying and selling grain in each 
commune. The government took measures to ensure that production teams to sell their 
entire surplus to the state granary at prices fixed by the sate. 
Text Box 2.1 The Grain Rating System that was Associated with the State Monopoly 
of Grain Purchasing and Marketing 
Roughly speaking, the grain rating system for production teams of the Peoples' Commune 
can be summarized as follows: 
Denote the average grain available to each team member per month as 0, which was 
calculated according to the following formula, 
0 = Cie - T - S&F)/(N*12) 
Where Ye was the estimated output of the team per annum, calculated in the same way as for the agricultural tax. T was the agricultural tax. S&F represented the amount of grain 
necessary for seed and fodder. N was the population of the team. 
This average grain (0) was then compared with the minimum level of average grain per 
capita set by the government called the 'safety level' ( denoted as Os). Os was usually between fifteen and seventeen kilograms of unhusked grain per person per month. If O was 
above Qs, the team would be rated as grain-surplus; if O was only around thirteen kilograms, the team would be rated as grain-deficit; if O was in between thirteen and fifteen kilograms, the team would be rated as grain-sufficient (Oi 1989). Table 2-3 summarizes the 
above information. 
Once a production team was rated, the government decided the procurement quota based 
on the surplus grain for grain-surplus teams, the potential grain supply available for resale to grain-deficit teams (fan xiao Jiang), both as part of the so-called 'three-fix' scheme that also included the officially determined estimated output (Oe)(Carter and Zhong 1988:39). Grain-
sufficient teams did not have to sell any grain to the state, but they were not eligible for the 
state grain resale, either. The three figures, Oe, the procurement quota and the grain for 
resale were initially fixed for three years, but were later changed to five years . However, 
unless a serious disaster occurred that resulted in a much lower actual output, the state procurement quota had to be met one way or the other (Oi 1989). 
11 The state monopoly of purchasing and marketing included other major agriculture products as well, 
such as cotton, rapeseeds, etc. 
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Firstly, the government decided which production teams should sell grain to the state by 
categorizing them into three groups: 'grain-surplus', 'grain-deficit' and 'grain-sufficient' 
(Oi 1989). The rating was based on the average grain available to each team member 
per month (see Text Box 2.1). Teams rated as grain-surplus had to sell to the 
government according to the procurement quota, at prices fixed by the state. Teams 
rated as grain-deficit had to rely on the resale of grain from the government through this 
system, at prices grain was sold to urban residents 12 (Walker 1984). These teams 
usually used income from other sideline productions, such as pig farm, to pay for the 
resale grain. 
Secondly, the government established quotas to obtain as much grain as it could from 
the production teams. Since the procurement quota was fixed for a few years, it might 
not reflect all the 'surplus grain' when actual output increased during the period. In 
order to obtain the maximum surplus grain possible, in addition to the initial 
compulsory procurement quota, called 'fixed quota purchases (dinggou)', the 
government introduced the other category of procurement quota, called the 'above 
quota purchases (chaogou)' in the 1950s. Later on, the 'negotiated purchase' was also 
introduced and price incentive was used to encourage grain sale to the state (Maxwell 
and Nolan 1980; Cheng and Tsang 1994). In practice, production teams were under 
constant political pressure to sell more than the fixed quota, and the 'above quota 
purchases' was often pre-determined by the local government. In principle, the 'above 
quota purchase' was not 'compulsory', but 'obligatory', in the sense that there was no 
penalty for not meeting the requirement. The government paid the same price for grain 
in this category as that in the fixed quota purchase until the early 1970s (Maxwell and 
Nolan 1980; Cater and Zhong 1988). A premium was added to the price paid to this 
type of procurement since the early 1970s (Carter and Zhong 1988). The 'negotiated 
purchase' referred to voluntary sales to the government that was in addition to the 
'above quota purchase'. The price was negotiated between the two parties (Maxwell 
and Nolan 1980). 
Overall, during the late 1970s, there were four categories for state grain procurement: 
(1) the agricultural tax, obtained in kind; (2) the 'fixed quota purchases' ( or the 
12 The sales price of grain to urban residents was higher than that of the procurement prices from the 
farmers. 
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procurement quota), obtained at the fixed state price; (3) the 'above-quota purchase', 
obtained at a premium price 20-30 percent higher than the fixed state price; and ( 4) the 
'negotiated purchases', obtained at a premium price 30-50 percent higher than the fixed 
state price, plus the opportunity to buy rationed goods. Table 2-4 lists these types of 
procurement. Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2-5 show the amount of state grain 
procurement13, and as a percentage of total output up to 1962. These figures provide 
some indications as to the scale of the state share of grain during that period. 
Figure 2-2 summarizes the division of the harvest between the state and the production 
team. The harvest was divided into the state share and the collective share. The sate 
share included the agricultural tax, the fixed quota purchase, the above-quota purchase 
and the negotiated purchase, while the collective share was composed of grain for team 
members' quota, the draught animals and the seed for the coming year. 
While the production team received payments for its grain sales, the amount of revenues 
depended upon the state determined prices, under the state monopoly of grain 
purchasing and marketing. If the prices were relatively low compared with other goods 
and the team had to sell the grain to the state, the real income of the team and its 
members would be lower than otherwise. Studies show that the government set low 
grain prices relative to industrial products. Through these low relative prices and a 
purchasing monopoly, the Chinese government obtained large amount of surplus from 
the agricultural sector for its industrialization (Oi 1989; Wen 2000; Guo 1993), leaving 
the production teams little to distribute amongst members. 
2.2.3 The People's Commune and the Farmer&-Division of Harvest within the 
Commune 
Following the division of the harvest between the production team and the government, 
the income distribution within the Commune was carried out at the production team 
level. Examining this distribution process--between the team and its members as well 
as among team members-reflects the critical role of the Commune in the rural social 
welfare system. 
13 The procurement figures are net of grain resale to farmers. 
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2.2.3.1 Income Distribution between the Production Team and its Members 
As illustrated in Figure 2-2, among the share of the grain harvest that belonged to the 
collective (mainly at the team level), it was divided into the fodder, the seed and the 
team members' ration 14 • 
As for the cash revenue15 of the team, the amount of withholdings by the team was 
often decided at team members' meeting. The leftover cash was then available to 
distribute among members. 
The cash withholdings were made for the purposes of production and public welfare. 
The former included reserves for capital accumulation, such as future purchases of 
draught animals and farm machinery, etc. The latter included withholdings called the 
'public welfare funds', which was mainly used to pay for education, medical care and 
public ceremonial events. A large amount of the public welfare funds were passed up to 
the brigade through capital accumulation, and payment for brigade-run welfare services 
such as medical centres and schools (Parish and Whyte 1978). 
This public welfare funds were withheld before the team members were paid. The 
labour share of the production team's output was treated as a residual, since members ' 
cash income was the last to be paid from the team's income. Since the income 
distribution among team members was designed to firstly fulfil the team's role of social 
welfare provisions. 
2.2.3.2. Income Distribution among Team Members 
Team members' labour contribution was measured by the 'work points system', which 
was widely adopted in People's Communes during the pre-reform period. Work points 
14 After the Great Famine (1959-1961), productions teams were allowed to keep additional grain as a 
'grain reserve' to provide security against famine or war. 15 It came from several sources, including: (1) sale of grain to the state; (2) surplus from team industries; (3) profit from other team production 0N en 2000). 
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could be assigned either by time (time rates) or by task (task rates) (see Text Box 2.2). 
Many teams used both time rates and task rates to measure members' labour 
contribution (Parish and Whyte 1978). Work points earned by household members 
were recorded at the household account at the production team. 
The work point system was supposed to be used for income distribution among 
households according to their labour contributions. The total monetary value of income 
for distribution was calculated by the sum of (1) the retained grain for distribution, 
valued at the state monopoly price; and (2) the cash income from other production and 
the sale of grain to the state. The sum total of (1) and (2) was then divided by the sum 
total of work points of the team, which gave the value of each work point. Income of 
the household was the total value of work points earned by family members. 
Text Box 2.2 The Time Rates and Task Rates of the 'Work Point System' in People's Communes 
Under a time-rate system, a member's points were calculated by multiplying the number of days worked during the period with their work-point rating. The work-point rating was based 
on an individual member's working capability, which was usually decided by age and sex. For 
example, able-bodied males between twenty and forty-five years of age might receive nine or 
ten points per workday. Able-bodied females without children might get seven or eight points per workday, and so forth. In principle, whether a team member received the full points of their 
rating depended upon how hard he/she worked. However, in practice, it was difficult to 
monitor a member's work and therefore most members obtained the full points for showing up 
to work (Wen 2000). 
Under task-rates, team members earned their work points by completing assigned tasks. The team decided how many work points each job was worth, and how fast the job was done was 
up to the individual receiving the assignment. 
In practice, income distribution among team households did not fully follow the work 
point system. Instead, grain 16 was distributed mainly according to the number of people 
in the household, while cash was distributed according to work points earned (Wen 
2000). Wen (2000) finds that 'maintaining subsistence' was the priority of income 
distribution in production teams, especially when per capita output was low. 
Households without enough work points to pay for their basic grain could usually 
receive most of their rations. In principle, by doing so they became in debt to the team, 
and were somehow supposed to repay the debt. However, studies have found that even 
16 In many production teams, usually 70 or 80% of grain were distributed in this way, while the rest were distributed according to household work points (Parish and Whyte 1978; Oi 1989). 
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though some households could not repay the debt, they still received the basic grain in 
later distributions (Parish and Whyte 1978; Oi 1989). 
Households that earned more than enough work points to pay for grain distribution were 
eligible for the cash distribution. The amount of cash they received equalled to th_e 
balance of the total value of their work points minus the value of grain they received. 
The above discussion shows that income distribution among team members embodied 
the following two features: 
• Income distribution was not based on team members' labour contribution. A 
large proportion of income was distributed evenly for everybody of the team in the 
form of grain ration, regardless of effort (Kung 1994). As a result, income disparity 
among team member declined during the People's Commune era (Wen 1994). 
Moreover, since farmers could not choose the land to work on, nor team members to 
· work with17, how much members could get for their labour not only depended on 
their individual effort, but also on many other factors, including the quality of team 
land, other team members' effort, and the (relative) price of agricultural products set 
by the government. Lack of incentive working on team land resulted an interesting 
observation: that output of the private slot was much higher than that of the team 
land, with the former more than double the latter in some cases (Wen 2000). 
Overall, agricultural production stagnated for most of the years during the People's 
Commune period, especially following the failure of the Great Leap Forward. As 
shown in Figure 2-3, per capita grain production during the 1960s and 1970s barely 
changed. In fact, it struggled to recover the level of the year before the Great Leap 
Forward (300 kg/capita in 1956) by the mid 1970s. 
• The income distribution process at the production team level was a part of the 
provisions of the rural safety net. The team contributed to finance the public welfare 
facilities, usually built and maintained at the brigade or Commune levels. Among 
team members, the limited food grain was shared so that everybody had grain for 
17 Note that migration between rural and urban areas, as well as among rural villages, was strictly 
restricted in China during the pre-reform period, with the household registration system. More details of 
this system are discussed in Chapter 3. 
27 
subsistence, regardless their labour contributions. The role of the production team's 
income contribution is discussed in more details in the following section. 
2.3 Rural Social Security System during the Pre-reform Period 
The social welfare system in rural China during the pre-reform period could be 
characterized as a system with three tiers: the family, the collective (the production 
team in particular) and, finally, the government. The family was supposed to provide 
the first safety net for its members: childcare, old age support (Parish and Whyte 1978), 
and looking after family members who needed support for the unforeseen emergencies. 
This role of the family came partly from social and cultural traditions, and partly from 
the government law and policies. The role of the production team included helping 
poor families and providing some community-based welfare services such as medical 
care and education 18. If the family as a whole were poor, for example, if it did not earn 
enough work points to pay for the basic grain ration, the production team would give 
them the basic grain allocation. This was referred to as a loan, although, in reality, it 
was understood by all concerned that it was unlikely to ever be repaid. The role of the 
government in the system was twofold: firstly, the government guaranteed access to 
land for all working-age, able-bodied rural residents who were members of the 
production team. Secondly, the government was the last resort when support from both 
family and the production team (and brigade) failed. For example, when natural disaster 
damaged the harvest of the team, the brigade or even the entire People's Commune, the 
government would provide disaster relief. 
2.3.1 Family as the First Resort 
Traditionally in China, the extended family has been the first resort for help for 
individuals (Ahmad and Hussain 1991). The support of family included: (1) Childcare 
of young children; (2) old age support for parents and grandparents who had lost 
working capacity; (3) support for family members with no working capacity and ( 4) 
temporary support for family members suffering from sickness or injury. 
18 Education will not be discussed here due to space limitations. 
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The communist Chinese government encouraged this tradition through powerful 
propaganda, and formalized this custom by enshrining it into national law. For 
example, as early as in 1950, Article 13 of the Marriage Law said 'children have the 
duty to support and assist their parents.' Article 15 stated that 'everyone has the 
obligation to provide and help his parents. If he fails to do so, his parents who are 
unable to work and have difficulty in making a living have the right to demand that he 
provides their living expenses.' 
Therefore, supporting elderly parents (and other family members in need) was not only 
a traditional and moral thing to do, but also a legal obligation on other family members. 
The legal obligation on children to support their elderly parents was especially 
important in rural areas. While the majority of China's urban residents had relatively 
adequate retirement pensions19, there were no formal retirement and pension programs 
for old people in rural villages. Instead, children, especially sons, were expected to 
provide for their elderly parents20 (Parish and Whyte 1978). 
The family also provided support for other members in need. There were no childcare 
facilities in villages. Before school age, young children were usually taken care of by 
their grandparents who were too old to work the land. Family members who were sick, 
or injured or who suffered from permanent disabilities were also mainly left to be taken 
care of by the family21 . 
The role of the family in providing security for its members was apparently reinforced 
by the income distribution procedure in production teams. As discussed in section 
2.2.3 .2, labour income was allocated to the hand of the household to distribute among 
household members, rather than to individual farmers. Only a family, rather an 
individual, could be classified as poor and entitled to borrow grain from the team22 . 
The traditional and law-reinforced social security function of rural families provided 
immediate support for people in need. In cases where the difficulties were beyond the 
19 See discussions in the next chapter. 
20 Daughters were regarded as brought up for other families, since they would eventually 'marry out' to live with and take care of their parents-in-law. 
21 There was some basic health care in villages, which provided some medical services. 22 An individual could get welfare support from the production team only if he/she had no family and was 
too old or too sick to work. 
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capacity of the whole family, the production team was expected to provide some 
support. 
2.3.2 Social Security Assistance Provided by Production Teams and Brigade 
By its nature, the People's Commune system was an organization that integrated 
government administration and economic management. As a result, the collective, 
especially production teams and brigades, was the major provider of social welfare 
services to the community and poor households in rural China during the pre-reform 
period. 
As the basic unit of production and distribution, production teams were expected to take 
care of the poor families under their administration23 . The production team's role in 
providing a subsistence living for its members is examined in section 2.3 .2.1. The 
brigade tended to take care of social welfare issues based on larger population scales, 
for instance, the financing and administration of the "five-guarantee' program (Section 
2.3 .2.2), and the so-called 'rural cooperative medical care program' (Section 2.3 .2.3). 
Since the brigade did not engage in many production activities, funding of these social 
welfare programs mainly came from the public welfare funds retained by the production 
teams under its administration. 
2.3.2.1 The Provision of Subsistence by the Production Team 
The most important welfare assistance from the production team was some kind of 
security of subsistence for its members. As discussed in Section 2.2.3 , 70-80 per cent of 
grain for distribution among team members was distributed evenly as the food ration, 
the 'basic grain'. Whatever their labour contribution, households almost always received 
their basic grain ration. In other words, the provision of this safety net was incorporated 
into the income distribution process in the production team. As such, Ahmad and 
Hussain (1991 :266) note that the People's Commune system 
23 As mentioned before, a typical production team was based on neighbourhood in villages. The quality of land it owned and the capacity of labours it had to employ were exogenously given. 
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provided each rural family with an iron rice bowl--the bowl symbolizes provision 
and iron the fact that the level of provision remains unaffected by everyday 
knocks and bumps, or, in other words, variations in labour performed by a 
household. 
There is a debate about the effectiveness of the production teams' prov1s1on for 
subsistence. Some studies have questioned the adequacy of the grain ration. Oi (0-i 
1989) and Walker (Walker 1984) argue that the Chinese government's definition of 
sufficiency needs to be closely examined. They compare the subsistence level of grain 
adopted by many international relief organizations (such as the International Labour 
Office) with that used in China, and conclude that the Chinese definitions of subsistence 
were much lower than those in the international standard. Indeed, there is evidence that 
the low level of grain ration forced farmers to manage their grain very carefully to avoid 
starving24 (Wen 2000). 
The low grain ration was clearly associated with low grain productions25 . Comparing 
Figures 2-3 and 2-4, per capita grain consumption in rural areas appears to track (per 
capita) grain production very closely. Following the trend of grain production, per 
capita grain consumption rose from 1952 to 1957, and then fell to its lowest level during 
the first few years of the 1960s. After the recovery of agricultural production in 1962, 
per capita consumption of grain again rose. However, in 1978, annual grain 
consumption per capita in villages was only about 193 kg, less than the level in 1957. 
Given the low grain production, the production team had to distribute the limited grain 
fairly equally among its households, in order to provide a subsistence for all members. 
This resulted in declined income disparity among . rural households during the pre-
reform period(Wen 2000). In 1978, the Gini Coefficient for rural households was 0.21, 
and the ratio of maximum/minimum income households was only 2.8 (Zhang 1994). 
During the period of 1963 and 1978, the safety net provided by the production team was 
effective in preventing any large-scale famine in villages between 1963 and 1978. 
24 Farmers usually could only afford to have solid grain meals while working, and liquid grain porridge 
while not working. 
25 Due to the self-reliance policy during the pre-reform period, domestic grain consumption was determined by the domestic production. 
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The Great Famine demonstrates that the provision for subsistence by the People's 
Commune system at the time was not effective. This famine, during 1959-1961, caused 
up to 30 million deaths, with most of them in the countryside (Ashton, Hill et al. 1984; 
Dreze and Sen 1989). In 1957, the rural population was 547 million (SSB 1981). 
Famine on such a scale cannot be explained simply by the failure of the Communes to 
provide subsistence grain to their members. It was in fact an economic as well as a 
political disaster, caused by policy mistakes, lack of democracy and natural disaster, as 
pointed by various studies (Walker 1984; Peng 1987; Dreze and Sen 1989). 
The famine occurred after the first year of the Great Leap Forward, which began in the 
spring of 1958 and ended with the Great Famine from 1959 to 1961. The Great Leap 
Forward was an economic and political campaign in which the government adopted a 
series of drastic policies to accelerate industrialization and communisation26 in China. 
In the rural area, these policies included mobilizing rural labour to take part in industrial 
production such as steel making, forcing farmers to plant in high density27• In particular, 
the government promoted communisation in villages by forming very large People's 
Communes (Xie 1990; Sheng 1991; Ma and Sun 1993). As shown in Table 2-1, a 
Commune usually included tens of thousands of people. It became the lowest level of 
government in the rural area, responsible for carrying out state government economic 
plans. Private plots, domestic animals, and small tools owned by rural households were 
all communised. Farmers in the Communes were mobilized to fulfil the government 
political and economic goals. At the peak of this aggressive campaign in 1958, the 
Communes established mass halls to provide free meals for everybody of the 
Commune. Medical care and school were also free of charge. This aggressive campaign 
of communisation was not welcomed by farmers and they responded by being slack in 
work (Wen 2000). 
Following the economic policies during the Great Leap Forward, harvests were reduced 
dramatically between 1959 and 1961. As listed in Table 2-5, comparing with the 
average agricultural output of 295.3 kg between 1955 and 1958, production per capita 
dropped 17 percent in 1959, 28.7 percent in 1960 and 26.4 percent in 1961. These bad 
harvests were apparently the outcomes of policy mistakes during the Great Leap 
26 See section 2.2.1 in this chapter for more details of communisation during the Great Leap Forward. 27 It was believed at then time that the high-density planting could increase the agricultural output. 
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Forward, when communisation heavily discouraged farmers' efforts in production (Wen 
2000; Xie, 1990), although the official claimed they were the result of 'natural disasters 
of the three years' (Peng 1987). 
Increased government grain procurement at the time of bad harvest led to the Great 
Famine. As shown in Table 2-5, net government procurement, that is, the gross 
procurement minus grain resold to villages, increased significantly between 1959 and 
1960. In absolute amount, it rose from 27.2 million tons in 1958 to 47.6 and 40.2 
million tons respectively in 1959 and 1960. The ratio of net procurement to total 
production increased from 13.6 percent in 1958 to 28 percent in both 1959 and 1960. 
Accordingly, urban per capita consumption rose in 1959 and 1960, compared with 
1958. Net grain exported to the world market also increased significantly in 1959 
compared with that in 1958. From Table 2-5, it seems that farmers suffered most from 
the reduction of production. Their per capita grain consumption decreased by 9 per cent 
and 23 percent, respectively, in 1959 and 1960, from consumption in 1958. It was not 
until 1961, that the government realized the significance of the famine, and responded 
by reducing the procurement quota and urban grain quota, and also by importing grain. 
This sharp contrast of falling output and grain consumption in rural area against rising 
government procurement and exports raised questions about the economic management 
system in China. While the market was eliminated during the Great Leap Forward, the 
central planning system either failed to obtain adequate information on agricultural 
production, or failed to interpret the information correctly. Dreze and Sen contribute 
such a failure to the 'absence of adversarial politics and open journalism' (Dreze and 
Sen 1989: 214). Studies by Chinese authors (Xie 1990; Ma 1993) show that the more 
immediate explanation of the failure of the planning system was that, as the result of a 
series of political campaigns, no government official was prepared to report any 
negative news to supervisors. As a result, the central planners made decisions, such as 
increasing the agricultural tax (in kind), and procurement quota, etc, based on false and 
exaggerated estimations of agricultural output. 
Given the political reasons behind the Great Famine, it is not surpns1ng that the 
provision of subsistence by the collectives (the People' Commune at the time) failed. 
The Great Leap Forward led to the decline in agricultural output. At the time, the 
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political environment encouraged government officials to hide the truth and report 
exaggerated output. There was no channel in the centrally planned economic system 
where individual farmers' voices could be heard so that their desperate need could be 
met. 
From the social security point of view, the Great Famine revealed important defects in 
the safety net in rural China at the time. The first problem was that the capacity of the 
collective to provide for subsistence was determined by the central planner' s decision, 
rather than by its members' efforts in production. The decline in output after the Great 
Leap Forward was only one instance of this problem. The second problem was that the 
system did not deal directly with individuals in need, but through its ' agent', the 
collective. Whenever an incentive was created for the agent not to represent the best 
interests of commune members, the security system failed. 
Both the Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine had important impacts on the 
subsequent development of economic and social policies in China. Part of the impacts 
was the institutional adjustment in rural China. From 1962 ( see Table 2-1 ), large-scale 
People's Communes were divided into smaller ones; The People's Commune became a 
three-tiered system, with the Commune at the top, the production brigade in the middle 
and the production team at the bottom; the basic agricultural production and accounting 
unit was lowered to the production team; Some small private plots were returned to 
farmers and local markets were reopened. 
In addition, the state procurement prices of agricultural products rose by 27 percent in 
1962, the government procurement dropped (see Table 2-5); agricultural tax rate was 
reduced, investment and loans to rural areas were increased (Wen 2000) . Following 
these policy adjustments, agricultural output gradually recovered to the level in 1957, 
before the Great Leap Forward, by 1978 (see Figure 2-3). 
The encouragement for rural officials to exaggerate output estimations was corrected. 
Actual increases of agricultural output became the major criterion to check on rural 
officials. During the period after the Great Famine and before the economic reform in 
1978, there was no other famine reported in rural China. 
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The safety net provided by the production team following the Great Famine had its own 
problems. After the state government took a large share of the harvest through the 
agricultural tax and its monopoly of grain purchasing and marketing (see Section 2.2.2), 
the production team had to distribute the major income, food grain, fairly evenly among 
its members, in order to provide subsistence for all members. As a result, team 
members' well-being had littlie to do with their effort, leaving farmers with little 
incentive to work hard to increase output. This is clearly illustrated in Figures 2-3 and 
2-4, which show that per capita grain output and consumption in rural China did not 
improve much after the recovery from the Great Famine. 
2.3.2.2 The Brigade and the Five-guarantee Program 
The neighbourhood-based production team was meant to look after all its members by 
providing the security for subsistence food grain. This arrangement was informal. There 
were other social security programs that were formal, involving more government 
guidelines and perhaps supervision. However, financial assistance from the government 
was very limited. 
The five-guarantee program was part of this formal social relief system. Introduced in 
195628, this program targeted the elderly, invalid and orphan rural individuals who had 
no family to support them. The name 'five-guarantee' tells its major content: providing 
the five basic needs: the basic food, clothing, fuei29, education and funeral expenses to 
the target group (Editorial Board of The Great Encyclopaedia of China 1988). 
This program was administered and supervised by the MCA30. The daily administration 
and finance of the program was mainly undertaken by the brigade, which was 
considered the appropriate size to pool the resources necessary for the program. As 
mentioned previously, part of the cash revenue of the production team was retained for 
the public welfare fund, which was usually contributed to the brigade for public welfare 
28 The principle of the program was established in the 'Demonstration Constitution of the Higher-stage Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives' (Editorial Board of The Great Encyclopaedia of China 1988). 29 This refers to firewood for cooking and heating. 30 This program was initially supervised by the predecessor of MCA, the MOI, which was disbanded in 1970 during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), when its functions were transferred to several other government organizations. See footnote 1. 
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programs such as the five-guarantee program. The government role in this program was 
mainly in making guidelines. However, in cases where the collective had trouble 
supporting the program, the MCA might help out by providing some financial 
assistance. 
There were two ways of providing five-guarantee assistance either by supporting 
recipients together or separately. The first approach was designed for those recipients 
who could not look after themselves. These people were gathered in a 'home of respect 
for the aged' (jinglaoyuan ), usually set up by the brigade. At the end of 1978, there were 
7,843 homes of respect in rural China, with 12,545 staff members. Altogether, they took 
care of 104,361 old people and 1,332 orphans. Given the total rural population of 790 
million, there were about 1.3 people per 10,000 rural residents receiving this assistance 
(SSB 1981: 131; SSB 1985b: 285). 
Most recipients of the five-guarantee program lived separately. This was less costly for 
the brigade, and, recipients could usually also get help from neighbours. Overall, in 
1978, rural collectives (mainly the teams and brigades) paid 116.5 million yuan3 1 to 
help five-guarantee recipients (MCA 2000). The total number of recipients in that year 
is not available. However, if the number of 2.9 million in 1980 is used (SSB 1985b: 
282), then each recipient received assistance valued at approximately 40 yuan in 1978. 
This value included assistance both in kind and cash. Compared with the 1978 average 
per capita expenditure of rural households of 116 yuan (SSB 1985b: 198), it is clear that 
the support for the-five-guarantee recipient was very limited. 
As in the case of the subsistence guarantee by the production team, the situation of 
recipients in the five-guarantee program varied across brigades, depending on the 
situation of each individual brigade. Recipients were provided with a set amount of 
grain, oil, and other goods distributed by their teams. The amount was usually the same 
as for other nonworking old people in the team, but five-guarantee recipients did not 
need to pay. In addition to the assistance in kind, recipients received 2-3 yuan per 
month in cash, although this depended on the wealth of the team (Parish and Whyte 
1978). However, Parish and Whyte note that whether or not an old person receiving five 
guarantee support could live securely was largely determined by whether or not he or 
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she was also engaged in some sort of private endeavour, such as raising chickens or 
tending a private plot (Parish and Whyte 1978). 
The five-guarantee program, though a ( central) government initiative, was mainly the 
liability of the production team and brigade. Effectively, it was financed by taxing team 
members. Therefore, its nature was more that of community security than of social · 
security. 
2.3.2.3. The Brigade and Public Health Care 
It is widely recognized that the Chinese government put enormous efforts into providing 
basic health care for the people during the pre-reform period. Life expectancy 
dramatically increased from 32 years in 1950 to 69 years in 1982, only six years less 
than that in many industrialized economies (World Bank 1984). The longer life 
expectancy followed the combination of several improvements: (a) a reduction in the 
burden of illness, (b) a reduction in malnutrition, ( c) improved water supplies, and ( d) 
better hygiene and sanitation conditions, etc. The health status of farmers also improved 
significantly during the 1949-78 period. However, huge differentials of health status 
remained between the cities and the countryside, as well as within rural areas. Again, 
using the example of life expectancy, it is estimated that average life expectancy in 
urban areas \;vas 12 years longer than for typical rural areas, while life expectancy in 
low-income rural areas was 5 years shorter again (World Bank 1984). 
(1) Establishment of the Rural Health Care System--Series of Campaigns 
The Chinese government initiated a series of large-scale campaigns that contributed to 
the establishment of a rural health care system. The purpose of these campaigns 
changed over time.. For instance, the earliest of these campaigns was back to the early 
50s. It was called the 'Great Patriotic Health Campaign' conducted in both rural and 
urban regions. The aim was to eliminate disease-carrying pests: rats, flies, mosquitoes, 
and grain-eating sparrows, these were later replaced by bedbugs, or cockroaches 
(Ahmad and Hussain 1991). Through successive campaigns, opium addiction was 
eliminated, and immunization for preventive diseases such as cholera, typhoid, and 
31 The official exchange rate in 1978 was US $1= yuan 1.68 (IMF 1983). 
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scarlet fever became widely available to children. During these campaigns, public 
hygiene and sanitary conditions were dramatically improved (Ahmad and Hussain 
1991). 
The establishment of a medical care system in villages was also initiated by government 
campaigns. From the early 1960s, especially after Mao Zedong's criticism of the 
Ministry of Health as the 'Ministry of Urban Lords', more primary medical care was 
channelled to villages. This involved the following major measures: ( 1) reassigning 
medical personnel from the cities and country towns to villages; (2) establishing village 
health stations; (3) training a large number of paramedics into the so-called 'barefoot 
doctors' (BFD)32 ; ( 4) promoting a cooperative health insurance scheme in villages; (5) 
sending urban doctors to work and teach in county and regional hospitals and also to 
travel periodically in special medical teams from one rural area to another. 
Some of the achievements of these campaigns are summarized in Table 2-6. During the 
1949-1980 period, the availability of health technicians and hospital beds per capita in 
rural China increased by around 10 times. 
While the cost of these campaigns to the government budget is not clear, the explicit 
financial costs could have been very moderate. Firstly, many of the campaigns were 
carried out by a massive mobilization of the population via a mixture of propaganda and 
coercion through the People's Commune. As the campaigns were labour-intensive and 
labour was not remunerated in most case (Ahmad and Hussain 1991 ), it could be 
expected that the financial cost to the government was not high (World Bank 1984). 
Secondly, in the 1960s the central government adopted a policy that medical costs 
should neither be passed down to rural families nor paid by the state, but, instead, kept 
at the intermediate, brigade level (Parish and Whyte 1978). As a result, government 
budget spending on rural health care was relatively small. For instance, a 1984 World 
32 The name does not mean that these village doctors did not wear shoes, but that they were actually 
village residents who had been sent to have a short period (usually around 6 months) of medical training. They worked in the village and some even continued part-time labour in the production team, some times barefoot. 
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Bank study shows that state subsidies for health care of urban residents in 1981 33 was 
about 26 yuan per capita compared to less than 3 yuan per capita for rural residents. 
Indeed, the rural health system was left to be run by the rural collective, especially the 
brigade. The cost of the operation was born mainly by the brigade from the public 
welfare contribution of its production teams. So effectively, team members were paying 
'tax' to finance the health system. In addition, individual farmers had to pay extra for 
medical services through the so-called rural cooperative medical insurance scheme. 
(2) The Multi-tiered Medical Care System in Villages 
Figure 2-5 illustrates the institutional structure of medical service delivered in rural 
China as in 197834. This was a clinic-based medical service system. At the production 
team level, there were usually part-time midwives and health aides. At the brigade 
(village) level, there was often a medical centre with several BFDs. At the commune 
level, there was typically a commune hospital with about ten beds (World Bank 1984 ). 
Doctors had at least medical trainings at polytechnic medical schools. Hospitals might 
have equipment such as an X-ray machine and were able to conduct some operations 
(Printz and Steinle 1977). At the highest level of the system was the county general 
hospital, where doctors had college degrees. 
The system worked as a referral network. In the first instance patients went to see the 
team health worker. If the case could not be handled at that level, the patient would be 
referred to the brigade level, and could be further referred to each of the higher levels, 
depending on the case. For problems that could not be dealt with at the county hospital, 
patients could be further referred to a regional hospital where there were specialists. 
33 Here the figure for 1981 is used as an approximated indicator for the situation just before 1978. 34There was a parallel system that provided for major preventive programs in rural areas. This system was 
financed by the state budget and was under the administration of the Department of Health. It was 
responsible for vaccination programs, general control of communicable diseases, monitoring 
environmental sanitation, assisting in implementing patriotic health campaigns and health education. See 
the World Bank (1984). 
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This rural health system was mainly financed by rural collectives, except for hospitals 
in counties, which were financed from the government budget. Hospitals and clinics at 
People's Commune and medical centre in production brigades were collective assets. 
The Commune and brigade used the public welfare fund contributed by production 
teams to finance the capital investment such as houses and equipment. 
The BFD was a unique phenomenon within China's rural medical care system. In 1970, 
on average, there were 1.8 BFDs per 1000 rural population. By 1975, the number had 
increased to 2.1 (Table 2-7). The brigade chose from local village residents who had 
lower-middle or higher-middle school education. They were sent for three to six months 
training of elementary medicine at a commune clinic or county hospital, before 
returning to provide rudimentary medical care at the grassroots level in the village 
medical centre35 . The cost of training was born by the brigade and wage payment for the 
BFDs also came from the public welfare fund. 
As the foregoing discussion shows, operation of the health system in the People's 
Commune was financed by farmers through the production team and the brigade. 
(3) The Rural Cooperative Medical Insurance Scheme 
The rural cooperative medical insurance scheme originated in the 1950s and was 
promoted by the government in the 1960s in all rural areas. It was a primitive medical 
insurance organized by the brigade. Its typical form was that of contributing a small 
amount of money in order for participants to receive some free medical treatment, such 
as injections, home visit of a doctor, and, perhaps, medicines (Sun 1994). 
The following is an example of such an insurance scheme in Guangdong province 
(Parish and Whyte 1978). The brigade created a cooperative insurance fund from both 
members' contributions and part of the brigade public welfare fund. Farmers joined the 
scheme by prepaying an annual fee, which was the same for both adults and children. 
The fees ranged from zero to six yuan per person, with an average of about three yuan 
in a sample of 27 villages. For a family of five, this accounted for around 10 per cent of 
35 BFDs were retrained periodically. There were also constant flows of new materials and a bimonthly 
magazine to introduce new techniques and experiences from model areas. See Parish and Whyte (1978). 
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their annual cash income. With the contribution, participants could 
reimbursement of some medical expenditure from the fund. 
. 
receive 
The insurance coverage for medical expenses varied across villages. Usually it included 
outpatients, hospital costs and some medicines. It covered more expenses for treatment 
at the brigade medical centre than for treatment at the commune hospital. 
The scheme also used other approaches to restrict medical expenses: some schemes 
only partially covered medication costs and many had limitations on payments for 
major surgical expenses. In some cases, the scheme set a limit on the amount of 
medical expenses. In some villages, a registration fee of 5 or 10 cents36 was charged 
when a patient visited a BFD. 
Most rural cooperative medical insurance schemes were run at the brigade level with an 
average population of less than 1,200 people37. Given its small scale, the capacity of 
risk sharing was extremely limited. As a result of these and other problems such as 
mismanagement, abuse of the cooperative insurance fund, etc, many schemes went 
bankrupt (Zhu 2000; Chen 2001). 
During the pre-reform period, China's rural health care system provided affordable, 
although very basic medical services to rural residents (World Bank 1984). BFDs in 
villages used cheap traditional medical treatment, such as acupuncture and herbs, to 
reduce the costs of medical care (Zhu 2000). The collectives ( especially the brigade and 
the team) maintained the operation of the system by financing most of the fixed costs of 
the medical service as well as the salaries of BFDs. The rural cooperative medical 
insurance scheme provided another risk-sharing mechanism among farmers. 
However, problems with this system were: (1) the system did not provide affordable 
medical care for rural residents with serious diseases (Sun 1994). (2) The large 
proportion of rural residents with no medical insurance had to pay full fees for medical 
services. In 1981, it is estimated that about 29 per cent of China's total population had 
36 100 cents= 1 yuan. 
37 This is for 1978 (SSB 1981: 131). 
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no medical insurance. Almost all of them were farmers (World Bank 1984). This 
indicates that more than 36 percent of rural residents lived without any medical 
insurance. (3) Since the system was collective-based, large variations could be expected 
across brigades in terms of quality and affordability of medical services. Usually, 
farmers in poor villages had less access to medical care compared with those in 
relatively wealthy villages. 
2.3.3 Social Security Programs Provided by the State Government 
As previously discussed, the family was the first resort for help for individual farmers in 
the rural social security system. The collective, especially the production team and 
brigade, provided some kind of subsistence guarantee for poor families and those 
individuals in need who had no families. In addition, they also looked after other 
welfare issues such as the basic medical care. The fact that collectives were responsible 
for so many important social welfare liabilities in rural China indicates that the People's 
Commune was an organization that integrated government administration and economic 
management. Only in cases in which the collective could not cope, such as a serious 
flood, the state government provided some social security services. Theses services, 
mainly social relief and disaster relief, were administered by the MCA38. 
Social relief was aimed at supporting households with temporary or long-term 
difficulties in subsistence. The official policy of social relief during the pre-reform 
period was: 'Rely on the masses, rely on the collective, produce to help oneself, help 
each other, with the necessary relief and support from the state' (Wu and Wang 1989). 
This policy was the guideline for social relief programs and it emphasized that the 
government would only help the poor when both the family and the collective failed to 
provide assistance. 
One social relief program was the five-guarantee program, which provided necessary 
food, shelter, clothing, basic medical care and funerals to poor rural residents who had 
no family support or working capacity (see Section 2.3.2). Recall that it was the 
collective (brigade and team) that undertook most of the daily administration and 
financing of the program. The MCA's role was in supervising the implementation of the 
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program. When the brigade could not afford the five-guarantees to potential recipients, 
the MCA provided financial support. As a result, collectives often spent much more 
than the MCA on the program. For example, in 197839, MCA expenditure on the five-
guarantee households plus subsidies for the collective's home of respect for the 
elderly40, was about 56 million yuan, which was less than half the amount paid by 
collectives for the program ( see Table 2-8). 
Another social relief program for rural residents was assistance to poor households. 
Again, recall that production teams were expected to take care of poor families, and 
MCA's financial support only came in when the local collective (team and brigade) 
could not take care of all the families in need. In 1978, assistance from the MCA to 
poor rural households was 17 5 million yuan, which was a similar amount to that from 
production teams (see Table 2-8). 
Disaster relief was aimed at assisting farmers suffering from natural catastrophes. 
Assistance included essential food, clothing, shelter and medicine. The principle of 
disaster relief was the same as that for social relief. It emphasized self-reliance and 
mutual help within the People's Commune. Disaster relief from the government was 
only provided if the Commune could not cope with the disaster by itself. Disaster relief 
was usually sent to the Commune, which then delivered to households through the 
brigade and team. 
Disaster relief usually dominated the MCA's social security provisions. In 1978, the 
MCA spent 419 million yuan on rural disaster relief, which accounted for about 30 per 
cent of the MCA's budget that year41 (Table 2-8). 
Finally, it can be seen from Table 2-8 that in 1978, the MCA spent 4 7 .4 per cent of its 
budget in rural China. Given the fact that 82.1 per cent of population lived in the 
countryside (SSB 1999: 4), this figure suggests that on average, a rural resident received 
38 S ee footnote 1 and 30. 
39 Data is not available for many years. But the available figures for 1978 seem o be good indicators for 
the general situation. 
40 Recall that the collective's home of respect for the elderly provided support for recipients of the five-guarantee program who could not take care of themselves. 41 For reference, GDP in 1978 was 362 billion yuan, budgetary revenue 113 billion yuan (both in current 
values) (Lou 2000: 60). 
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only about 12 per cent of the financial assistance an average urban resident received 
from the MCA. This is just one of the many examples of the ways in which rural 
residents were disadvantaged in the Chinese social security system. 
2.4. Conclusions 
This chapter reviews the social welfare system in rural China during the pre-reform 
period, focusing on the major programs as at the end of the 1970s. Due to data 
limitations, detailed quantitative analysis 1s not feasible. Nevertheless, the review 
illustrates the main features of that system. 
The rural social security system was established in a centrally planned economy that 
was attempting a strategy of rapid industrialization. This strategy ·demanded that the 
agricultural sector became the net contributor to the economy. To fulfil this function, 
the government promoted the formation of the People's Communes, as the lowest level 
of government administration as well as economic management in rural China. The 
system was established during the 1950s and was then consolidated during the early 
1960s, after the Great Famine (1959-1961). The consolidated People's Communes after 
the famine had three tiers: with the neighbourhood-based production team as the 
foundation, several production teams in the same village formed the brigade, and at the 
top the People's Commune, equivalent to the previous township. 
The production teams owned land and other capital goods. They were supposed to 
undertake a few economic and administrative functions. These functions included: (1) 
conducting agricultural production according to the government economic plan; (2) 
paying agricultural tax (usually in kind); (3) selling as much yield as possible to the 
state at the state monopoly prices; and ( 4) taking care of the welfare issues for its 
members. 
This chapter examines the division of harvest between: the state government and the 
collective, the collective and farmers, and finally amongst the farmers in the team. 
Under the state government economic plan, this division ensured that the state obtained 
a very large share of the harvest through the agricultural tax and the state monopoly of 
purchasing and marketing of major agricultural products. There was little incentive for 
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the production team to increase its production efficiency, except for a higher monopoly 
price for the so-called 'above-quota purchase' and 'negotiated purchase'. 
The income distribution amongst team members created little incentive for farmers to 
work harder, too. In order to provide subsistence to all members, a large proportion of 
income-the rationed food grain--had to be distributed almost evenly across team 
members. As a result, income was very similar within a team, regardless of how much 
work a farmer did. Shirking was a common phenomenon among team members, which 
negatively affected the agricultural output. 
The production team also played an essential role in the three-tiered social security 
system in rural China. In this system, farmers were pretty much left to be taken care of 
by their families and/or local communities. Family was especially important for 
supporting old people, since there was no pension scheme for farmers. The social 
welfare function of local communities was formalized by collectivisation. Production 
teams were expected to provide the subsistence for all its members, especially poor 
families, through the income distribution process. In addition, the team contributed to 
finance the major social welfare programs that were provided at the brigade's level : the 
five-guarantee program and the basic medical care. In principle, limited assistance 
came from the government when the collective could not fulfil their role of social 
security provision. 
Between 1962 and 1978, this community-based rural social security system, by and 
large, provided a basic safety net for team members, including a subsistence of living, 
and a rudimentary medical care program42 • Perhaps the sad lesson that the government 
and the local officials learned from the Great Famine was to realize that the subsistence 
of farmers were at least as important as their contribution to the industrialization. 
However, the lesson from the Great Famine did not change the pursuing of rapid 
industrialization by the government. During the pre-reform period, agricultural sector 
was heavily taxed to finance the industrialization, leaving villages with little incentive 
to improve output. In the meantime, the capacity of providing social welfare by the 
42 The commune system also provided a primary education system in villages, which is not included in 
this study. 
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collective was also limited by this policy. At the production team level, providing a 
safety net while the output was low meant that most of the income had to be shared 
within the community, leaving individual farmers little incentive to work hard. This 
small-community based social security system further exacerbated the incentive 
problem in rural China. 
This chapter studies the rural social security system independently of the urban 
economy. Indeed, during most of the pre-economic reform period, the rural and urban 
economies were managed in very different ways by the central government. To be born 
as a farmer's child in a village resulted in a very different life path and welfare 
opportunities than to be born as a worker's child in a city. The next chapter will 
complete the study of the origins of the social security system in China by looking at 
the social welfare system in urban China during the pre-economic reform period. It 
shows that to be born in a city was far better than to be born in a village. It will also 
explore how the gap in opportunities and welfare between rural and urban residents was 
maintained. 
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Figure 2-1. Social and Administrative Structure in Rural China during the Pre-
reform Period 
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Figure 2-2. The Division of the Harvest during the Pre-reform Period in China 
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Stage 
Major 
collective 
measures 
Scale of the 
collective 
Ownership 
of land 
Ownership 
of other 
capital 
goods 
Income 
distribution 
Table 2-1. The Process of Collectivisation in Rural China 
From mutual aid group to advanced 
agricultural producer's cooperatives (1953-
1956) 
Mutual-aid 
group 
(1953-1954) 
Exchange 
labour, tools 
and draft 
animals with 
each other 
7-8 
households 
Household 
Household 
Lower-stage 
agricultural 
producers' 
cooperatives 
(1954-1955) 
Pool land; 
Farm 
activities are 
planned by the 
co-op's 
management 
committee 
based on the 
targets set by 
the 
government; 
Small private 
plot remained, 
and its 
products can 
be sold at the 
nearby free 
market 
20-40 
households 
Household 
Household 
Higher-
stage 
agricultural 
producers' 
cooperatives 
(1955-1957) 
Land, draft 
animals, 
large 
implements 
and orchards 
were 
collectivised. 
N/a 
The co-op 
Private plots, 
domestic 
animals and 
small tools 
The Great Leap 
Forward and the 
People's Commune 
(1958-1961) 
Specialized 
production teams 
were formed; 
The three level 
ownership of the 
People's commune 
was established 
(production team, 
production brigade 
and the people's 
commune); Private 
plots and rural free 
markets were 
eliminated; water-
1mgation projects 
with uncompensated 
use of farmers. 
Very large, in many 
cases included tens of 
thousands of people 
People's Commune 
People's Commune; 
private plots, 
domestic animals, 
and small tools were 
remained m all communised. 
household 
Extra 
assistance 
required 
reimbursem 
ent 
Based both on 
the labour 
contribution 
and the share 
of land and 
other 
resources gave 
over by the 
household 
Based solely 
on labour 
contribution 
of members 
Income 
distributed 
was 
by the 
commune centre; 
New mess halls 
provided free food, 
nursery schools and 
medical care were 
provided free of 
charge. 
Consolidated 
People's 
Commune 
(1962-1978) 
Communes were 
subdivided into 
units one-third to 
one-half as large; 
The labour 
management and 
income-sharing 
unit was 
decentralized to 
the production 
brigade, and then 
to the production 
team; private 
plots and free 
peasant markets 
were restored; 
Free supply of 
grain, mess halls, 
and nursenes 
were eliminated. 
20-40 households 
per production 
team. 
Production team 
The team, the 
brigade and The 
People's 
Commune 
Income was 
distributed at the 
production team 
level based on 
work-points. 
Source: author's construction based on Huang (1976), Parish and Whyte (1978); Marsh (1985); Liu (1994). 
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Table 2-2. Agricultural Taxes as Percentage of Total Output during the Pre-
reform Period (unit for actual yield: 100 million kg flour and rice) 
Year 1950 1957 1962 1968 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 Actual 1097.7 1724.9 1267.4 1940.1 2210.2 2596.1 2586.7 2576.5 2802.3 yield 
Agricultural 10.7 10.3 8.1 5.9 5.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.9 
tax(%) 
Source: Lou (2000:74-5). 
Table 2-3. Grain Sufficiency, Grain Sales and Grain Resale 
Minimum per capita Grain Ration 
(unhusked grain, kilograms/month) 
Categories Compulsory 
Grain Sales 
Grain 
resale 
Eligibility 
>=15-17 
14 
<=13 
Source: based on Table 7 in Oi (1989: 47). 
Grain surp 1 us 
Grain 
sufficient 
Grain deficit 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
Table 2-4. Types of State Procurement of Grain in China during the Late 70s. 
Type 
Agricultural tax 
Fixed quota 
purchases 
Above quota 
purchases 
Negotiated 
purchases 
Year 
introduced 
1949 
1953 
1957 
N/a 
Compulsory 
or not 
yes 
yes 
Compensation 
no 
State fixed price 
In some areas, Premium price 20-30 percent 
yes higher than the state fixed price 
no Premium price up to 30-50 percent 
higher than the state fixed price; 
Opportunities to buy rationed 
goods at state prices. 
Source: author's construction based on Carter and Zhong (1988), Oi (1989) 
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Table 2-5. Grain Production, Consumption, Government Procurement and Trade 
for Selected Years in China 
Year Per Capita Per capita Grain Government Procurement d Net Grain Grain Consumption (Kg) Exporf Production (Million (kg)3 
Rural6 
tons) 
Urbane Net Net 
procurement procurement 
(Million tons) ratio(%) 
1953 278.1 191.7 242.2 30.4 18.2 1.8 1955 293.2 195.7 214.4 32.0 17.4 2.1 1956 299.9 205.0 200.3 22.1 11.5 2.5 1957 295.0 204.4 191.0 32.5 16.7 1.9 1958 293.2 201.8 185.6 27.2 13.6 2.7 1959 245.8 183.1 200.9 47.6 28.0 4.2 1960 210.5 156.0 192.6 40.2 28.0 2.7 1961 217.4 153.7 179.5 25.8 17.5 
-4.5 1962 230.8 160.6 183.8 25.8 . 16.1 
-3.9 
Source: a. Table 2.2(Carter and Zhong 1988: 5); 
b. Table 5.3 (Carter and Zhong 1988: 90); 
c. Table 5.1 (Carter and Zhong 1988: 88); 
d. Government net procurement= gross procurement minus rural grain resale; Net procurement ratio= 
net procurement as a percentage of total grain production. Figures for years from 1953 to 1957 are from Table 21 (Walker 1984: 54); Figures for years from 1958 to 1962 are from Table 51 (Walker 1984: 162); 
e. Author's calculation based on SSB (1981: 368, 384). 
Table 2-6. Availability of Health Technicians and Hospital Beds in Rural China 
Source: SSB (1985a). 
1949 
0.21 
0.45 
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1965 
0.97 
1.37 
1980 
2.03 
5.10 
Table 2-7. Health Services in Production Brigades in the 1970s 
Year 1970 1975 1980 
Number of brigades (thousands) 650.7 675.4 702.9 
Number of brigades with rural cooperative insurance scheme 498 .5 571.4 483.6 (thousands) 
% of total brigades 76.6 84.6 68.8 
Number of barefoot doctors (BFDs) (millions) 2.2 1.6 1.5 
Number of rural midwifes (millions) n/a 0.6 0.6 
Number of brigade health aides (millions) 3.6 3.3 2.4 
Total number of other part-time health staff . brigades 4.8 5.5 4.5 ln (millions) 
Total, all rural health personnel (millions) 9.6a 11.0 9.0 
BFD per 1000 rural population 1.8 2.1 1.9 
Total, all rural health personnel per 1000 rural population 14 14.4 11.3 
Note: a. figure does not include rural midwifes. 
Source: health related figures are from Table C-14, World Bank (1984: 155); rural population used are from SSB (1999). 
Table 2-8. Social Relief Expenditure and Disaster Relief Expenditure in Rural 
China (million yuan) (1978) 
Social relief 
Disaster relief 
Total 521.5 
Total expenditure paid by MCA 230.7 
Assistance to five-guarantee households 25 .9 
Assistance to poor households 174.6 
Subsidy to collective home of respect for the old 30.2 
Total expenditure paid by collectives 291.8 
Assistance to five-guarantee households 116.5 
Assistance to poor households 17 5 .3 
Total 
Grain relief 
Cloth and quilt relief 
Shelter building relief 
Disaster induced-sickness relief 
Rescue and settlement of victims 
Subsidy for resuming production 
Other expenditure 
419.4 
157.9 
27.3 
18.9 
12.7 
N/a 
N/a 
N/a 
Share in MCA's 
Budget(%) 
16.8 
30.6 
Source: based on SSB (1985:291); MCA (2000: 117). The figures for social relief are estimated based on 
the relevant proportions as in 1980. 'N/a' indicates that data are not available. 
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Chapter 3. A Review of the Social Security Programs in Urban 
China during the Pre-reform Period (1949-1978) 
3.1 Introduction 
Following the review of the social security system in rural China during the pre-reform 
period (1949-1978) in the last chapter, this chapter reviews the social security programs 
in urban China during the same period. These two chapters not only discuss the origins 
of the contemporary Chinese social security system, but also reveal the background on 
which the ongoing reforms have been based. 
A simple comparison between the urban and rural social security systems during the 
pre-reform period may be helpful at this stage. In a sense, the Chinese government's 
basic welfare policy was to ensure everybody, both in villages and cities, a subsistence 
living, while emphasizing self-reliance and family support. In rural areas, this included 
access to land, and the provision of the community safety net by the production team. In 
urban areas, this included lifetime employment guarantee for all able-bodied, working-
age residents. The major difference between the rural and urban social security system 
was that urban people, especially those in State-owned-enterprises (SO Es), enjoyed far 
more generous and comprehensive social welfare benefits, which covered employees 
from the cradle to the grave. 
Similar to the social welfare system in rural areas where families were taken care of by 
the production teams, urban families were looked after by the organization where they 
worked, the generic name was 'work unit', or simply 'unit' (danwei 1)' . The welfare of 
individual urban residents, and often their families, was very much determined by 
where they were employed, that is, the work unit. A work unit could be state-owned or 
collectively owned. It could be a factory, a government organization, a school, a 
research institute, or a store, where urban people were employed. 
The dependence of employees on their work units was significant. Firstly, they received 
a monthly salary from the work unit. Moreover, once they were assigned a job at a work 
unit by the government, the employment was lifetime. In fact, due to the government's 
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full-employment target, sooner or later, almost every able-bodied urban resident would 
expect to be assigned to a work unit. Secondly, employees received various fringe 
benefits from their work unit. These fringe benefits were regular non-monetary benefits, 
such as cheap housing. Thirdly, employees also received wide-range welfare benefits 
from their work unit. These welfare benefits might be monetary or non-monetary and 
were provided to employees only in cases of ill health, special need, or misfortune. 
Examples of welfare benefits included pensions, medical services, and other welfare 
facilities2. As a result of the full-employment policy and the function of the work unit in 
distributing various fringe benefits and welfare benefits, the wellbeing of the vast 
majority of urban residents was determined by their work units. 
As in the case of the production teams in villages, the urban work units had two major 
tasks. On the one hand, it was to carry out the government's economic plan, producing 
goods and services. The government was the decision-maker for these work units, for 
instance, the number of employees, wage rates, and welfare benefits they were entitled 
to. On the other hand, the work unit was also responsible for the financing and delivery 
of social welfare services to its employees ( and often their families), including pensions, 
medical services, and other welfare facilities3• 
For those who were unemployed for various reasons, other social welfare programs 
were available. These programs were usually delivered by a community-based 
organization called 'the residents' committee Ouweihui)4'. Nominally, the residents' 
committee was a mass organization that was set up to link local residents with the 
government. During the pre-reform period, the committee was in fact under the control 
of the government5-the street office, which _was the lowest level of government in 
cities (Wu and Wang 1989). Due to its closeness to residents, the committee was used 
by the government to provide some social welfare services to the local community. In 
principle, all local residents had access to the services provided by the residents' 
committee, including those who belonged to work units ( and therefore depended on the 
work unit for social security). In reality, however, the role of the committee in social 
1 See Section 3.2.3.1 for further details about the 'work unit' in urban China. 2 The work unit engaged in less welfare activities before the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). 3 See footnote 2. 
4 See Section 3.2.3 .2 for further details about the nature and functions of the 'residents' committee' . 5 The committee is still very much controlled by the local government. 
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welfare provision focused on those who did not have a work unit to lean on, while 
people who did have work units tended to rely on them for social welfare provisions 
(Whyte 1984). 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the structure of the channels, through which urban residents could 
obtain social welfare services during the pre-reform period. 
The diagram shows that urban residents were taken care of either by their work units, or 
the residents' committee of their residential area. Employees of SOEs enjoyed a wide 
range of social welfare benefits, which were mainly stipulated in the 'Labour Insurance 
Regulations' (LIR). They included pensions, medical services and childcare6. At the end 
of 1978, there were four government ministries involved in the administration of social 
security programs for employees. For those who were unemployed, there were only a 
few limited welfare programs available from the government. The Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (MCA) was in charge of these programs. The MCA often used the residents' 
committee to conduct the daily administration and delivery of these services. The target 
groups of the welfare programs of the MCA was similar to that in villages: people who 
had no family support, and did not belong to any work unit. 
The following relationships are essential in order to fully understand Figure 3-1, 
• the government and the work units 
• the employees and the work units 
• the government and the residents' committee 
• the residents' committee . and the residents, especially those who were 
unemployed 
These relationships will be discussed in various parts of this chapter. The structure of 
this chapter is as follows. The second part briefly discusses the social and economic 
background during pre-reform period. The third part looks at the social security 
programs available to employees from the work units. The fourth part talks about the 
social welfare programs, mainly for unemployed urban residents, through the residents' 
6 The LIR applied only to the SOEs and large collective work units, but other state-owned work units, including government organizations, had similar welfare provisions. Small collectively-owned work units were required to provide similar but less generous benefits. 
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committee. Some overviews of the urban social security system are discussed in the 
end. 
3.2 Social and Economic Background and Labour Mobility 
This section covers the major institutional settings that shaped the features of the social 
security system during the pre-reform period in urban China. While policies and 
institutions experienced dramatic changes during the 30-year period, the discussion will 
focus on their impact on the social welfare system by the end of the 1970s. 
Section 3 .2.1 is about the ownership structure of the economy, since the ownership of a 
work unit had a strong bearing on the social welfare entitlements of its employees. 
Section 3 .2.2 discusses the full-employment target and the means the government 
adopted to achieve this end, including the household registration system (HRS) that 
forbade labour mobility. Finally, Section 3.2.3 provides a general description of the 
work unit and the residents' committee. 
3.2.1 The Ownership Structure of the Economy 
By the 1970s, the state-owned sector had come to dominate the urban economy. 
However, the formation of such a structure took an extended period of time. It included 
confiscation and socialization of formerly privately owned enterprises in the early 
1950s. By 1957, these firms were state-owned (Walder 1986). Formerly self-employed 
handicraftsmen were collectivised in the mid-1950s: they were either recruited into new 
enterprises owned by the government, or grouped into handicraft cooperatives. 
This socialization process ended up with an ownership structure of the urban economy 
dominated by the SOEs and other state-owned organizations and institutions-the state-
owned work units. Accordingly, a large proportion of urban residents were employed in 
these work units, which are still referred to by people now. A work unit is an 
organisation, especially those within the public sector. It may be a factory, a shop, a 
school, or a government ministry. During the pre-reform period, it had important 
political economic and social functions (Yang and Zhou 2000). 
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Figure 3-2 shows the ownership structure of employment in urban China during the pre-
reform period. The share of employment in the state-owned work units was 64 per 
cent in 1952, rising to 78 per cent in 1978 (based on SSB 1981: 105, 107). While 
collective work units employed only 1 per cent of working people in 1952, this share 
had jumped to over 20 per cent by 1957, and then continued to increase slightly until 
1978. In contrast, the number of employees in private work units was drastically 
reduced between 1952 and 1957, with its employment share dropping from 36 per cent 
to only 3 per cent (based on SSB 1981: 105, 107). In 1978, there were only about 150 
thousand self-employed workers in urban China, which was less than 1 per cent of all 
employees. Their businesses were strictly restricted to a few industries, such as 
repairing and handicraft (Emerson 1965; Whyte and Parish 1984; Zhang 1999: 22). 
In this publicly owned urban economy, each work unit was under the administration of 
a level of government or one of its ministries/departments (Yang and Zhou 2000: 60). 
The government administrative hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 3-3. At the top, it was I 
the national level governments composed of the State Council and its ministries. It was 
then followed by provincial-level, prefectural-level and county-level governments. At 
the bottom, it was the lowest level government called the Street in urban areas and the 
People's Commune in countryside 7. 
Corresponding to this administrative hierarchy, each work units, being a factory or a 
university, had a rank corresponding to its supervisor's position in the government8. For 
example, Peking University is under the direct administration of the Ministry of 
Education. It is thus a work unit at a higher rank than a local university that is financed . 
and administered by a provincial government. In general, the higher the administrative 
level, the more important the work unit was for the national economy and therefore, the 
more 'powerful' the unit was in terms of obtaining funds, materials in shortage, and the 
provision of welfare for its employees (more details in Section 3 .2.3 .1 ). 
The close link between work units and the government had significant implications for 
employees of work units. These employees felt they were linked to the government 
7 In China, not all cities are at the same levels in the administrative hierarchy. For instance, there are cities at the prefecture level, and cities at the county level, and cities directly under the central government. 8 With the economic reform, the close link between a work unit and the government has been loosen, especially firms. However, many features of the old administrative system are still maintained. 
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through their work unit. Each work unit was like an operation unit on the whole national 
machine of economy, politics and society. Any operational surplus of a work unit was 
transferred to the government, while all losses would be covered by the government 
budget. As a result, employees were looked after by the government through their work 
units. In the meantime, since most work units were owned by the government and were 
administered by a government ministry or agency, the · government could carry out its 
economic and other social or political plans through work units (Yang and Zhou 2000: 
60). 
3.2.2 The Full Employment Target & Labour Mobility 
In the pre-reform period, as part of the central government economic plan, a full-
employment policy was adopted in the early 1950s. The aim of this policy was that 
every able-bodied urban resident should be assigned to a job in one of the work units. 
However, the heavy-industry oriented development strategy soon fell to generate 
adequate jobs for the urban labour force. In the meantime, the generous social security 
programs for urban residents9 attracted a large inflow of farmers into cities, which was 
regarded as imposing burden on the government budget (Shao and Chen 1991 ). As a 
result, the government introduced various policies to ensure the economic plans 
(including the full-employment target) to be fulfilled in cities . These policies, along 
with the communisation of farmers, formed two parallel yet distinctive systems in 
China: a commune-based rural economy and a state-owned work unit-based urban 
economy. Accordingly, the social security systems in rural and urban China were 
operating based on these two different institutional environments. The key to 
successfully maintain the two social security systems in China was to impose strict 
limitations on labour mobility between cities and villages. 
3.2.2.1 The Full Employment Target 
Unemployment was regarded as one of the social evils inherent in capitalism by the 
communists, and should be eliminated in socialism. The full-employment target also 
reflected the ideology of self-reliance of the CCP, which was transformed into 
encouragement for every able-bodied man and · woman to support themselves by 
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working. There is no reliable data on the participation and employment rates for the pre-
reform period. One estimate is that the labour force participation rate in 1957 was about 
41.5 per cent of the urban population, rising to over 50 per cent in 1975 (Rawski 1979: 
29-30). Rawski argues that by 1975, there was evidence both from foreign visitors to 
China and official statistics indicating a very high employment rate in cities, with an 
unemployment rate of less than one per cent (Rawski 1979: 33). 
There was no labour market in China during the pre-reform period. The mechanism the 
government used to achieve its full-employment target was to allocate everybody in the 
labour force to a work unit. Unless the government relocated employees later, they 
would remain permanent employees of that work unit. During the early 1950s after the 
prolonged war10, the expanding economy easily absorbed the labour force in cities. 
Over time, school graduates became the main source of new labour supply. Typically, 
the government labour assignment plan was distributed to individual urban schools 
every year, and the school would determine who got which job, without much 
consideration for individual preference. If there were graduates who could not get jobs 
right away, they had to 'wait for employment (daiye)'. These youths were often taken 
care of by their parents, who would make every effort to find a job for them, usually 
through their personal network11 • Between the late 1970s and mid-l 980s, a practice 
called 'dingti' was applied. This was a form of employment inheritance. When one 
parent retired, other conditions being equal, the work unit where they worked would 
employ one of the children at priority. This was formally institutionalised in 1978 but 
abolished in 198612. 
3 .2.2.2 Policies to Achieve the Full-employment Target and Labour Mobility 
Achieving full employment (with a high participation rate) in cities was not always an 
easy task. On the one hand, the industrialization development strategy made heavy 
industry a priority, which by its nature required a high capital-labour ratio. On the other 
9 Details of these programs are discussed in Section 3 .3 in this chapter. 1
° China experienced invasions from the west and Japan as well as civil wars between the early 20th 
century and 1949. 
11 As will be discussed Section 3. 4, urban residents' committee might also provide some help to these people. 
12 For more details about the employment situation during this period in urban areas, see (Rawski 1979; Whyte 1984; Whyte and Parish 1984; Walder, 1986; Meng 2000) . 
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hand, during the early 1950s, many farmers migrated to urban areas in search of the 
high wages and the generous social welfare benefits available there. This generated 
pressure on the full-employment target, on urban facilities, and on the government 
budget, which alarmed the government (Shao and Chen 1991: 53). To cope with the 
potential problems of open unemployment in cities, the government adopted several 
measures (Yang and Zhou 2000: 53-54), of which the household registration system 
(HRS) was the most important. It was designed to stop rural-urban migration and to 
restrict migration between cities. Some other policies implemented at the same time, 
such as rationing consumer goods, travel restrictions, effectively reinforced the HRS 
curbing migration. Another measure used by the government was sending down urban 
residents to the countryside. This transferred the pressure of job assignment in cities to 
the countryside. These measures are discussed next. 
The HRS commenced in 195 8, when the document 'Household Registration Regulations 
of the People's Republic of China' was issued. The system is still in effect, although in 
practice, the rules have become somewhat slack following the economic reform 13 . The 
discussions follows describe the HRS before 1978. 
There were two basic types of household registrations: rural14 and urban (non-rural). 
Whether a household was designated as urban or not depended on whether the usual 
residential place of the household was in the city or not at the time the HRS was 
introduced. There were two kinds of urban households for registration purposes: 
individual and collective households. For the former, each household was issued with a 
booklet containing detailed information of its members. Births, deaths and marriages 
were also recorded in this booklet. Urban residents who lived in dormitories in their 
work units (usually single people) were registered as collective households (Zhang 
1987). 
The HRS separated Chinese citizens into two groups: rural and urban. In effect, it 
created a hierarchy that largely determined potential lifetime opportunities for 
13 See Section 5.5.2 for some discussions of the recent policy changes. 14 Rural household registration was a record of local households, including the basic information of household's members such as name, birth date, sex, relationship with the household head, education, occupation, etc. During the pre-reform period, it was the production team that set up and updated the booklet for all households of the team and handed copies to the brigade and the People's Commune to keep the record. 
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individuals. Changes of registration status were very difficult, if not impossible. 
Migration from rural to urban areas, and from other cities to Beijing, Shanghai and 
Tianjin became very difficult. Exceptions were rare, including emolment into 
universities 15, recruitment by the state labour department or staff transfers by the 
government. Migration from towns to cities and from small to large cities was also 
strictly restricted. Migration from cities to villages, or from big to small cities, and 
between cities at equivalent level or between villages were relatively easier in principle 
(Zhang 1987: 99-100). The HRS ranked peasants the lowest of the hierarchy: above 
them were residents in towns, small cities, and large cities, with residents in the three 
big cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin at the top. While moving upwards was nearly 
impossible, moving downwards was relatively easier (but still involved lengthy and 
complicated procedures). Even marriage did not change an individual's household 
registration status automatically (Zhang 1987: 78-79). 
When the HRS was combined with other policies, it became a very effective barrier for 
labour mobility. One of these policies was the restriction of domestic travel. Official 
letters from a certain level of administration (usually the work unit) were required when 
purchasing travel tickets. Another measure was a registration requirement for temporary 
residents. People who wanted to stay outside their own registration city for more than 
three days were required to register at the local police station. Hotels were required to 
keep registries of all guests for examination by the police (Whyte and Parish 1984). 
These measures made physical movement difficult. 
In addition, there was the policy of rationing consumption goods, including basic grain 
foods, cooking oil and cotton cloth, etc. They were rationed in cities by issuing 
coupons. Between 1949 and 1978, China had the most comprehensive system of 
rationing of any country in the world for most of the time (Ahmad and Hussain 1991: 
287). The rationing included most consumption goods, and each city had different 
rationing coupons, which could not be used in other cities. Rationing was based on the 
information (age, sex) recorded in household registration booklets. Rationed goods 
could only be purchased at state-owned shops by presenting both the appropriate (local) 
coupons (for the entitlement) and the money (for the payment). With the rationing, 
15 University students were temporary collective residents in the city of the university. This would change 
when they were assigned a job by the government when they graduated. 
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unless they had relatives to help them, people who tried to stay outside registered cities 
or villages would have no access to basic food. However, due to the shortage of 
consumption goods, the rationed amount barely met most peoples' own needs, let alone 
providing spares. 
Household registration, restrictions on travels, food rationing, etc. all worked together 
to reinforce migration restrictions. As a result, labour mobility was very low during the 
pre-reform period (Whyte and Parish 1984: 20-1; Shen and Tong 1992: 191-7). Indeed, 
in spite of the rapid industrialization, the share of urban residents in the total population 
declined between 1960 and 1976. Table 3-1 shows that the proportion of urban 
population reached a peak in 1960, which was not exceeded until 1981, when the figure 
rose to 20.2 per cent (SSB 1999). 
The peak in 1960 was generated by the changing policies since the late 1950s, as well 
as the more dramatic policy of sending urban residents to villages, which mainly 
occurred from the early 1960s to the mid-l 970s. The first of these government-
organized migrations was in the early 1960s, when some 20 million staff members in 
the state-owned work units were retrenched and sent to the countryside. This was to 
reduce the pressure on food rationing in cities during the Great Famine (1959-1961). 
Along with their family members, this sending down reduced the urban population by 
about 26 million (Shao and Chen 1991: 59; Shen and Tong 1992: 185; Yang and Zhou 
2000: 53-54). 
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), sending down to villages was also used to 
punish people (and sometimes their families) who were regarded by the CCP as having 
incorrect political views. It is estimated that between 1968 and 1970, hundreds of 
thousands of this type of urban resident were sent to villages (Shen and Tong 1992: 
186). After 1968, the target of regular sending down was shifted to urban youth 
(Bernstein 1977; Whyte and Parish 1984: 39; Orleans 1982: 132). Other than in special 
cases such as physical disability, sickness, etc, almost every middle school graduate was 
required to go to a village. To some extent, working in rural areas for some time became 
the prerequisite for youth to get jobs in cities or to be admitted to universities (Shen and 
Tong 1992: 187). There are no reliable official statistics about the scale of this kind of 
urban to rural migration . . It is estimated that 12-17 million youth were sent to the 
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countryside between 1968 and 197616 . . This large-scale urban to rural migration 
obviously effectively prevented further net migration to urban areas. As shown in Table 
3-1, the proportion of urban people in the population declined from about 20 per cent in 
1960 to 17.3 percent in 1975. 
The policy of sending urban residents to rural areas was eased from the mid-l 970s 
onwards. Those urban residents who were sent down as a punishment were allowed to 
return. At the same time, urban youth who had been sent to villages began to have some 
access to migrating back to cities. Legal ways of doing this included job assignments in 
cities, admission to universities, or sickness. Many of them sneaked back into cities 
illegally, depending upon their parents to look after them. 
3.2.3 The Work Unit and the Residents' Committee 
The work units and the residents' committees were the basic units that carried out the 
so-called 'dual administration system' (Whyte and Parish 1984: 22) in cities during the 
pre-reform period. This was a system of a strict government administration, with strict 
restrictions on labour mobility. It was also a system that provided comprehensive social 
protection and insurance, by providing lifetime employment and other welfare benefits. 
In this system, the real power was in the hands of government, since both work units 
and residents' committees were under its control. However, urban residents' welfare 
was delivered by work units and/or residents' committees. 
3.2.3.1 Work Units 
As previously mentioned, a work unit was the organisation where an urban resident was 
employed. Work unit literarily means the organisation where a person works. It is a 
very general term, and could be a factory, a school, a government department, or a mass 
organization. It could be state owned or collectively owned. There was a close 
relationship between the work unit (the employer) and the people who were assigned 
jobs there (the employees). Due to the labour policy at the time, once urban individuals 
were assigned to jobs, they became permanent employees of the work units. Their well 
16 For example, Rawski 's estimation is 12 million (Rawski 1979: 127), while Parish and Whyte's estimation is about than 17 million (Whyte and Parish 1984: 39). 
64 
being during the rest of their lives were closely linked to the work unit: salaries, 
accommodation conditions, children's future, as well as other social security benefits. 
The security of salaries and other benefits provided by the work unit, which were 
determined by the government, were effectively guaranteed by the government budget, 
especially for the state-owned work units and large collectively owned work units. 
Small collective work units were in a disadvantaged position, especially in terms of the 
financial support from the government. As a result, remuneration for labour was lower 
in these work units, including wages, labour insurance and other benefits. Table 3-2 
compares the average annual wage of employees in state-owned versus collectively 
owned work units. Despite some fluctuations, on average, employees of collective work 
. units earned about 25 per cent less than those in state-owned work units. This wage gap 
was mainly due to government policies (Whyte and Parish 1984; Li 1991: 124). 
The social welfare function of work units was significant in their employees' lives. How 
much welfare provisions were provided by a work unit varied, depending on ownership, 
size and the administrative ranking of the work unit. The following list includes the 
major social welfare benefits a work unit would provide its employees during the pre-
reform period: 17 
• The labour insurance benefits stipulated by government regulations 18, such as 
pensions, and medical care services. 
• The 'unit welfare' or 'collective welfare' facilities, such as nurseries, canteens, 
kindergartens, or even schools. 
• Nearly free housing to the employees. The cost of building the houses was met 
by the government. 
• Assistances to family members of the employees, such as entitlements stipulated 
by government regulations 19, the provision of jobs for unemployed family 
members, mediation of domestic disputes, etc. (Walder 1986; Yang and Zhou 
2000). 
17 See Walder (1986), Yang and Zhou (2000) (in Chinese) for detailed discussions about the role of work 
uni ts in China. 
18 See details in the next part of this chapter. 19 For details, see the next part of the chapter. 
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3.2.3.2 The Residents' Committee 
While the work units looked after their employees, the resident's committee looked 
after urban residents who were either temporarily or permanently unemployed, for 
various reasons. The number of households under the administration of a residents' 
committee varied from city to city. For example, in Guangdong Province, a residents' 
committee took care of 100-800 families, while a street office administered 2,000-
10,000 households, (Whyte and Parish 1984: 22). 
The nature and function of residents' committee were stipulated in the 'Organic Rules of 
Urban Residents' Committee' in 1954. The Rules stipulated that the residents' committee 
was a self-governing mass organization. The costs of the public welfare facilities should 
be raised among the residents on a voluntary basis, with the approval of the district or 
city government. The major functions of the residents' committee are the follows: 
• Providing public welfare services for the residents; 
• Reporting comments and requests of residents to its upper level government, the 
street office. 
• 
• 
• 
Mobilizing residents to respond to the CCP's call and abide by its regulations; 
Organising mass public security activities within the neighbourhood; For 
example, assisting the police to maintain public order; 
Mediating disputes among residents. 
In practice, however, the residents' committee took on many daily social and 
administrative function . of the government at the grassroots level in cities (Whyte and 
Parish 1984: 23; Wu and Wang 1989: 141). In particular, it delivered the social welfare 
benefits that were administrated by the MCA to its residents (see Figure 3-1). It acted 
as the agency of the lowest level of government, with the head of the committee 
appointed and supervised by the street office. In addition, the miscellaneous expenses 
of the committee, and the living subsidy of the committee members were appropriated 
from the local government. 
In general, the role of the residents' committee 1n its residents' lives was less 
significant, compared with the role of a work unit to its employees. First of all, the 
residents' committee did not provide employment, or any social insurance that 
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employees of work units were entitled to. Secondly, the economic and social 
dependence of the residents upon their residents' committee · was much weaker, 
compared with that between the employees and their work units. For example, usually 
the residents' committee was not responsible for providing free housing for the 
residents. As for social welfare provisions, the role of the residents' committee was 
unspecific, supplementary to those provided by the work unit, and they were not 
regular. In general, a typical residents' committee was less dependable, compared with 
a typical work unit. 
The work unit and residents' committee dual administration systems covered all urban 
resident. People with jobs mainly depended upon the work unit, and enjoyed the income 
security and welfare services that it provided; while those who did not belonged to any 
work unit and had no family to rely on had to find assistance from their residents' 
committee. Both the work unit and the residents' committee were responsible to the 
government. They were, therefore, the intermediate agencies the Chinese government 
used to manage the urban population. 
The role of work unit and residents' committee in the urban social welfare system 
during the pre-reform period is shown in Figure 3-4, as part of the overall 
administrative structure of the system. The Ministry of Labour (MOL)2°, the Central 
Department of Organization (CDO), the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs (MCA) were the main government ministries21 in charge of social welfare 
policy-making and administration. This figure also provides an overview of programs 
available to urban residents during the pre-reform period. These programs were 
designed for two distinct groups of urban people: employees ( and their family 
members) of work units, especially those sate-owned22; and those who were 
unemployed. In this system, these two types of programs were delivered by work units 
and residents' committees, respectively. In general, programs for employees of work 
20 The MOL was the predecessor of the current Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS) . 21 The CDO is not a government ministry. It is a department of the CCP Central Committee. It is relevant here since it is in charge of appointment of high-rank goven1ment and CCP officials and their salary and pension system. 
22 The social welfare programs for employees in other state-owned work units and in large collectively owned work units were similar to the LIR, which applied to employees in SOEs, while those for employees in other collect work units were less generous. In Figure 3-3, programs for workers in SOEs as specified in the LIR are used as examples. 
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units were relatively well defined, which covered a large proportion of urban residents; 
while those for the unemployed were much less specific and therefore less dependable. 
3.3 Social welfare Programs for Employees of Work Units 
There were two parallel systems of social welfare programs for employees in the state-
owned institutions ( and government departments) and those in SO Es. The eligibilities 
and benefits of the two systems were very similar to each other. The discussions in this 
section are based on the system for employees in SOEs. 
Among the programs for employees in SOEs, some had well-defined criteria of 
eligibility as well as formalized rules to determine the quantity of assistance. Examples 
included the Labour Insurance Regulations (LIR) and its related laws and regulations. 
Others were informal, with only general principles stipulated by the central government. 
The detailed implementing rules were left to the local government to specify. 
Sometimes, even with these detailed rules stipulated by the local government, there was 
plenty of room left to the work unit. This was done so as to allow for variations across 
work units. The LIR and other informal fringe benefits as well as welfare benefits are 
discussed in tum. 
3.3.1 The Labour Insurance Regulations (LIR) 
3.3.1.1 An Overview of the LIR 
Designed to provide social insurance for employees in SOEs, the LIR was issued in 
1951 by the Chinese central government. It was revised in 1953 . Up until the mid-
1980s, there were no significant changes to the LIR. However, some details and 
administrative arrangements were modified later by supplementary regulations (Shao 
and Chen 1991 ). The LIR covered labour insurance, including old age insurance, 
medical insurance, injury, maternity assistance, and funeral allowance. 
The LIR applied to formal (permanent) employees in SOEs, which essentially covered 
nearly every employee in SOEs by the end of the 1970s. The government required 
collectively owned work units to set up their own labour insurance programs, with 
reference to the LIR. These programs had to be less generous than the LIR (Wang 
1989). Large collectively owned work units usually had similar labour insurance and 
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welfare provisions as the LIR, while small ones could only offer very little labour 
· 23 insurance. 
The expenditure for programs in the LIR was financed by individual SOEs24, and there 
was no requirement for employee contribution. However, in the centrally planned 
economy, where any operating surplus of SOEs had to be transferred to, and any 
operating deficit covered by the government, financing the LIR by individual SOEs was 
essentially backed up by the government budget. In other words, the government budget 
effectively provided the risk-pooling mechanism of these labour insurance programs. 
The work unit's major role was to maintain the daily administration and delivery of the 
benefits. During the pre-reform period, the LIR was a pay-as-you-go (PA YGO) system 
without an explicit payroll tax, and was delivered by individual SOEs. 
The benefits stipulated in the LIR were minimum entitlements. The actual level of 
benefits was also affected by the financial status of the work unit and the wishes of its 
decision-makers. As a result, there were variations of labour insurance benefits across 
work units and over time (For examples see Vermeer 1979). 
Table 3-3 summarizes the coverage and expenditure of labour insurance for selected 
years, mainly during the pre-reform period. By 1978, the LIR covered more than 78 per 
cent of urban employees (and their families). The LIR relevant expenses increased 
significantly between 1952 and 1978. However, the ratio of the expenses to the total 
wage bill did not increase accordingly. Comparing the numbers in 1952 (14 per cent) 
with 1978 (14.3 per cent) shows that the ratio only increased by 0.3 percentage points. 
According to Table 3-3, the number of employees in the state owned sector increased 
by more than 30 per cent between 1957 and 1962, while labour insurance expenditure 
only increased by less than 1 percent. As a result, the ratio of labour insurance 
expenditure to the total wage bill declined from 17 .9 to 13 .2 percent. This was probably 
due to the changing age structure of the labour force. Since most of the new employees 
23 More detailed comparisons of labour insurance programs for the collectively owned work units and those in the SOEs are listed in Table 3 in Walder (1986: 44-5), also see Whyte and Parish (1984). 24 There was requirement for individual SOEs to contribution for the LIR before the Cultural Revolution (1966-197 6), including a social pooling fund. This was abolished when the Cultural Revolution started. Discussions in this section focus on the situation as at the late 1970s (Shao and Chen 1991). 
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were young and relatively healthy, major costs, such as the old age pension and health 
care, were not much affected. Accordingly, total labour insurance costs did not increase 
by much. A survey of 508 Chinese firms shows that the retiree/employee ratio declined 
during the per-reform period. For the state-owned firms, the ratio during the periods 
1950-1959, 1960-1969 and 1970-1979 was 0.31, 0.15 and 0.07, respectively (Li and 
Zhang 2000: 155). Even though the survey is only for a relatively small number of 
firms, it does show a significant drop in the retiree/employee ratio in cities during the 
pre-reform period. 
Another observation from Table 3-3 is the comparison between 1978 and 1979. While 
the number of employees rose by only 3 per cent from 1978 to 1979, labour insurance 
and welfare expenditures25 increased by almost 40 per cent. This was quite a significant 
change, and was due to a sudden increase of retirees in SOEs (Liu 1999). During the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the previous retirement system was nearly stopped for 
various political reasons. Many employees at retirement age could not formally retire. 
Instead, they stayed at their jobs and received wages. The normal retirement procedure 
was resumed in 1978. This resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of retirees 
within a short period of time. There were 2.48 million retirees26 from state-owned work 
units by the end of 1978. That number was almost doubled to 4.73 million by the end of 
197927 . The ratio of the number of retirees to that of the current employees rose from 
1:30to 1:16(SSB 1985a: 126). 
3.3.1.2 Major Programs in the LIR 
The major programs of the LIR, explained as follows, are summarised in Table 3-4. 
3.3.1.2.1 Old Age Pensions 
Regulations for retired and resigned employees were stipulated in the LIR in 1951. 
They were modified in separate documents later issued in 1957, 1958 and 1978. The 
main features of the system are: 
25 This figure includes expenditures for labour insurance programs in the LIR as well as other 
expenditures for collective facilities, etc. See note of Table 3-3. 26 Officially, there was a distinction between retirees and resigned ex-employees. The discussions in this thesis use 'retirees' for both types of people. 27 The numbers for urban collective work units in these two years were 0.3 million and 1.23 million . 
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(a) Qualifications for retirement and pensions 
To be able to formally retire and enjoy old age pensions, an employee needed to satisfy 
two conditions simultaneously: 
• First, at least ten years of continuous service in a state-owned work unit. 
• Second, the retirement age was 60 years old for both male workers and staff. For 
female workers and non-worker staff, it was 50 and 55 years old, respectively. 
For workers who worked under unfavourable conditions28, the retirement age 
was 5 years younger for both male and female workers. 
The exception to the above rules was that people could retire due to ill health, whether 
work related or not. 
(b) Pension Benefits 
Pensions were paid monthly to retirees until death. The replacement rate (the ratio of_ 
pensions to wages before retirement) varied according to the length of employment. It 
was usually between 60 and 90%. The rates were: 
• 90% for retirees who had joined the revolutionary activities led by the CCP 
during the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945); 
• 80% for retirees who joined the CCP-led activities during the War of Liberation 
(1945-1949); 
• 75%, 70% and 60% for retirees of 20, 15 and 10 years of employment, 
respectively. 
• The minimum pension was 20 yuan per month, which was about 40% of the 
average wages of the state-owned work units.29 
• For retirement due to non-work related illness, the replacement rate was 40 per 
cent, irrespective of the length of employment. 
28 Examples include working in wells underground, high or low temperature at working environment, etc. 29 In 1978, the average annual wage for employees in the state-owned work units was about 644 yuan (see Table 3-2), which was about US$ 3 83 according to the official exchange rate at $1 = yuan 1.68. 
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( c) Settlement Assistance 
In cases where retired employees needed to settle in cities other than where their work 
unit was located, the LIR provided a settlement allowance. The work unit would cover 
transportation and board costs for the retirees and their direct dependants. A lump sum 
settlement allowance was also granted: 150 yuan for retirees settled in cities, and 300 
yuan for those settled in villages. The allowance was less for people retired due to non-
work related health problems. 
3.3.1.2.2 Maternity Benefits 
Female employees enjoyed 100 per cent paid leave for giving birth or miscarriage. For a 
normal birth, the entitled leave was 56 days. For twins or complications at birth, an 
additional 14 days was granted. There was . a 20 to 30-day leave for miscarriage. The 
work unit covered all relevant medical expenditures during pregnancy, including the 
birth and postpartum period. This included examination fee, delivering fee, operation 
fee and hospitalisation expenses. The LIR also provided a lump sum supplementary 
maternity allowance for female employees ( and wives of male employees) who gave 
birth. It was 4 yuan for one child, or 8 yuan per child for twins or more. In cases where 
the female employee was not fully recovered after the entitled maternity leave, she 
would be qualified for sickness leave and relevant benefits. 
3 .3 .1.2.3 Work-related Injury and Invalidity 
Employees who were injured due to work commitments were entitled to the following 
benefits: 
• Full paid injury leave; 
• Free medical care and coverage of all relevant costs, including examinations, 
treatment, drugs, hospitalisation (including food) and transportation. 
In cases in which the injured were diagnosed as disabled, they would be entitled to one 
of the following benefits, depending on the extent of invalidity: 
• Fully invalid: retire immediately and receive a monthly payment, called 
'pensions due to work related invalidity' for the rest of life. Pensions equal to 
75% wages for cases where nursing assistance for daily life required, and 60% 
otherwise. 
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• Not fully invalid: go back to the previous work unit to work30. In this case, if 
the post-injury wages were lower, a monthly subsidy would be granted. It was 
called the 'work-related disability subsidy'. The amount of the subsidy depended 
upon the loss of wages due to the injury: if it was 10 to 20 per cent lower, the 
subsidy should be 10 per cent of the pre-injury wages. If it was 20 to 30 per 
cent lower, the amount should be 20 per cent. If it was more than 30 per cent 
lower, the subsidy should be 30 per cent. This subsidy was paid until the injured 
employees recovered to full capacity or died. 
3.3.1.2.4 Sickness, Non-work Related Injury and Invalidity Benefits 
Employees who were sick, or injured outside their work environment, had access to free 
medical services at the clinic ( or hospital) of the work unit or its appointed hospitals. 
The work unit covered the relevant medical expenses including diagnosis, examination, 
operation, hospitalisation and ordinary medicines. In general, the employee paid for 
expensive medicines, board costs in hospital and transportation costs incurred. Poor 
employees, however, could receive some assistance from the work unit for these 
payments. Application for this assistance was considered on a case-by-case basis, and 
there were no unified rules. 
Sickness ( or injury) leave was up to six months. During this period, employees received 
the sickness ( or injury) leave salary. This amount was from 60 to 100 per cent of their 
usual salary, depending on length of continuous employment in the current work unit. 
The rules were: for employees with less than 2-years employment, the sickness leave 
salary was 60 per cent of usual salary. The benefit rose by 10 per cent for every 2 
additional years of services, so that fully paid leave was provided for employees with 8 
or more continuous years of service. 
Employees that needed further leave after six months would eligible for the sickness or 
non-work related injury relief, until either they recovered, or were diagnosed as 
disabled31 , or until they died. The amount of the relief was between 40 to 60 per cent of 
the employee's usual salary, again depending on length of employment. The rules were: 
• For less than 1 year of employment: 40% of the usual salary; 
30 The employee could be relocated to another position in the same work unit. 31 These people would then retire and receive a pension. See Section 2.3 .1.2.1. 
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• For employment between 1 to 3 years: 50% of the usual salary; 
• For 3 or more years of service: 60% of the usual salary. 
• For low salary employees: the minimum relief was 40% of the work unit's 
average salary. 
This relief was paid until the employee recovered, was diagnosed as invalid or died. 
The financial assistance for medical care from the work unit also covered employees' 
direct dependants, although this was less generous compared with the coverage for 
employees. In general, medical diagnoses and examinations at the work unit's clinic, or 
appointed hospitals, were free. The work unit also covered 50 per cent of operation and 
ordinary medicine costs. 
3.3.1.2.5 Death and Funeral Related Benefits 
Upon the death of an employee, direct dependants, defined as family members who 
relied on the employee for a living32, were eligible for funeral assistance, as well as a 
dependant pension. The amount of the benefits depended upon whether or not the 
employee died on duty. 
• Any death directly caused by duty, as well as the natural death of a retired 
employee who had been injured on duty, was classified as death on duty. The 
funeral assistance for death on duty was the 3-months average salary of the work 
unit. However, the pension increased with the number of dependants: one 
dependant could get a pension equal to 25 per cent of the employee's salary; two 
and three ( or more) dependants were eligible for 40 and 50 per cent of the 
salary, respectively. The pension was paid monthly until the dependant no 
longer qualified. 
• For death due to other reasons, funeral assistance was the 2-months average 
salary of the work unit. Instead of the dependent pension, direct dependants 
were eligible for a one-off, lump sum subsidy upon the employee's death. 
Again, the amount depended upon the number of dependants: one dependant 
received 6-months salary of the deceased employee, two dependants would 
32Examples include: (1) grandfather, father or husband over 60 years old or were fully invalid; (2) grandmother, mother or wife unemployed; (3) children, including adopted children, children from previous marriage and children born out of wedlock, and younger brothers and sisters who were younger than 16 years old; (4) grandchildren less than 16 years old whose father died or was invalid, and whose mother was unemployed. 
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share 9-months of salary; and three or more dependants would share 12-months 
of salary. 
Dependants of retired former employees were also eligible for funeral assistance, as 
well as a one-off subsidy, when the retiree passed away. The funeral assistance was 
between 50 and 100 yuan, determined by the work unit. The subsidy was equal to 6-
months pension for the deceased retiree if there was only one dependant, 7 .5-months of 
pension for two dependants, and 9-months of pension for three or more dependants. 
In addition to the financial assistance for dependants of deceased current and retired 
former employees, the LIR also required the work units to employ these dependants at 
priority. 
Financial benefits to cover funeral expenses were also granted to the employee upon the 
death of their direct dependants. If the deceased dependant was more than 10 years old, 
the subsidy was equal to a half of the average monthly salary of the work unit. It was 
one-third of the average monthly salary if the deceased dependant was 1-10 years old. 
There was no funeral subsidy for a deceased dependant younger than 1 year old. 
3.3.1.2.6 Paid Home Leave 
Employees were eligible for annual paid home leave, if they satisfied the following two 
conditions simultaneously: (1) at least one-year of employment in state-owned work 
units; (2) single or married, but living in a different region33 from their parents or 
spouse. This paid leave was provided once a year, for two to three weeks. In cases 
where both the husband and wife were eligible for this leave, only one could take the 
leave in a year. In principle, the work unit did not pay for travel costs. However, it 
might provide some subsidies for employees with financial hardship. 
3.3.1.2.7 The Provision of Collective Welfare Services 
The LIR also stipulated that all employees in the state-owned work units were entitled 
to the public welfare facilities provided by the work unit. These facilities included a 
33 Usually, this referred to a location that was too far away to allow for regular visit during public holidays. 
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convalescent hospital34, a recreation room, a canteen, kindergarten and nursing room, 
etc, with capital costs, staff salaries and other running expenses paid by the work unit. 
When using these facilities, employees only paid for board expenses, and there could 
also be exemptions, if they were under financial stress. 
3.3.2 Fringe Benefits and Other Welfare Benefits 
3.3.2.1. An Overview of Fringe Benefits and Other Welfare Benefits 35 
In addition to the formal programs in the LIR discussed in the previous section, the 
work unit was also supposed to provide a wide range of other benefits to its employees, 
which could be summarised as fringe benefits and other welfare benefits. Examples 
included heavily subsidized housing, various price subsidies, distribution of rationing 
coupons for consumer durables, transportation subsidy for travel to work, etc (Yang and 
Zhou 2000; Song 1994). 
Fringe benefits could be divided into benefits in cash and in kind36 . Most of these 
provided by the work unit were in kind. Benefits in cash were usually only a small 
amount. Some were regularly distributed to all employees, such as a winter heating 
supplement and a summer cooling subsidy. Some were contingent and thus only for 
employees in need, for example, a family hardship allowance. In kind benefits could 
account for a large proportion of an employee's income. Perhaps, the most significant 
item was housing. Childcare and preferential employment opportunities for family 
members were also important for employees. 
Most fringe benefits were usually distributed, at least with some intention to spread 
them evenly across employees of the work unit (Song 1994; Yang and Zhou 2000). For 
example, every employee had equal access to public welfare facilities such as 
kindergarten, canteen, and a store financed and run by the work unit. Housing, 1n 
general, was distributed according to the size of the family and employment history. 
However, this 'fairness' applied only within each work unit, and not across all work 
34 They usually located at places supposed to be good for relaxation, such as places close to the sea. 35 The fringe benefits and informal welfare benefits discussed here were common in state-owned work units. For collective work units, they were usually much less generous in terms of the types as well as the amount (Walder 1986). 
36 Here benefit in kind includes entitlement, such as coupons for rationed consumer durables. 
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units. In an economy where the distribution of goods and services was not performed by 
markets, but by bureaucracies using direct allocations and legal entitlements, a gap 
between fringe benefits from the work unit often led to a gap in living standard between 
employees in different work units. The lack of explicit regulations about the provision 
of fringe benefits reinforced such gaps. Usually, the higher the bureaucratic level of a 
work unit, the more important it was for the national economy, and the more access it 
had to scarce consumption goods for its employees (Walder 1986: 67). However, all 
other things being equal, the leader of a work unit could be motivated to mobilize more 
resources than otherwise for distribution. For example, by increasing the share of 
operating surplus used for public welfare facilities in the work unit, or by increasing the 
chances of obtaining scarce consumer goods through better personal connections, the 
leader could bring more fringe benefits to the employees. 
Fringe benefits and informal welfare benefits provided by the work unit were important 
to the wellbeing of its employees. Table 3-5 is one way to show this. It lists family 
budgetary expenditures of urban employees37 for selected years38 . These figures come 
from the annual household survey, conducted by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) of 
China. 
Food accounted for about 60 per cent of total household expenditure, which is not 
unusual for a low-income country. The share of medical expenditure was no more than 
2 per cent, which is not surprising, given the nearly free medical services stipulated in 
the LIR. 
An interesting feature of the household budget during this period was the very low share 
of rent. It was less than 3 per cent for all four years, and only 1 per cent in 1981. This 
was due to the heavily subsidized housing provided by the work unit. The shares of 
electricity and water and childcare were also low. These figures suggest that the 
expenses on these items were heavily subsidized, which was significant for employees' 
living standards. 
37 Figures in the table include current employees' families, in both state-owned and collectively owned 
work units. Since the state-owned work units dominated urban employment, these figures should give · good indications for the situation in state-owned work units. 38 Most fringe benefits and informal welfare benefits still existed in 1981 and 1982, even though the 
economic reforms started in rural areas in 1978. 
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Table 3-6 also demonstrates the importance of fringe benefits and informal welfare 
benefits for urban employees. It lists the major types of these benefits that employees in 
state-owned work units received in 1978, the end of the pre-reform era. The housing 
subsidy was calculated as the balance between the estimated actual rent and the rent 
paid by the employee (Wang 1991). The 'price subsidy' was paid by the government to 
all urban residents, mainly for food grains, cotton cloth and cooking oil. Since these 
goods were rationed according to age and sex, etc to urban residents, working-age 
employees had more rations than children and old people. As a result, the 6.46 yuan in 
Table 3-6 underestimates the actual subsidy per employee. Public welfare facilities 
usually included staff bath/shower room, barbershop, laundry, nursing room, canteen 
and kindergartens, etc. Benefits from these facilities are the sum of the subsidy for 
running costs and maintenance costs paid by the work unit, but excluding capital costs 
of these facilities. Therefore, the figure of 11.68 yuan per employee also underestimates 
the actual benefits. "Others' refers to subsidies such as those for paid home leave travel, 
wash and haircut subsidy, and hygiene subsidy, etc. Overall, on average, each employee 
received at least 100-yuan value of fringe benefits in 1978, which was about 16 per cent 
of the average salary of state-owned work units that year39 . 
There were other fringe benefits and welfare benefits that are either difficult to measure 
in money value, or for which there is no data. Examples include employment 
opportunities for family members, the distribution of coupons of rationed consumer 
goods, etc. Therefore, figures in both Table 3-5 and 2-6, underestimate the share of 
actual value of these benefits in employees' incomes. 
3 .3 .2.2 Major Fringe Benefits and welfare Benefits for Employees in the State Owned Sector 
3.3.2.2.1 Housing 
Housing was obviously the most significant part of the fringe benefits provided by the 
work unit. Notionally, employees in state-owned work units rented accommodation 
(usually a flat) from the work unit, with rent directly deducted from salary. The rent was 
determined by the government and was heavily subsidized. As a result, accommodation 
39 See footnote 28 for the average wage in 1978. 
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was almost free. As shown in Table 3-6, it is estimated that in 1978, each employee in 
state-owned work units received more than 63 yuan subsidy for rent. The actual rent 
each urban family paid only accounted for a negligible fraction of total household 
expenditure (see Table 3-5). Indeed, the rent was so low it could not even cover 
maintenance costs40 (Whyte and Parish 1984: 84; Wang 1991). 
Such a low rent certainly attracted a high demand for housing. However, there was no 
housing market during the pre-reform period. In cities, most houses were owned either 
by the work unit or the government. By the early 1980s, in the largest 200 cities in 
China, work units owned 54 per cent of all rental living spaces, the city government 
owned 29 per cent and the private sector owned 18 percent (Whyte and Parish 1984: 
82). Regarded by the government as a consumption rather than investment, housing was 
given low priority compared with capital investment in the government economic plan. 
As a result, the provision of housing was in short supply. The work unit was the major 
source of allocating limited housing to employees. Single employees either stayed in 
their parents' flat, or the living quarters provided by their work units, while newly 
married couples often had to wait in long queues for a small flat, which was always a 
process that was very complex, and often led to intensive competition among 
employees41 . In 1978, Chinese urban residents had only 4.2 square meters of residential 
area, on average (SSB 1986). Housing distribution rules might vary among work units, 
but, usually, the rank and length of employment in the current work unit, current 
housing conditions, and demographic structure of the household were important 
considerations. Once an employee was allocated a flat, he/she could live there until 
death, so long as he/she continued to be an employee or a retiree in that work unit. 
3.3.2.2.2 Small Supplements and Allowances 
Another type of fringe benefit could be called small supplements and allowances. Some 
examples were the 'winter heating supplement', which subsidized an employee's 
purchase of coal used in stoves for cooking and heating; 'high-temperature supplements' 
or direct distributions of cold refreshments to employees during summer months; the 
supplement for newspaper and books; subsidy for travel costs to work; and the subsidy 
for bath and haircut, etc. Some of these items are included in 'Others' in Table 3-6. 
40 Some employees of the state-owned work unit lived in the privately or municipally owned housing. They could receive money grants from their work units for repairing housing (Walder 1986: 65). 
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Others were included in the employee's salary listed as 'allowances'. These supplements 
and allowances were not as important as the housing subsidy, but they were usually 
regular and helpful for family income. 
3.3.2.2.3 Hardship Allowance and Other Financial Assistance for Poor Families of 
Employees 
During the pre-reform period, the work unit not only took care of its employees, but 
also their families. If the family experienced financial hardship, the employee could ask 
their work unit for a hardship allowance. The qualification and amount of the hardship 
allowance were not explicitly stipulated by the government, but left to individual work 
units to decide. In 1978, state-owned work units paid a total of 600 million yuan of 
hardship allowance to employees (see Table 3-6), which was about 1.3% of the total 
wage bill42 . 
Another form of financial assistance was a short-term loan. Employees who had 
temporary financial difficulties might be able to obtain a short-term loan from the work 
unit, which in practice might not need to be repaid (Walder 1986: 63). 
The effectiveness and fairness of this type of poverty alleviation allocated by the work 
unit for poor employee families is not clear, due to data limitations. However, it was 
understood that the work unit had the liability to look after of its employees so that no 
destitution should occur. 
3.3.2.2.4 Public Welfare Facilities for Employees 
The work unit was also expected to provide a wide range of public welfare facilities to 
its employees. In addition to the clinics, childcare and nurseries, etc. that were required 
by the LIR, the work unit usually provided many other services that might not otherwise · 
be available. The work unit was more than an economic agent. It was like a mini society 
that looked after its employees, from employment to family welfare; from economic 
production to public welfare facilities. Within the range of the work unit, were 
barbershops, public baths, kindergartens, clothing repair shops, movie shows ( outdoors 
or in halls), grocery shops and meal halls. These services might not all be free of 
charge, but they were subsidized by the work unit. In 1978, state-owned work units paid 
41 This is mainly from the author's personal experience while living in China. 
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a total of 870 million yuan net for running these facilities (Table 3-6), about 1.7% of the 
total wage bill. Moreover, food and consumer goods sold by these services could 
provide employees with another channel through which to obtain rationed or 
unavailable goods. 
3.3.2.2.5 Preferential Employment Opportunities to Family Members 
During the pre-reform period, the work unit was also expected to help with finding jobs 
for members of an employee's family (Whyte and Parish 1984). Offering temporary 
jobs and setting up collective factories were two important approaches the work unit 
often used to hire these unemployed family members. In 1978, the inheritance of jobs in 
the state-owned work units was institutionalised by an official decree, 'The Temporary 
Regulations for Retirement and Resignation of Workers'. It stipulated that when an 
employee in a state-owned work unit retired or resigned, his/her children should be 
employed at priority by the work unit when finding a replacement. This formalized 
employment heritance was an extreme case of the social responsibilities undertaken by 
the work unit43 . 
3.3.2.2.6 Distribution of Rationing Coupons for Scarce Consumer Goods 
Some of the distributions of rationing coupons for consumption goods were also done 
through the work unit44 . Coupons for daily essentials, such as food and clothes, etc, 
were allocated according to the demographic characteristics of a family. However, 
coupons for many consumer durables, such as sewing machines, bicycles, radios, 
watches, and furniture, were mainly distributed through work units. The role of the 
work unit was not simply a passive distributor of allocated coupons, but also an active 
negotiator engaging in 'out of the plan' deals with the state administrative agencies, or 
other work units, to obtain more coupons for its employees (Walder 1986). These deals 
could bring either extra coupons, or rationed commodities, to be distributed within the 
work unit, sometimes at subsidized prices. 
42 The total wages in state-owned work units in 1978 was 4,687 million yuan (SSB 2000a: 28). 43 This policy was abolished in 1986 (Wang 1989). 
. 44 The other delivery agent was the residents' committee. 
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3.4 Social Welfare Programs for Other Urban Residents 
While the work unit took care of its employees as well as their families, during the pre-
reform period, there were urban residents who did not have work units to rely on. If 
they were family members of employees in state-owned work units, they could receive 
some assistance from their relative's work unit (Recall the dashed arrow in Figure 3-1 ). 
Otherwise, these urban residents had to look for help from the MCA and the 
community-based residents' committee. This section discusses the major social security 
programs available to these urban residents during the pre-reform era, including formal 
programs from the MCA and the informal programs from the residents' committee. 
Political ups and downs during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) exacerbated the 
problem of lacking data. Therefore, this section focuses on policies of these programs. 
Some figures are available for 1978, which are used to provide some indications with 
regard to the scale and coverage of these programs. 
The formal programs were administrated by the MCA 45 . Formal programs included 
social relief (including disaster relief), and welfare factories for disabled people 46• The 
daily administration and the delivery of these programs were the responsibility of the 
street office and residents' committee. This was because as the agencies at the grassroots 
level, they had the most updated information about the households within their 
jurisdiction (Wang 1996: 147). 
Several informal social welfare assistance programs were also administered and 
delivered by the street office and residents' committee. Examples were the setting up of 
small collective workstations to provide jobs for local unemployed, and the provisions 
of services for local residents. However, informal assistance was usually a policy 
response to transient social issues, for instance, high youth unemployment, rather than a 
reliable source of assistance for people in difficulties. 
45 See footnote 28 in Chapter 2. 
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3 .4.1 Social Relief 
The social relief policy between 1954 and 1978 emphasized self-reliance and 
community assistance before any direct government relie:t47• There were two main 
types of social relief. The first one applied to general public in the form of regular or 
temporary relief. Recipients received a monthly stipend if they were granted regular 
relief. Temporary relief was usually granted to those who had financial stress due to 
unexpected events, such as natural disasters (Wang 1996: 146). There were no clear 
rules about either eligibility for or quantity of social relief. This was left to be decided 
by the local MCA. Overtime, the program became focusing on people who had no 
reliable income, no family and no working capacity, the so-called 'people without the 
three essentials' (Wang 1999). 
The second type of social relief targeted special groups, whose lives were adversely 
affected by previous government policies. The government used the special social relief 
to provide some sort of compensations for those among these groups who experienced 
financial hardship. As a result, the qualification for and the amount of relief were 
different from the first type of social relief, and they varied across these special groups. 
The first of these groups was the so-called 'retrenched employees', which included the 
20 million dismissed ex-SOE workers in the early 1960s, as part of the government's 
effort to cut urban employees48 . Some of these workers were qualified for a special type 
of social relief, which amounted to 40 per cent of their salary and two-thirds of any 
medical expenditure. Only those people who satisfied all the three conditions qualified 
for this relief: (1) they must have become employees of state-owned work units prior to 
the end of 1959, and have been retrenched during the 1961-1965 period; (2) They must 
have had lost most or all of their working capacity, or were too weak or too sick to 
work; (3) had poor families, and no other relatives to lean on (Wu and Wang 1989: 95). 
Other special social relief groups were poor people who suffered political persecution 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), including some of the sending down youth, 
who experienced financial difficulties back to cities due to sickness or invalidity. 
46 In China, other programs are often included as well, such as the preferential treatment of current and 
ex-servicemen and their families, collecting and sending back vagrants, etc. All these programs are still 
operating in 2002, although some of them have now been substantially reformed. 47 See Section 2.3 .3 in Chapter 2. 
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The MCA's spending on social relief was funded by three maJor sources: (1) the 
government budgetary appropriation to the MCA; (2) the operating surpluses of some 
institutions affiliated to the MCA 49; (3) donations from organizations and individuals. 
There are no data available for the proportion of each component of the budget, or for 
the share of social relief expenditure in the MCA' s budget during the pre-reform period. 
3.4.2 Welfare Factories and Facilities for People in Special Needs 
The other formal social welfare program provided by the MCA focused on providing 
facilities for people in special need. This program included two parts: the first was 
aimed at providing employment opportunities by setting up welfare factories for 
disabled people; while the second provided care for other people in need, such as 
welfare homes for the elderly, mental homes for the mentally disordered, and children's 
homes for orphans. During the pre-reform period, these welfare homes mainly took care 
of those needy people who did not have any family support (Whyte and Parish 1984: 
75). 
In addition to the MCA, the government encouraged the entire Chinese society to take 
part in the provision of these services. During the pre-reform period, in addition to the 
MCA, work units, street office and residents' committees in cities were also encouraged 
to build welfare facilities for local disabled people, as well as welfare homes for people 
in need. The MCA sometimes supported these services by granting some financial 
support (Yu, Shi and Feng 1996). 
Evaluation of how these social relief and welfare factories/institutions programs worked 
is difficult, due to lack of data for most years during the pre-reform period, except 1978. 
Using the figures of 1978 for the discussion is expected to provide only a snapshot of 
the coverage and effectiveness of these programs. The official number of people in the 
target group for social relief50 was 69 million (MCA 2000: 115), which includes both 
rural and urban poor. Among the 69 million, assume 18% 51 were urban recipients. 
48 For more details of this event, see Section 3.2 of this chapter. 49 For example, welfare factories built by the MCA to employ disabled people earned surpluses. See the 
next part of this section. 
50 The target group include both of the two main types of social relief in cities and recipients in villages. 51 18% was the share of urban population in the total population in 1978 (SSB 1985a). 
84 
There were 12.4 million urban recipients. The MCA spent about 112 million yuan in 
cities on this program. Therefore, each urban recipient received about 9 yuan (about 
US$ 5.3) from the social relief program. This was about 1.4 per cent of the annual 
average salary of employees of state-owned work units in 197852 . 
From the total urban population point of view, 12.4 million urban recipients of the 
social relief program accounted for 7 .2% of urban population in 197853 . However, this 
figure does not reflect the extent of urban poverty during the pre-reform period. This is 
because work units looked after their employees with poor families by providing 
hardship allowances (see Section 3.2.2.2.3 of this chapter). This hardship allowance can 
be regarded as the counterpart of the social relief program of the MCA. Due to the full-
employment policy during the pre-reform period, most urban residents had jobs in work 
units. Thus the number of people eligible for social relief from the MCA was quite 
small. 
For the program of social welfare factory/institution, Table 3-7 shows some figures for 
1978. Overall, there were about 92,000 individuals (mainly in cities) benefiting from 
this program, with facilities provided by both the MCA and work units54 . With an urban 
population of 172 million (SSB 1985a), the coverage was very small55 . Without further 
information about the number of people eligible and the decomposed figures of the 
MCA and work units, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of this MCA program. 
The discussions of the formal social security programs administered by the MCA show 
that the target groups were . very small in cities. This was because the work units, 
especially those state-owned, were responsible for the wellbeing of their employees and 
their families. When the urban Chinese economy was dominated by these work units 
during the pre-reform era, social security programs of the MCA did not have a 
significant role in providing social assistance for the needy group. The limited data 
available also show that the amount of the assistance provided by the MCA was small. 
52 For the average salary, see Table 3-2. 
53 Urban population was 172 million in 1978 (SSB 1985a). 54 The original figure does not provide the amount from the MCA and work units separately. 55 No figures available for the number of people targeted by the program. Thus it is hard to estimate how 
effective the program was. 
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3.4.3 Informal Social Welfare Assistance from Street Office and Residents' committee 
The informal social welfare programs were provided to urban residents by the 
grassroots government-the street office, and its agency in the community-the 
residents' committee. The target group of these programs were mainly, but not 
exclusively, those outside the work unit system56, guided by government policies (Chan 
1993)57. With limited funds from the government, these organizations had to motivate 
local people to contribute to community welfare services58 . As a result, the services 
were neither regular, nor dependable. Here are two examples of these types of 
community service. 
One example of these community services was creating employment opportunities for 
unemployed local residents. In the late 1950s, the government urged the street office 
and the residents' committee to build up small collective firms to absorb the then large 
number of housewives, who had not previously been in the labour force. This policy 
was in line with the idea that all able-bodied people should work to support themselves. 
There was another wave of setting up collective firms at the community level during the 
late 1970s. This time, it was a response to the government call to find employment 
opportunities for the returned urban youth who had been sent down to the villages (Yu, 
Shi and Feng 1996). 
Another example of the informal social welfare programs was some community 
services organized by the street office and the residents' committee. During the pre-
reform period, investment in service facilities was regarded as part of consumption 
expenditure, which did not contribute to capital accumulation. Therefore, the 
government's economic plan put little resources into this sector. While employees could 
rely on public welfare services provided by the work unit, unemployed people had to 
find help from the community welfare services. Usually, the street office and the 
residents' committee built up services, such as bicycle repair, in collectively owned 
workshops, with funds raised mainly within the community. These workshops hired 
56 Employed local residents usually had access to some services as well, especially those that charged fees (the dashed arrow in Figure 3-1). 
57 Chan (1993) gives a detailed description of the role of the street office and the residents' committee in groviding social welfare at the community level during the 1980s. 8 As other social welfare activities in China, the community-based welfare supports had ups and downs during the per-reform period. See Dixon (1981) for a detailed description. 
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people in the community. Since there was little or no government financial support, 
these services tended to be small and primitive. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the social welfare system in urban China during the pre-
reform period. Because of the political upheavals during this period, the discussions 
have focused on the situation at the end of the 1970s. The main features of the system 
are summarised here. 
1) The social welfare system was designed as part of the overall economic, social 
and administrative system in China during the pre-reform period (Section 3 .2). 
In building up a centrally planned economy, the urban economy was dominated 
by publicly (including state and collective) owned work units, which were 
supposed to provide jobs to all able-bodied urban residents. To achieve the full-
employment target, various measures were adopted to reduce labour mobility: a 
stringent household registration system was the most important one. For 
administrative purpose, urban residents either belonged to a work unit that was 
administered by a level of government directly or a government agent, or a 
residents' committee that was under the control of the street office, or both. 
Employees' welfare was taken care of by work units; while the unemployed 
usually had to get assistance from the MCA and the residents' committee. 
2) Compared with the social welfare system in rural China during the same period, 
the welfare benefits for urban residents were much more extensive and much 
more generous. Compared with the community-based rural social security 
programs, the urban system was essentially supported by the government 
budget, despite the fact that the programs were operated at the individual work 
unit level. 
3) Within the urban social security system, the work unit played a dominant role. 
Employees in state-owned work units enjoyed generous social security 
prov1s1ons, which covered old age, maternity, work and non-work related 
injuries and invalidity, sickness, death, paid home leave, and a wide-range of 
public welfare facilities within the work unit. These provisions not only covered 
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all employees, but also their families. In addition, employees received many 
fringe benefits and welfare benefits, which ranged from free accommodation, 
childcare and hardship allowance to small supplements and allowances for 
various purposes. This work unit-based social security system covered all 
employees ( and their families) in state-owned work units and large collective 
work units. These people accounted for the vast majority of urban residents. The 
system operated on a PA YGO basis that was managed by individual work units, 
but was effectively financed by the government budget. It had no explicit 
employee contributions. 
4) The other part of the urban social security system was designed to look after 
urban people who were not employed in any work unit, and had no access to the 
work unit system through other family members. This system therefore covered 
those who were unemployed, had no families, and no working capacity. The 
formal social security programs of this system were administered by the MCA, 
financed by government budgetary appropriations and other sources. The 
informal programs that were provided by the street office and the residents' 
committee were mainly financed by the local community. Compared with the 
social security benefits of employees, these programs were far less generous or 
dependable. 
5) The urban social welfare system contributed to a social stratification within 
cities. Urban people were usually referred to as 'members within the system' or 
'members outside the system' (Yang and Zhou 2000: 40), where the 'system' 
referred to the state-owned and large collective work unit system. People in this 
system were at the top of society in terms of economic welfare as well as other 
social and political benefits. Employees of collectively owned work units were 
at a lower level, while the unemployed were at the bottom. Within each of the 
first two categories, people could be further divided into different subgroups 
depending on the scale of social and economic welfare benefits provided by 
different work units. Employees of large work units, or work units that were 
important in the central economic plan, received even more generous welfare 
benefits than those at small or less significant work units. 
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The impact of this stratification was two fold. On the one hand, it generated welfare 
disparities among urban people in different categories. On the other hand, within each 
category, each subgroup, and each work unit in particular, the distribution of social 
welfare benefits was relatively equal. Once a job was assigned, the employment was for 
life, the wage was fixed, and social welfare benefits were simply the non-wage incomes, 
which generally depended on age and length of employment. Since this system applied 
to wages as well as other benefits, there was no incentive to work hard, since every 
worker in the same cohort and the same work unit would have the same salary and 
similar social welfare benefits that were not related to labour contributions. 
This work units dominated social security system in urban China was challenged by the 
economic reforms that started in 1978. With the establishment of a market-oriented 
economy, this system had to be reformed dramatically. In the following chapters, the 
discussion will focus on the impact of economic reforms on this social security system, 
reforms of this system during the 1980s and 1990s, and the prospect for future reforms. 
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Figure 3-1. Channels by which Social Welfare Services were Delivered to Urban 
Residents during the Pre-reform Period in China 
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Figure 3-3. China's Administrative Hierarchy During the Pre-reform Period 
Note: R for residents' committee. 
Source: Adopted from Figure Al 1. in Zhu (1999), except minor changes. 
Nation 
Provincial-level 
Units 
Provinces Autonomous Regions Cities under Central 
Administration 
Prefectural-level 
Units 
Cities 
County-level 
Units 
Towns 
R 
People's 
Communes 
Streets 
R 
Prefectures 
Counties 
People's 
Communes 
92 
Autonomous 
Prefectures 
Cities 
Counties Urban Districts 
Suburban Districts City Proper 
Towns People's Towns Streets 
Communes 
--
R R R 
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Table 3-1. Share of Urban Population in Chines Population(%) 
Year 
Share of urban 
population (%) 
1949 
10.6 
1952 1957 
12.5 15.4 
1960 1965 1975 1976 1977 
19.7* 18.0 17.3 17.4 17.6 
1978 
17.9 
Source: Based on SSB (1999). * indicates the highest urban population ratio during the 1949-1978 period. 
Table 3-2. Comparison of Annual Average Wages of Staff and Workers in the 
State and Collective Sector (unit: current yuan) 
Year 1952 1957 1962 1965 1970 1975 1978 1980 
State sector 446 637 592 652 609 613 644 803 (1) 
Collective 348 571 405 398 405 453 506 623 
sector 
(2) 
(2)/(1) (%) 78 89 68 61 67 74 79 78 Source: author's calculation based on figures in SSB (2000a: 33). 
Table 3-3. The Coverage and Expenses of Labour Insurance Benefits of State-
owned Units (selected years) (unit: current yuan) 
Year . Urban % of total State-owned % of urban Average Labour Proportion population population unit employment monthly insurance and to total (million) employees wage welfare wage bill (million) expenditure a (%) 
(billion yuan) 1952 71.63 12.5 15.80 63.0 37.17 0.95 14.0 1957 99.49 15.4 24.51 76.5 53.08 2.79 17.9 1962 116.59 17.3 33.09 72.9 49.33 2.82 13.2 1978 172.45 17.9 74.51 78.3 53.67 6.69 14.3 1979 184.95 19.0 76.93 76.9 58.75 9.21 17.4 1980 191.40 19.4 80.19 76.2 66.92 11.60 18.4 1981 201.71 20.2 83.72 75.7 67.67 13.24 20.0 Note: a. This expenditure includes expenses paid by enterprise, institutions and government organs for medical care, extra allowances for living expenses, expenses on recreation activities, sports and propaganda, etc, including pensions, funeral expenses and pensions for the family of the deceased. Source: author's calculation based on SSB (1981 : 105, 107, 435-37), SSB (2000a). 
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Table 3-4. Welfare Programs Stipulated in the Labour Insurance Regulations 
Program 
Old age 
Maternity 
benefit 
Work 
related 
injury, 
invalidity 
Sickness, 
non-work 
injury and 
invalidity 
Qualification and Benefits Duration 
Retirement agea: (1) male aged 60, female workers aged 50, female staff aged Until death 55, plus at least ten years of continues service; 
(2) male aged 50; female aged 45, plus at least 10 years of continuous service, 
fully invalid with medical certificate. 
Exceptions: retirement was permitted due to both work and non-work related 
health problems. 
Pensions: 
For retirees, pensions were 60-90% of the salary, depending on the time of joining the revolution led by the CCP (minimum pension was 25 yuan/month59). 
Note: outstanding employees' pensions can be 5-15% higher but not more than 
the pre-retirement salary. 
The minimum pension was 20 yuan. 
Settlement assistance for settling in different places: (1) settlement allowance. 
(2) transportation assistance for employees and their direct dependants 
Medical expenses: free medical services as those who were working 
Normal: 56-day leave, 100% salary 
Miscarriage: less than 3O-day leave, 100% salary 
Twins or complications at birth: 7O-day leave, 100% salary 
Unable to work after leave: sickness leave 
Lump sum maternity allowance for female staff or wives of male staff on 
giving birth: 1 child- 4 yuan; twins or more-8 yuan per child 
All relevant medical expenses; During 100% salary treatment 
Disability allowance due to work related disability (for staffs who returned to 
work after injury): subsidies to the after -injury salary if it was lower than the 
previous salary due to the invalidity. 
Early retirement pensions due to work related invalidity: Until death 60% or 70% of the salary depending on whether nursing assistance was required 
for daily life. 
Medical expenses covered examination, treatment, operation, hospital, and 
ordinary drugs. 
Salary for duration of sickness or injury leave less than 6 months (% of Up to six 
salary): months 
60-100% depending on the length of service. 
Sickness or non-work related injury relief for duration of medical treatment 
more than 6 months: 
40-60% of the staffs salary depending on the length of service, but not lower 
than 40% of the unit average salary 
Non-work related invalidity relief: 
40% or 50% of the salary depending on whether nursing assistance was required 
for daily life 
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Until 
certified as 
invalid, or 
dead, or 
recovered 
Until work 
capability 
recovered, 
or death 
Program 
Sickness, 
non-work 
injury and 
invalidity 
Death 
Qualifications and benefits 
Living stipend after resignation from the job due to health problem: 
40% of salary; (minimum 20 yuan) 
Free medical services. 
Death due to work responsibilities, or after work-related invalidity: 
Funeral assistance: 3-month unit average salary; 
Pensions for direct dependants (monthly payment as % of the deceased 
salary): 
25-50% depending on the number of dependants. 
Death due to non-work related reasons: 
Funeral expense: 2-month unit average salary 
Pensions for direct dependants (once off payment): 
6-12 months of the deceased salary 
Funeral expense subsidy to the employees for the death of direct 
dependants (lump sum payment): 
1/3-1 /2 unit average monthly salary depending on the age of the deceased 
dependant; 
Death of the retired (resigned) former employees: 
Funeral expense of 50-100 yuan, determined by the unit; 
Lump sum payment to direct dependants: 6-9 months pens10ns of the 
deceased, depending on the number of dependants. 
Paid home 2-3 week fully paid home leave every year for qualified employees leave Note: transportation assistance might be granted for employees who had financial hardships 
Collective The unit should set up convalescent hospital, rest home, nutrition canteen, 
welfare and kindergarten ( or nursing room). 
provisions 
Subsidies for food and drink costs at convalescent hospital, rest room, 
nutrition canteen (up to one-half of the costs) and kindergarten (up to one-
third of the costs) were available for individuals with economic difficulties. 
Duration 
Until death 
Until they no 
longer 
qualified as 
direct 
dependants 
Once for all 
payment 
Note: a. Retirement age was different for workers who worked in unfavourable conditions such as: (1 ) high or low temperature, (2) some chemical industry that may directly affect health. The retirement age for male workers was 55 years old, and that for female workers was 45 years old. 1 year of service in 
category (1) conditions above was equivalent to 1.25 years of ordinary service year; 1 year of service in 
category (2) conditions above was equivalent to 1.5 years of ordinary service year. b. There were regulations for temporary, seasonal workers and workers on probation, and the benefi ts 
were in general inferior to those listed in this table. 
Source: author's construction based on documents compiled in Wang ( ed.)(1989: 488-536), Shao and Chen (1991 ). 
59 For reference, in 1978, the official exchange rate between Chinese yuan and US dollar was: 1.70 yuan=l U.S. dollar (IMF 1983). Per capita income in China was 314 yuan/person (SSB 1981). 
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Table 3-5. Urban '.Employees' Family Budgetary Expenditure in Selected Years 
Year 1957 1964 1981 1982 
Number of households 5.3 3.5 8.7 9.0 
Family size 4.4 5.3 4.2 4.1 
Total annual expenditure ( current yuan) 222 220.9 456.8 471 
Food 129.7 130.7 258.8 276.2 
(58%) (59%) (57%) (59%) 
Clothes 26.6 24.2 67.6 67.7 
(12%) (11%) (15%) (14%) 
Fuel 8.6 9.4 8.9 8.8 
(4%) (4%) (2%) (2%) 
Rent 5.2 5.8 6.4 7.1 
(2%) (6.4%) (1%) (2%) 
Electricity and water 3.2 3.8 4.4 5.0 
(1%) (2%) (1%) (1%) 
Medical service 4.1 4.1 2.8 2.9 
(2%) (2%) (1%) (1%) 
Childcare 2.9 3.5 2.8 2.8 
(1%) (2%) (1%) (1%) 
Note: number in bracket is the proportion in total expenditure, they do not add up to 100 per cent since 
some of the expenditures are not listed here. 
Source: author's construction based on SSB (1984). 
Table 3-6. Fringe Benefits and Informal Welfare Benefits to Employees in the 
State-owned Sector in 1978 
Fringe benefit 
item 
Total expenditure 
on Fringe benefit 
(million yuan) 
Average benefit 
per employee 
(yuan/employee) 
Housing 
subsidy 
4715 
63.28 
Price Collective 
subsidy welfare 
facilities . 
1114 870 
6.463 11.68 
Hardship Cultural, Others 
allowance sports and 
propaganda 
600 260 440 
8.05 3.49 5.91 
Total 
7739 
99.87 
Note: a. This number is the average subsidy per urban person, which under estimates the magnitude of the subsidy for each employee. 
Source: housing subsidy figures are from Wang (1991: 109); Price subsidy figures are from Lou (2000: 154); Other figures are from SSB (1989: 12, 372-73), the number of state sector employees was 74.51 million by the end of 1978 (SSB, 1989). 
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Table 3-7. Social Welfare Facilities in Urban China (1978) 
Social welfare home a Number of homes 577 
Number of member (1000) 38.5 
Expenditure per person ( current yuan) 553 
Children home a Number of homes 49 
Number of member (1000) 3.7 
Expenditure per person ( current yuan) 813 
Mental home a Number of homes 102 
Number of member (1000) 15.3 
Expenditure per person (current yuan) N/a 
Welfare factories I) Number of factories 920 
Number of disabled peoples in the factories (1000) 34.5 
Profit per person c ( current yuan) 540.9 
Note: a. the numbers included those facilities established and ran by the MCA and by the work units. Therefore, the expenditures came from both the MCA budget and the work units. 
b. the welfare factories included those both in rural and urban areas, but most of them were in the cities; 
c. the profit per person is averaged over the total number of employees in the welfare factories, not just the number of disabled workers. 
Source: MCA (2000, 119-20); SSB (1985b: 130). 
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Chapter 4. Social Insurance and the Transition 
Economy-Reforms of Urban Social Security System in China 
during the 1980s and 1990s 
4.1 Introduction 
Economic reform since 1978 has changed the basic resource allocation mechanism in 
China. In particular, the role of government in decision-making and resource allocation 
has been dramatically reduced. The economic transition has challenged the Chinese 
social security system. 
The whole social security system has to be reformed, in particular, the pre-reform work 
unit1 -based system, operated according to the Labour Insurance Regulations (LIR)2. 
The LIR applied to employees of SOEs; however, other state-owned work units and 
large collective firms had very similar system, although small collective work units had 
far less generous programs. This chapter focuses on the reform of social insurance 
programs of the LIR3; accordingly, the phrase 'SO Es' is used to replace 'work unit'. 
By the time economic reform began in 1978, the social insurance programs included in 
the LIR were operated at the individual SOE level, and in principle, the programs were 
financed by the SOE's current operating surpluses. Effectively, the government 
supported these programs by subsidizing SOEs that made losses. 
The economic reforms changed two important aspects of the environment where the 
LIR was operated. The first aspect was that the previous policy of subsidizing 
industrialization by taxing the agriculture sector was abolished. The old People's 
Commune system had collapsed by the mid-1980s. Market trades and prices replaced 
the previous state monopoly of purchasing and marketing of agricultural products. 
These changes implied that the state's control and the state's capacity of mobilizing 
resources from the agriculture to the industrial sector by mandatory economic plan were 
1 As explained in Chapter 3, work unit is the general phrase for any organization, including SOEs, which 
employed urban residents in China. 
2 Chapter 3 discusses the details of the LIR. and how it was operated. 3 The next chapter examines the reform of the social relief program administered by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA). 
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significantly reduced. As a result, it became increasingly difficult for the central 
government to subsidize SOEs4. 
The second aspect of the changing environment was the continuous SOE reform started 
from the early 1980s. This reform experienced several stages, aiming at improving the 
economic efficiency of SOEs, and eventually transforming SOEs into independent 
economic agents in a market economy to compete with other firms 5• These reform 
targets obviously clashed with the old, SOE-based social security system. 
During the economic transition, this 'SOE security system' had three major problems: 
1. As an insurance system, it lacked diversifications of risks. The SOE-based 
insurance could not share risks among a large population. This reduced the 
effectiveness of the system. For example, SOEs with a high retiree/employee 
ratio had a higher pension burden, while those with lots of female employees 
had to pay more for maternity benefits. In the extreme case, employees of a 
bankrupt SOE could lose both their jobs and other social insurance benefits. 
2. As a social security program, the scheme had shrinking coverage of urban 
employees, when the private sector was emerging but left out of the mandatory 
coverage of the scheme; 
3. The system prevented efficient specification of functions because each SOE had 
to be: 
a. A production-based firm; 
b. An insurance company; 
c. A superannuation fund. 
The first two problems affected the effectiveness of providing an adequate social safety 
net for people in need, while the third prevented SOEs from becoming independent 
firms in a market economy. 
4 Wang and Hu (2001) have an interesting discussion with regard to the declining state fiscal capacity in China since the economic reform. 
5 The SOE reforms in China have been well documented, for example, Dong and Tang (et al.) (eds.) (1995), Walder (ed.) (1996), Hay and Morris (et al.)(1994) and Gao (1999). 
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There are several factors to be considered for a new social insurance system to replace 
the LIR: 
(1) How to define people in need, and how much support the government should 
provide; 
(2) How to design the system so that its inefficiency impact is minimised; 
(3) How to transfer from the old to the new system with the minimum cost; 
( 4) How to design the new system so that the efficiency loss is minimized while 
providing a given level of social security. 
Both this and the next chapter examine the first two issues in the light of the major 
social security reforms in urban China during the 1980s and 1990s. These two chapters 
will describe the actual reforms related to the first two issues. Chapters 6 and 7 then 
look at questions three and four, from a more theoretical point of view. 
This chapter is composed of six parts. Each part is one of the programs in the LIR 
system, except for the next part, which looks at the new unemployment insurance. Parts 
three and four examine the old age pension and medical care reform, respectively. A 
brief discussion of reforms in maternity insurance and occupational injury insurance 
follows in part five. The last part summarizes the chapter. 
4.2 The Unemployment Insurance Reform 
4.2.1 Background of the Reform 
The first unemployment insurance program in China, since the start of the communist 
regime, was implemented between 1950 and 1957, and provided grain and other relief 
for four million unemployed workers. In 1957, the Chinese government announced the 
eradication of unemployment in socialist China, and abolished this unemployment 
insurance program (Wang, Liu et al. 1998). From then until the economic reform, the 
most fundamental form of social security for urban residents was employment security. 
The government guaranteed jobs for almost all working age urban individuals. With a 
lifetime employment guarantee, urban residents not only secured stable monetary 
incomes (salaries), but also received entitlements to other comprehensive benefits such 
as old age pensions, medical care, free housing and childcare. These welfare benefits 
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covered both employees of SOEs and their immediate family members, although 
6 benefits for the latter were less generous . 
The labour market and SOE reforms created a few sources of unemployment in urban 
China: 
(1) frictional unemployment for new contract workers between jobs, 
(2) employees may lose jobs when the firm became bankrupt; and 
(3) laid-off SOE employees who were previously employed under the implicit 
lifetime contract with the government during the central planning period 7. 
Firstly the government job guarantee was abolished during the labour market reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s. In 1983, a pilot labour contract scheme was introduced, which 
required all new employees of state-owned as well as collective firms to sign an 
employment contract with the employer. This labour contract system was implemented 
nation-wide in 1986. By 1995, the share of contract workers among total employees of 
SOEs was 39 per cent, compared with 3.7 per cent in 1985 (Meng 2000). When this 
labour contract replaced the lifetime job guarantee, unemployment became an inevitable 
phenomenon of the economy. 
Other labour market reforms included relaxing government control of wages, allowing 
enterprises to decide remuneration for employees, and relaxing restrictions on SOEs' 
hiring decisions, etc. 
Secondly, another reform triggered the establishment of an unemployment insurance 
scheme. It was the introduction of the bankruptcy law in 1985. Employees of bankrupt 
firms (including SOEs) could obviously become officially unemployed. 
Thirdly, China's economic transition, especially SOE reforms, created another source of 
unemployment. Following these reforms, excess workers employed by SOEs during the 
thirty years of central planning could be made redundant. In contrast, before 1978, as a 
result of the government full-employment target, SOEs had to hire designated 
6 For details, see the review in Chapter 3 about the social security system in cities during the pre-reform 
feriod. 
These laid-off workers were dealt with separately, especially between the mid-1990s and 2001. See Text Box 4.1. 
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employees according to the economic plan8. In addition, since these employees were 
essentially hired with an implicit lifetime contract under the pre-reform labour 
arrangement, SOEs had not been able to dismiss any workers. It is estimated that SOEs 
had about 20-30 million excess employees by the late 1990s (Zhou 1998: 69). 
4.2.2 Major Reforms of Unemployment Insurance Program 
The major reform policies of unemployment insurance during the 1980s and 1990s are 
listed in Table 4-1. These policies took time to be implemented across the country. They 
are discussed in the next two sections. 
4.2.2.1 Reform Policies in 1986 and 1993 
The first reform was the 'Temporary Regulation for SOE Employees Waiting for Jobs"9, 
which was issued by the State Council in 1986. The Regulation covered four categories 
of SOE ex-workers: (1) ex-employees of bankrupt SO Es; (2) retrenched employees 
from impending bankrupt SOEs; (3) ex-employees of SOEs whose labour contract had 
expired or had been terminated; ( 4) workers dismissed by SOEs (Wang, Liu et al. 
1998). This reform was to establish a public unemployment insurance scheme that 
provides some protections for SOE employees who had been made redundant by the 
introduction of labour contracts and the bankruptcy law (Wang, Liu et al. 1998). 
However, at the time, it was rare for SOEs to dismiss workers, especially those 
employed prior to the labour contract system, since they had an implicit lifetime 
contract. 
In 1993, the unemployment insurance program was further reformed according to the 
'Stipulation of Insurance for SOE Employees Waiting for Jobs'. This policy extended 
the coverage of the program by adding three new eligible categories of workers: (1) 
employees of SOEs dismantled by the government; (2) retrenched employees from 
SOEs re-structured according to government policies; and (3) other employees of SOEs 
eligible for unemployment benefit according to law, or other local regulations (Wang, 
Liu et al. 1998). The first two new categories protected workers when SOEs were 
8 For more details about the full employment target, see Chapter 3. 
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discontinued for policy reasons, while the last one gave local (municipal and provincial) 
governments some room to extend the coverage in their administration areas. 
According to the 1993 Stipulation, SOEs were required to contribute 1 percent of total 
wages to the social pool of the unemployment insurance program. The Department of 
Labour at the city or county level was responsible for the administration of this 
program. It collected contributions, registered unemployed workers and paid out 
benefits. Unemployment relief was about 20 to 50 per cent higher than the social relief 
standard of the city, or the poverty line (Wang, Liu et al. 1998). The duration of 
unemployment relief depended upon length of employment: for those with less than 5 
years of employment, it was up to 12 months; workers with more than 5 years of 
employment could receive relief for up to 24 months. The unemployment insurance 
program also provided other benefits: medical care benefits, funeral subsidies and 
dependant allowances upon the death of the unemployed worker. In addition, it 
provided other assistances to help the unemployed to find new jobs. The amount of 
these benefits was left to be determined by the provincial level government (Li and 
Zhang 2000). 
After the 1993 reform, the Chinese unemployment insurance program only covered a 
few categories of unemployed SOE workers. With the rapid development of the non-
publicly owned sector and its rising share in urban employment, the program would 
only cover a declining share of urban employees. As shown in Table 4-2, from 1980 to 
1999, the share of SOE employees in total urban employees declined from 76 to 40 
percent. The share of employees in collective work units also dropped from 23 to 8 
percent. Equally dramatically, the share of employees in registered work units fell from 
99 per cent of all urban employees to only 56 per cent, indicating that a rapidly growing 
percentage of urban people were either self-employed or in small private firms. With 
the ongoing economic reform, this trend could be expected to continue. However, the 
unemployment insurance program left these employees unprotected. 
The financing of the program also indicated potential problems. Assuming revenues are 
only used to pay unemployment relief but not other benefits included in the program, 
9 Prior to 1993, unemployment was not officially acknowledged in China, but was called 'waiting for jobs' (Editorial Board 1999). 
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the break-even condition for the financial viability of an unemployment insurance 
scheme is show in equation ( 4-1 ): 
(4-1) 
where C is the average contribution per worker ( or employer contribution rate as a % of 
wage bill), W is the average wage, B is the average unemployment relief, U is the 
number of people unemployed, and N the number of workers, all variables are for a 
. . dlO given peno . 
Equation ( 4-1) can be used to examine the 1986 program, which had contributions of 1 
per cent of wages, and benefits of 75 per cent of wages (for up to 24 months). Roughly 
speaking, the program is only financially viable providing that unemployment rate is 
not higher than 1.4 per cent. Even after the 1993 reform, with a contribution rate of 1 
per cent of payroll, assume that the poverty line was at 20 per cent of average wages, 
and unemployment benefits was 1.5 times the poverty line, the break-even 
unemployment rate would only be about 3 .3 per cent. 
Contributions in the Chinese unemployment insurance program are used to pay more 
than just unemployment relief. Other benefits, as mentioned previously, included 
medical care subsidies, funeral subsidies, dependent allowance, etc., as well as 
administrative costs, training costs and other financial support that would assist with 
reemployment. In 1990, revenues from contributions were 7 43 million yuan, and the 
outlay was only 187 million yuan. Only 6.95 % of the outlay was used to pay 
unemployment benefits, including relief, medical care, dependent allowance, etc, while 
administrative costs accounted for more than 33%, reemployment training costs 
accounted for 34.75%, and the subsidy for self-employed workers used 19.79% of the 
total outlay (Li and Zhang 2000). 
Despite the low break-even unemployment rate, and multiple payments from limited 
contributions, the program went through the 1980s and the early 1990s with 
10 Revenues of the scheme are C*N, the outlay equals to B*U, the break-even condition is C*N = B*U, 
which gives equation ( 4-1 ). 
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accumulating ( overall) surpluses. In 1986, the program covered 50 million employees 
but the number of beneficiaries was negligible. There may have been several reasons for 
this outcome. The first one was that SOE reform had just started and relevant policies, 
such as bankruptcy law, were not fully in place. Unemployment within SOEs was low. 
The second possible reason was, as Meng (2000) notices, during the 1990s, most out-of-
work SOE employees had been laid off (xiagang) 11 , as opposed to being dismissed. 
They therefore continued to receive a living allowance from the (reemployment centre 
of) SOEs, and were not eligible for unemployment benefits. Finally, it took time for 
people to become aware of the availability of unemployment insurance and to register 
as unemployed, rather than 'waiting for jobs'. 
4.2.2.2 The Reform in 1999 
In 1999, further reforms of the unemployment insurance program were formalized by 
the policy stipulated in 'The Rule of Unemployment Insurance'. The major reforms 
included 12 : 
a. Coverage of the program was expanded to employees of all urban enterprises and 
institutions, which included all urban employees except public servants13 . 
b. Contribution rate was formally increased to 3 per cent of wage bill 14, which was 
composed of employer contributions of 2 percent of payroll, and employee 
contributions of 1 per cent of wages. Provincial governments could adjust contribution 
rates based on the local job market situation, with the permission of the State Council. 
c. Social pooling of unemployment insurance funds was increased from county to city 
level. The reform also allowed the provincial government to coordinate among cities by 
forming an adjustment fund, with contributions from funds collected at cities, to pool 
risk among cities in the province; 
11 These employees were nominally considered to be temporarily laid off. In reality, this often became 
permanent. For the arrangement for the laid-off SOE employee, see Text Box 4.1. 12 Based on Li and Ren (1999). · · 
13 The reform was yet extended to the public servant sector and therefore they were regarded as 
permanent employees. 
14 The rate increased since 1998, see Text Box 4.1. 
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Text Box 4.1 Laid-off Workers and the Transitional Assistance from Reemployment Centres 
Laid-off workers of SOEs were called 'xiagang' in Chinese, meaning they had lost their job 
positions in SOEs. However, since they were employed prior to the labour contract system, with 
an implicit contract of lifetime employment, it was difficult to officially dismiss them during the early 
stages of the SOE reform. They were therefore not officially eligible for unemployment benefits, 
because in principle, their employers (SOEs) were responsible for their wellbeing. However, since 
there were no official regulations with regard to these laid-off workers, some of them did not get 
their wages in full. This caused hardship for them and their families. 
When the scale of laid-off workers became large (see the table below), the government 
implemented a reemployment project to provide financial support for these workers as well as to 
help them in finding new jobs, by providing training, etc. During the peak period between 1998 and 
2000, every SOE with laid-off workers had to establish a reemployment centre to provide these 
services. To receive the services, laid-off workers had to register at the centre, sign a contract (up 
to 3 years) promising to officially terminate his/her employment relationship with the SOE when 
he/she was reemployed, or at the end of the 3-year period. If they were still unemployed after 3 
years, they then became eligible for unemployment benefits. The · reemployment centre was 
designed to provide a period of transition from lifetime employment to the labour market. Since 
2001, the policy has been: no new reemployment centres, and laid-off workers should terminate 
their employment relationship with the firm and become eligible for unemployment benefits. 
The reemployment centre provided the following services to laid-off workers: (1) a living 
allowance, which decreased over time, which was higher than the local social relief but lower than 
unemployment relief; (2) relevant social insurance contributions, and (3) job training and 
employment information. 
Funds needed for the centre came from three sources, with each party contributing roughly 1/3: 
the SOE, the local government and the unemployment insurance fund (He 2000). For this 
purpose, the contribution rate for the unemployment insurance program was increased in 1998 to 
2% of total wages by employers and 1 % of wages by employees. The unemployment insurance 
fund paid 1.46, 4.09 and 4.9 billion yuan to reemployment centres in the year of 1998, 1999 and 
2000, respectively, which accounted for 28, 45 and 40%, respectively, in the total annual outlay of 
funds. 
Number of Retrenched workers of SOEs (by year end) 
year 
Number of retrenched workers (million personst 
Total employees in state-owned work units6 
(millions of persons) 
Note: a. Figures do not include reemployed retrenched workers. 
1997 1998 1999 
6.3 6.1 6.5 
109.5 107.7 88.1 
b. state-owned work units include SOEs and other institutes and organizations. 
2000 2001 
6.6 5.2 
83.3 78.8 
Source: author's construction based on figures from MOLSS (various years), on line at http://www.molss.gov.cn .tongji/gb 
Source: Based on Liu (2000), Wang and Liu (et al.) (1998), and He (2000). Chinese news on the 3rd of January 2001, Southern Urban Newspaper 
d. Unemployment relief was stipulated to be lower than local minimum wages 15, but 
higher than the urban local minimum living security (UMLS) line 16. Details of the relief 
were determined by the provincial government. The duration of relief no longer 
15 The minimum wage is determined by the provincial government. The relevant regulation was issued in 
1993. 
16 The UMLS is a new program of social relief, formally implemented nationally in 1997. It is a 
guaranteed income for all urban residents, so it is a kind of the city's poverty line. See Chapter 5 for 
details. 
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depended on length of employment, but on years of contributions: employees who had 
contributed for between 1-5 years could receive benefits for up to 12 months. 
Employees who contributed for between 5 and 10 years could receive benefits for up to 
18 months. Employees who contributed for more than 10 years could receive benefits 
for up to 24 months. 
Some features of the 1993 Regulation were maintained in the 1999 Rule: 
• Government budgets remained as another source of funds for the program. This 
showed that the government stood by to bail out the program when necessary; 
• Unemployment benefits included more than unemployment relief, such as: a) 
medical care subsidy; b) funeral subsidy, and a lump sum subsidy for 
dependants of deceased unemployed workers; and c) subsidy for training and 
employment services during any unemployed period (Kang and Feng 2000). 
4.2.3 Some Comments about the Current Unemployment Insurance Program 
Table 4-3 lists some official figures of the unemployment insurance program. They 
include the coverage, revenues and the outlay of the funds between 1996 and 2000. 
Nationally, the program appeared to be financially viable: revenues were more than 
outlays in every year during this period. As a result, the balance of the fund in this 
program was accumulated. It reached 18.3 billion yuan (current value) in 2000. 
However, during this period, the unemployment program did not cover retrenched 
workers from SO Es (see Text Box 4.1 ). In 1999 and 2000, this unemployment 
insurance fund financed one-third of the costs of the separate program, re-employment 
centres, which supported these retrenched workers, while budgetary appropriations 
financed the same amount. Table 4-3 clearly indicates that the unemployment program 
would not have been financially sustainable if it had covered all retrenched workers in 
cities. 
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Assuming unemployment relief is 30 per cent of local average wages 17, with a total 
contribution of 3 per cent of payroll, equation ( 4-1) indicates the program breaks even 
when the unemployment rate is 10 per cent, providing all revenues are used to pay 
unemployment relief only. However, since unemployment benefits also include other 
payments, such as medical care and training subsidies, the actual unemployment rate 
that can be supported is much lower than 10 per cent. 
In 1999, the official figure of workers who had been temporarily laid off was about 10 
million people and, together with the official unemployment figure of 5.4 million 
people, this represented an unemployment rate of 6.8 per cent in urban China (SSB 
2000a). However, the actual unemployment rate is often higher than the official figures 
indicate. For example, Li and Zhang (2000) estimate the urban unemployment rate 
(including retrenched workers) was about 9.4% in 1998. 
High unemployment rates in urban China may continue for an extended period of time 
for several reasons. First, the large-scale laid-off of workers will continue for some 
time. Second, the jobs of contract workers, and employees in the more flexible labour 
market, such as those in joint ventures and private firms, are more often affected by 
business fluctuations. Third, the benefits of the program are generous, in that it provides 
not only unemployment relief, but also other benefits. A relatively generous 
unemployment insurance program may provide a disincentive for active job searching, 
which tends to keep the unemployment rate higher then otherwise. 
Another issue facing the current program is its social pooling level. Funds are collected 
and pooled at the municipal level, with a provincial adjustment fund. There are 
problems associated with this pooling. The first being whether the pool is large enough 
to share the unemployment risk. When a city is shocked by an economic downturn, fund 
revenue will shrink, but outlay will rise, generating financial pressure on the program. 
The second is related to labour mobility. A city's unemployment insurance program 
covers local residents only, that is, residents with the local household registration 18. 
17 Author's calculation based on the MLS line in provincial capital citi es in 2000 shows that the MLS line 
is about 25% of the provincial averages. Assume the unemployment relief is 5% higher than the MLS 
line. 
18 This is a system that registers every resident according to residential location. The system is rigid with 
regard to changing residential areas. See details in Chapter 3. 
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Since unemployment benefits also depend upon the number of years of contribution to 
the municipal fund, people who move to work in another city will have · to have their 
contributions (both employer and employee) transferred from the original city fund to 
the new city. While in principal, there is no barrier to doing so, in practice, the original 
city may be unwilling to give up the accumulated contributions and the new city of 
proposed residence may be reluctant to accept the unemployment liabilities associated 
with new immigrants. In such cases, the costs of bureaucratic bargaining may greatly 
inhibit labour mobility. 
4.3 The Old Age Pension System 
4.3.1 Background of Pension Reforms 
The old age pension program was part of the LIR during the pre-reform period. By the 
late 1970s, the program had evolved into an individual-SOE based, 'pay-as-you-go' 
(PA YGO) system where SOEs payed pensions to their retirees from current operating 
surplus. During the central planning period, this SOE-operated pension scheme was in 
fact a social insurance program, since the government always subsidized SOEs that 
made losses. 
With the economic reform, this work unit-based pension system faced several problems. 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, there was a lack of risk sharing; the 
scheme had shrinking coverage as a social security program; and there was also a lack 
of specification of functions for SO Es. 
In reality, the first problem was shown as the imbalanced pension burden among 'old' 
and 'young' SOEs, as the former had high retiree-worker ratios, while the latter had low 
ratios. This triggered the initial reform of social pooling of pension funds among SO Es 
(Han and Jiao 1997; He 2000; Li 2000) (see Table 4-4). 
The second problem was that a rising share of urban employees was left out of this 
SOE-based pension program, due to the changing employment structure in cities (see 
Table 4-2). Moreover, this change of employment structure was accompanied by 
increased retiree/worker ratios in the public sector. Table 4-5 lists retiree/employee 
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ratios in urban China by ownership for selected years in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
overall retiree/employee ratio in urban China rose during this period, from 0.1 in 1980 
to 0.3 in 1998. This increase was mainly due to the rising retiree/worker ratios in the 
state-owned and collective work units, while in the other ownership sector, the ratio 
fluctuated during the period. More importantly, Table 4-5 shows that the ratio in the 
latter is much lower than that in the former. 
This observation reflects that both the economic transition and emerging private sector 
in urban China eroded the old PA YGO system. Since the old PA YGO scheme only 
covered employees in SOEs, old people had an incentive to stay in SOEs to receive 
pensions. However, once the scope of mobility was created by the new private sector, 
the young people had an incentive to move into private firms, so as to avoid having to 
pay for the pensions of the old. The nature of a PA YGO pension scheme is that it is 
only stable if it is centrally enforced by regulations. 
This problem of the old PA YGO pension scheme indicated that the social pooling of 
pension funds among SOEs was unsustainable. This accelerated the need for further 
pension reforms. As shown in Table 4-4, Chinese pension reforms moved towards a 
three-pillar pension system, with the (targeted) coverage that includes all urban 
employees. 
4.3.2 The Pension Reform 
The government approach to the problems of the old pension scheme was a series of 
passive responses to pending financial pressure. All formal reforms were implemented 
after experiments in pilot cities. The major reforms included: (1) in 1984, the social 
pooling of pension funds among SOEs was established at the city's level; (2) in 1986, 
the government established a funded pension scheme for the new contract workers of 
SOEs; (3) in 1991, all employees in SOEs were required to contribute to pension funds; 
(4) in 1993, a pilot project was launched to reform pension benefits; (5) in 1995, the 
government initiated a 'three-pillar' pension scheme, which was composed of a scaled-
down PA YGO system that provided a universal elementary pensions to all employees 
(the first pillar); a compulsory individual account system that provided individual 
account pensions (the second pillar), and enterprise supplementary pensions that based 
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on voluntary contributions (the third pillar). This reform was carried out in many 
different ways in cities and counties in China, with the guideline of the two alternative 
implementation methods (see Text Box 4.2); (6) in 1997, a new reform was started 
aiming at unifying various pension schemes within a given province into one scheme at 
the province level. These reforms are briefly listed in Table 4-4 and are discussed as 
follows. 
4.3 .2.1 Social Pooling of Pension Funds of SO Es 
When some SOEs found it difficult to pay pensions to their retirees, pooling pension 
funds of all SOEs seemed to be an obvious solution to this problem. In principle, as 
long as the whole public sector could afford to pay pensions to its retirees, pooling 
funds could solve the financial problem of the old PA YGO pension scheme. 
This reform began in 1984 as a pilot project in a few cities and counties (White and 
Shang 1996). The social pool was administered by the local government social 
insurance bureau. It collected contributions from local SOEs according to a unified 
rate19, and then distributed funds backs to each SOE according to its pension liabilities20 
(Wang, Liu et al. 1998). 
Social pooling of pension funds was later promoted across the country. By the end of 
1987, 67% of all cities and counties had established a pooled pension fund; by the end 
of 1991, 82 per cent of employees and 95 per cent of retirees in SOEs had been covered 
by a local pooled pension fund. By 1995, 13 of 31 provinces (including the central 
government administered cities: Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin) had established a social 
pooling fund at the province level (Han and Jiao 1997). 
4.3.2.2 A Separate Public Pension Fund for Contract Workers 
Along with the introduction of the labour contract system in 1986, a pension scheme 
was set up for new contract employees of SOEs, which was initially separated from the 
scheme of permanent workers. According to the document 'Temporary Regulation of 
19 It is not clear how the rate was determined. Presumably, the local social insurance bureau calculated the 
contribution rate as: (pension payment of SOEs + administration costs)/total payroll of SOEs. 20 At the time, retirees of SOEs still received their pensions from their work unit. Later on, pensions were 
paid from the local social security bureau. 
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Implementing Labour Contract in SOEs' issued in that year, SOEs that employed 
contract workers were required to contribute 15 per cent of these workers' total wages, 
while individual contract workers were required to contribute 3 per cent of the standard 
wage21 . All contributions were accumulated in a 'special account of pension funds', 
which was administered by the local government social security agency. These funds 
were separated from the social pool of pension contributions for permeant workers. 
The document also specified that future pensions of contract workers would depend 
upon contribution years, the amount of contributions, and the average wage during 
employment22 (Chow and Xu 2001). 
By the end of 1991, the accumulated pension funds for contract workers were almost 7 
billion yuan ( current value), which was equivalent to 15 per cent of total pension 
payments that year (Li and Zhang 2000). 
After this reform, there were two systems in SO Es: a PA YGO system for permanent 
workers, and a funded system for contract workers. The accumulated funds were 
actually pooled and managed by the government agency. The funds could only be put in 
the sate-owned bank and the return was the same as the bank interest rate for private 
· 23 savings account . 
During further reforms after 1991, the pension scheme of contract workers and that of 
permanent workers were gradually merged into the new, three-pillar scheme. Pension 
funds accumulated for contract workers were pooled together with social pooling funds 
of permanent workers, which were often used to pay pensions to current retirees. 
The significance of the pension scheme for contract workers was that it introduced 
employee contributions to pension funds, and the idea that future pension benefits 
would be linked to contributions. Another consequence of this scheme for contract 
workers, which most literature ignores, was its implications for future pension reforms. 
The dual-pension scheme required contributions for both current retirees of the old 
21 The national regulation allowed the local government to determine the employee contribution rate, with 
a maximum of 3 per cent of standard wages. 
22 The details of how to determined future pensions are not clear. 23 Han and Jiao (1997) mention that the scheme was funded and there were individual accounts for 
contract workers. However, neither other literature, nor the government document mentions individual 
accounts. 
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PA YGO system and for future pensions of the funded system for new contract workers. 
The high contribution rates appeared to be difficult to sustain (Han and Jiao 1997). This, 
perhaps, contributed later to the choice of a partially funded pension scheme as the new 
pension system in urban China. 
4.3.2.3 Employee Contribution of All Employees 
In 1991, all employees of SOEs were required to contribute to the social pooling fund. 
In the beginning, the contribution rate was 3 per cent or less of wages24, and the rate 
was expected to rise over time (Han and Jiao 1997). A second part of this reform was 
that pension funds of contract workers were combined with the social pooling funds of 
permanent workers to pay the pensions of retirees (Han and Jiao 1997). 
After this reform, the pension system of SO Es was still a PA YGO scheme. Each county 
or city had a social pooling fund, which was composed of the following parts: (1) 
permanent employee contributions of 3 % ( or less )25 of wages; (2) accumulated and 
current contract employee contributions of 3% of wages; (3) employer contributions of 
15% of contract employees' total wages; and ( 4) employer contributions of a certain 
percentage of permanent employees' payroll, as specified by the local government social 
insurance department. Since most present retirees were ex-permanent employees, 
pension benefits followed the rules of the LIR26. 
Neither the reform of pooling pension funds nor the reform of employee contributions 
could solve the intrinsic problem of the old PA YGO pension system discussed 
previously. The present and expected financial pressure of the PA YGO system 
eventually pushed the reform to move forward. 
24 See footnote 20. 
25 See footnote 20. 
26 In the LIR, pensions are paid as a proportion of pre-retirement wages, with the proportion depending on 
the length of employment. See Chapter 3 for details. 
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4.3.2.4 Reforming Pension Benefits-Pilot Projects 
In 1993, pilot projects were launched by the Ministry of Labour27 to reform pension 
benefits. In the new system, pension benefits were composed of two parts: social 
pensions and contribution pensions (Han and Jiao 1997). 
The social pensions were set as 15-25% of local average wages during the year before 
retirement. The exact proportion within this range depended on length of contribution: 
5-10 years of contribution--15%; 
10-15 years of contribution-20%; 
> 15 years of contribution-25%. 
The contribution pensions depended on the ratio of individual wages to local average 
wages, as well as on contribution years as expressed in the following formula: 
CP=(f. w, *__!_)*W*T*1% 
1 ~ T (4-2) 
where CP represents the contribution pension, wt is individual wage in year t, ~ is 
local average wage in year t, T is total contribution years, Wis the local average wage 
during the year prior to retirement. 
This new pension payment system established a partial linkage between benefits and 
contributions, since social pensions related benefits to contribution years, while 
contribution benefits related benefits to both contribution years and the individual's 
wage rank. However, the link between pension benefits and contributions was indirect, 
and the relationship between contribution and future pension benefits was not clear. 
4.3.2.5 Establishing a Three-Pillar, Partially Funded Pension Scheme, with an 
Individual Account for All Urban Employees 
In 1995, the government decided to reform pensions into a three-pillar scheme, with a 
partially funded program that covered all urban employees, with individual accounts. 
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The three-pillars were: (1) a scaled-down PAYGO component to pay elementary 
pensions to all retirees with contributions of 15 years or longer; (2) a compulsory, fully 
funded component using individual accounts to accumulated individual account 
pensions and (3) voluntary enterprise supplementary pensions. Among the three pillars, 
the third pillar is still undergoing pilot projects in the country and therefore no national 
regulations have been formalises. Major reforms have focused on the first two pillars. 
Text Box 4.2 Two Implementation Schemes of the Reform in 1995 
Method 1 was clearer and simple, with a 'large' individual account, with about 16% of wages as 
contribution. Both employer and employee contributions were put into an individual account, 
with employer contribution declining over time, while employee contribution rising: 
Initial contribution: employer-13% of wages (8% of individual wages + 5% of local average 
Wages); 
employee----3% of wages. 
Target contribution: employer--8% of wages (3% of individual wages + 5°/o of local average 
Wages); 
employee--8% of wages. 
Pension benefits: retirees were eligible for a pension if had more than 15 years of contribution. 
The monthly pension was set as a percentage of funds accumulated in the individual account, 
depended on the expected average years of life after retirement. Pensions for current retirees 
and workers employed prior to this pension reform were calculated in other ways. 
Method 2 included a social pooling fund contributed by employers ( contribution rate was not 
clear), which was used to pay a minimum pension (25% local average wages) for employees 
with at least 15 years of contribution. Pensions also included an individual account pension, 
which depends on the balance in the account and the life expectancy at retirement. Pensions for 
current retirees and for workers employed before this pension reform were calculated in other 
ways. 
This method did not clearly specify the contribution rate or the size of the individual account. In 
practice, it formed two different methods: Method 2A and Method 28. 
Initial contribution 
Target contribution 
Source: based on Han and Jiao (1997). 
2A 
Employer: 0 
Employee: 3% of wages 
Employer: 2% of wages 
Employee: 8% of wages 
2B 
Employer: 7% of wages 
Employee: 3% of wages 
Employer: 2% of wages 
Employee: 8% of wages 
Unsure as to the best way to carry out the reform, the government issued two alternative 
implementation methods for provinces and cities to choose between (see Text Box 4.2). 
The government did not specify details of the reform; instead, it left scope for cities and 
provinces to design the reform according to their local conditions. This led to many 
different forms of pension systems in cities and provinces. Most of them operated at a 
27 The Ministry of Labour was the predecessor of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS). 
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county or city level, comprised of a social pooling funds (PAYGO) at that level to pay 
the elementary pensions, and a fully funded individual account system to pay individual 
account pensions (Zhang, Huang et al. 1998). 
A pension program operating at a county or city level had two potential problems: 
• The social pool was too small to provide adequate risk sharing; 
• It created barriers to labour mobility. Different contribution rates, · and different 
benefits made it very difficult to have pension contributions transferred with 
individual workers. This meant they would incur an extra cost of moving to 
another social pooling area. 
Soon after the reform in 1995, the government issued another reform policy to unify 
pension schemes within provinces. 
4.3 .2.6 Unifying Pension Programs within Provinces 
In 1997, the State Council issued another pension reform document, the 'State Council 
Decision of Establishing a Unified Basic Pension System for Enterprises'. This 
document retained some features of the 1995 reform, especially those of the first two 
pillars of the pension system. It focused on unifying regulations on public pensions 
within provinces in terms of employer and employee contribution, the size of individual 
account, rules with regard to the management of individual accounts, and pension 
benefits. In particular, the reform required that the social pooling of pension fund to be 
shifted from municipal or county governments to provincial governments. However, it 
left some room for provincial governments in determining details of the program, for 
example, the contribution rate. The Decision also required the coverage of the pension 
program to be extended to all urban employees gradually, including self-employed28 • 
The rules of the 1997 Decision shaped the main features of the current ( as in 2002) 
urban pension system in China. These features are discussed as follows using a general 
case as an example, ignoring any provincial differences in details .. 
28 The following discussion about the 1997 Decision is based on Han and Jiao (1997); Wang and Liu (et 
al., eds) (1998). 
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The first pillar of elementary pensions operates on a PAYGO basis. The funds come 
from employer contributions. Initially, employers contributed about 13% of total wages 
in 1997. The contribution rate rose by 1 % every other year from 1998, and it will 
eventually reach about 17%. The elementary pensions are paid to retirees with at least 
15 years29 of contribution. The amount is 20% of provincial average wages of the year 
prior to retirement. 
The second pillar of individual account pensions is designed to be fully funded. Funds 
in individual accounts come from both employer and employee contribution, with the 
total of 11 % of wages. Employees contributed 4% of wages initially in 1997. The 
employee contribution rate then rose by 1 % every two years from 1998. It will 
eventually reach 8%. Accordingly, employers contributed 7% of wages into individual 
accounts in 1997. The employer contribution rate started to decrease by 1 % every other 
year from 1998 and it will finally drop tp 3%. Retirees who contribute for more than 15 
years receive a monthly individual account pension that equal to 1/120 of total funds in 
the individual account at retirement. Other retirees receive all accumulated funds 
(including credited interest) as a lump sum upon retirement. 
The management of individual account follows the following rules: 
• Funds in individual accounts are accumulated to pay pensions only, and could 
not be withdrawn beforehand; 
• Funds accumulated in individual accounts can only be used to invest in bank 
accounts in state-owned banks and government bonds; 
• The return on funds in individual accounts is credited annually, at the rate 
determined by the provincial government. The rate is based on bank deposit 
rates and the government bond rate; 
• Individual accounts (including both employee and employer contributions) are 
portable when employees change jobs. 
• Employee contributions in the account can be inherited when the 
employee/retiree dies. 
29 This included years of employment that was acknowledged according to the government rules, which 
may or may not be equal to the actual working years of the individual (Liu 2000) ( ed.). 
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The first pillar of elementary pensions and the second pillar of individual account 
pensions together form the so-called 'basic pensions'. The basic pensions are partially 
indexed to the growth of average wages annually, with the degree of indexation varying 
between 40% and 80% (Han and Jiao 1997). The basic pensions are payable to all new 
retirees after the 1997 reform, who are referred as the 'new people' of the three-pillar 
pension system. Those who retired before 1997, the 'old people', receive pensions 
according to the pre-reform arrangement stipulated in the LIR. Their pensions are 
adjusted according to the growth rate of average wages, as for the 'new people'. The 
'middle people', that is those whose employment period crossed pension reforms30, have 
basic pensions specified by the following formula: 
Basic pensions of the 'middle people' 
pensions + transitory pensions 
elementary pensions + individual account 
where the first two parts were the same as for the 'new people', while the transitory 
pensions was designed to make up for the difference of contribution rate into individual 
account before and after the pension reform31 • 
The major reforms in 1997 were aimed at building up a unified public pension scheme 
that would cover all urban workers within provinces. Once completed, these reforms 
would increase risk sharing and reduce barriers to labour mobility, at least within each 
province. 
However, the current, provincially unified scheme has its own problems. The most 
significant of these is that the government seems to want to use this scheme to meet 
both the short run and the long run costs of the program (Han and Jiao 1997; Li 1998). 
In the short run, the main cost is the pension liability of the previous PA YGO system, 
that is, pensions of current retirees. However, it is not clear in the reform how theses 
liabilities are financed. If the government wants to rely on the social pooling fund, 
which will increase over time, as employer contribution rates rise from about 13 % in 
1997, to 17% of payrolls, this does not seem to be adequate for the reasons set out 
below. 
30 The criterion is different for cities/counties that chose different implementation methods in the reform 
of 1995 (Han and Jiao 1997). 
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In the short run, the scheme has to pay pensions to current retirees whose pensions 
follow the pre-reform rules. To finance a pension scheme on a PA YGO basis, for a 
fixed replacement rate (pension/wage ratio), the fund is financially viable if the 
following condition holds: 
p * NR t=- --
w Nw 
(4-3) 
where P is average pensions, W is average wages, P/W is aggregate replacement rate; 
NR is number of retirees, while Nw is number of workers, tis the contribution rate (as a 
percentage of total wages). 
Using equation ( 4-3), the current social pooling contribution rate does not appear to be 
adequate to pay pensions of current retirees. For example, in 1998, the retiree/employee 
ratio reached 0.29 (Table 4-5), while the aggregate replacement rate that year was 80%. 
The social pooling contribution rate therefore needed to be 23 .2% to collect just enough 
contributions for pension payments. In fact, the shortage of funds has led to a few 
problems, such as demand for government budgetary appropriations for pension 
payment32, defaults on pension payments33 , as well as the so-called 'notional individual 
account' problem34 . 
In the longer run, even though China is facing an aging population ( see details in 
Chapter 6), when the middle people and new people of the pension program start to 
retire, the social pooling seems to be too large for what it claims to pay. Using equation 
( 4-3), a 17% employer contribution of payroll would be enough to pay elementary 
pensions of 20% average wages for a retiree/employee ratio up to 0.85. This indicates 
31 Cities and counties had different formulas of calculating pensions for the middle people. 32 For example, in 1999, 17.9 billion yuan were appropriated into social pooling fund to pay pensions 
(source: author's discussion with ex-MOLSS employees), which was about 7% of pension payments that 
year. 
33 For instance, in 2000, pension funds paid 166.8 billion yuan for current period pensions, and more than 
10 billion yuan of default pensions from previous years. However, there was a new default of pension 
payment of 3.9 billion yuan that year (source: author's discussion with ex-MOLSS employees). 34 This refers to the situation where funds in individual accounts are used to pay pensions to current 
retirees, with/ out regulations. During the first three years after the 1997 reform, about 199 billion yuan in 
individual accounts were used to pay pensions (He 2000). There will be additional discussions about 
notional accounts in Chapter 7. 
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that this defined-contribution ( and also defined-benefits) PA YGO scheme can collect 
sufficient contributions to pay the defined benefits for a very 'old' population, where 
every five workers have to support four retirees. Problems of the social pooling in the 
current pension scheme will be discussed in details in Chapter 7. 
4.4 Medical Care Insurance Reform 
4.4.1 Background of Medical Care Insurance Reform in Urban China 
Medical care insurance was one of the major programs of the pre-reform social security 
system in China. In cities, it was composed of the 'Labour Insurance Medical Care 
System' and the 'Public Medical Care System'35 . The former applied to employees in 
SOEs, while the latter applied to employees in all government institutions, including 
schools, research institutes and government organs. Both programs provided nearly free 
medical care for employees, and partly free medical care for their family members. 
The medical care insurance system was also SOE-based and operated in a similar way 
to the pension scheme at the time: medical care payments were paid by individual SOEs 
out of current operating surplus; and SOEs making losses received government 
subsidies to allow them to fulfil their liability of providing medical care. SOEs also 
covered the medical care expenses of their retirees. 
During the economic transition, this SOE-based medical care insurance program had 
similar problems as the SOE-based pension program (see Introduction of this chapter) . 
However, the overhaul of the medical care system did not begin until 1998, almost 
twenty years after economic reform commenced, even though pilot projects were 
carried out in some cities36 . The delay was partly due to the fact that medical c~re 
reform was more sensitive: it related to every person, regardless of age. It was also 
because medical care expenses were less significant at the time, compared with the 
pension program. Figure 4-1 shows three time series for state-owned work units: the 
35 The former was discussed in Chapter 3, as part of the LIR. The operation of the latter was very similar 
to the former. 
36 The most famous pilot project of medical care reform is the so-called 'two-jiang reform', initiated by 
the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Health in 1994, at Zhen-jiang city and Jiu-jiang city. This project 
had an important impact on the major reforms in 1998. See Wang and Liu (et al. eds. 1998) 
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ratio of social welfare expenditure37 to total wage payments, the share of pensions, and 
the share of medical care expenses in social welfare expenditure. Obviously, the cost of 
social welfare programs of state-owned work units was rising during the 1980s and 
1990s: from less than 20 percent of total wages in 1980 to more than 35 per cent in 
1998. However, the share of the two major programs of social welfare system, pensions 
and medical care, moved in quite different ways: while the share of pensions rose from 
about 3 5 percent in 1980 to over 60 percent in 1998, medical care declined from more 
than 30 percent to about 24 percent. 
In addition, medical care insurance has its own special feature: individual SOEs had 
more scope to adjust expenditure within medical care insurance programs. Unlike 
pensions that were specified by government regulations, there was no explicit regulation 
with regard to how much SOEs should pay for the medical expenditure of their 
employees. Some SOEs had their own medical clinics or even hospitals, which could be 
used to control some medical expenses. Cost-control of medical care expenses by SO Es 
included demand-side control and supply-side control. 
1. Demand-side control. Individual SOEs as well as other work units started medical 
cost control reform in 1984 (He 2000). Initially, cost control focused on the demand 
side within SOEs. For example, some SOEs required individual employees to pay a 
certain percentage of medical expenses; some SOEs set a lump sum limit on medical 
expenses for individual employees, with unused funds given to employees. Employees 
had to pay for part of excess medical expenses (He 2000). 
Since 1985, reforms of hospital services and relaxation of control of medicine prices 
required the cost-control reform to extend to the supply side of medical services. This 
also reflected another feature of the medical insurance program, the 'induced demand' 
problem. 
2. The 'induced demand' of medical care refers to the situation where the supplier of 
medical care (including medicine) has an incentive to induce patients to consume too 
37 As discussed in Chapter 3, social welfare expenditure of SOEs includes pensions, medical care, 
childcare, and expenditure for other collective welfare facilities . 
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much medical services. Due to asymmetric information between patients and doctors, 
induced demand for medical care could push up the costs of medical services. 
Chinese hospitals used to be government institutions, which provided medical services 
to people. Nurses and doctors were government employees and their income had 
nothing to do with the actual provision of medical services. The reform of hospitals 
introduced market mechanisms: (a) hospital employees' income were related to hospital 
revenue, (b) the share of government budgetary appropriation in hospital revenues was 
reduced, while that from medical services was raised. To compensate for the reduction 
of budgetary funds to hospitals, the government allowed hospitals: (1) to add 15 percent 
to medicine prices when they are sold in the hospital,38 and (2) to charge examination 
fees for new equipment and instrument for medical services (Wang 1999b). 
In the meantime, government control of medicine prices was relaxed, as with other 
prices. In the 1980s, while control of domestic medicine prices was maintained, there 
were no restrictions on the prices charged for medications supplied by joint ventures or 
foreign producers. 
These reforms clearly encouraged hospitals to prescribe and sell more medicines, 
especially more expensive ones produced by joint ventures and foreign companies. It 
also encouraged the use of more expensive new equipment to conduct medical 
examinations and treatment (Bloom 1997; Wang 1999b ). As a result, the revenue of 
Chinese hospitals from sales of medicines accounted for a large proportion of total 
revenue. For example, the share of all hospital revenues from medicine sale was 66 per 
cent in 1985, and 63 per cent in 199039. 
Cost control reform was also extended to the supply side: hospitals and the 
pharmaceutical industry. Examples included the follows: a) some SOEs signed a 
contract with a designated hospital, which was the only hospital where their employees 
could receive free or partially reimbursed medical services. The hospital provided these 
38 Prior to the reform, Chinese hospitals provided both medical services and medications. Patients 
obtained prescriptions from doctors, and then bought the medicine from a pharmacy belonged to the 
hospital. 
39 The figures are for all medical care institutions in China. However, most hospitals are in cities. 
Calculated based on figures in Du and Lu (1996: 540-41). 
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services for a lump sum payment by the SOE determined in the contract; b) SOEs made 
a list of medications and medical services that could be subsidised. Employees and the 
doctor could only choose from the list to be reimbursed for medical expenses (Wang 
1999b). 
Despite cost-control measures implemented at SOEs, medical care expenditure of state-
owned work units increased during the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 4-7). The real value 
of medical care expenses rose by a factor of four between 1980 and 1998. In the 
meantime, its proportion to total wages of SOEs increased from less than 6 percent in 
1980, to nearly 10 per cent in 1998. In the meantime, total health expenditure40 as a 
share of GDP was rising (Figure 4-2). It rose rapidly from about 3 .2 per cent in 1980 to 
4.6 percent in 1997. 
The structure of the health expenditure was also experiencing changes (Figure 4-3). In 
China, health expenses are shared by the government, firms, and individuals. While 
total health expenses were rising between 1980 and 1997, most of the increase was 
borne by individuals. Government expenditure includes government budgetary 
appropriation for public health service, and for public medical care programs, such as 
medical research and medical education. Firms' expenditure includes health expenditure 
from SOEs, other urban and rural firms, as well as rural collectives. Individual 
expenditure refers to health expenses paid by rural and urban residents. In 1990, firms 
(including rural collectives) and individuals contributed a similar share in national 
health expenditure, 38 and 37 per cent, respectively, while the government share was 
about 25 per cent. The share of the government and firms (including rural collectives) 
had steadily declined since then. In 1997, the figures were 15 and 28 per cent, 
respectively. Accordingly, the share of individual spending increased by 20 percentage 
points to 57 per cent in 1997. The increased share of individual health expenditure 
comes mainly from the rising share of urban residents. The share of health spending by 
urban people in total health expenditure rose from 11 percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 
1997, while that of rural residents rose from 26 to 34 per cent (Health Economics 
Research Institute 1999). 
40 Health expenditure is a broader concept than medical care expenses: it includes expenditure on health 
products, such as health magazines and tonic medicines, which are not directly related to illness . The 
figures also include both rural and urban areas. They are used here to approximate the situation in cities . 
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The urban medical care insurance system was also in need of reform. The old system 
suffered similar problems as the old, PA YGO pension system. The SOE-based medical 
insurance was facing shrinking coverage and lack of risk sharing, as well as soaring 
costs for both SOEs and individuals. The two major reforms happened in the 1990s. 
4.4.2 Reforms of Medical Care System in Urban China 
The first major medical care reforms in cities involved some city level governments 
pooling medical funds in 1988. In 1998, the central government initiated a major reform 
to establish a new nationwide, basic medical care insurance system. 
4.4.2.1 Social Pooling of Medical Funds for Severe Diseases 
With soaring medical care costs, it was very difficult for individual SOEs to bear the 
risk of medical expenses, especially for severe diseases. As in the case of the initial 
reform of the old pension system, some local social security departments started to pool 
funds from SOEs to share the risk of medical costs for severe diseases. SOEs were 
required to contribute a fixed proportion41 of their total payroll expenses to the local 
government-managed social pool. Employees of participating SOEs received financial 
assistance from the pooling fund when they had severe diseases 42 . 
This reform introduced an element of risk sharing into the SOE-based medical 
insurance program. However, it did not deal with the more fundamental problems of the 
old program, and the social pooling did not restore its financial viability (Qi 1996). A 
city level social pool could also generate barriers for labour mobility. 
4.4.2.2 Establishing a New Basic Medical Care Insurance System in Cities. 
After several pilot projects, a national medical care reform was initiated by the central 
government in 1998. Major reform measures are listed in the document 'Decisions 
about Establishing a Basic Medical Care Insurance for Urban Employees' (Kang and 
41 How the proportion was determined in cities is not clear. Qi (1996) states that the rate for some cities, 
including Beijing and Tianjin, was 3% of total wages. 
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) 43 Feng 2000 . This reform is aimed at establishing a basic medical care insurance 
program covering all employees in cities. The medical insurance is compulsory. The 
new program is financed by employer and employee contributions: the employer 
contribution is ( around) 6 percent of total wages, and the employee contribution is 2 per 
cent of wages. 
The new program is composed of a social pool and individual accounts, managed by 
each local government department of social security, at the prefectural level.44 
Contributions from employers and employees are divided into two parts: 70 per cent of 
employer contribution, or 4.2 per cent of total wages, is put into the social pool. All 
employee contributions, plus 30 per cent of employer contributions, that is 3.8 per cent 
of individual wages, is put into an individual account. The proportion of contributions 
into the social pool and the individual accounts, 4.2: 3.8, is roughly the same as the 
proportion of hospital expenses versus outpatient expenses of total public medical care 
expenditure in 1997 (He 2000). 
The social pool is a risk sharing mechanism, mainly paying for severe diseases, while 
the individual account is used to finance minor illnesses. The coverage of the social 
pooling fund and individual accounts is not specified by the government. In practice, 
local governments usually divide the coverage according to: (1) medical expenses; (2) 
outpatient or inpatient; and (3) types of illness (Li and Li 2000). Local governments 
also determine the threshold and the maximum amount of payment from the social 
pooling fund. In principle, the threshold should be around 10 per cent of annual average 
wages of the social pooling area, while the maximum amount should be about 4 times 
annual average wages. Medical expenses below the threshold are paid by the patients, 
including funds in their individual accounts. Medical costs above the threshold and 
below the maximum amount are shared by the individual and the pooling fund, but is 
mainly paid from the pooling fund. How the costs are shared varied, often according to 
the age of the patient and the hospital where the patient is treated. Medical costs that are 
42 Reforms varied from city to city. See Qi (1996). 
43 The discussion that follows is based on the 1998 government document in Kang and Feng (2000) ( eds.). 
44 In the Chinese administrative hierarchy, prefectural level is below province level, but above county level. 
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higher than the prescribed maximum amount paid by the pooling fund are borne by the 
patient (Li and Li 2000). 
The individual accounts are owned by individual employees. Each account is under the 
employee's name, but is administered by the local social security department of the 
government. Funds in individual accounts can only be used for medical care 
expenditure. Unused funds in individual accounts are accumulated in the account, as 
well as the return on the funds. There are three types of returns: (1) unused funds from 
current year contribution have the same return as bank deposits; (2) unused funds 
carried over from the previous year have the same return as the bank interest rate for 
three-month term deposits; (3) unused funds from a year ago have a return at the similar 
rate as the three-year term deposits in banks. Both funds and returns can be carried over 
for medical expenses, inherited by relatives, and transferred when employees change 
jobs (Li and Li 2000). 
Current retirees must join the program and establish their individual accounts. However, 
they do not make contributions to the individual account. Instead, their ex-employers 
contribute (separately) into the accounts. Compared with current workers, retired 
patients bear lower proportions of medical costs that are between the threshold and the 
maximum amount that can be paid by the social pool. 
The reform also included the provision of medical services and medicines. The main 
idea was to appoint some medical care institutions, such as hospitals, clinics, and 
pharmacies as designated institutions for the medical insurance program. These 
designated institutions and pharmacies must have appropriate qualifications, and sign a 
contract with the local social security department with regard to the scope of services, 
quality control, cost control, etc. Participants of the program may only seek medical 
services from these designated medical institutions, and fill prescriptions from 
designated pharmacies. The reform also requires that sales of medication and provision 
of medical services should be separated, and competition should be encouraged among 
medical institutions and pharmacies in order to reduce costs. 
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4.4.3 Some Comments about the Urban Basic Medical Care Insurance 
Since the reform in 1998, coverage of the basic medical care insurance program has 
increased but slowly; so too have contributions and reserves. By the end of 2000, the 
program covered 43.3 million urban employees and retirees, which was about 17 per 
cent of all urban employees and retirees. Total contributions in 2000 were 17 billion 
yuan; total outlay was 12.4 billion yuan. By the year-end, accumulated contributions 
were 8.9 billion yuan. By the end of 2001, 27 percent of all urban employees and 
retirees (76.3 million) were covered by the program. Total contributions in 2001 were 
3.8 billion yuan, while total outlay was 2.4 billion yuan, with an accumulated reserve of 
25.3 billion yuan at year-end45 . 
While the reform takes time to implement, there are a few issues that raise concern. 
Firstly, during the first two years after the reform, total contributions were much more 
than total outlays: outlay were about 73 per cent of contributions in 2000, and only 63 
per cent in 2001. It is not clear how much of the reserve was in individual accounts and 
how much was in the social pool. If the reserve was mainly in the social pool, it might 
suggest that the contribution rate was too high; if it was mainly in individual accounts, 
then the regulation and management of these funds became important. This is because 
unless individual accounts are privately owned and earn market returns, the system acts 
like a tax and inhibits risk sharing over time for individuals46 . 
Secondly, the reform in 1998 reduced the financial burden of the government in medical 
care provisions. In the new scheme, government does not have direct financial . liabilities 
for medical care. Its functions include: collecting and managing medical insurance 
contributions; regulating and supervising designated medical institutions and 
pharmacies; updating medications and medical services that are covered by basic 
medical insurance. However, the administrative costs of the scheme are paid out of 
government budget. Accumulated contributions are managed by government 
departments, and must be put into a special account in state-owned banks. How to 
minimize administration costs, and how to use the accumulated funds efficiently will 
affect the actual public liabilities in medical care insurance. 
45 Calculated based on figures in MOLSS (2000), MOLSS (2001). 
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Thirdly, the impact on labour mobility should not be overlooked. The social pooling of 
the medical care insurance fund is at the prefectural level. Potentially, this raises two 
concerns for the program. The first is whether the pool of risk sharing is large enough to 
cope with medical care expenses. The second is whether the pooling will generate 
potential barriers to labour mobility across prefectures, since contribution rates and the 
scope of payment from individual accounts, etc, are different across regions. 
Finally, the coverage of medical care leaves unemployed people out of protection. The 
coverage of the new basic medical care insurance only includes employees and retirees, 
and leaves out unemployed people, and others who are not in the labour force, such as 
children. Currently, medical insurance for family members of employees, especially 
children, still follows stipulations in the pre-reform program, which allows a certain 
percentage of reimbursement of medical expenses from the employer (Li and Li 2000). 
This arrangement is obviously not consistent with the trend of social security reform, 
since it leaves the provision of basic medical care of dependants of employees to 
individual employers. Whether the program should provide basic medical care for these 
people and how to do so needs to be dealt with as soon as possible. 
4.5 Other Social Security Reforms 
In addition to unemployment, pension and medical care insurance, other major social 
security schemes in the pre-1978 system have also been reformed. These are maternity 
insurance and occupational injury insurance. 
4.5.1 Maternity Insurance 
In the pre-reform labour insurance system, female employees in publicly-owned work 
units received paid maternity leave, as well as reimbursement of medical expenses 
associated with pregnancy and birth. The work unit paid all benefits out of its current 
operating surplus, as part of their social welfare liabilities. 
46 The principles that ensure the minimum disincentive impact of mandatory savings with · individual 
accounts are discussed in more details in Chapter 7 in the context of pension reform. 
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In a market economy, the firm-based maternity benefit program imposes a tax on firms, 
and the actual tax rate varies with the age and sex structure of employees of the firm. 
The potential costs associated with maternity benefits may affect the decisions of firms 
to employ females of childbearing age. 
The maternity insurance reform in China started in 1995, with regulations in the 
document 'The Stipulation for Trial Implementation of Firm Employee's Maternity 
Insurance' (the Stipulation) (Kang and Feng 2000). 
According to the Stipulation, insurance funds for maternity benefits are managed by 
government social security institutions at city or county level. Funds are contributed by 
employers, at a rate determined by the local government. The contribution rate is based 
on the expected number of births and associated benefits, but must not exceed 1 per cent 
of total wages. The scheme is designed to cover all female employees in all urban firms . 
Maternity benefits paid by the insurance fund include47 : (1) maternity allowance during 
maternity leave. The allowance is equal to the average wages of the firm during the 
previous year; (2) medical care expenses during pregnancy and birth, such as 
examination, operation, hospital and medication; (3) medical expenses for illness 
caused by the birth. Administrative costs of the program are also paid from the fund, but 
they must be no more than 2% of the fund. The balance of insurance fund is deposited 
in the bank and receives bank deposit interest rate. 
Table 4-8 demonstrates the progress of the maternity insurance program during the first 
few years after the reform. Insurance coverage doubled between 1995 and 1999, 
although it was still only 14 per cent of total urban employees in 1999. Each year, fund 
revenues exceeded outlays, so that the balance accumulated rapidly, and was more than 
the total fund revenues. 
If the excess reserve of the fund is due to the high contribution rate, the program has 
imposed an unnecessarily high tax burden on firms. Due to the family planning policy 
in China, females who plan to have babies need to register at the government family 
47 Details of the benefits are not clear. They are determined by local (municipal) government and may 
vary between cities. 
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planning organization 1n order to obtain a 'birth-permission certificate', before they 
pregnant. This policy reduces uncertainty as to number of births during a year, and thus 
the expected payout from the insurance fund. As a result, the local social security 
department could have a more accurate estimation of the contribution rate for the year. 
An accurate contribution rate is also important since according to the Stipulation, 
unused funds have to be deposited in a state-owned bank, and receive returns as a bank 
deposit. Since the balance of the fund does not have a market return, which is usually 
higher than the government regulated bank interest rate, it causes further inefficiency 
when the program has a large amount of reserves. 
4.5.2 Occupational Injury Insurance 
Occupational injury insurance was also part of the pre-reform social security system 
that was operated by individual work units, and financed out of their current operating 
surpluses. As in the case of other labour insurance programs, this program has been 
facing reform pressure. 
The reform commenced when the document 'The Stipulation for Trial Implementation 
of Occupational Injury Insurance for Firm Employees' was issued in 1996. The main 
regulations are discussed briefly here. 
The program aims at covering employees in all firms and is administered at the city 
level by the local social security department. It currently provides for 11 types of 
benefits48 for occupational injury49 ( details are in Table 4-9). However, only 8 50 are 
paid from the social pooling fund, while firms pay for the remaining 3 types. 
The social pooling funds are contributed by employers, at rates determined by the local 
government. The contribution rate varies according to risks associated with the industry. 
48 These 11 types are: (1) Medical expenses due to the occupational injury, including transportation cost, 
hospitalisation, etc; (2) nursing costs due to the injury; (3) pension for the injury; ( 4) lump sum subsidy; (5) costs of supplementary equipment for injured employees; (6) funeral allowance, (7) dependant 
allowance; (8)lump sum occupational death subsidy; (9) occupational injury allowance; (10) settlement 
subsidy; and (11) reemployment subsidy. 
49 There are detailed lists and regulations of the types of occupational injury as well as classification of 
m3unes. 
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Within each industry, the contribution rate of individual firms could fluctuate within 5-
40 per cent of the industry rate, depending upon both the firm's occupational safety 
status, and actual payments for occupational injury during the previous year. The 
industry rate is adjusted every five years, while the firm rate is adjusted annually. 
The 1996 reform significantly increased risk sharing among firms for occupational 
injuries. It also provides unified compensation rules for all employees of all types of 
firms. The difference in contribution rates between industries and firms within the same 
industry provides an incentive for firms to take precautions to prevent occupational 
1nJunes. 
Table 4-10 lists some figures for the occupational injury insurance program. As in the 
case of the maternity insurance program, fund revenue exceeded outlay in each year 
between 1996 and 1999, and the fund balance was more than double its revenue in the 
latter year. This implies an excess tax burden on firms. In addition, since the fund can 
only be deposited in state-owned banks, the returns on the balance are likely to be lower 
than the market return. 
Despite its aim of covering all employees in cities, the coverage of the program was 
very low at the end of 1999. Note that this coverage is of urban employees only, and at 
the national level, the coverage is even lower. The low converge is perhaps the result of 
a too high contribution rate reflected in excess reserves. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The economic transition in China had changed the institutional foundation as well as the 
basic economic mechanism that the old social security system was built upon. This had 
generated pressure to reform the old Chinese social security system. This chapter 
reviews major reforms of the social security system in urban China during the 1980s 
and 1990s, especially the programs that were related to the LIR. These reforms were 
part of the process of transferring the previous, work unit-based labour insurance 
system into a new, employment-based social security system. An unemployment 
insurance program has been established in line with labour market reforms and 
50 They are the first 8 types in footnote 48 . 
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emerging open unemployment. Programs for contingencies that were covered by the 
LIR, such as old age, basic medical care, maternity and occupational injury, have also 
been overhauled. This review focuses on the unemployment, pension and medical care 
programs, which affect the majority of urban employees. Reform policies are in the 
process of being implemented, but they have shaped the main features of the current 
and future social security system in urban China. These features are summarized as 
follows. 
First, reforms have focused on cities, with insurance programs mainly for urban 
employees51 . Rural arable land in China belongs to the collectives52, and all rural 
residents are entitled to have access to a piece of land. Access to land is regarded as the 
social security provided to rural Chinese people (Ming 1999; Zhao and Wen 1999). The 
urban focus and the employment focus of social security system are features inherited 
from the old system during the command economy. 
Second, the new system aims at expanding its coverage from employees in the public 
sector only to employees in the private sector as well. This leaves people who are self-
employed and those long-term unemployed out of some basic social insurance. As 
discussed, this is especially significant in the case of the basic medical insurance. 
Third, all of the new programs are operated at the local levels. According to the reform 
policies, the pension scheme is designed to be administrated by the provincial 
government. The unemployment insurance scheme is operated at the municipal level, 
with an adjustment fund at the province level, while the basic medical care insurance 
and the occupational insurance program are operated at the city level. In practice, some 
of the social pools of contributions are still at a lower level than the government 
targeted one. Potentially, social insurance programs at a low level may not be able to 
provide sufficient risk sharing. It may also create barriers to labour mobility. 
Fourth, the finance of the social security programs has been changed significantly, yet 
the government still plays an important role in terms of financial support of these 
programs. Compared with the situation during the command economy, when the 
51 Except the occupational injury insurance, which includes all employees in all firms in China. 52 Forests, mining areas and urban land belongs to the state. 
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government essentially financed the programs on an implicit PA YGO basis at the 
national level, explicit mandatory contributions from both employers and employees are 
now specified by government regulations. In addiJion, the new social security programs 
have adopted a multiple-funding strategy. For example, in the new pension scheme, 
there is a scaled-down PA YGO component financed by employer contributions. There 
is also a funded component that uses individual accounts to accumulate mandatory 
savings for employees. The basic medical care program has similar arrangements. Lots 
of efforts have been contributed to ensure the financial sustainability of the new 
programs. However, the government still explicitly or implicitly promise to bail the 
locally operated funds if necessary. 
In this brief review, it is noticed that some of the programs have accumulated lots of 
funds over the years, such as the maternity insurance and the occupational injury 
insurance program. It is a concern that excessive contributions impose taxes on the 
private economy and leads to inefficiency. This is especially so when the accumulated 
funds cannot be invested to have the market return. Similar issues are raised for the 
pension scheme and the medical care insurance, where individual accounts are used to 
accumulate mandatory savings. These issues are also important for the financial 
sustainability of these programs, since the taxation component of social security 
contributions often leads to incompliance among firms (Zhao and Xu 2002). Since 
these impacts depend very much upon the detailed designs of the program, the 
discussions in this chapter only provides a background for the analysis in the later 
chapters of this study. Chapters 6 and 7 will focus on taxation impacts of the social 
insurance system, in the context of the old age pension program. 
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Figure 4-1. State-Owned Work Units: ratio of social welfare expenditure to 
payroll, share of pension expenditurre and medical care expenditure in social 
welfare expenditures 
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Figure 4-2. Share of Health Expenditure in Chinese GDP 
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Source: author's construction based on SSB (2001a); Table 1 in Liu, Zhao et al. (2001); figures for total 
health expenditure are from Health Economics Research Institute (1999), and Zhao (1999). 
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Table 4-1. Summary of Chinese Unemployment Insurance Reforms in the 1980s 
and 1990s 
Time 1986 1993 1999 
Document Temporary Insurance Stipulation of Insurance Rules of Unemployment Insurance 
Regulation for SOE for SOE Employees 
Employees W airing for Waiting for Jobs 
Jobs 
Coverage Four categories of ex- Seven categories of ex- All urban employees, except public 
employees of SOEs employees of SO Es servants 
Finance Employer contribution; Employer contribution; Employer contribution; Employee 
Budgetary Budgetary contribution: 
appropriation appropriation Budgetary appropriation 
Unemployment Unemployment relief: Relief: 20-50% above Unemployment relief between 
benefit between 50% to 75% of social relief, plus social relief and minimum wages; 
standard wages Medical care subsidy; Medical care subsidy; 
Funeral subsidy and Funeral subsidy and dependant 
dependant allowance; allowance 
Other benefits Other benefits 
Duration 12-24 months 12-24 months 12-24 months 
Note: a. social relief refers to the local poverty line, the minimum living security line ( details in Chapter 
5). 
Table 4-2. Employment Structure by Ownership in Urban Chinaa (1980-1999) 
Year 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
State-owned 
(%) 
76 
70 
62 
57 
55 
53 
43 
40 
Collective-owned 
(%) 
23 
26 
21 
16 
15 
14 
9 
8 
Other Ownership 
(%) 
0 
0 
1 
5 
5 
5 
8 
8 
Total 
99 
96 
85 
78 
75 
73 
60 
56 
Note: a. Figures are based on total urban employment, including all people who worked and received 
income during the year. 
Source: Figures are from page 8 and 14, SSB (2001a). 
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Table 4-3. Unemployment Insurance Program: Coverage, Fund Revenue and 
Fund Outlay during the 1990s 
Year 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Number of 
Employees 
covered 
(millions of 
persons) 
83.3 
79.6 
79.3 
98.5 
104.1 
% of total Revenue Total Outlay 
urban (billions of (billions of 
employeesa 
(%) 
56 
54 
64 
81 
90 
current 
yuan) 
4.5 
4.7 
6.8 
12.5 
16.0 
current 
yuan) 
2.7 
3.6 
5.2 
9.2 
12.3 
Funds to 
reemployment 
centres 
(millions of 
current yuan) 
1.5 (22%/ 
4.1 (33%) 
4.9 (31 %) 
Balance at the 
yearend 
(billions of 
current yuan) 
8.6 
9.7 
11.3 
14.6 
18.3 
Note: a. urban employee excludes private firms and self-employed people (There were few years the 
number of urban employees declined). 
b. The figure in bracket is the share appropriation from to reemployment centres in the overall 
fund revenue. 
Source: author's construction based on SSB (various years), and MOLSS (various years) on line 
http://www.molss.gov.cn. 
Table 4-4. A Summary of Public Pension Reforms in China in the 1980s and 1990s 
1. Social pooling of 
pension funds 
_ (1984) 
, 3. Employee 
contributions introduced 
for all employees of 
SOEs (1991) -
5. Individual account, a 
three-pilfar pension 
program 
(1995) 
Within a pooling area cities; later 
provinces), SO Es contributed to -a social pooling fund 
accord1rig to a unified rate. Pensions:were then paid fr~ni the 
· social pool, 
·'. Employees of Employee contribution about 3%-wages. 
SO Es - and - · Accumulated funds of contract workers were combined with 
state-owned social pooling funds of permanent employees of SOEs. 
All . urban 
employees 
A three-pillar pension system that comprised: -1) elementary 
pensions (PA YGO, soci~l pooling fund at the city it co_unty 
le_vel); 2) individual account pinions · (privately owned 
individual accounts, fully funded); and 3) other supplementary 
pensions (half-:voluntary, at enterprise lelvel. Stillundergoing 
experiments). 
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Table 4-5. Retiree/employee Ratios by Ownership Structure in China 
Year Total Total Retiree/employee Retiree/ employee Retiree/employee · Retiree/ employee 
Employees retirees ratio(%) ratio (state-owned ratio ( collective ratio ( other units) (million (million units)(%) units)(%) (%) 
persons) persons) 
1982 112.8 11.1 0.10 0.10 0.09 
1985 123.6 16.4 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 
1987 132.1 19.7 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.11 
1989 137.4 22 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.08 
1990 140.6 23 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.06 
1992 147.9 26 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.07 
1995 149.1 30.9 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.08 
1996 148.5 32.1 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.09 
1997 146.7 33.5 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.08 
1998 123.4 36 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.12 
Source: author's calculation based on SSB (2001a). 
Table 4-6. Average Pensions, Average Wages and their ratios, Selected Years 
( current yuan) 
Year Average wages Average pensions Average pensions/average wages 
(yuan/year) (yuan/year) (%) 
1982 798 709 89 
1985 1148 935 81 
1989 1935 1478 76 
1990 2140 1760 . 82 
1992 2711 2300 85 
1995 5500 4335 79 
1996 6210 4923 79 
1997 6470 5458 84 
1998 7479 5972 80 
1999 8346 6614 79 
Note: average wages does not include wages of private firms, income of self-employed, etc. 
Source: author's calculation based on SSB (2000a). 
Table 4-7. Medical Care Expenditure in State-Owned Work Units 
Year Medical care Medical care Total wage bill (1)/(2) 
expenditure expenditure (Billions of current (%) 
(Billions of current (Billions of 1978 yuan) 
yuan) yuan) (2) 
(1) 
1980 3.6 3.3 62.8 5.7 
1983 5.0 4.3 74.8 6.7 
1985 6.5 4.8 106.5 6.1 
1988 15.1 8.0 180.7 8.4 
1990 22.6 10.2 232.4 9.7 
1992 31.8 12.5 309.0 10.3 
1994 47.3 12.8 517.7 9.1 
1996 61.6 13.2 679.3 9.1 
1998 65.8 13.8 681.3 9.7 
Source: author's construction based on SSB {various years). 
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Table 4-8. Maternity Insurance in Urban China 
Year Number of % Of total Revenue Outlay Balance at the 
employees urban (billions of (billions of yearend 
covered employees current yuan) current yuan) (billions of 
(millions of current yuan) 
erson) 
1995 15.0 7.9 0.3 0.2 0.3a 
1996 20.2 10.2 0.6 0.3 0.6 
1997 24.9 12.3 0.7 0.5 0.8 
1998 27.8 13.4 1.0 0.7 1.1 
1999 29.5 14.0 1.1 0.7 1.5 
Note: some cities started the reform before 1995. As a result, the balance at the end of 1995 includes 
balance from previous years. 
Source: author's calculation based on SSB (2001a). 
Table 4-9 Benefits for Occupational Injury of the Occupational Injury Insurance 
Program Reform in 1996 
Medical treatment 
Medical care period 
Nursing fee 
Supplementary 
e ui ment 
Occupational 
injury pension for 
those who are 
severely injured 
(levels 1-4) and have 
to resign from the 
job 
Occupational 
injury allowance 
Occupational death 
treatment 
All relevant medical expenses, including transportation, 2/3 
of boarding costs; hospital, medication, etc. 
1-36 months, with occupational injury allowance equal to 
the average wages of the employee during the 12 months 
prior to the injury 
30-50% of the average wages of local employees (AW) 
during the previous year 
Costs of artificial limb, eye, tooth, etc. can be reimbursed 
Pensions: 75-90% of employee's wages; 
Lump sum subsidy: 6-24 month wages; 
Settlement subsidy for those who choose to move to 
another city ( county): 6 month AW in the area+ expenses 
during the trip 
Paid according to average wages of the employee prior to 
the injury 
Funeral allowance: 6 month AW of the region during the 
preV1ous year. 
Dependant allowance: spouse--40% the ASP; other 
dependant--30% of the AW per person. Total allowance no 
more than 100% of the employee's wages; 
Lump sum occupational death subsidy: 48-60 month of 
the AW 
Note: The table does not include all the details of the document. 
Source: Author's construction based on Kang (2000). 
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Insurance fund 
Employer 
Insurance fund 
Insurance fund 
Pensions, lump 
sum subsidies are 
from the 
Insurance fund; 
Settlement 
subsidies are from 
the employer. 
Employer 
Insurance fund 
Table 4-10. Occupational Injury Insurance in China 
Balance at the 
Total employees Revenue Outlay yearend 
covered (millions of % of urban (billions of current (billions of current (billions of 
~ear persons) emplol'.'.ee luan 1'.'.uan) current 1'.'.uan) 
1996 31.0 15.6 1.1 0.4 2.0 
1997 35.1 17.4 1.4 0.6 2.8 
1998 37.8 18.3 2.1 0.9 4.1 
1999 39.6 18.8 2.1 1.2 5.0 
Note: some cities started the reform before 1996. As a result, the balance at the yearend of 1995 includes 
balance from previous years 
Source: author's calculation based on SSB (various years). 
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Chapter 5. The Urban Minimum Living Security in China-the 
Reform of the Urban Social Relief Program 
5.1 Introduction 
The initial reform of the urban social security system in China focused on the programs 
in the LIR that were employment-based. It was not until 1997 when the government 
initiated a major reform of the social relief program-the Urban Minimum Living 
Security (UMLS) program. The UMLS program intends to provide the ultimate safety 
net for all urban poor, employed or not. This was the state's response to the increasingly 
important phenomenon in Chinese cities-the urban poverty. However, this new 
program excludes poor people who are not legal urban residents according to the 
household registration system 1• With more and more rural migrants work and live in 
Chinese cities, this limited coverage of the UMLS program has potential adverse impact 
on economic efficiency. This chapter reviews the background, the establishment, and 
the achievements of the UMLS program. It also contains discussions about the potential 
problems of this program. 
The relatively late reform of the social relief program that targets all urban people is 
best understood in the context of the pre-reform social security system in urban China. 
As reviewed in Chapter 3, it was based on the provision by the government of lifetime 
job security for its employees and their families, which in practice included most urban 
residents. Associated with employment, urban people-those with urban household 
registrations were protected by a wide-range of those formally classified as social 
security programs. These included pensions, free medical care, occupational injury, and 
maternity benefits, as well as other fringe benefits and welfare benefits, such as nearly 
free accommodation and childcare. This system not only protected employees, but also 
family members, although it was less generous for the latter. The protection extended to 
the death of an employee, with funeral subsidies; and allowances for dependants. Those 
protected by this employment-based social security system had little need for the social 
1 The household registration system was established in the late 1950s and is still in place. It registers 
Chinese people as 'agricultural' and 'non-agricultural (urban) residents. For more details, see Chapter 3. 
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relief program, which was mainly used to protect urban people with no work unit2, no 
family, and no source of support from any relatives. These were the so-called 'people 
without the three essentials' (sanwu)(Zheng, Wang et al. 2000). 
During the pre-reform era, the household registration system (HRS), along with other 
policies3, effectively curbed rural-urban migration and those among cities and among 
villages (Zhao 2003). As a result, people who lived in cities were mostly urban residents 
with urban HRS. Majority of these urban residents were employees of SOEs, they and 
their families were looked after by the work units and enjoyed a generous social 
security benefits. People in need among the other group of urban residents were by and 
large supported by the social relief program, often through the community-based 
residents' committee (see Chapter 3). 
This situation was changed after the economic reform with the introduction of market 
mechanism of resource allocation (see Chapter 4). In particular, when job guarantees 
and job security no longer existed, the employment-based social security could not 
protect the unemployed4, nor people out of the labour force due to illness or disability. 
However, as long as they had previously been employed and thus belonged to a work 
unit, then according to the pre-reform arrangements, the work unit was supposed to 
support them, and thus they were not qualified as 'people without three essentials', and 
so were not entitled to any protection from the social relief program. With the 
deepening of the SOE reform, these people were often left without adequate support 
from any public resources. 
During the 1990s but before the introduction of the UMLS program, urban people in 
need could be broadly classified into three groups: (1) residents who had local urban 
household registrations5 and were employed in the public sector; (2) Other urban 
residents who had local household registrations; (3) Migrants in cities who did not have 
local household registrations. This last category included those came from small cities 
2 During the pre-reform period, once an individual was allocated to a work unit, the employment 
relationship was permanent. The work unit was also supposed to take care of the individual and his/her 
family for lifetime. See discussions in Chapter 3. 
3 The HRS and other policies that curbed migration within China during the pre-reform period are 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
4 Including retrenched workers during the economic transition. See details in Chapter 4. 
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to big cities but did not have the local HRS of the destination cities. However, majority 
of the migrants were from villages and they lived and worked in cities but did not have 
urban household registrations (Jiao 2002). 
In terms of social security entitlement during that period, the first group had the most 
generous benefits and were often entitled to be looked after by their work units ( as 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4), although in practice they did not always received their 
entitled benefits6; the second group had minor benefits (the small amount of social relief 
for 'people without the three essentials' from the MCA's social relief program), while 
the third group had almost no social safety net. However, in terms of the need for social 
support, the order is just opposite: the most needy were often the third group and the 
least needy were the first group. 
This brought about a strange situation in poverty alleviation in urban China during the 
economic transition, especially during the early to mid-1990s. On the one hand, the 
long-term unemployed, or people on low incomes, had formed a new group. These 
people, including both those with local HRS and the migrants who did not have the 
local household registrations, and their families had little or no reliable income, and 
were often too poor to make ends meet (Chen 1994). On the other hand, the old social 
relief programs, which were established to support needy people, did not cover this 
needy group, usually either because they had worked before and therefore were 
expected to be supported by their ex-employers (but their ex-employers could not or did 
not provide adequate support), or still belonged to a work unit, or simply because they 
did not have local household registrations. This gap between the need for poverty relief 
and the rigid, out-of-date provisions of support challenged the old social relief program. 
This situation also reflected the feature of a transition economy: while the old SOE-
based social relief system was under reform and employer's social security function was 
reduced, a new system was not in place to meet the need of poor people. The lack of the 
new system also hindered the further reform of SOEs. 
5 This refers to the household registration at the city level, since moving within a city is not restricted by 
the HRS. 
6
. This was often due to the financial difficulties of their work units and the reduction of government 
subsidies towards SOEs in deficit during the SOE reform. 
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The role of government in poverty alleviation has a long history in the world (Novak 
1988; United Nations 1996). Studies of various experiences show there are many 
different approaches to provide relief for the poor. Whether and how a government 
deals with poverty has economic consequences, such as impacts on income distribution, 
labour supply, human capital accumulation etc. Studies also indicate that poverty 
reduction policies should examine the causes of poverty, and the potential responses of 
the poor towards relevant poverty relief policies, as well as the overall efficiency impact 
on the economy (Hemming 1984; United Nations 1996). 
As one of the significant parts of its social security reform, the Chinese government has 
chosen to establish the UMLS program. The program requires the city government to 
provide a guaranteed money income for any local residents who have the local 
household registrations, once their household income falls below the UMLS line. The 
UMLS line can thus be regarded as a kind of poverty line in urban China. This reform 
was initiated nation wide in 1997 and had been claimed to have covered all urban 
residents in China by the end of the 1990s 7. With the progress of economic reform and 
the emergence of the new urban poor, the UMLS program has become an important part 
of the current Chinese social security system. While this new program targets all urban 
poor, it has ignored the need of migrants, in particular, rural migrants in cities. The 
possible implications of this problem, as well as other problems of this program are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
This chapter is divided into six parts. The next part briefly discusses the experience of 
poverty alleviation in other countries. Part three looks at the background of the UMLS 
program. Part four reviews the establishment of the UMLS program. Part five provides 
a preliminary discussion with regard to the assessments and possible impacts of the 
current program. Some conclusions are drawn at the end of the chapter. 
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5.2 Some Experiences of Poverty Alleviation in the World 
Many countries have public poverty reduction programs. Since China is a developing 
country that has just introduced market mechanism, this section focuses on the 
experiences in other developing countries, especially those in Asia, and on the 
experiences of developed countries during the early development of capitalism. 
5.2.1 Poverty Reduction Experiences in Some Asian Countries 
Most countries in Asia are developing economies, with large numbers of people living 
in poverty8. Poverty reduction has been part of these countries' policies. These policies 
include both macroeconomic policies and development strategies aimed at raising the 
incomes of the poor, as well as social security programs that directly improve their 
living conditions (United Nations 1996). Given that each economy has different 
economic and social features, these poverty reduction policies vary across nations. 
Given changing economic and social environments within countries overtime, country-
specific poverty reduction programs evolve over time. 
It is impossible to review all of the relevant poverty alleviation policies in all 
developing countries in this short section. However, it is useful to be aware of measures 
that have been taken in some other countries, especially those aimed at directly reducing 
poverty. Based on a United Nations' study (1996) of eight countries9 in the Asia-Pacific 
region, their major poverty reduction measures, especially those that were current at the 
time of the study (excluding China), are listed in Table 5-1. 
Without going into the details of these programs, there are a few observations that can 
be made about the list. The first observation is that not every country in the study had an 
explicit public program aimed directly at helping destitute people, such as India, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Uzbekistan. Instead, some programs were aimed at providing 
7 Based on MCA (1999). 
8 According to the World Bank's estimation for 199 8, which are based on household survey data of 
people in the world living on less than $1 per day ( at 1993 purchasing power parity prices), East Asia and 
the Pacific account for 23% (with China accounting for 18%), and South Asia accounting for 44%. 
Figures are from Table 1, the World Bank (1999). 
9 They are: China, Fiji, India, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Uzbekistan. 
Discussions here focus on experience on the other 7 countries other than China. 
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jobs, and access to factors of production, such as land and loans; others created . 
employment opportunities for the poor. 
The second observation is that many programs focused on the rural poor; for example, 
land reform in India, the Philippines and Thailand. The other two programs of poverty 
reduction in Thailand also focused on the rural poor. This is perhaps because in these 
countries, the majority of people in destitution live in rural areas. 
Thirdly, except for Fiji, the Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka, which had some sort of 
direct relief for poor families, other countries in the study did not have a public program 
providing direct cash assistance to the poor. 
Finally, there were few direct restrictions on eligibility for poverty reduction programs 
in these countries. Rather, the programs were designed to target different categories of 
people in need. 
5.2.2 Poverty Reduction Experiences in Some Developed Countries during 
Their Early Development of the Market Mechanism 
Since the Chinese economy is under the transition towards a market economy, the 
experiences of poverty alleviation in developed countries during their early stages of 
capitalism may be useful for China in dealing with its poverty reduction problems. 
In many European countries, state interventions in poverty relief started and developed 
in the sixteenth century10 (Birnie 1964). In England, as early as 1601 , the law explicitly 
recognized the right of a destitute person to receive relief from the public authority. 
Until the Poor Law was established in 1834, the duty of poverty relief was put on local 
authorities? each parish was responsible for its own poor, and 'a destitute person could 
only claim to be relieved in the parish in which he belonged or in which he had acquired 
a settlement' (Birnie 1964: 201 ). In a sense, if the church is regarded as the analogy of 
the communist party and the parish as the analogy of the rural collective, the English 
arrangements look very similar to those in rural China during the pre-reform era 11. 
10 This section on poverty relief is mainly based on Birnie (1964), except where indicated otherwise. 
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Similar to various policies in China that limited labour mobility, the legislations in 
· England at the time made it almost impossible for a man, especially a poor man to 
obtain a settlement. Each parish had the incentive to remove any new migrants if they 
were poor or had the possibility of being poor later, because they would increase the 
burden of poverty relief. In the meantime, 'the statute of apprenticeship obstructs the 
free circulation of labour from one employment to another, even in the same place. The 
exclusive privileges of corporation obstruct it from one place to another, even in the 
same employment' (Smith 1900: 122). Obviously, the poor laws in England also 
contributed to the obstruction of the free circulation of labour by effectively took away 
any opportunity for a person to move to another parish, no matter how better off he 
could be in the new parish. As Smith noticed, these policies created inequality between 
people in towns and those in counties. They also generated huge differences of wages 
in England, even between geologically nearby areas (Smith 1900). The poor, however, 
could not explore these benefits to improve their wellbeing by moving to another parish 
or another employment, due to these restrictive policies. In effect, the poor laws, along 
with other policies, effectively prevented poor people to use their labour to get out of 
poverty, by obstructing the free circulation of labour. 
In England, it was not until the 1834 Poor Law Report that a national superv1s1on 
institute for poor relief was established. However, it was still mainly the local 
authority-the parish that had the power to decide the level of the relief, and to whom 
and on what conditions it would be granted (Novak 1988). 
The legislation of the French poor law resembled that of England during the sixteenth 
century. However, the French poor law statutes were not carried out by the central 
government until the nineteenth century. Prior to this period, it was up to local 
institutions (such as large hospitals) to provide voluntary poverty relief. When the 
compulsory system was introduced in the nineteenth century, four groups of poor 
gained a legal claim to relief: deserted and orphan children, the insane, the sick, and the 
aged. In 1905, new legislation introduced a system of allowances to three groups of 
poor: the aged ( over 70), the infirm, and the incurable, with the grant determined by the 
local council within a fixed limit. Part of the cost came from the departments and the 
state, other costs from the commune. It is noticed that the system mainly concentrated 
11 Of course, the nature and the historical background of these two systems were very different. 
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on poor people in towns, meaning half of the country (rural areas) had no distribution of 
any poor relief. 
Some of the initial German poor laws were also established in the sixteenth century, 
when each town was supposed to be responsible for its own poor. However, as in 
France, a regular system of poor relief did not exist before the nineteenth century. 
General principles of poor relief were laid down in a law of 1870, which left the 
application to the state government. Among various arrangements at the state level, the 
Elberfeld system was the most well known. In the town of Elberfeld, a few (initially six, 
then twelve) overseers were appointed to collect voluntary subscriptions and to assist 
destitute persons. Later on, a compulsory poor rate was introduced to finance the 
program. In this system, each application for poor relief was handled by an appointed 
visitor, who assisted the overseers by supplying written reports on the cases under 
consideration. The application and the visitor's report were then handed to the district 
council for approval. In addition, the visitor was responsible for examining the use of 
the relief, as well as visiting the recipient family regularly to check any changes of 
circumstances, if the recipient applied for further relief. 
The experience in these developed countries shows that it takes a long time to recognize 
and form a formal public poor relief program. During the process, national legislation 
and supervision would help the reinforcement of the claim of the poor on the public 
authorities at the local or the national level. Given the fact that these countries still fight 
with poverty today, it indicates that poverty is very likely to be a long-term 
phenomenon. Public poverty alleviation programs need to consider both the poverty 
reduction effects in the short run, and incentive impacts in the long run. Their 
experiences of having poverty reduction administered by local authorities demonstrate 
that a locally based poverty reduction system may hinder labour mobility, and impose 
costs of economic efficiency on the whole economy. 
5.3 The Background of the UMLS Program in Urban China 
During the pre-reform period (1949-1978), with the HRS and other policies, migration 
in China was effectively curbed (See Chapter 3 and Zhao 2003) and almost all urban 
residents had their local household registrations. The social security system in cities was 
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designed to cover only these legal urban residents. It targeted two distinct groups among 
these residents: the majorities who belonged to work units, and the very small 
proportion who did not12 . Since the family was the basic unit for social security 
assistance, families with at least one member employed were supposed to be taken care 
of by the work unit. For these urban residents, there was a comprehensive social 
security system, which by the late 1970s was funded and administered by individual 
work units. This work unit-based social security system covered the vast majority of 
urban residents 13 . For the rest of the urban population, the main public security service 
was the social relief program, financed by the government, and administered by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA). The target for this social relief program was mainly 
limited to those legally registered urban people who did not have any of the 'three 
essentials': family, work unit, and source of stable income for a living. The number of 
people who were eligible for social relief was very small. This phenomenon remained 
until the introduction of the UMLS program in the mid-1990s (Tang 1998). 
Table 5-2 shows the situation for regular relief under the urban social relief program 14• 
From the mid- l 980s to the mid- l 990s, only a small number of urban residents received 
regular social relief from the MCA. In most of these years, recipients accounted for less 
than 0.1 per cent of urban population. Government expenditure on the social relief 
program was also small 15. For example, in 1992, total expenditure for this program was 
only 87 .4 million yuan. On average, each recipient received 3 8 yuan per month, which 
was equivalent to 25 per cent of urban per capita income that year (Tang 1998). This 
total expenditure accounted for 0.003% of GDP, 16 and 0.03% of budgetary revenue17 
that year. 
12 See Chapter 3. 
13 As illustrated in Table 2-3, in 1978, about 80% of urban employees in state-owned and large collective 
work units (and their families) were covered by the LIR (or similar programs). Employees in small 
collective work units had similar but less generous social security programs. 
14 As discussed in Chapter 3, the social relief program included the relief for special groups, especially 
those whose poverty was due to government policies. For example, it covered workers that bad been 
retrenched in the early 1960s. 
15 Detailed figures for the program over the years are not available. 
16 Calculated .based on GDP figures in SSB (1999). 
17 Calculated based on government revenue figures in Lou (2000) . 
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The social relief program was only one of the social security programs administered by 
the MCA18 . Other programs included providing: jobs in welfare factories to disabled 
people; welfare homes for orphans, aged people without families, and people with 
mental illness; disaster relief; as well as assistance to veterans and their dependents. 
Among these programs, the social relief program came under increasing pressure 
following the economic reform, because its potential recipients had changed. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, economic reform in China, especially labour market reforms 
and the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), have undermined the old work unit-
based social security system in cities. Following these reforms, the government job 
guarantee and lifetime employment arrangements collapsed; the private sector has been 
growing while the public sector has been shrinking. Within the public sector, reforms 
have been aimed at releasing ·firms from the obligations of providing social security 
services to their employees. In summary, before the establishment of the UMLS 
program during the period between the early and the mid-1990s, the following groups 
of people could potentially fall below the poverty line in cities. 
(1) Unemployed, especially long-term unemployed people and their families. 
Competition in the labour market and structural adjustments of the economy under the 
transition inevitability bring unemployment. People who were employed outside the 
public sector were particularly vulnerable, since the unemployment insurance did not 
cover them (see Chapter 4). Since the early 1990s, the SOE reform has deepened and a 
large number of employees of SOEs were laid-off. Although these workers no longer 
worked for the SOEs, they were not immediately regarded as officially unemployed. 
Instead, they were looked after by the reemployment centres within SOEs for a period 
up to three years or until they found another job. During this period, they received 
living stipend and other social insurance benefits (see Text Box 4.1 in Chapter 4). 
However, income of these laid-off workers was often reduced significantly and they and 
their families might experience hardship. 
18 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the MCA also manages other civil affairs and services, such as burial 
services, marriage and dependents services; civil education and public administration, etc (Shao and Chen 
1991). 
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(2) Poor family members of employed people. Reform of SOEs meant that firms were 
no longer required to take care of the poor families of their employees and retirees. Poor 
families of employees and retirees had no resort for help, under the old arrangement, 
from the urban social relief system. These families, usually having members on low 
wages, and/or with high dependency ratios (the ratio of dependants and income earners 
of the family), or with disabled family members, were the most vulnerable. Their basic 
living could be threatened by many factors, such as diseases. 
(3) Inflation could drag some low-income families into absolute poverty. When wages 
and pensions were not indexed to the cost of living, inflation significantly reduces 
people's living standards. Figure 5-1 shows annual inflation rates in China during the 
1980s and 1990s, as measured by the urban consumer price index. During the period 
between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, the annual inflation rate reached over 20%. 
Since there was no mechanism at the time to index wages and pensions to the cost of 
living, these rapid rises in living costs pushed many urban families into poverty (Tang 
· 1998). 
( 4) The previous three groups of vulnerable people in urban China were legal residents 
of cities. Another, even more vulnerable, group had emerged in cities since the mid-
1980s. They were mostly rural migrants who did not have the local household 
registrations. Migration ,vithin China, especially from poor to rich areas, and from 
villages to cities started in the 1980s, as a result of the relaxation of de facto controls 
over migration followed the reforms (Nolan 1993). Most of these migrants were 'poorly 
educated, relying mainly on physical strength to ensure employment' (Nolan 1993: 
1373). It is also found that city governments were very reluctant to grant permanent 
rights . of settlement-local household registration-to migrants 'for fear that this will 
impose a long-term burden on welfare resources' (Nolan 1993: 1373). These migrants 
did not have the legal rights to stay in cities and were often discriminated against in 
employment ( especially in the public sector), and usually worked in very poor working 
conditions with little or no labour protection. The lack of legal residency also excluded 
them from social security benefits that were available to legal residents from the city 
government where they stayed (Zhao 2003). 
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These vulnerable groups became large with the progress of reform, especially since the 
early 1990s. For instance, Table 5-3 lists official figures of registered unemployment19 
and laid-off workers in urban China during the 1990s. Clearly, there was a rising trend 
of unemployment rates in cities during this period. The table also lists official figures of 
laid-off workers from 1996 to 1999, which include only those laid-off employees who 
were not reemployed at year-end. The actual number of laid-off workers, including 
those found new jobs later, was obviously even larger. Table 5-3 shows that the 
proportion of urban people who did not have jobs, including both the registered 
unemployed and laid-off workers, in urban labour force was around 7% in 1990 as well 
as during the late 1990s. The actual figures could be higher, for example, some 
unemployed did not register with the government. Both the officially unemployed 
people, who were eligible for up to 24 months unemployment benefits if they were 
qualified (see Chapter 4), and laid-off workers, who only received a living stipend for 
up to three years, and their families could easily fall into poverty if they had not already 
done so. A study of Zhang and Wei (1999) using urban household survey20 data in 1988 
and 1995 finds that (head count) poverty incidence21 increased from 4.2% in 1988 to 
11.25% in 1995. In addition to the poverty among legal urban residents, the number of 
rural migrants in cities was also rising and their income were more likely to be lower 
and unstable (see more discussions in Section 5.5.2). 
Studies of poverty among legal urban residents also indicate that the composition of 
these poor families has changed (Atinc 1997; Li, Chen et al. 1999). In addition to the 
'traditional' recipients of the social relief program, that is, those who have been 
receiving support from the urban social relief program prior to the reforms, a very large 
proportion of urban poor come from families of low-income employees and retirees. 
Table 5-4 summarizes figures from surveys about urban poor in China conducted by the 
local MCA in some cities and provinces. The main observation from this table is that 
only a relatively small proportion of the urban poor were 'traditional' recipients of the 
social relief program, while poor employees, retirees and their families dominated the 
urban poverty group in the late 1990s. For example, in Xining city, more than 50% of 
19 The official figures of unemployment only include those urban residents with local household 
registrations and were registered as unemployed. Laid-off workers of SO Es were not included. 
20 Both household surveys were designed by China Academy of Social Science (CASS) and conduced by 
the urban survey team of the State Statistical Bureau of China. 
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the urban poor were employees and retirees and their families. In Hebei province, more 
than three quarters of urban poor were employees and retirees. Part of the reasons why 
workers were below the poverty line was the default on wages and pensions by some 
SOEs that had financial difficulties. Table 5-5 shows some figures for urban 
employees/retirees whose employers had partially or fully defaulted on their 
wages/pensions ( at year end) for selected years. Without further information about these 
defaults, such as duration and amount, it is impossible to estimate their impact on these 
people and their families' living standards. However, one can imagine that these defaults 
could have caused hardship for both these employees/retirees and their family members. 
In addition to its limited coverage, the old social relief program had another problem: 
the amount of assistance provided was very limited. For example, in 1994, poor family 
relief was 421 yuan per person, which was only 14 per cent of per capita annual income 
in cities that year (Wang 1996). 
Although the scale of urban new poor had become significant by the mid-1990s, the old 
social relief program did not provide much protection. Social and, particularly, political 
pressure pushed for government to respond to the problem of the emerging urban 
poverty and to reform the old safety net. The UMLS program was introduced in the late 
1990s, followed experiments in a few cities. Its target group is poor urban residents who 
have local household registrations, regardless of age, working capacity, employment 
status, and employment history. However, the program does not cover migrants in cities 
who are not legally recognised as residents. This is an important defect of the program, 
which will be discussed further later in this chapter. 
5.4 The Urban Minimum Living Security (UMLS) Program 
This new social safety net program was initiated in Shanghai, one of the biggest cities in 
China, by the municipal government in 1993. Shanghai's experience was later extended 
to all urban areas by the central government in September 1997 (Zheng, Wang et al. 
2000). By 1999, the program had been implemented in all city areas and counties22, and 
21 They choose the formula designed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) to calculate the poverty 
incidence. The poverty line is based on food consumption. 
22 Based on MCA (2000b ). 
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the 'Regulations for Urban Resident's Minimum Living Security' (the Regulation) was 
implemented as the national legislation for the program (Kang and Feng 2000). The 
Regulation stipulates sources of funds, the coverage of the program, and eligibility for 
relief. It also defines the meaning of 'the minimum living security'. The MCA is 
responsible for the national administration and supervision of the program. Each city 
government is responsible for the implementation of the Regulation, including 
determining the local UMLS level and delivering the cash assistance, with regulations 
and coordination by the provincial government. 
According to the Regulation, the amount of relief for an UMLS recipient family is 
calculated by the following formula: 
Total relief in yuan = Local UMLS line * number of household members - Total 
calculated household income 
(5-1) 
The 'total calculated household income' may not be the same as the 'total actual 
household income'. How to define this term obviously has important implications for 
the effectiveness of the poverty relief program, both for recipients and for the local 
government. This and other relevant issues of the program are explained in details 
below. 
5.4.1 Establishing the Right of Legal Urban Residents to Claim for Poor Relief 
The Regulation establishes the legal right of the local urban poor-those who have the 
city's household registrations-to claim from their local authority? the city 
government? for the defined minimum living security, if their household per capita 
income23 is below the specified level. Similar to the British poor relief system before 
the 20th century, in this program, the poor can only claim on their local authority-the 
city government where their household registration is-in the Chinese administrative 
hierarchy. In China, the municipal government can easily identify whether the residents 
have the legal right for a claim or not by checking their household registration. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, Chinese households are broadly grouped into 'agriculture 
23 The income is defined broadly, including both incomes in cash and in kind, etc. It is discussed further 
later in this section. 
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registration' and 'non-agriculture (urban) registration'. In each group, as legal local · 
residents, each household is also registered locally in village and county for those with 
agriculture registration, or town and city for those with urban registration. Migration 
has always been difficult, especially if people wanted to change their household 
registration. For example, people registered as Beijing resident want to move and settle 
down in another city, say Nanjing, must apply through the public security bureau in 
Nanjing, to be registered as Nanjing residents. If they do not apply or fail to be accepted 
as Nanjing residents, they will not be eligible for the UMLS relief from the Nanjing 
government, even if their household income is below N anjing's UMLS line and they 
physically live in Nanjing. 
From a migrant's point of view, although the de facto control over migration has been 
relaxed since the economic reform, and a large number of migrants have moved to cities 
to find jobs, obtaining the legal residency in the city they live is still very difficult and 
rare (Nolan 1993; Li 2001). Without local household registration, migrants have no 
legal right to claim for support on the local authority where they live. For migrants who 
are legal residents of other cities, they have access to the UMLS support from their city 
of origin where their household registration is located. For migrants who hold 
agricultural registration back in their villages, they have no legal right to any UMLS 
safety net24. For these people, their last resort is to go back to their village of origin and 
live on the piece of land they rent from the village (Wen 2000; Zhao and Wen 1999). 
This feature of the current UMLS program that the city government only provides poor 
relief to households with local household registrations has some important implications. 
These will be discussed in Section 5.5. 
In practice, there is some exclusion with regard to those who have broken government 
rules, or those who are clearly not poor. The main categories of poor people that were 
excluded in some cities/counties in 1998 are summarized as follows25 (Zhou 1999): 
24 There are few cities have extended their UMLS to nearby rural areas during recent years. One example 
is Beijing City. 
25 The categories are summarized by the author based on government documents for selected cities in 
1998. 
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•!• Unemployed or laid-off workers who had twice refused to take up jobs found by 
the re-employment centre; 
•!• Households that had violated the one-child policy; 
•!• Households that had become poor due to the criminal behaviour of their 
members; 
•!• Households that had luxury consumer goods valued at more than 3000 yuan, and 
households that owned cash, bank deposits and securities with a total value of 
more than 1200 yuan26 . 
According to the Marriage Law in China, there are three main obligations of financial 
support among family members (Gao 2000): (1) parents are liable for bringing up their 
children, and children are liable for their parents in old age. Thus, parents are supposed 
to look after their children who are not yet grown up, while grown-up children have a 
financial obligation to support their parents, if the parents' income is low; (2) 
grandparents have an obligation to · support grandchildren whose parents pass away; and 
grandchildren have an obligation to support grandparents whose children pass away; (3) 
grown-up siblings are liable to support under-age siblings, if the parents pass away or 
the parents do not have the capability to support these young children. 
The stipulation about financial support among family members affects a household's 
eligibility to receive poor relief. To make thing seven more complicated, the Marriage 
Law does not specify how much these financial liabilities should be, and this leaves 
loopholes in practice. Many city governments stipulate that only when people with 
liabilities cannot afford to pay, that is, when their own household income is below the 
city's UMLS line, does the liability no longer apply. Otherwise, the part of the 
household income that is above the local UMLS should be paid to their legal 
dependants whose incomes are below the UMLS level. In practice, how much and 
whether the liabilities are actually paid adds another complication to calculating 
household income. 
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5.4.2 Calculating Household Incomes 
By the definition of the Regulation, the 'total calculated household income' includes all 
actual monetary and in-kind incomes of all household members, as well as all sorts of 
income that household members are entitled to according to relevant laws and 
legislations, such as the Marriage Law. Finding the 'total calculated household income' 
is complicated, not only because the detailed definition varies across cities, but also 
because it often includes both actual and entitled income. Taking Hefei City as an 
example27, household incomes include wages, bonuses, inheritance, price subsidies, 
pensions, unemployment benefits, medical insurance benefits, incomes from other 
social welfare programs, all other labour income, gifts, income from portfolio and bank 
deposits, income from relatives who have the legal liability to support the family 
members, college student living subsidy, and income from student's part-time jobs. 
Among this list, there are some types of income that need to be explained further. For 
instance, it is assumed that people who are employed or retired do indeed receive their 
entitled wages or pensions, which are equal to or above · local minimum wages28 . In 
other words, the assumption is that all employers abide by the minimum wage law. It is 
also assumed that laid-off workers receive · their minimum living stipend from the 
reemployment center and unemployed people receive unemployment benefits29. In 
addition, during 1998 and 1999, some cities assumed all able-bodied males aged 
between 18 and 60, and females aged between 18 and 55 received the local minimum 
wage, on the grounds that people might not be honest about their actual income from 
self-employment or part-time jobs (Liao 1999; Wang 1999a; Liao 2000). Although 
there were people who hid their incomes, these assumptions could have led to over-
estimation of actual household incomes for people who were unemployed or worked at 
lower than the minimum wages. As shown in Table 5-5, there are large numbers of laid-
off workers and retirees who did not receive full wages or pensions during the 1990s, 
26 3000 yuan= US $360, 1200 yuan= US $145 in 1998, according to the official exchange rate. 
27 Hefei is the capital city of Anhui Province, located at East China. The information comes from author's 
interview with local MCA officials during the fieldtrip in February 2001. 
28 The Ministry of Labour issued 'Regulations for Minimum Wages of Firms' in 1993 (Kang and Feng 
2000). The minimum wages are determined by the provincial government. It is not clear how extensively 
this legislation has been reinforced at firm's level. However, the UMLS line is supposed to be lower than 
the local minimum wages. 
29 Details of minimum living stipend from the reemployment centre and unemployment benefits are 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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and some might receive nothing at all (Wang 1999a; Gao 2000). This assumption of full 
employment and full compliance with the minimum wage standards certainly would 
contribute to overestimation of household incomes. 
5.4.3 The Level of Urban Minimum Living Security 
The UMLS line, or the level of Urban Minimum Living Security, is determined by the 
city government. According to the definition of the Regulation, it includes the cost of 
basic food, clothing and shelter, with some consideration of the daily expenses of water 
and electricity, as well as children's compulsory education costs. It should be stressed 
that the UMLS is only designed to help the poorest households to survive, by providing 
the minimum subsistence need. It does not include expenditure such as medical 
services. 
There is no nationwide formula for calculating the UMLS level. Since the program was 
established, local UMLS lines have been increased, despite relatively stable living costs 
in cities over this period30 . For example, the UMLS line in Beijing, which was 179 
yuan/month per person in 1998, was adjusted to 290 yuan/month per person by July 
2002. Among 35 other cities (including most capital cities) that adjusted their local 
UMLS lines in July 2002, the lowest was 143 yuan/month per person (Nanchang City), 
and the highest was 344 yuan/month per person (Shenzhen City), with an average level 
at 207 yuan/month per person31 . 
The central government may intervene in the determination of UMLS of cities. For 
example, the State Council ordered municipal governments to raise the UMLS 
standards by 30 per cent in July 1999, as part of ongoing efforts to increase domestic 
demand (Zheng, Wang et al. 2000). 
The UMLS standard varies from city to city, due to the significant and increasing gap 
between regional development and standard of living (Zhao, Li and Riskin 1999; Lin 
2000). The second column of Table 5-6 lists the UMLS line in 1999 for capital cities of 
30 Urban CPI for the four years between 1998 and 2001 is 100, 98.7, 99.5 and 100, respectively (SSB, 
2001; SSB 2002). In 1998, the exchange rate between Chinese yuan and US dollar was $l=yuan 8.28. 
31 The figure for 1998 is from Zheng, Wang et al. ( eds.) (2000). Figures for 2002 are from MCA (2002a). 
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Chinese provinces. The highest level was 312 yuan/month in Guangdong, while the 
lowest level was only 130 yuan/month in Ningxia and Jiangxi. Whether the provision is 
adequate for the urban poor requires careful studies using more detailed information of 
individual households. 
5.4.4 Financing the UMLS Program 
The source of funds for the UMLS program is municipal government's budgetary 
revenues. Each city determines its own UMLS level and pays the poverty relief through 
local MCA bureaus. In practice, during the first few years of the program, many local 
governments, especially those in large cities, shared the cost with lower level 
authorities. For example, some municipal governments and district govemments32 
shared the costs of the program in the proportion of 7:3 or 6:4 (Liao 1999; Gao 2000). 
There were also cities (such as Beijing and Liuzhou) that required work units to pay 
UMLS recipients who were their employees/retirees. However, by 2000, this 
· phenomenon had been largely corrected. 
The central government has been standing by to help local governments in establishing 
the UMLS program, especially in those provinces where the local governments have 
difficulties in meeting the demand for poverty relief (Liao 1999). For example, 
budgetary appropriations from the central to lower level governments for the UMLS 
program were 0.4 billion yuan in 1999. This accounted for 17 per cent of total poverty 
relief from the program that year33 . 
There are reports that due to tight budgets, some local governments had to reduce the 
level of the UMLS (Wang 1999a). A survey was conducted in April 1998 in 2234 out of 
31 provinces in China. The UMLS chosen was between 70 to 120 yuan/month per 
person, whereas? according to the central government regulation-it was supposed to 
cover estimated minimum living costs, which were between 90 and 150 yuan/month per 
person. The survey also showed that only 910 out of 2600 thousands, or 35 percent of 
32 The urban administrative hierarchy has not changed since the economic reform. See Figure 3-3 for the 
urban system. 
33 Calculated based on figures from the MCA (2000c). 
34 The 22 provinces did not include rich provinces and cities under central administration, such as 
Guangdong and Shanghai. 
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poor people who would have been recipients of the program actually received any 
assistance35 . It seems that in 1998, the UMLS program was not effective in helping all 
poor families. The major reason was the lack of funds at the municipal government 
level. 
5.5 A Preliminary Assessment of the UMLS Program 
A formal and comprehensive assessment of the impacts of the current UMLS program 
needs, at least, to examine its effectiveness of poverty reduction as well as its influences 
in the labour market. This requires appropriate data, especially at the household level. 
Due to the lack of such data, this section only provides some preliminary evaluations of 
the program. Firstly, some aggregate figures are used to show how the program 
expanded during the first few years after it was implemented. It is followed by some 
analysis of two important defects of the UMLS program that cause concerns for its 
development in the future: (1) the limited coverage of the program and its potential 
impact on labour mobility and poverty reduction, and (2) the distorting feature of the 
program: a high marginal tax rate on earned income of recipients. 
5.5.1 The Progress of the UMLS Program in Providing Poverty Relief 
Table 5-7 lists some national aggregate figures of the UMLS program between 1998 
and the first half of 2002. The UMLS program has been providing poverty relief to 
more and more urban residents since 199836. The proportion of UMLS recipients in the 
urban population37 was 0.5 per cent in 1998, and rose to 2.44 per cent in 2001. The 
significant increase of recipients in 2001 may be due to the fact that this was the first 
year a large number of laid-off workers left the reemployment centers and became 
recipients of the UMLS program38 . The cost of the UMLS program also rose rapidly. 
However, part of the dramatic increase in costs in 1999 was due to the State Council's 
35 Usually the city government added other conditions to restrict limited funds to the poorest households. 
Some local governments refused to provide relief to employees/retirees of SOEs directly belonged to the 
central government, arguing that taxes from these SOEs were paid to the central government (Gao 2000). 
36 Due to the lack of data, the proportion of urban poor that were actually covered by the program is not 
clear. 
37 Urban population is defined as those with urban household registrations. 
38 Recall from Chapter 4, large-scale laid-off workers entered employment centres since 1998 with the 3-
year contract. Many of the contracts expired in 2001 and those laid-off workers had to leave the 
reemployment centres. 
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decision to increase all UMLS standards by 30 per cent in July 1999 (Zheng, Wang et 
al. 2000). 
During the first few years of the program (1998-2002), the Chinese central government 
put a lot of emphasis on implementing the UMLS program. It emphasized the 
supervision by the MCA, and also contributed to costs of the program for poor local 
governments. In July 2002, the MCA claimed that all 19.3 million urban poor who were 
supposed to receive cash payments from the UMLS program had been covered by the 
program. The total cost of the program for the first six months in 2002 was 10.5 billion 
yuan, among which 4.6 billion yuan, or 44 per cent, came from the central government 
budget39 . These supervision and financial support from the central government have 
certainly contributed to the increasing coverage of the UMLS program. The political 
commitment is also a positive sign for future progress of this program. 
At the city level, a simple empirical exercise is carried out, based on data collected by 
the author, for selected cities during the period between 1996 and 1998. The exercise is 
summarised in Appendix 5.1 at the end of this chapter. A few observations emerge from 
the sample cities during this period. 
1. Among the 96 sample cities, the UMLS standard varies significantly across cities and 
time. The mean value of the UMLS line is 120 yuan/month, with the minimum of only 
68 yuan/month and the maximum of 230 yuan/month (Table A5.l-2). 
2. The UMLS standard shows strong and positive correlation with the average urban 
wage of the city, and per capita revenue of the municipal government, while it is 
negatively related to the official unemployment rate of the city (Table A5. l-3). 
3. The econometric test shows that, the UMLS level reflects differences of living costs 
and income disparities among cities, and the level of poverty relief is constrained by the 
city government's budgetary revenues, although the impact seems to be very small. 
These aggregate figures and this city-level study suggest that the UMLS program has 
made important progresses during the first few yeas after its introduction. The UMLS 
standard appears to reflect regional differences in living standard. However, local 
government budgetary revenues seem to have imposed a constraint to what level the 
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local UMLS line was. This raises concerns that whether in some poor cities, the 
guaranteed income may be set too low to meet even the basic need of the poor. 
5.5.2 The limited Coverage of the UMLS Program and Its Potential Impact on 
Labour Mobility and Poverty Reduction 
While the coverage of the current UMLS program has been expanding since it was 
introduced, the design of the program has a few important features that need to be 
studied and reformed. This sub-section looks at the first one of these features. 
5.5.2.1 The Limited Coverage of the UMLS Program 
The coverage of the current UMLS program is limited to local, legal urban residents 
registered according to the household registration system. It excludes all migrants who 
are not official local urban residents. These migrants can be broadly divided into two 
groups. The first group includes migrants from other cities, and the second group 
includes rural migrants. 
In principle, poor people of the first group could claim poverty relief from the 
municipal government where their household registrations are located. In practice, it is 
very likely that this cross-region claim incurs additional costs to the poor, but it is not 
clear how high these costs may be. 
The second group, often referred to as 'the floating population' in Chinese cities (see 
Appendix A5.2.1), are totally excluded from the coverage of this safety net40, even 
though they work and live in cities. The number of the floating population has been 
rising since the mid-1980s, with the relaxation of the household registration system. 
Despite local policies that discriminate against them, better life and more economic 
opportunities in cities have attracted millions of farmers to cities, especially large cities 
(see Appendix A5.2.2). It is estimated that there were one rural migrant in every 4-5 
urban residents in Chinese cities around 2002 (see Appendix A5.2.2). These people 
mainly work on low-paid jobs and are denied of equal access to all sorts of social 
39 Figures are from the MCA (2002b). 
40 In recent years, some rich cites, such as Beijing and Shanghai, have established rural minimum living 
security program to provide a safety net to local rural residents. 
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security and welfare benefits that are available to local urban residents. Compared to the 
local people who are registered as residents, the floating population are much poorer 
and have little protection from the local government. The background and the situation 
of the floating population are discussed in Appendix 5 .2 to this chapter. 
The exclusion of the large number of migrants from the UMLS program defeats the 
stated purpose of the program, which is to provide a minimum living security for all 
urban residents. Given that these migrants contribute to the urban economy and 
therefore the government budgetary revenues, they should be entitled to benefits of this 
safety net. 
5.5.2.2 The Potential Impact on Labour Mobility and Poverty Reduction 
The exclusion of migrants from the UMLS program has potential impacts on different 
aspects of the society. For example, it may cause political instability. From the 
economic efficiency point of view, the main adverse impact is on labour mobility. Lack 
of labour mobility can hinder poverty reduction, which is the very purpose of the 
UMLS program. 
The adverse impact on labour mobility is twofold. Firstly, the current UMLS program 
leaves poverty relief to the local authority, especially fhe municipal government. It can 
be expected that similar to the parish in British poor relief before the 20th century, the 
Chinese city government has the incentive to deny poor migrants from coming to the 
city. Based on the current institutional environment in China, the easiest way is to deny 
migrants of their legal residency in the city. Secondly, it discourages the poor to explore 
economic opportunities in other regions. The urban poor would be more reluctant to 
move to other cities or provinces to find employment opportunities, even if there is lack 
of opportunities for them in the city of their household registration. This is because it 
will be costly for them to apply for the UMLS relief from other places to their 
originating city government. For the rural migrants, the lack of a minimum safety net in 
cities adds more uncertainty for their decision to move to cities. It also makes it difficult 
for them to leave their land, because it is regarded as the ultimate safety net. 
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Both the lack of incentive to open household registration by the municipal government 
and to move to explore better employment opportunities by the poor hinders the 'free 
circulation of labour' (Smith 1900). As a result, they effectively prevent poor people to 
get out of poverty by exploring the best use of their labour. 
5.5.3 The Implicit High Marginal Tax Rate of the UMLS Program 
The current UMLS program is based on a very simple idea that a minimum income is 
guaranteed for all urban residents who have the local household registration. However, 
the design of the program has a distorting feature, which is that its recipients are taxed 
heavily. As shown in equation (5-1 ), as recipients of the poverty relief, the amount of 
cash received from the program is negatively related with their household income. More 
precisely, when household income is increased by one yuan, the recipient household 
will lose one yuan from the UMLS program. This feature effectively imposes a 
marginal tax rate up to 100% on recipients' earned income. 
This feature is shown in Figure 5-2 for a recipient household in a given Chinese city. 
The household's income (yuan/month per capita) is drawn on the horizontal axis, and 
the UMLS relief that the household is eligible for (yuan/month per capita) is drawn on 
the vertical axis. M represents the UMLS line of the city. When the household (per 
capita) income is zero, each household member receives the maximum amount of 
poverty relief from the UMLS, M yuan/month. When the household per capita income 
is above the UMLS line, M, it receives no poverty relief. When the household income is 
between zero and M, for each extra yuan per capita it earns, it loses the same amount of 
poverty relief from the UMLS, thus the slope of the budget line for the recipient 
household is 45-degree. For this household, the trade off between earned income and 
cash payment from the UMLS program is 1: 1. Effectively, every yuan of earned income 
that is below M is taxed. The recipient household is not financially better off by earning 
more income, so long as it remains a UMLS recipient. 
Of course, this 100% marginal tax rate would be lower or even irrelevant, if there is an 
effective minimum wage in place that is much higher than the city's UMLS line, and if 
part-time work is not available. Currently, regional disparity is so large in China that 
this high marginal tax rate is likely to present only in some rich cities. In an official 
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document called 'Issues of Pilot Projects to Perfect Urban Social Security System' by 
MOLSS (2001a), it is stated that one of the problems of the UMLS program in 2000 
was that the UMLS lines were uneven among cities. It points out that 'in some cities, the 
UMLS lines were too high, while in others, they were too low'. It urged the municipal 
governments to design the UMLS lines so that it 'ensures a basic living for the urban 
poor, but still encourages employment' (MOLSS 2001a: 515). 
For regions where minimum wages are set and implemented41 , the current gap between 
the minimum wage and the UMLS line may not be big enough to eliminate the 
disincentive impact of this program. Studies of the relationship between the minimum 
wages and the UMLS lines are rare. Table 5-6 compares the provincial minimum wages 
and the UMLS line in the capital cities in 1999. On average, the UMLS line was about 
60% of the minimum wages in 1999. Take this figure and suppose that the average 
family size was 3 people 42 : two parents and one child. Suppose only one parent worked 
in 1999 and received the minimum wages and the family had no other income, then the 
per capita income of this family was about 56% of the local UMLS line. Therefore, this 
family was eligible for the UMLS poverty relief and faced a tax rate of 100% on any 
family earnings. 
However, for some unemployed people, the relevant choice is between full-time 
employment and unemployment. For such people, the effective rate of tax on earned 
income is less than 100%, particularly if minimum wage rates are actually enforced. For 
example, using the figures for the UMLS line and provincial minimum wage rates in 
1999, a fulltime job at the minimum wage for a month would typically pay about 67% 
more than the monthly UMLS benefit. As a result, the average effective tax rate facing 
a person choosing between the UMLS benefit and full time employment at the 
m1n1mum wage would be 60%, not 100%. This is still a very high and distorting 
implicit tax. 
41 In China, the legislation of minimum wages was issued in 1993 (Kang and Feng 2000). The provincial 
government decides the minimum wages for the province and adjusts it (at most) once a year according to 
factors such as changes of living costs. By 1996, 29 out of 31 provinces in Mainland China ( except Tibet) 
had established local minimum wages (MOLSS 1996). 
42 The average family size in 1999 was 3.14 persons (SSB 2000b) . 
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This feature of high marginal tax rate has disincentive impact on labour supply. Even 
for cities where the UMLS lines are currently low and the disincentive impact is very 
limited, it is important to be aware of this potential adverse impact in the future. It is 
likely that this impact becomes more significant when the economy grows and the 
UMLS standard increases over time. Careful empirical studies are needed to examine 
the actual impact on labour supply of the UMLS program. Reforms should follow if this 
impact is significant. 
From the government's point of view, an efficient approach to provide the social safety 
net for the urban poor is the one with the minimum costs. One way to achieve this 
efficiency object is to minimise the number of people who rely on the poverty relief, 
ceteris paribus: For this purpose, the design of the safety net must consider its 
disincentive impact on people's effort to find jobs. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the background, reforms, and the practice of the new 
program of the Chinese urban social relief system-the UMLS program. The UMLS 
program is an important part of the social security system reform in China, since it is 
the foundation of the current and future social safety net for the urban poor. This 
program was designed to provide a guaranteed income to all urban people-but only 
those who have the local urban household registration. The UMLS program was 
established by the central government in the late 1990s, and had been implemented by 
municipal governments in all urban areas by 1999. 
Since the UMLS program is administered by the municipal government, detailed rules 
vary across regions. Since this is a relatively new program, relevant data and studies are 
rare. The preliminary assessment in this chapter has focused on two aspects. The first 
one is the progress of poverty relief of the program during the first few years of its 
implementation. The national aggregate data show expanding coverage of the program, 
along with increasing number of recipients and amount of budgetary expenses. This 
suggests that an increasing number of people were benefit from this program. The issue 
is also investigated using a sample of 96 cities during the 1996-1998 period. The sample 
shows large variations of the UMLS standard across cities and over time. A simple 
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empirical test is carried out as a preliminary attempt to assess the performance of the 
UMLS program at the city level (see Appendix 5.1). The results show that both the 
living costs and income disparities in the city have significant impact on the city's 
UMLS level, with the former being positive and the latter being negative. While the 
city government's budgetary revenues (per capita) are a statistically significant 
constraint on the city's UMLS line, the magnitude appears to be fairly small. Couple of 
reasons are suggested for this small impact of budgetary revenues. 
Discussions of the second aspect for the assessment focus on the major defects of the 
current program: (1) its limited coverage has the potential to restrict labour mobility, 
and therefore hinders poverty reduction by the poor exploring economic opportunities 
across regions; (2) the program has a very high marginal tax rate on earned income of 
its recipients, which may have disincentive impact on labour supply. This disincentive 
impact may not be important for relatively poor cities where the UMLS line is set low. 
However, it has caused concern of the government for rich cities. 
The UMLS program was designed to provide a safety net for all urban residents in 
China, irrespective of their age, sex, employment history, etc. It appears to be the 
government's short-term response to the emerging urban poverty problem during the 
economic transition. However, in the long run, these adverse impacts on labour mobility 
and labour supply can have significant impacts on people's decision-makings. For 
example, the distorting feature of a 100% marginal tax rate on recipients' earned income 
can easily create the so-called 'poverty trap' (Hemming, 1984), and gives incentive for 
the poor to rely on the program, rather than searching for paid jobs. 
More studies are needed for further reforms to correct these defects of the current 
UMLS program. Experience of poverty relief in other countries, as summarised at the 
beginning of this chapter, is useful for exploring reform options. Other options should 
also be considered. For example, the adequate provision of eduction to children of poor 
families is an important way to help them to gain human capital and get out of long-
term poverty. In the long run, poverty reduction in urban China should aim at providing 
a basic safety net for all the poor, while creating no significant distortions to the private 
economy. 
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Figure 5-1. lnfaltion Rates in China during the 1980s and 
1990s 
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Table 5-1. Major Poverty Alleviation Programs in 7 Countries in the Asia-Pacific 
Region 
Country 
Fiji 
India 
Philippines 
Republic of 
Korea 
Major Programs 
(1) Family allowance-temporary assistance for destitute families 
(2) Assistance to elderly and disabled persons who also receive services from 
other government agents, such as the Ministry of Health. 
(1) Land reform; 
(2) Employment Guarantee Scheme: provide jobs for the poor at a wage below the 
market rate; 
(3) Public distribution system: food rations through a national network of fair 
price shops, covering both poor and non-poor; 
(4) Integrated child development services: a package of services for pregnant and 
nursing mothers and children under the age of 6. 
(1) Land reform: for security of tenure and redistribution of land; 
(2) Credit for the poor: loans for income-earning activities to the poor. 
(1) Livelihood assistance: covers the elderly, orphans, the disabled, and women in 
need, etc. 
(2) Medicaid: free health care and funeral grants for those receiving livelihood 
assistance; 
(3) Social welfare services: institutional care, job training, counseling and 
monthly allowances for the needy people. ,,, 
Sri Lanka (1) Samurdiya program: family allowance based on income; 
(2) Relief: monthly relief to the destitute, and people affected by civil 
disturbances, refugees, etc; 
(3) Institutional care: the elderly, the disabled and orphans 
Thailand (1) Land reform: providing land ownership to the poor; 
(2) Public work program: rural job creation during the slack season 
(3) Rural development policy: improving the living condition of the poor 
Uzbekistan Increasing expenditure on social protection, and raising minimum wages in accordance 
with inflation 
Source: Based on United Nations (1996). 
Table 5-2. Urban Social Relief Recipients during the 1980s and Early 1990s 
Year Urban population (million Recipients with regular relief Proportion Of urban 
persons) (10,000 persons) populationb 
(1) (2) (2)/(1) (%) 
1984 240.17 24.5 0.10 
1985 250.94 18.2 0.07 
1986 263.66 35.6 0.14 
1987 276.74 16.2 0.06 
1988 286.61 17.6 0.06 
1989 295.4 16.2 0.06 
1990 301.91 16.4 0.05 
1991 305.46 16.1 0.05 
1992 323.72 19.2 0.06 
1993 333.51 13.8 0.04 
1994 343.01 12.4 0.04 
1995 351.74 12.7 0.04 
Note: a. regular relief is one of the two parts of the social relief program. The other part is temporary 
relief. The figures in this column are the product of the numbers of recipients times the number of times 
receiving the regular relief, therefore the number of people benefited is not clear. 
b. figures in this column provides a rough idea of the scale of the people received regular relief 
from the MCA. 
Source: author's calculation based on SSB (various years). 
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Table 5-3. Registered Unemployment3 in China during the 1990s 
Year 
Number of unemployed (million 
persons) 
Number of laid-off workers at year end 
(million persons )b 
1990 
3.8 
1997 
5.8 
6.34 
1998 
5.7 
8.92 
1999 
6.0* 
9.37 
Urban labour force (million persons) 
% of labour force out of worke (%) 
166.16 202.07 206.78 210.14 
7.2 6.0 7.1 7.3 
Note: a. Unemployed does not include laid-off workers of the SOEs; 
b. Figures include all laid-off workers still unemployed at year-end; 
c. This figure is for 1996. 
e. This is the total number of officially unemployed and laid-off workers divided by the urban 
labour force. 
* estimation from author's discussion with Chinese economist. 
Source: 1. SSB (2000a). 
2. Figures for laid-off workers are from MOLSS (various years). 
Table 5-4. The Structure of Urban Poor in China (based on surveys in some cities 
and provinces) 
Province/ cities Xining City Dalian City Hebei Province Ningxia Hui 
Time of the Dec-1995 to March-1998 Sep.-Nov. 1997 Sep.1999 
survey Jan.-1996 
Total urban Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share 
poora (1000 (1000) (0/o) (1000) (%) (1000) (%) (1000) (%) 
persons) 
Traditional 0.53 2.3 0.68 2.0 14.23 11.4 6.18 8.2 
"without the 
three 
essentials" 
Other 4.41 13.0 15.46 12.4 26.14 34.6 
unemployed 
Employees/ 11.74 51.0 14.86 43.8 95.42 76.3 38.10 50.5 
retirees 
Othersb 10.75 46.7 13.96 41.2 5.05 6.7 
Total 23.01 100.0 33.91 100.0 125.11 100.0 75.47 100.0 
Note: a. the poverty line was different for each city at the time of survey. 
b. This category mainly includes family members of poor families; 
Source: author's construction based on MCA (1999). Number of persons includes family members. The 
number of employees/retirees includes retrenched workers. The criterion of urban poor is different in 
different cities/provinces. 
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Table 5-5. Numbers and Share of Urban Employees/Retirees who Did Not 
Receiving Full Wage/Pensions 
Year 1994 1995 1997 
Urban Employees 
(million persons) 
184.13 190.93 202.07 
Employees whose salary were partly or fully default by firms 
(million persons) 
Share of total employees (%) 
Retirees 
(million persons) 
Number of retirees whose pensions were partly or fully 
default by firms ( million persons) 
Share of total retirees (%) 
4.95 
2.7 
20.79 
1.15 
5.5 
4.79 10.96 
2.5 5.4 
22.41 25.33 
0.7 N/a 
3.1 N/a 
Note: figures of employees and retirees who did not receive full payment for 1994 and 1995 are for 23 
provinces; figure for 1997 is for the 31 provinces of the whole country. 
Source: author's calculation based on Zheng (2000); SSB (1999). 
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Table 5-6. Comparison of the Provincial Minimum Wages and the UMLS Lines in 
Capital Cities in 1999 
Province minimum wagesa UMLS UMLS/Minimum 
(yuan/month) (yuan/month) wages 
(%) 
Beijing 400 260 65 
Tianjin 350 241 69 
Hebei 290 182 63 
Shanxi 300 156 52 
Neimonggu 273 143 52 
Liaoning 240 195 81 
Jilin 270 169 63 
Heilongjiang 250 182 73 
Shanghai 423 280 66 
Jiangsu 320 195 61 
Zhejiang 380 215 57 
Anhui 240 195 81 
Fujian 380 221 58 
Jiangxi 290 130 45 
Shandong 320 208 65 
Henan 290 169 58 
Hubei 280 195 70 
Hunan 280 169 60 
Guangdong 547 312 57 
Guangxi 200 195 98 
Hainan 350 221 63 
Chongqing 270 169 63 
Sichuang 270 156 58 
Guizhou 260 156 60 
Yunnan 300 182 61 
Shaanxi 260 156 60 
Gansu 289 156 54 
Qinhai 260 156 60 
Ningxia 300 130 43 
Xinjiang 390 156 40 
Note: a. most provinces had several different minimum wage standards, which applied to different cities 
or counties with one province that had various standards of living. The higher level of the standard is 
listed since the capital city often has the highest living costs within a province. 
Source: author's construction based on Labour Security News Report (2000: 21) 
Table 5-7. Some Aggregate Figures for the UMLS Program (1998-2002) 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 First 6 months of 2002 
Recipients (million persons) 1.84 2.66 4.03 11.71 19.15 
Share of urban Population 0.49 0.68 0.88 2.44 
(%) 
Relief costs (billion yuan) 0.7 2.37 3.45 5.00 3.66 
Source: number of recipients and relief costs figures are from the MCA (various years); Urban 
population figures are from SSB (various years) . 
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Appendix 5.1: A Simple Empirical Study of the UMLS Program 
A.5.1.1 The Motivation for the Exercise 
In this Appendix, a simple empirical test is conducted, as the first attempt so far, to 
examine the relationship between the city UMLS line and other local economic 
indicators, especially the government budgetary status and the local cost of living. The 
purpose is to see whether these two factors had any significant impact on the actual 
level of the poverty line of UMLS the first few years of the UMLS program. 
This exercise uses a simple demand-supply model of poverty relief provided by the 
UMLS program. The supply side depends on the situation of the city government's 
budgetary revenues, since the UMLS program has been mainly financed by the city 
government. The demand for relief is determined by several factors: (1) the local UMLS 
standard, (2) the size of poor households, and (3) calculated household incomes per 
capita. The local government can manipulate the demand for relief by adjusting the 
UMLS level as well as how household incomes are calculated. However, reducing the 
UMLS line excludes households with relatively high incomes among the poorest group, 
which may reduce the program's effectiveness in poverty relief. 
This Appendix is composed of the following sections: section AS.1.2 establishes the 
supply-demand model for the UMLS poverty relief. It is followed by some discussions 
of the data used. The results are presented in section AS .1.3 . Some comments with 
regard to these results are in the final section of conclusion. 
A5.1.2 The Model 
The main supply side variable is the local government's budgetary revenue. The 
government decides what percentage of its budgetary revenue is to be used for the 
UMLS program. This relationship is expressed by the following simple supply function: 
S=aR (AS.1-1) 
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where S is the supply for UMLS relief (in 100 million yuan/year), R is the annual 
budgetary revenues of the local government (in 100 million yuan/year), and a is the 
proportion of the revenue that the government wants to use for the UMLS program. 
The demand side is determined by local living costs as well as poverty incidence in the 
area. Ideally, it should include variables such as the local consumer price index, which 
allows for cross-city comparison of living costs. It should also include the local gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, and the Gini coefficient as a measure of income 
distribution. However, in practice, some of these variables are not available at the city 
level. As a result, other variables are used in this empirical study. The demand side is 
approximated by the following equation: 
D = F(MLS, W, UR, POP, GDP) (AS.1-2) 
where D is the city's demand for UMLS relief (in 100 million yuan/year), which is a 
function of the city's UMLS line (in yuan/month per person); the local living costs, 
approximated by the local average wages, W (in 1000 yuan/year per worker); a variable 
that affects the local poverty incidence, the city's unemployment rate, UR (in %/year); 
and a variable that is positively related to the number of people who need relief from the 
UMLS program, the city's population of the year, POP (in 100 million persons); and 
finally, the scale of the local economy, represented by the annual GDP of the city (in 
100 million yuan) . 
The city government chooses the level of the UMLS line, such that the demand for 
UMLS relief can be met by the proportion of the budgetary revenue that the government 
intends to spend on the program. Therefore, the local UMLS line to be chosen is 
expected to be a function of R, W, UR, POP and GDP. These variables and their 
definitions are listed in Table AS .1-1. 
A5.1.3 The Data 
Most studies of the UMLS program are based on either national or provincial figures. 
The data that will be used for this estimation are at the city level. They come from two 
. 
maJor sources: 
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(1) The UMLS lines adopted by cities are from various independent studies of the 
UMLS program, and some working reports by the staff members at the MCA (Shi 
1999; Zhou 1999; Zheng, Wang et al. 2000). Thus, these cities are not randomly 
selected samples for statistical studies, but are chosen here simply because the 
information for their local UMLS lines is available. Therefore, some provinces may be · 
over-represented, such as Anhui, Guangdong, Liaoning, Hebei, and Henan. However, 
since the purpose of this exercise is to look at the situation of the UMLS program at the 
city level, this should not be a major concern. The data cover 96 cities43 over three 
years. Most of the sample cities are medium to large cities in China, which represented 
approximately 43 per cent of the total 221 medium to large cities during this period. 
They are not panel data, although some cities appear in the sample more than once, for 
instance, Hefei and Beijing. 49 observations are from 1996, 26 from 1997, and 20 from 
1998. 
(2) Other relevant figures for these sample cities are from various issues of the Urban 
Statistical Yearbook of China (SSB 1997, 1998, 1999) These include the size of the 
economy, the municipal annual GDP (GDP); city government annual budgetary 
revenues (R); the local official unemployment rate of the year (UR); the average annual 
wages of the city (W) and the city population (POP). All figures for 1997 and 1998 are 
at 1996 constant values. This is calculated using urban consumer price index for each 
province, since the relevant index is not available at the city level. 
A5.1.4 The Results 
Based on the demand and supply functions discussed previously and expressed in 
equations (A5.l-1) and (A5.1-2), equilibrium occurs when the supply of relief equals 
demand for relief: 
S(R) = F(MLS,W,UR,POP,GDP) (A5 .1-3) 
43 There were 666 cities in China by the end of 1998. 
176 
In this supply-demand model for poverty reduction, the UMLS line can be regarded as 
the price, and that the expenditure on UMLS can be regarded as the quantity. However, 
in this particular situation, the higher the UMLS line, the more people will be qualified 
for the relief, and therefore, the higher the expenditure of the program. Assuming that 
the government has full information, it can choose the appropriate level of the UMLS 
line such that the expenditure demanded is equal to the budgetary revenue that the 
government intends to spend on the program. This gives the reduced form of the 
equilibrium condition for the local UMLS line: 
MLS = a *UR +b* POP+c*(GDP/ POP) +d *(RI POP) +e* W (A5.1-4) 
where variables are defined in Table A5 .1-1. 
Table A5. l-2 lists some summary statistics for these figures. The samples are very 
diversified, including cities of very different urban population sizes, as well as the size 
of the economy (GDP of the city). They also include 'rich' and 'poor' local government 
in terms of budgetary revenue per capita. The diversification of these cities' economic 
situation leads to quite different levels of the city UMLS line. For instance, the 
minimum of the UMLS standard was about 70 yuan/month (1996 value) per person, 
while the maximum was 230 yuan/month per person (1996 value), with the mean of 120 
yuan/month per person for the sample. 
Equation (A5.1-4) is estimated using the simple OLS approach, in four different 
combinations of the explanatory variables. The results are shown in Table AS .1-444 . 
Among the independent variables, the local unemployment rate (UR) and the local 
average annual wages (W) are significant in all four cases. When the unemployment 
rate is one percent higher, all other things being equal, the UMLS is reduced by about 2 
yuan/month per person. This is because when the unemployment rate is higher, more 
local people are likely to fall into poverty, forcing the government to reduce the level of 
the UMLS line, so that the available fund can meet the demand. When the average 
annual wage (W) is 1000 yuan/year higher, the UMLS level is increased by about 10 
yuan/month per person. This is because when the average wage is higher, the local 
44 
Table A5. l-3 shows correlations between the variables used in the regressions. 
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living costs are likely to be higher, pushing up the local minimum living security line. 
These two variables at the demand side show significant impacts on the local UMLS 
level. The city's population (POP) and the local GDP per capita (GDP/POP) have no 
significant impact on the UMLS level. 
The supply side variable: the local government budgetary revenue per capita (R/POP), 
shows mixed results in the four cases. It has a positive but insignificant impact in cases 
1 and 3, where the GDP per capita variable (GDP/POP) is also included in both cases. 
This result is likely due to the high correlation between GDP per capita and budgetary 
revenue par capita, as shown in Table 5.1-3. When GDP per capita is not included in 
the regression, as in cases 2 and 4, local government revenue per capita does have a 
positive and significant impact on the UMLS level. However, the magnitude is very 
small: when government revenue per capita increases by 1000 yuan/year, the UMLS 
line increases by less than 1 cent. 
The significant yet small role of the local government budgetary revenue in deciding the 
local UMLS line is, perhaps, due to the following reasons: 
? Only a very small proportion of the local budgetary revenues were spent for the 
UMLS program. As a result, the budgetary revenues have little impact on the 
UMLS line. Table AS. l-5 shows some figures for Hefei City, Anhui province 
during the first three years of its operation of the UMLS program. The local 
UMLS standard rose from 120 yuan/month, per person in 1996 to 13 0 
yuan/month (127 yuan in 1996 value) per person in 1998. The share of UMLS 
expenses in budgetary revenues was less than 1 per cent spent each year. This 
was the common situation nationwide during this period (Wang 1999a). 
? The local government budgetary revenue was not the only source of funds for 
the UMLS program. As mentioned previously, during the sample period, many 
city governments shared costs with lower level governments, or required SOEs 
to pay for UMLS relief for their employees and retirees. In addition, poor cities 
could expect budgetary transfers from the provincial government and the latter 
from the central government if they had difficulties in meeting the demand for 
local poverty relief. If the local government could expect some assistance from 
the higher-level government, then the 'budget constraint' of the local UMLS 
lines would not be very tight. 
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Table AS.1-1. Definition of Variables in the Regression 
Variable Definition Unit 
UMLS The Urban Minimum Living Security yuan/month per person 
line of the city 
UR Official unemployment rate of the city % 
POP Population of the city 100 million persons 
GDP Annual gross domestic product of the 100 million yuan 
city 
R Annual government revenues of the city 100 million yuan 
GDP/POP Annual GDP per capita of the city yuan/per person per year 
RIPOP Per capita annual government revenue yuan/per person per year 
of the city 
w Average annual wage of the city's urban 1000 yuan/year per capita 
employees 
Table AS.1-2. Summary Statistics for the 96 Sample cities (sample size: 96) 
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
UMLS 119.8 28.4 67.3 230 
(yuan/month *per capita) 
Unemployment rate 2.4 2.6 0.1 17.9 
(%) 
Urban Population 0.9 1.3 0.1 8.7 
( 100 million persons) 
GDP per capita 20.1 10.1 0.6 6.8 
( 1000 yuan/year) 
Budgetary revenue per capita 1.2 0.6 0.4 3.7 
(1000 yuan/year) 
Average wage 6.5 1.7 4.0 11.4 
( 1000 yuan/year) 
Source: author's calculation based on selected samples. 
Table AS.1-3. Correlation Matrix of the Variables (sample size: 96) 
UMLS UR GDP/POP R/POP W POP 
UMLS 
UR 
GDP/POP 
RIPOP 
w 
POP 
1.0 
-0.3 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.4 
1.0 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.1 
Source: based on the data set collected by the author. 
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1.0 
0.7 
0.6 
0.1 
1.0 
0.7 
0.3 
1.0 
0.5 1.0 
Table AS.1-4. Regression Results of the UMLS Levels in Selected Cities in China: 
e endent variable: UMLS; Number of observations: 96) 
Note: 1. Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
2.'-' Indicates the variable is not used in the regression; 
3. * indicates the coefficient is significant at 10%, * * indicates the coefficient is significant at 5%, 
**** indicates the coefficient is significant at 1 %. 
Source: author's regressions. 
Table AS.1-5. Expenditures of UMLS Program versus Local Government 
Budgetary Revenues in Hef ei City, during the First Three Years of the UMLS 
Program 
Year UMLS Expenditures of the Local government (1)/(2) 
(yuan/month UMLS program budgetary (%) 
per person) (million yuan) revenues (100 
(1) million yuan) 
2 
1996 120 0.21 9.14 0.02 
1997 120 2.97 12.49 0.24 
1998 130 2.26 16.12 0.14 
Source: expenditures of the UMLS program are from author's interview with the local branch of the 
MCA; budgetary revenues are from SSB (various years). 
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Appendix 5.2: The Floating Population in Chinese Cities 
In this appendix, the background and the situation of the floating population in Chinese 
cities is briefly discussed. 
A5.2.1 The Floating Population in Chinese Cities 
Since the economic reform, especially since the mid-1980s, policies45 that curbed 
labour mobility during the pre-reform era have become less effective (Zhao 2003). In 
the meantime, surplus rural labour force has been 'pulled'46 and 'pushed'47 towards cities 
(Zhao 2003, Wang 2001; Hare 1999), and migration among cities has also become more 
common. 
Migrants often come to large cities and economically booming coastal cities in east 
China to find jobs, despite the institutional barriers that are still in place, such as the 
HRS. These migrants in cities can be divided into two categories. The first category 
includes those who have obtained the city's household registrations and become 
permanent residents of the city. They often are treated as other local residents and have 
equal access to employment opportunities as well as other public welfare benefits, such 
as pensions, medical care. However, obtaining a city household registration has been 
very difficult and it has rarely happened (see Chapter 3 and Zhao 2003). With the 
government's policies, the majority of rural workers in cities belong to the second 
category. They are not able to obtain city household registrations and are therefore 
temporary residents, regardless how long they have stayed in the city. In the literature 
and in government regulations, this group of migrants are referred to as the 'floating 
population', 'people from another place', 'temporary population' and some times 'peasant 
workers'48 , often with slightly different definitions (Li 2001: 17). The second category 
of migrants, especially those from villages, is the group of migrants that is interest here, 
since they have been discriminated against with regard to the social and economic 
45 These policies are discussed in Chapter 3. 
46 For example, income and living standard gap between cities and villages are among the factors that 
pulled farmers towards cities. 
47 For example, improved agricultural production efficiency and surplus labour are among factors that 
pushed farmers to go to cities for jobs. 
48 This is because the majority of them are from villages. 
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entitlements in cities they live. This category of migrant workers is referred to as the 
'floating population' in this appendix and this chapter. It is broadly defined as rural 
workers who hold agricultural household registrations but come to cities to look for 
jobs, and do not have the household registration of the city of destination. 
A5.2.2 Government Policies Towards the Floating Population and the Scale of 
the Floating Population 
In 1984, in response to surplus rural workers 49, the government began to encourage 
rural people to engage in non-farm activities, such as rural industries in the form of 
township and village enterprises (TVEs ), domestic trade and long-distance 
transportations. Also in 1984, government policies began to allow rural people to move 
their household registration to small towns, but they were not eligible for rationed food 
grain (see Chapter 3 for a brief discussion for rationing in China) (Zhao 2003). At this 
stage, the policy was to encourage farmers to 'leaving the land but not to leave the 
villages'. However, small towns did not attract many rural workers due to their lack of 
employment opportunities. Many rural migrants moved to cities, including big cities 
such as Beijing and Shanghai as well as booming cities in the coastal areas (Li 2001). 
The Ministry of Public Security then issued 'The Temporary Regulations with regard to 
Temporary Residents in Urban Areas' in 1985. It emphasizes that any temporary 
resident who stays for more than 3 days in the city to register at the local police station. 
Those who stay more than 3 months and are 16 years or older must apply for 'the 
temporary resident certificate' (Li 2001). In 1995, the Ministry of Labour (MOL, now 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, MOLSS) required every rural migrant to 
obtain 3 certificates and one card to be considered a legal temporary resident in cities 
(Zhao 2003): 
•!• Identification certificate: this is issued by the police station of the originating 
county. It is a personal identification card that is issued to all Chinese citizens. 
•!• Temporary resident certificate: this is issued by police stations in destination 
cities and needs to be renewed every year for migrants to legally live in a city 
that is not their household registration location. 
49 Studies contribute the surplus farmers to the improvement of efficiency after the agricultural reforms 
since 1978, and the very low land/people ratio in rural China (Zhao 2003 ; Hare 1999). 
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•!• Employment certificate: this is issued by labour bureau of originating counties 
to migrants as a certificate for the eligibility for employment. 
•!• Employment card: this is issued by labour bureaus of destination cities, as a 
proof of employment in cities of destination. It is only issued with the presence 
of the three certificates mentioned previously. 
In addition to these national regulations, many provinces, most capital cities and cities 
in the east coastal arrears have their own local regulations that target the floating 
population (Li 2001 ). These policies often impose restrictions on the floating population 
in house renting, employment and family planning, etc. Obtaining household 
registration in cities, especially large cities, is still very difficult for most of the floating 
population50 . 
Despite these government policies at national, provincial and municipal levels to restrict 
migration, the number of floating population has been increasing and is ref erred to as 
'the history's largest labour flow' (Wang and Zuo 1999: 276). However, it is a difficult 
question to have an accurate answer of how large the scale of the floating population in 
Chinese cities. Official statistics often report city population based on the household 
registration, and therefore exclude the floating population. Recent population censuses 
( such as those in 1990 and 2000) and surveys started to cover people more based on 
actual residency instead of solely on household registration51 . Since the household 
registration based population statistics are reported at different time of the year (usually 
at year end) as that of population census or surveys, the floating population cannot be 
calculated by simply deducting the household registration population from the census 
results. However, the difference between the census figure and the household 
registration statistics provides a rough estimation of the scale of the 'floating 
population'52 . According to the Almanac of China's Population (CASS 2001), at the end 
of 2000, the population of Beijing City (including all residents who had lived in Beijing 
for 6 months or more) was 13 .64 million, while the household registration population 
5
° Few areas have relaxed the restriction of the HRS. Guangdong Province has been advanced in this 
regard. For example, the province issued new policies in 1995 and 1999 to protect some rights of the 
floating population. In particular, it allows migrants who have been temporary residents for 7 year to 
obtain urban household registration (Li 2003). 
51 These recent censuses include both residents with local household registration and those who live in 
the city for more than 6 months (CASS 2001). 
52 The difference between the census and the household registration figures also include floating 
population from other cities in China. But majority of them are from rural areas. 
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was 11.08 million. These figures indicate that in Beijing, the floating population was 
about 2.6 million, or nearly 20% of its population. In Shanghai City, the figures for 
2000 were 16.7453 million and 13.22 million, respectively. So the floating population 
was about 3 .5 million, or slightly above 20% of its population. 
As Wang (2001) notices, estimations of the scale of the floating population vary 
significantly, often due to definitions of this category and purposes of studies and 
surveys. However, various studies point to a single fact: that a large scale and 
increasing number of farmers are moving into China's cities for employment. Jiao 
(2002: 74) notes that the scale of floating population was no more than 30 million 
people in the early 1980s, while sources indicate that by 1995, it reached 80 million, 
with Shanghai City had 4.65 million and Beijing City had 3 million floating population. 
Rawski and Mead (1998) use information from cost surveys in rural China to estimate 
China's farm labour force during 1979-93. The result suggests that there were more than 
100 million rural people who actually worked outside the agricultural sector. Rozelle 
and de Brauw ( et al. 2002) conduct a rural household survey in 2001. Their study 
further confirms that migration has become the most important form of off-farm 
employment, with young workers dominating the rising trend of migration. Wang 
(2001) examined a few studies including both official figures and surveys conducted by 
government departments and institutes. She concludes that by the mid-l 990s, the 
number of floating population in cities was about 80 millions. A recent statistics from 
the Ministry of Agriculture shows that there are 92 million rural workers have left their 
household registration place for more than 6 months and have moved to cities to work 
(Jiang 2003). Based on these sources, it is reasonable to have some rough estimations of 
the scale of the floating population in urban China: during the early 1980s, the floating 
population accounted for less than 12% 54 of urban population. By the mid-1990s, they 
accounted for about 23%55 . In recent years, both the population with urban household 
registration and the floating population have been growing56 . Roughly speaking, there is 
one migrant among every 4-5 urban residents in Chinese cities. 
53 This figure is for the end of October 2000. 
54 This is calculated by assuming the floating population was 30 million, and those with urban household 
registration was, on average, 226.1 million over 1981-1985 (SSB, 2000a) 
55 This is calculated by assuming the floating population was 80 million in 1995. 
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A5.2.3 The Situation of the Floating Population 
Studies find that vast majority of the floating population are young people. Wang 
(2001) summarises studies of the floating population during the mid-1990s and find that 
the average age of rural migrants was much lower than the average age of the rural 
labour force. Most of the rural migrants were between 20-35 years old. Rozelle and de 
Brauw ( et al. 2002) find that there is strong evidence in their rural household survey, 
conducted in various years, that the increasing trend of rural migrans is dominated by 
young and better-educated workers. 
The situation of the floating population in China is not good. In general, since the 
· floating population does not have the urban household registration, it is discriminated in 
cities in all aspects of their life, such as legal rights, as well as economic and social 
entitlements (Jiao 2002; Meng 2000; Zhao 2003). For example, children of floating 
population have to pay very high fees to go to local schools, despite that free junior 
secondary education is provided in China's cities (Meng 2000; Zhao 2003). Rural 
workers in cities earn much lower wages compared with their urban counterparts; they 
work under very tough and sometimes dangerous conditions; they are often blamed as 
the sources of social and economic problems in cities (Hennock 2001 ). In addition, 
local governments often adopt regulations to impose institutional barriers to reduce the 
floating population, such as restrictions and punishment of urban firms that hire rural 
workers. These regulations increase the costs of migration (Li 2001; Wang 2001). As a 
result of these policies, floating population is pretty much segregated from those urban 
residents who have local household registration. These rural migrants have formed a 
second class in China's cities and among the most vulnerable people in urban China. 
Recently, there have been some changes in government policies with regard to the 
household registration system and the rural floating population (Hennock 2001; Taylor 
2003). In particular, the State Council issued a notice on the 5th of March 2003 (State 
Council 2003) urging city governments to improve the management of and to provide 
better services to the floating population in cities. In this notice, the government 
acknowledges the positive impacts of rural to urban migration. It urges local 
56 An important source of the growth of number of households with urban household registration is when 
the county is upgraded to a town for administrative purpose. 
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governments to eliminate unnecessary restrictions on the floating population, to solve 
the problem of wage arrears to rural workers, and to ensure children of rural migrants 
have the same access to education as local students. 
However, the floating population is not only discriminated against in employment and 
other legal rights as labour, but is also excluded from all the social welfare benefits that 
are only distributed among urban residents with household registration (Meng 2000; 
Jiao 2002). As employees, except those who work in the public sector, they often have 
no access to pensions, medical insurance, and unemployment benefits, etc. As residents 
of cities, they are not entitled to the safety net provided by municipal government-the 
UMLS program. 
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Chapter 6. Economic Transition, Population Aging and the 
Study of the Old Age Pension Reform in China: Smoothing the 
fiscal burden over time 
6.1 Introduction 
As the discussions in the previous two chapters have shown, reform of the social 
security system in urban China was driven by the overall economic reform. In the case 
of the old age pension program, it was also driven by financial pressure from the old, 
work unit-based, PA YGO system. Among the major social security programs, pension 
reform started first, and has undergone the most dramatic changes. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, this system was changed from a PA YGO system towards a partially funded, 
three-pillar system. In addition, the pension program is by far the largest social security 
program in urban China. For instance, in 1999, the total expenditure for pension 
payments accounted for more than 75 per cent of total expenditure for major social 
security programs in urban China, while the second largest expenditure was for medical 
care, which spent about 20 per cent of the expenditure of the five main programs (see 
Figure 6-1 ). Due to its significance, pension reform is chosen to be the case study for 
future reform options of the Chinese social security system. It is expected that this case 
study will help to gain some insight for reforms of other social security programs in 
China. 
The problems facing China with pension reform are similar to those in many other 
countries in the world (World Bank 1997). For instance, many world economies, 
including China, are experiencing population aging (World Bank 1997; Peterson 1999). 
However, the Chinese pension reform is more complicated, because it occurred against 
the background of a dramatic transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented 
economy. Among many interesting issues with social security reform in China, and the 
pension program in particular, the economic efficiency of financing the programs is 
very important. This is especially so because the economy is undergoing various 
reforms to explore the benefits of a more market oriented system. The study of the 
pension scheme is divided into two chapters. Both this and the next chapter look at 
reform options for China's pension reform, taking into account of population aging and 
economic transition. 
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Many studies of Chinese pension reforms focus on the financial viability of the 
program, in the short and medium run 1. However, there are several financially viable 
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pension options and the choice between them will have significant economic efficiency 
impacts on the economy: (1) for the economy as a whole over time and, (2) via taxation 
effects on individual employees. These efficiency impacts are examined in the two 
chapters, respectively. This chapter focuses on the optimal taxation approach to finance 
a defined-benefit pension scheme over time versus a PAYGO year-by-year financing 
scheme. Chapter 7 looks at the taxation impact of a funded scheme on employees, with 
special reference to the current Chinese pension scheme. 
The choice of a pension scheme needs to consider the following features of the scheme: 
(1) How the program is financed, that is, whether it is a PA YGO system or a funded 
one. In the former case, pensions are paid from revenues collected from current 
workers; while in the latter, they are paid from accumulated contributions from 
previous years. 
(2) Whether the program is defined-benefits program or a defined-contribution one. 
The former approach pays . pensions that are pre-determined, and 
taxes/contributions vary accordingly. The latter is opposite. It collects pre-
determined taxes/contributions, but allows benefits to change accordingly. 
Although there is no theoretical necessity, in practice, a PA YGO system usually 
pays a defined-benefit pension to retirees, while a FF system usually specifies the 
contribution rate (usually based on wages). 
Related to these two features are two issues that need to be distinguished. From the 
government's viewpoint, the difference between a PA YGO and a funded pension 
scheme is simply a matter of the government budgetary practice. In a PA YGO public 
pension scheme, future public pension liabilities are not recorded explicitly as 
government liabilities at the time revenues are collected from current workers. 
However, in a funded public scheme, the government's future pension liabilities are 
recorded when funds are collected to accumulate for the future. This distinction 
1 Examples include: Boadway (1991), He (2000), Li (1998), Li (2000), Arron (1999), World Bank 
(1997), West (1999), White and Shang (1995), White and Shang (1996). 
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between a PA YGO and a funded public pension scheme is important for the 
government. When the government examines its budgetary status for the foreseeable 
future, it must consider all its liabilities, including future pension liabilities. In 
particular, the government that adopts a PA YGO public pension scheme must examine 
whether its budget still balanced, or at least not so far out of balance that the credibility 
of future pension entitlements is doubtful, when all its pension liabilities are explicitly 
recognized. 
A separate question is whether pension contributions are pooled together as 'collective' 
funds or kept in 'individual accounts'. In practice, the former is usually associated with a 
PA YGO scheme; while the latter is linked to a FF system, such as in the current 
Chinese pension scheme, although in theory, a PA YGO pension scheme can have 
individual accounts, and funds in a FF system can be pooled together. For example, the 
former would occur when: (1) the government pays all its expenditures, including 
pensions, from current revenues (including pension contributions), and (2) the 
government pays pensions to retirees according to a stipulated formula that links 
pensions to retirees' previous contributions. An example of the latter could be when all 
retirees get a uniform pension, but the benefits are paid from pooled funds accumulated 
from previous contributions. When a public pension scheme is mandatory, its effects on 
incentives depend upon how closely contributions are linked to future pension benefits, 
rather than on whether it is a PA YGO or a funded scheme. However, this latter 
distinction? between PAYGO and funded? is very important if the age structure of 
the population is changing rapidly because under a PA YGO system the government 
budgeting process fails to take proper account of government liabilities. 
The choice of the pension scheme also needs to consider factors that are not directly 
under government control, for instance, demographic changes of the economy over 
time. Specifically, system age structure2 has an impact both on revenue and outlay of a 
PA YGO, defined benefit program3. The larger the working age population, the larger is 
the program contribution base, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, if the ratio of the 
number of retirees to the number of workers is high, the financial burden of the program 
is higher, ceteris paribus. 
2 System age structure refers to the age structure of the population covered by a public pension program. 
3 This has been studied by many researcher, for example, see Feldstein, (1996), James (1999). 
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Another factor that needs to be considered in pension reform is the 'transition 
costs/pension debt' of pension reforms. In a PA YGO system, an implicit public debt is 
generated from the first generation of retirees: they receive public pensions contributed 
by current workers without making any contribution during their working life. This 
implicit public debt of pensions is not necessarily a problem if the system carries on to 
the future, when each working generation pays for retirees4 • However, it becomes a 
problem if the government wishes to change from a PAYGO system to a funded 
system. During such a transition, the working generation has to contribute to their own 
retirement, if they are enrolled in the new funded system. In the meantime, since current 
retirees have contributed during their working years, the government has to finance 
their pension liabilities promised by the old PA YGO system. These public pension 
liabilities are the so-called 'transition costs' to be financed by the government if such a 
reform is carried out. These public pension liabilities are not really 'costs' of the pension 
reforms. Instead, the issue is merely an accounting problem since the pensions of the 
last generation that belongs to the PA YGO system must be paid whether the system is 
reformed or not. The problem is the need to correct the accounting error that is implicit 
in a PA YGO system, which fails to take proper account of the government future 
liability for the pensions of those who have contributed to the system. The recognition 
of such liabilities has an adverse effect on the government's measured budgetary 
position. How the government finances these liabilities can have efficiency impact on 
the current and future generations. 
This chapter examines two policy options in the context of population aging and 
economic transition in China. The first one is a defined-benefit, PA YGO scheme 
financed on a year-by-year basis, which is similar to the old public pension scheme in 
China described in Chapter 3. The second one also has defined-benefits, but it adopts 
optimal tax rates over time in order to minimise the efficiency costs of the scheme. A 
theoretical model based on Barro (1979) is used, which is modified to incorporate the 
transition features of the Chinese economy. 
4 It can be~ome a problem, though, when the population is aging. This aspect is discussed in the next part 
of this chapter. 
190 
The next chapter focuses on the economic impact of the current, post-reform public 
pension scheme in China. It also examines the economic burden of financing the 
transition costs if the Chinese government wants to transform the scheme to a fully 
funded pension pro gram. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next part discusses estimations of population 
aging in China during the past 20 years, as well as projections for the next 50 years. Part 
three looks at the implications of population aging on financing alternative public 
pension systems. Part four establishes an analytical model based on Barro's (1979) 
framework. The model uses explicit measurement of the deadweight loss, and has the 
same results. Part five conducts some simulations using the results of the model to 
show the difference of dead weight loss associated . with alternative approaches to 
finance the old defined-benefit public pension schemes in China over a 50-year period. 
The last part concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Population Aging in China: What Happened during the Past Twenty 
Years and What will Happen during the Next Few Decades 
Due to lower fertility rates and longer . life expectancy, population aging is being 
experienced in many countries in the world (Treas and Logue 1986; IMF 1996). Since 
population aging is accompanied by a rising retiree/worker ratio covered by a public 
pension system, it raises concerns about financial viability for the system (Hussain and 
Zhu 1996; Schieber and Shaven 1996). Some countries, such as Chile and Sweden, 
have converted their former PA YGO, defined benefit pension system into funded ones 
(Schieber and Shaven 1996; Peterson 1999). 
The Chinese population is also aging, but this process has three distinct features: 
? Unlike most of the other countries, where the population aging process occurs as 
a result of families choosing to have fewer children, population aging in China 
has largely been the result of the one-child policy adopted by the government in 
the late 1970s (Wu 1991). 
? While most other economies with an aging population belong to developed 
countries, China 's aging population has begun when its per capita GDP is much 
lower (Peterson 1999); 
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? The population aging process in China may be more unbalanced across regions 
than in most other countries. Due to various policies implemented during the 
pre-reform period5, rural and urban areas in China have been more or less 
separated. Since the one-child policy has been more effective in cities than in 
villages, population aging is more prominent in urban than in rural areas 
(Hussain and Zhu 1996). However, · rural-urban migration, especially from 
villages to cities, has been increasing since the economic reforms, particularly 
since the early 1990s (See Section 5.5.2; Zhu 1999; Zhu, Gu et al. 2001). Since 
these migrants tend to be young people, and the scale of migration is large6, they 
are expected to reduce the speed of population aging in cities, and to accelerate 
it in villages. This type of rural-urban migration will affect the public pension 
system in the near future, since the current old age pension program only covers 
urban employees 7. 
There are several measures of population aging: 
•!• The median age of the population provides a rough idea about how 'old' the 
population is; 
•!• The share of people aged 608 or over in the population gives a measure of the 
proportion of population that are old and need support; 
•!• The old-age dependency ratio is a very useful measure for exam1n1ng the 
financing of an old age pension program. In this chapter, unless otherwise 
stated, this ratio is defined as the number of people aged 60 or over to the 
number of people of working age, which is defined as aged between 15 and 59. 
The higher the old-age dependency ratio, the higher the burden on current 
workers to support retirees. In a PA YGO, defined benefit pension system, this 
ratio largely determines the system dependency ratio and thus affects the tax rate 
required to finance the system. 
5 These policies include some that are still in place, for example, the household registration system, as 
well as those that have been abolished, for example, food rationing and restrictions on domestic 
travelling. For more details of these policies and their effects, see Chapter 3. 
6 For example, see Hussain and Zhou (1996), Hu (1984), and Nolan (1993). 
7 The impact of rural migrants on urban age-structure, of course, depends on future government policies 
on HRS and the coverage of the old age pension scheme. 
8 The age of 60 is chosen since this is in line with the current official retirement age in China; although 
the retirement age is different for female workers and professionals. See Chapter 3 for details. 
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This section first examines population aging in China during the past twenty years of 
economic reform, and summarises some projection results for the next 50 years. It is 
followed by a brief discussion on the possible impact on the population aging process of 
a different demographic policy-a 'two-child' policy. The regional, especially rural and 
urban, differences of age structures, and the implication of migration on urban 
population aging are briefly discussed at the end of this section. 
6.2.1 Population Aging in China 
Birth control and especially the one-child policy, which commenced in the late 1970s, 
has contributed to dropping fertility rates in China. Between 1970 and 1980, the total 
fertility rate (TFR) in China dropped from about six births per woman to 2.3 births per 
woman (Wu 1991). The TFR indicates the average number of children a women would 
bear over the course of her lifetime if current age-specific fertility rates remained 
constant throughout her childbearing years (usually between 15 and 59). Therefore, 
these figures show that an average Chinese woman in 1970 was expected to have 6 
children during her lifetime, but by 1980, this number had dropped to about 2.3 
children. This is an extraordinarily large change compared with any other nation over a 
comparable span of time (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985). In the meantime, life 
expectancy of the Chinese population increased steadily from about 40 years in the 
early 1950s to nearly 70 years in the late 1980s (Wu 1991). 
Some demographic statistics for the whole Chinese population during the past 50 years 
or so are shown in Table 6-1. From the 1950s to the early 1980s, there is no indication 
of an 'aging population'. The median age in 1982 was similar to that thirty years earlier 
in 1953. The proportion of people aged 60 and over in the population was only slightly 
higher in 1982 compared with that in 1953, while the old-age dependency ratio was the 
same in 1982 as in 1953. In fact, the (total) dependency ratio? the share of the young 
(aged 14 and less) plus the elderly (aged 60 and over) in population? increased but then 
declined during this period. In 1982, total dependency ratio was 10 percentage points 
lower than that in 1953. In fact, comparing figures of the 1964 census and those of the 
1953 census, it is clear that the population was very 'young'-median age, the share of 
population aged 60 and the old-age dependency ratio dropped. 
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As for the period between 1984 and 2000, the two decades following the introduction of 
the one-child policy, the figures indicate only minor population aging. The median age 
rose by 2.3 years between 1982 and 1990, the share of people aged 60 and over rose by 
I-percentage points and the old-age dependency ratio was 0.5 percentage points higher 
during this period. However, due to the falling fertility rate followed the one-child 
policy, the total dependency ratio dropped by 12.5 percentage points. 
Given the low fertility rates after the introduction of the one-child policy, it is expected 
that China will experience rapid population aging during the first few decades of the 
21st century. Although there are slight differences among the detailed results, several 
demographic studies point to the same direction of a rapidly aging population. Some 
results of these studies are summarized here in tables and figures. Table 6-2 lists 
findings from population projections conducted by the World Bank (Bos, Vu, et al. 
1994), the United Nations (1999) and a joint project by Japanese and Chinese scholars 
(Wu 1991)9. According to the United Nation's projection, the median age of the Chinese 
population will increase from 27 .6 years in 1995 to about 40 years by 2025, and it will 
rise to 44 years by 2050. The share of people aged 60 and over in population will 
increase from less than 10 percent in 1995 to more than 19 per cent in 2025. This share 
is projected to reach 29.9 per cent in 2050 by the UN, while it is 21.4 per cent according 
to the joint project by Japanese and Chinese researchers, and about 26.5 per cent 
projected by the World Bank. 
Two dependency ratios are listed in Table 6-2: the total dependency ratio and the old-
age dependency ratio. The total dependency ratio is defined the same way as in Table 6-
1. It measures the average number of dependents each working-age person has to 
support. The results of the projections by the World Bank (1994) and the UN (1999) 
show the similar trend that the ratio first declines from 1995 to 2010 and then rises after 
2015. In 1995, on average, every two working-age people had to support one 
dependent. After that the burden drops slightly until 2010. It then picks up and rises 
rapidly. By 2050, on average, every five working-age persons will have to support 
about four dependents, according to the projections by the UN and the World Bank. 
The projection adopted in Wu (1991) predicts a similar trend, but the burden of 
9 The results of the study are cited by Wu (1991). 
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dependents is projected to be lower by 2050, compared with the results of the UN and 
the World Bank10• 
The old-age dependency ratio is an indicator showing the economic burden of the 
elderly on the current workforce. Again, the projections of the World Bank and the 
United Nations show similar rising trend, but the UN's result indicates am even higher 
burden of the elderly on the labour force by 2050. In 2000, both projections show that 
this ratio was about 16 per cent. This means that every 6 workers supported one old 
person. By 2025, it is projected that, on average, roughly every 3 workers will have to 
support one old person (both the World Bank and the UN); and by 2050, every 2 
workers will have to support one old person according to the UN, while the World 
Bank's projection is every 2.1 working-age people per old person. The projection . 
adopted in Wu has very similar results as the UN. 
Figure 6-2 shows the population age structure in China projected by the UN (1999) for 
selected years during the first 50 years of the 21st century. In each panel, the horizontal 
axis indicates the number of people, while the vertical axis lists age group. The six 
panels listed show rapid population aging in China during the 50-year period. The age 
structure shifts from the usual pyramid shape in 2000 to one that is close to a 
rectangular shape, indicating both a rising number and share of old people in the 
society. 
The population aging process in China is more striking, when it is compared with other 
regions. In Figure 6-3, the elderly dependency ratio of the population (the number of 
people aged 60 and over divided by the number of people aged between 15 and 59) is 
drawn for the world, China, the more developed regions and the less developed regions 
(excluding China), using population projection by UN (2001). Between 1950 and 2005, 
the ratio in China is similar to other countries of the less developed regions, but below 
that of the world population. According to the projection (UN 2001), after 2005, the 
elderly dependency ratio in China will rise rapidly to not only above the level of the rest 
of the less developed countries, but also above that of the world population. Moreover, 
the speed of population aging in China appears to be faster than that of the more 
10 The difference appears to due to the different assumptions about the key parameters. For example, the 
birth rate, death rate, total fertility rate, life expectancy, etc. , and whether and how they vary over time. 
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developed regions between 2005 and 2050. By 2025, the old-age dependency ratio in 
China will reach 31 %, which is the level of the more developed regions in 2000. 
6.2.2 Population Aging and the One-Child Policy 
The one-child policy has contributed to the projected rapid population aging in China 
by reducing the fertility rate since the early 1980s (Wu 1991; Hussain and Zhu 1996). 
Figure 6-4 draws the old age and the total dependency ratios in China from 1950 to 
2050, based on results from the United Nation's population projection (UN, 2001). By 
definition, the distance between the two curves shows the young dependency ratio 
(number of people aged 14 and below/ number of people aged between 15 and 59). 
While the old-age dependency ratio was quite stable during the period from the 1950s to 
the 1980s, the total dependency ratio rose from the early 1950s until the 1970s and then 
declined slightly during the 1970s. The total dependency ratio has dropped sharply 
since the late 1970s. These movements reflect changes in the young dependency ratio of 
the population, which is mainly determined by the fertility rate. This diagram shows 
that the falling fertility rate since the late 1970s has been able to maintain the trend of a 
falling total dependency ratio until 2000. However, it is projected that after 2010, when 
the fertility rate becomes stable, the rise of the old-age dependency ratio will dominate 
and the total dependency ratio vvill increase. 
The fertility rate is one of the key parameters for population projection. The assumption 
made about China's future fertility rate is usually based on recent fertility rates obtained 
from population surveys in the past (Wu 1991). Projections by the World Bank and the 
United Nations are also based on fertility rates of the recent population surveys, even 
though they do include several scenarios of future paths of fertility rates. Recall that 
fertility rates in China since the 1970s have been affected by the government population 
control policy-the one-child policy. Thus the future fertility rate in China will not only 
depends on the past and current fertility rate, but also on the government's family 
planning policy. There have been some relaxations of the one-child policy in some areas 
in China during the first two years of the 21st century. One change is the so-called 'two-
child' policies, which is said to have been implemented in twenty-five out of thirty 
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provinces in China 11 (Zhai 2001} The policy works as follows: if both husband and 
wife are the only child of their parents, the couple can have a second child if they wish. 
Since the generation born after the one-child policy is now entering child-rearing age, 
this policy may have a significant impact on the future fertility rate. 
Even though the outcome of this change of the one-child policy is not yet clear, it is 
clear that its impact on population aging is different in the short-run and the long-run. If 
this policy turned out to increase the fertility rate in China, it can only slow down 
population aging in the long run. Initially, higher fertility rates increase the total 
dependency ratio before the children reach their working age. When they enter the labor 
force in 15-20 years, the outcome will be a lower old-age dependency ratio than would 
occur otherwise. 
6.2.3 The Household Registration System, Rural-Urban Migration and 
Population Aging in Cities 
Population aging in China has significant regional, especially rural-urban, variations. In 
Figures 6-5 and 6-6, the age structures in cities, towns and counties are drawn for men 
and women, respectively12• In Figure 6-5, the height of each bar represents the share of 
males in an age group in the total male population in cities, towns, and counties, 
respectively. The different age structure in cities and counties is obvious. The share of 
young people ( aged under 15) is the lowest in cities, and the highest in counties. The 
order is reversed for the age group over 60, with the share of elderly males the highest 
in cities and lowest in counties. A similar pattern exists for females, as shown in Figure 
6-6. 
This pattern of different age structure across rural and urban areas is mainly due to 
government policies in China. One of the policies is the one-child policy. While the 
policy has been carried out in both cities and villages, it has been more effective in 
cities than in villages, since government control is more stringent in urban areas 
(Cooney and Li 1994; Li 1995). Another policy is the household registration system, 
11 In China, the provincial government decides the detailed family planning policy, which should be in 
line with the national population control policy. 
12 The data available does not distinguish rural and urban areas, but is based on administrative locations. 
However, most rural population lives in counties, while urban residents live in cities and towns. It is not 
clear from the data source that whether the population include 'the floating population' (see Chapter 5). 
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which has been implemented sine the late 1950s 13 . The policy effectively curbed rural-
urban migration ( as well as migration within urban areas and within rural areas) until 
the 1990s, and thus created a physical and geographical segregcl;tion between cities and 
villages. These two policies, along with policies that provided much better medical care 
system for people in cities than that for people in villages, have generated two 
population groups in rural and urban China. The former group has a relatively higher 
fertility rate than the latter group, yet relatively shorter life expectancy (Wu 1991 ). 
This rural-urban segregation has become blurred since the 1990s, when voluntary, 
large-scale rural to urban migration began. Millions of farmers have come to cities to 
find jobs. Attracted to higher income and an expected better life, many of them try to 
stay (See Section 5.5.2 of Chapter 5; Nolan 1993; Hussain and Zhu 1996; Cai and 
Zhang 2000). 
In fact, some local governments, especially in small towns and cities, have reformed the 
rigid household registration system to allow rural residents to become permanent urban 
residents by granting them urban household registration. For example, in some areas, 
farmers who invest a certain amount of money in towns/cities, and farmers who have 
lived in towns/cities for a certain period of time and have their own accommodation and 
formal jobs in cities, can apply for urban residency (Ban and Zhu 2000). 
Rural to urban migration changes the age structure in both villages and cities. As 
discussed in Section 5.5.2 in Chapter 5, given the difficulties of migration and the lack 
of entitlement for rural migrants in cities 14, most of the floating population in cities are 
young people, who are more likely to find employment in cities, which are mostly . 
physically demanding jobs. Young rural migrants increase the scale of the labor force 
in cities, while leaving both the very young and old people behind in villages. Even 
though this internal migration cannot change the overall population age structure in 
China, it can make the urban population 'younger' , and the rural population 'older' than 
it would otherwise be (Yan 1999). 
13 For details of the system, see Chapter 3. 
14 Recall from Chapter 3 that major social security and welfare benefits only covered employees in state-
owned work units, who must have local urban residency. 
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However, this rural-urban migration may not affect the age structure of the population 
covered by social security scheme. Since most of these migrants do not have the city's 
household registration, they have little, if not at all, access to social security and welfare 
benefits that are available to the residents who are legally registered as local residents. 
In the case of the old-age pension scheme, young rural migrants do not directly reduce 
the old-age dependency ratio of the population covered by the scheme. As a result, they 
do not reduce the financial pressure of population aging on the old PA YGO scheme. 
The large number of young rural migrants can reduce the burden of the old PA YGO 
pension scheme, only if they are covered by the scheme. This can happen when the 
division of rural and urban residents is eliminated and the pension scheme covers all 
employees. Of course, this can only be possible when the household registration system 
is reformed so that it is not used to discriminate people of the entitlements of social 
security benefits in China. Although there is some evidence that the HRS has been 
relaxed somehow, it may take some time for the elimination of the division between 
rural and urban Chinese. 
While the Chinese population is aging, factors such as government family planning 
policy as well as rural-urban migration can affect the speed of aging in different regions 
of China, especially those in cities. However, population aging in China may not be 
fully reversed by the government future changes of family planning policy, and will not 
be affected by rural-urban migrations. Population aging has profound implications for 
many aspects of the society and economy (Wu 1991; Schultz 1995). It is its impact on 
the finance of public pension schemes that this chapter is focused on. 
6.3 Population Aging and the Public Pension System-The Implication on 
Government Pension Liabilities 
As discussed, population aging is accompanied by rising old-age dependency ratios . In 
a public pension system that is financed by a PA YGO scheme, a higher old-age 
dependency ratio means that on average, each worker has to support more retirees. In 
particular, if the pension system is a defined benefit system, a higher old-age 
dependency ratio can generate financial pressure on the workforce (US Council of 
Economic Advisors 1997). 
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To carry the analysis a little bit more formal, this section looks at two alternative public 
pension schemes: a defined benefit, PAYGO system and a fully funded, defined 
contribution system. While these two schemes do not exhaust all possible public 
pension schemes, they are the basic ones that are often adopted in practice. Therefore, 
the analysis below is somewhat stylised, because it focuses on the extreme cases: a pay-
as-you-go approach versus a fully funded approach. Public pension schemes in reality 
often have more aspects and have various combinations of these two schemes. The 
financial arrangements of the two schemes are discussed first. This is followed by an 
analysis of the implication of an aging population on the systems. The final part of this 
section briefly discusses 'transition costs' when a PA YGO pension system is 
transformed into a fully funded system. 
6.3.1 Alternative Public Pension Schemes and Their Finance 
6.3 .2.1 Financing a Defined-Benefit, PA YGO Public Pension Scheme 
A defined-benefit, PA YGO scheme is specified as follows. The government collects 
revenues from current workers through a payroll tax, paid by employers or employees 
or both, and uses the revenue to pay pensions of current retirees. The pension benefits 
of retirees are pre-determined and fixed. In order to have revenues equal to 
expenditures, ignoring administration costs, the government faces a simple equation for 
each period of time: 
t*N *W=N *B W R p (6-1) 
where t is the tax rate on wages, Nw is the number of workers paying taxes for the 
public pension program, W is average taxable wages of workers covered, NR is number 
of retirees covered by the system, and Bp is average pension benefits per retiree. It 
follows that to achieve balance for each period, the (payroll) tax rate required to finance 
the scheme is determined by the following equation, which is the same as equation ( 4-3) 
in Chapter 4: 
(6-2) 
200 
Equation (6-2) shows that the payroll tax rate is determined by two ratios: the 
retiree/worker ratio, NR/ Nw, or the so-called 'system dependency ratio'; and the average 
pension benefit/ average wage ratio, Bp /W, or the so-called aggregate replacement rate. 
The higher the system dependency ratio, the higher the tax rate has to be, ceteris 
paribus; similarly, a higher aggregate replacement rate demands a higher tax rate. 
In equation (6-2), the aggregate replacement rate is defined as the ratio of the average 
pension of current retirees and the average wage of current workers. In practice, in a 
defined benefit, PA YGO scheme, pension benefits are often specified as the ratio of 
pensions (per month) to wages (per month) of the retiree prior to retirement. To show 
this, equation (6-2) is written as follows 15 : 
(6-3) 
where WR and W w represents the average wages of current retirees and current 
workers, respectively. Thus W R/Ww is the ratio of the average wage of retirees ( during 
their working life) to that of the current workers. It can be regarded as an indicator of 
the growth of (average) wages over generations. The smaller the value of WR/Ww, the 
faster the (average) wage grows. 
Equation (6-3) provides another angle to examine how the tax rate of financing the 
PA YGO pension scheme can be determined. The payroll tax rate is the product of the 
system dependency ratio, NR/Nw; the average replacement rate of pensions, Bpi'WR, and 
the ratio of the average wage of retirees to that of current workers, WR/Ww, which is an 
indicator for the change of wages. Equation (6-3) shows that the tax rate increases with 
the system dependency ratio and the replacement rate of pensions, but decreases with 
increases of wages over generations. From the financial balance point of view, in this 
defined benefit scheme, where the replacement rate is fixed, faster wage rises, and/or 
lower dependency ratio of the population covered by the scheme, can keep the tax rate 
low. When the increase of wages slows down, and/or the dependency ratio rises, the tax 
rate must rise in order to maintain the same replacement rate. 
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The old public pension system in urban China was a defined benefit, PA YGO system 
before its recent reforms. Even though there was no explicit payroll tax to collect 
revenues, it would be interesting to see what the above relationship would suggest about 
the effective tax rates was over time, if the system was financially balanced each year. 
Due to data limitations, equation (6-2) is used to illustrate the calculations. The data 
used are for state-owned work units only, since the old pension schemes mainly covered 
employees of these work units. Figure 6-7 shows system dependency ratios (that is, the 
retiree/worker ratios), the average pension/average wage ratios, and the total 
pension/total wage ratios between 1980 and 1998 16. According to equation (6-2), to 
finance the PA YGO public pension scheme within the state-owned work units each 
year, the effective tax rate, t, on wages must be equal to the total pension/total wage 
ratio. Since the replacement rate (Bp/W) was very high17 at the beginning of this period, 
the implicit tax rate was fairly close to the system dependency ratio, that is, the 
retiree/worker ratio, in the diagram. Between 1985 and 1998, the replacement rate was 
lower but was stable. As a result, the effective tax rate for the balanced finance became 
lower than the retiree/worker ratio, but follows its trend fairly closely. The steadily 
rising retiree/worker ratio suggests the system was under increasing financial pressure, 
due to an aging population covered during this period 18 . The effective tax rate on wages 
for the PA YGO pension system increased from about 7 per cent in 1980 to 25 percent in 
1998, while the retiree/worker ratio increased from 8 percent in 1980 to 32 percent in 
1998. 
The Chinese case shows that in a defined benefit, PA YGO public pension system, the 
payroll tax rate required for current workers to finance pension payments has to rise in 
line with the system dependency ratio. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 4, rising and 
unbalanced dependency ratios of SOEs triggered the initial pension reform-social 
pooling of pension funds in the mid-l 980s. Other reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, such 
as employee contribution and expanding pension coverage to all urban employees, were 
also driven by the financial pressure of the old PA YGO system. After the latest pension 
15 This follows Arron (1999). 
16 Pension reforms started before 1998, and the pension system had become partially funded. However, 
· the calculation assumes the old PA YGO system waa still applied until the end of this period. 17 It is unusual that the aggregate replacement rate in 1980 was 100%. This may be due to the fact that 
some retirees receive higher pensions than their wages, especially some government officials. 18 For more details of the rising dependency ratio of the system, see section 2 of Chapter 4. 
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reform in 1997, the system has a scaled-down PAYGO portion, with the target payroll 
tax rate of 17 per cent. 
6.3.1.2 Financing a Defined Contribution, Fully Funded Public Pension Scheme 
A defined-contribution, fully funded public pension system works as follows. Through 
mandatory contributions (by employers or employees or both), a percentage of workers' 
wages is put into a fund, which is then invested. Both contributions and returns on 
investments are accumulated for future pension payments. The system may or may not 
use individual accounts to accumulate contributions for each individual. In practice, a 
fully funded public pension scheme is often associated with using individual accounts. 
Further analysis of individual accounts is in Chapter 7. Assume that an individual's 
pension can only be drawn from his/her own accumulated contributions. Consider a 
two-period model, where a representative individual works during the first period, and 
contributes to pension funds. The fund available at the beginning of the second period, 
when the individual reaches retirement age, is given by: 
B = (r * W)(l + r) (6-4) 
where B is the total pension funds available, -c is the mandatory contribution rate ( as a 
percentage of wages), W is total wages of the individual during the working life, and r 
is the rate of return on pension funds. The formula indicates that total pension funds 
available for the individual increase with his/her lifetime wages, contribution rate, and 
the rate of return on pension funds. 
Equation (6-4) can be written as follows to be able to compare with the PAYGO 
pension system directly: 
r= 1 *BP 
l+r WR 
(6-5) 
where Bp is pension benefits of the retiree and WR is the retiree's wage during the 
working period. They are the same number as Band Win equation (6-4). 
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Equation ( 6-5) provides some basic characteristics of a balanced, fully funded public 
pension scheme. For example, in a defined contribution, fully funded system, where "C is 
constant, pensions? as a proportion of wages? Bp/WR, declines when the return on 
pension funds, r, is lower than expected. Alternatively, if a fully funded public pension 
system aims at achieving a certain level of defined benefits? a constant Bp/WR , it has 
to increase contribution rate, "C, ceteris paribus, when the rate of return on pension 
funds, r, is lower. 
Despite the obvious differences between the financing of a defined-benefit, PA YGO 
public pension scheme and a defined contribution, fully funded public pension scheme, 
there are important similarities in terms of the role of government in both schemes. If a 
government takes on all responsibilities of operating and managing a public pension 
scheme, including pension funds, public pension liabilities are generated when payroll 
tax, or mandatory contributions are collected. In both cases, the government makes a 
promise for future pension benefits, which is pre-determined in the PAYGO system 
discussed in this section. However, in the fully funded system as defined in this section, 
such pensions are variable, depending on other factors, such as those in equation (6-5). 
Ideally, workers who pay pension contributions would expect the government to ensure 
the market return on pension funds as well as the safety of funds for their retirement 
( more on this in Chapter 7). 
6.3.2 The Impact of Population Aging on the Financing of Alternative Public 
Pension Systems 
The simple decomposition of a balanced finance of a public pension scheme shows that 
population aging has implications on a PA YGO public pension system, while it has no 
direct impact on the fully funded system. Table 6-3 compares the finance of the two 
pension schemes, including the impact of population aging and economic growth. 
Results are based on equations (6-3) and (6-5). The finance of the PAYGO and the fully 
funded systems are as defined in the last section, but the comparison allows the system 
to be either defined benefits, or defined contributions. The purpose of this comparison is 
to examine the differential impact of population aging and economic growth on the two 
systems. 
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The main factors that affect the financing of a pension system can be summarized into 
two categories (see Table 6-3): (1) the growth factor-the rise of average wages over 
generations in the PA YGO scheme, and return on capital in the FF scheme; (2) the 
population aging factor? the system old-age dependency ratio. When the population is 
aging, to achieve a given level of defined benefit? a fixed replacement rate BP /WR , the 
payroll tax rate (t) in the PA YGO system must rise, while the mandatory contribution 
rate ( -r) in the FF system remains unchanged. When population is aging, if the public 
pension system aims to maintain a fixed payroll tax/contribution rate of workers, 
pension benefits (BP /WR ) in the PA YGO pension scheme must drop, while it remains 
unchanged in the FF scheme. However, economic growth, through rising rate of returns 
on labor, tends to offset the financial stress of a PA YGO public pension system that 
caused by the population aging. In a FF pension scheme, a higher rate of return on 
capital could bring higher pension benefits, when the contribution rate is fixed 19. 
6.3.3 Transition Costs of Pension Reforms 
Another factor that affects public pension liabilities is the 'transition costs' (World Bank, 
1997), if a government wants to reform a PA YGO pension scheme to a fully funded 
one. As mentioned previously, these 'transition costs' are really the implicit public 
pension liabilities generated by a PA YGO system, which become explicit when 
replaced by a funded system, and therefore not a real cost of pension reform at all . A 
PA YGO system effectively involves inter-generational transfers of wealth: tax collected 
from current workers pays the pensions of current retirees. However, the first generation 
of retiree in the PA YGO system do not contribute to the program during their working 
lives. Ignoring this implicit debt of pensions does not lead to serious errors if the system 
carries on forever in a stationary state so that each working generation pays for retirees. 
However, the accounting error cannot be ignored when the PA YGO system is changed 
to a funded system. During such a transition, the government must finance the pensions 
of current retirees, since they have paid their contributions during their working years. 
These transition costs are public pension liabilities. In particular, if the old PA YGO 
pension scheme has defined benefits, the amount of this government debt is pre-
19 The issue of return on accumulated pension funds is further discussed in Chapter 7. 
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determined. While pensions must be paid to current retirees during the transition from 
the old PA YGO to the new funded pension system, how to finance this debt needs to be 
considered carefully, if the government wants to minimize the negative impact of the 
transition costs of pension reforms. 
6.4 A Theoretical Model of Optimal Taxation Policy to Finance Public 
Pension Liabilities over Time 
Barro ( 1979) sets up a simple model for government's optimal choices between taxation 
and debt to finance government expenditures. His model provides a general framework 
for optimal taxation/debt issue of a government over time. It suggests that, under certain 
assumptions, there is an optimal tax rate that is constant in each period that minimises 
the taxation costs imposed on the economy. Barro's model is briefly described in 
Appendix 6.1 to this chapter. Further examinations of Barro's model in Appendix 6.1 
suggest that certain assumptions in Barro's model generate the key result of a time 
invariant optimal tax rate. In the model established in this section, these assumptions are 
assumed to be satisfied. 
Barro's framework is applied in a model for optimal taxation decisions of a government 
to finance its public pension liabilities over time20 . In particular, the government's 
problem is to minimize the deadweight losses associated with collecting payroll taxes to 
finance public pension liabilities, given an aging population during the foreseeable 
future21 . In the setting of the basic model, it is different from the Barro's (1979) model 
in that it explicitly includes the growth of the economy, and it expresses the deadweight 
losses of taxation as an explicit function of the tax rate. Later on, an additional factor is 
included into the basic model to capture the nature of economic transition, which is 
relevant for the Chinese economy. 
In this section, this new factor of economic transition that will be added to the basic 
model is discussed first. This factor is called the 'inefficiency coefficient' of the taxation 
system of a transition economy. It is assumed that collecting tax revenues incurs some 
20 This model can apply to any government liabilities. The focus here is the pension liabilities and most of 
the current Chinese government revenues is from sources other than payroll taxes. See Section 6.4.1. 21 At this stage, the detailed differences between a PA YGO and a FF scheme are ignored. It is assumed 
that all tax revenues are used for current and/or future pension payments. There will be some discussions 
of the differences of these two programs in Chapter 7. 
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administrative costs, such as wages of employees in the taxation system, and the loss of 
taxation revenues due to corruption. It is assumed that during the transition, the taxation 
system is becoming more efficient in collecting taxes over time, such that the 
administrative costs, as a proportion of taxation revenues, declines. Secondly, the basic 
model of the optimal taxation path for public pension liabilities is set up and the optimal 
tax rate is solved. At this stage, the economic transition factor is ignored. Finally, the 
optimal taxation path is solved when the economic transition factor is incorporated. 
6.4.1 The Economic Transition and the Taxation System 
Economic transition refers to reforms of a previously centrally planned economy . 
towards a market-based economy, such as China and Vietnam. Take China as an 
example. Under the central planning, there were no 'regularised' taxation systems 
(McMillan and Naughton 1992: 130). The government had the power to allocate 
resources by owning firms, directing the uses of capital, labor and land, and determining 
prices (including wages), etc22 • Taxation was implicit in government control of the 
price system. Government revenues mainly came from the operating surplus of firms it 
owned (McKinnon 1991 ). During the economic transition towards a market economy, 
economic reforms, such as those of the price system and of SOEs, significantly 
undermined the fiscal revenues (McMillan and Naughton 1992). In order to obtain 
revenues in a market economy, the government has to establish a new taxation system 
that is in line with the market mechanism. However, it takes time to build up such a 
system, and particularly so to have the new system operating efficiently, that is, to use 
the minimum administrative costs to collect a given amount of taxation revenues. 
During such an economic transition, the administrative costs of taxation, as defined 
previously, are expected to decline over time. 
China's gradual reform strategy has allowed a steady although significant decrease of 
the government fiscal recourses. Figure 6-8 shows the share of total government 
(including both the central and the local governments) budgetary revenues in GDP 
during the period from the early 1950s to the end of 1990s. The figure has distinct 
features before and after the economic reform started in 1978. Before the reform, the 
22 Reviews of the social security system in China during the pre-reform era also reveal some of the nature 
of central planning. See Chapters 2 and 3. 
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share of the budgetary revenue in GDP fluctuated, but was always well above 25 per 
cent. During the twenty-year economic transition (1978-1999), while the economy was 
growing rapidly23, government's budgetary revenues (as a share of GDP) declined. In 
1995, it dropped to below 11 per cent, and then increased but only slightly, until the end 
of the period. The falling share of government revenues in GDP is unusual with rapid 
economic growth, but is in line with the declining of the government's control of the 
economy24• 
Before the taxation reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, a large proportion of government 
revenues came from enterprise revenues (mainly SOEs and large collective firms). Tax 
reforms introduced personal and enterprise income tax as well as changes of other 
taxes25 . Figure 6-9 shows the share of non-tax revenues collected from enterprises and 
the share of taxes in total budgetary revenues in China. Before 1985, total budgetary 
revenues included taxes, revenues from enterprises, and other revenues such as 
'revenues raised from funds for key construction projects in energy industry and 
transportation' (Lou 2000). Since 1985, subsidies to loss-making SOEs have been listed 
as a negative item in the budget. In the same year, income tax of enterprises was 
introduced to replace the previous revenues from ( state-owned) enterprises26 . In Figure 
6-9, during the central planning period between 1952 and 1978, the share of tax 
revenues27 in budget declined, while the share of non-tax revenues collected from 
enterprises rose. This trend changed after 1978, when the share of revenues from 
enterprises dropped significantly due to the poor performance of the SOEs. Since the 
enterprise income tax was introduced in 1985, taxation revenues became the most 
important source of budgetary revenues, which accounts for nearly 100 per cent in 
199828 . 
23 According to the author's calculation, based on figures of nominal GDP and general retail price index 
in Lou (2000), during the 1978-1998 period, Chinese real GDP grew at an average of nearly 10 per cent 
per year. 
24 Economic reform is about relaxing government control of the economy. For example, in 1980, state-
owned work units accounted for 82 % of total fixed capital investment. By 1999, the share had dropped to 
53% (author's calculation based on figures in SSB 2000b). 
25 For a description of the taxation reform in China, see Gordon and Li (2002). 
26 The reform began with large SOEs and not until 1994 that it was extend to all SOEs (Zhu and Sun 
1994) 
27 During this period, tax revenues came from industrial and commercial tax (value added tax), tariffs and 
agricultural taxes (Lou 2000). 
28 There were couple of years when the share of taxation revenues was over 100%, since the subsidy to 
SOEs was listed as a negative item in budgetary revenue. 
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During the late 1990s, industrial and commercial tax was the most important source of 
taxation revenues of the Chinese government. It accounted for about 80 percent of 
revenues, followed by enterprise income tax ( about 10 percent), agriculture tax and, 
finally, tariffs. Although individual income tax was introduced in the early 1980s, it 
only had a negligible contribution in the budget revenues (Lou 2000). 
These observations suggest that economic transition from a central-planned economy 
towards a market economy could negatively affect government revenues, even though 
the economy is growing rapidly. While there are lots 9f reasons for this outcome (Wang 
and Hu 2001, McKinnon 1991 ), it is also reasonable to argue that the establishment of a 
new and efficient taxation system takes time. Similar to other new institutions, the new 
taxation system has to experience the 'learning and catching up' process, when new 
regulations and types of taxes are introduced, staff members are trained, and better 
technologies of modem taxation system are applied, etc. During this process, the new 
taxation system is expected to become more efficient in the sense that for a given 
amount of taxation revenues collected, the administrative costs are reduced. This feature 
of the taxation system of a transition economy is modelled later by adding an 
inefficiency coefficient of the taxation system to the basic model. This coefficient 
represents the proportion of total taxation revenues that are 'wasted', that is, a 
percentage of tax collected cannot be used to pay government pension liabilities. As a 
result, when this coefficient is added to the model, the revenue that can be used to pay 
these expenditures is the net tax revenue, which is gross tax revenue*(l-inefficiency 
coefficient). This percentage of tax revenue wasted is expected to decline over time, 
when the taxation system becomes more efficient. Thus this coefficient is expected to 
drop29. 
6.4.2 The Basic Model 
The basic model for optimal taxation over time to finance government pension 
payments is set up as follows. It is assumed that payroll tax is the form of taxation for 
29 This assumption of increasing efficiency of the taxation system in China attempts to capture some of 
the features of the transitional nature of the Chinese economy. It makes the model more interesting. 
Results with and without this assumption are given. In practice, policy choice should base on whether this 
assumption is likely to hold in the economy or not, or whether the government adopts policies to increase 
the efficiency of the taxation system over time. 
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the government to finance pension liabilities. Output is assumed to be a quadratic 
function in employment, so that demand of labour is linear3°. Labour supply function is 
also assumed to be linear. The standard Lagrange method is applied to find the optimal 
tax rate over time. 
The setting up of the basic model ensures an analytical solution for the deadweight loss 
(DWL) of taxation. Figure 6-10 shows the economy for a particular period, t. the 
demand and supply curves of labor are straight lines. Quantity of labor is represented by 
the horizontal axis; wages, W, are on the vertical axis. A payroll tax (re)? ? expressed 
as a ratio (%) of the net wages to workers (Ws)? is collected. This tax drives a wedge 
between wages paid by employers, W\1 +1r), and those received by employees, ws . 
The DWL is represented by the usual triangle in Figure 6-10. 
The government's objective is to choose TCt for each period so as to raise a given amount 
of revenues (in terms of its present values), denoted as "Ct, such that the present value of 
the deadweight loss, DWL, associated with the payroll tax is minimized. The 
government objective function, DWL, is expressed as in equation (6-6): 
DWL=f DWL, 
t== l (1 + r)1 (6-6) 
where DWLt is the deadweight loss of taxation in period t, r is the discount rate. T 
represents the last year of the planning horizon of the government. 
The choice of the tax rate must satisfy the following budget constraint to finance 
government's pension liabilities, that is, the sum of (the present values of) taxation 
revenues in each period, "Ct, must be equal to the sum of (the present values of) 
government expenditures in each period, Bt, which is assumed to be exogenously given, 
T B T L t = L r t 
t==l (1 + rY t==I (1 + r)1 (6-7) 
30 This is the case with the assumption that firms maximise profits . 
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Using the usual Lagrange approach, the optimal tax rate for period t can be solved as a 
function of the Lagrange multiplier, and coefficients of the labour demand and labour 
supply functions. The process of obtaining the solution is in Appendix 6.2 to this 
chapter. 
It is straightforward to show that when Barro's assumptions are satisfied in this model, 
the optimal tax rate is a constant over time. The proof is also in Appendix 6.2 to this 
chapter. 
6.4.3 The Economic Transition Factor and the Optimal Tax Rates 
Once the optimal tax rate for the basic model . is solved, it is simple to incorporate the 
economic transition factor-the inefficiency coefficient of the taxation system-into the 
basic model. The inefficiency coefficient indicates that part of tax revenues are 'wasted' 
in the taxation system in the sense that they cannot be used by the government to pay its 
pension liabilities. 
If this inefficiency coefficient is a constant over time, the optimal tax rate is still a 
constant, although the deadweight losses are higher, ceteris paribus. This is because the 
more tax revenues need to be collected. If the taxation system becomes more efficient 
over time, which is likely to be significant during economic transition, the inefficiency 
coefficient declines with time. This means that the optimal tax rate is time dependent: it 
is higher when the inefficiency coefficient is small and is lower when the coefficient is 
large. In the case that the taxation system becomes more efficient during the economic 
transition, the optimal tax rate for collecting tax revenues declines over time. These 
results are shown in Appendix 6.2 to this chapter. 
6.5 Simulations of the Deadweight Losses Associated with Financing a 
Defined-benefit Pension Scheme Using Alternative Approaches 
This section uses the results of the model in the previous section to examine the most 
efficient way of financing public pension liabilities when an economy is facing an aging 
population. In particular, two alternative approaches of financing are used to compare 
the differences of efficiency losses to the economy: a PA YGO year-by-year approach 
and an optimal tax approach. 
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Here the PA YGO year-by-year approach scheme collects just enough payroll taxes to 
finance pension expenditures each year. The optimal taxation scheme collects taxes 
according to the optimal tax rate for each period, but collects just enough taxes (in 
present values) that equal to (the present values of) public pension liabilities during a 
50-year period between 2001 and 2050. In simulations, the impact of the economic 
transition factor-the inefficiency coefficient of the taxation system-is also 
considered. 
6.5.1 The Simulation Methods 
Since the current Chinese pension system covers only urban residents31 , simulations are 
based on the urban economy. The Chinese urban economy in 2000 is chosen as the base 
year. Parameters of the labour supply curve and labour demand curve are chosen to 
replicate the situation in urban economy in the base year. The estimation of parameters 
for the base year is discussed in Appendix 6.3 to this chapter. Given the information in 
2000, parameters of labour demand function are determined. There is one degree of 
freedom in determining parameters of the labour supply curve. This is used to choose 
the wage elasticity of labour supply in 2000. To start with, this elasticity is chosen to be 
1. Some sensitivity tests are conducted later to examine the impact of different values of 
this elasticity. 
In the simulation model, the economy grows when the parameters of the labour supply 
and demand functions grow over time. The growth rates of these parameters are 
exogenous and it is assumed that the way they change satisfies Barro's assumptions for 
a constant optimal tax rate, as examined in Appendix 6.1 to this chapter. In other words, 
it is expected that the optimal tax rate is time invariant for the base model where the 
inefficiency coefficient of the taxation system is assumed to be zero. The optimal tax 
rate is expected to rise when the inefficiency coefficient is added, which increases with 
time. The required tax rate for the PAYGO year-by-year approach, of course, always 
rises with the rise of the expected retiree/worker ratio, as discussed in Section 6.3 .2.1 . 
31 These are those residents who have the urban household registration. 
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To incorporate the factor of population aging into simulations, the expected 
retiree/worker ratio in urban China is estimated based on the projected population age 
structure of the Chinese population by the UN (2001 ). The details of calculating the 
expected retiree/worker ratios are in Appendix 6.3 to this chapter. The idea is to take the 
projected old-age dependency ratio32 for the whole population as the base, but allow for 
factors that deviate the urban retiree/worker ratio from the old-age dependency ratio. 
This ensures that the retiree/worker ratio in the base year is the same as the actual 
statistics. The case when the urban population aging is as fast as the rural areas is the 
base scenario in the simulation. Simulations are also carried out for other two possible 
scenarios: 1) the urban population is aging at a faster rate compared with the rural 
population. For this scenario, the urban retiree/worker ratio is assumed to be 10% 
higher than the base retiree/worker ratio; and 2) the urban population is aging at a 
slower rate compared with the rural population. For this scenario, the urban 
retiree/worker ratio is assumed to be 10% lower than the base retiree/worker ratio. 
Simulations are conducted for the base scenario of urban population aging when per 
capita GDP grows at a fast rate (6%/year), a medium rate ( 4.5%/year) and a slow rate 
(3%/year). These cases are listed in Table 6-4. The growth rate of urban employment is 
estimated to be 1.39%/year by Zhao and Xu (2002) based on the World Bank's (1996) 
projections. As discussed in Appendix 6.3 to this chapter, both the growth rate of 
employment and of GDP per capita depend on the growth rate of parameters in the 
labour supply and demand functions, as well as the payroll tax rate. If the tax rate is 
constant, which is true for the optimal taxation approach and when the inefficiency 
coefficient is constant, the growth rates of employment and GDP per capita are 
constant, and are functions of the growth rates of parameters only. As a result, once the 
growth rates of parameters are chosen, the growth rate of urban employment and GDP 
per capita are (roughly) determined. 
The expected public pension liabilities are calculated based on the number of retirees, 
which is estimated using the expected retiree/worker ratio and the urban employment 
( details are in Appendix 6.3). The optimal tax rate is simulated for the baseline scenario 
of population aging when the economy grows at different rates. The deadweight losses 
32 This is defined as the number of people at retirement age (males 60+ and females 55+) to the number 
of people at working age (males 15-59, females 15-54), for the whole Chinese population. 
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(DWLo) are calculated for each case. Once this is done, the PA YGO year-by-year tax 
rate is simulated and the associated deadweight losses (DWLp) are calculated. The 
efficiency gains of following the optimal tax rate are defined as the percentage 
reduction of deadweight loses: the efficiency gains(%)= l00*(DWLp-DWL0 )/DWLp_ 
6.5.2 The Simulation Results 
6.5.2.1 An Efficient Taxation System 
The first part of the simulation focus on the optimal tax rate for the basic model, when 
the inefficiency coefficient of the taxation system is assumed to be zero. This is the case · 
when it is assumed that all tax revenues are used to pay the government pension 
liabilities and no revenues are wasted in the taxation system33 . In these simulations, it is 
expected that the PA YGO year-by-year tax rate rise over time when the retiree/worker 
ratio increases due to population aging, while the optimal tax rate approach imposes a 
constant tax rate to minimise the deadweight losses. 
The base scenario is simulated first, where urban population aging is the same as that in 
rural areas and the population age structure is based on UN's (2001) projection (medium 
variant fertility assumption), wage elasticity of labour supply is 1, and GDP per capita 
grows at 6% per year at optimum. The results are presented in Figures 6-11 to 6-15. 
Figure 6-11 draws the population old-age dependency ratio calculated based on UN' s 
(2001) projected age structure of the Chinese population, and the simulated results of 
the PA YGO year-by-year tax rate that is needed to finance pension payments. The old-
age dependency ratio is defined as the number of people of retirement age (males aged 
60+ and females aged 55+) to the number of people of working age (males aged 15-59 
and females aged 15-54). The diagram confirms the direct linkage between the old-age 
dependency ratio and the tax burden of the PA YGO year-by-year financed public 
pension system, as discussed in Section 6.3. 
Figure 6-12 shows the simulated results of the optimal tax rate and the PA YGO year-
by-year tax rate. As expected, while the PAYGO year-by-year tax rate rises due to 
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population aging, the optimal tax rate is constant. In this particular scenano, the 
PAYGO year-by-year tax rate for pension payments has to rise from 13.3% in 2001 to 
52.9% in 2050. The optimal tax rate smoothes out the burden over the whole 50-year 
planning period, yet it still requires a constant payroll tax rate of 34.8%. This suggests 
that for the economy that is facing rapid population aging in the near future, the current 
tax rate is too low, compared with the optimal tax rate that minimise the taxation costs 
of financing pension payments. The tax burden of future pension payments should be 
smoothed out over time in order to minimise the efficiency costs. It is also very clear 
from this diagram that even the optimal payroll tax rate is very high. This raises 
concerns about the high tax burden for a defined-benefits PA YGO public pension 
scheme in Chinese cities. 
In Figures 6-13 to 6-15, simulated results of urban employment, net wages to workers 
and pre-tax wages of the PAYGO year-by-year approach and the optimal approach are 
compared. Higher payroll tax rates reduce net wages and discourage labour supply 
(when wage elasticity of labour supply is positive), but increase pre-tax wages, ceteris 
paribus. Since the PA YGO year-by-year tax rate is lower than the optimal tax rate 
during the early years when the retiree/worker ratio is relatively low, but higher than the 
optimal tax rate later when the retiree/worker ratio is relatively high, it is expected that 
urban employment and net wages are higher in the PA YGO year-by-year approach than 
that in the optimal approach initially, but are lower later on. The pre-tax wages are 
expected to be lower in the PA YGO year-by-year case but higher later on, compared 
with that in the optimal case. These expectations are confirmed in these figures ; even 
though the gap between wages of these two approaches is very close and is hard to tell 
in the diagrams. 2029 is the year when the year0by-year tax rate becomes higher than 
the optimal tax rate. This is also the year when the two curves cross in these three 
figures. 
When the growth rate of GDP per capita changes and when the wage elasticity of labour 
supply in 2000 is different, the numerical results change. However, the variations are 
not very significant. For example, when GDP grows at 3%/year and elasticity of labour 
supply is 1, the PAYGO year-by-year tax rate rises from 13.0% in 2001 to 57.0% in 
2050, while the optimal tax rate is a constant of 30.3%. When GDP grows at 6% per 
33 The inefficiency coefficient is discussed in more details in Section 6.4.1. 
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year, but wage elasticity of labour supply is 0.5, the PA YGO year-by-year tax rate rises 
from 13.1 % in 2001 to 54.8% in 2050, while the optimal tax rate is 35.5%. However, 
the key relationships between the variable of the PA YGO year-by-year scheme and the 
optimal tax scheme, such as those shown in Figures 6-13 to 6-15, remain. 
Now tum to the issue of efficiency gains. In the basic scenario (GDP grows at 6%/year, 
wage elasticity of labour supply is 1 in 2000), the efficiency gains of following the 
optimal tax rate rather than the PA YGO year-by-year approach is 12.3%. This indicates 
that by adopting the optimal tax rate, the deadweight loss is reduced by 12.3% 
compared with that by following the PA YGO year-by-year approach (See Table 6-5). 
These optimal tax rate and the efficiency gains are affected by the key assumptions of 
the simulations. For example, they are different when GDP per capita is assumed to 
grow at a slower rate, or when the wage elasticity of labour supply chosen for 2000 
changes. The optimal tax rates and efficiency gains of some of these cases are 
summarised in Table 6-5. 
In the same row of Table 6-5, the growth rate of GDP per capita is the same and 
therefore pension liabilities are the same34. The difference of the optimal tax rates and 
of the efficiency gains are due to the impact of the wage elasticity of labour supply 
chosen for 2000. For example, when GDP per capita grows at 6%/year, the optimal tax 
rate is 37.4% when the elasticity is 0.1, 35.5% when the elasticity is 0.5, and 34.8% 
when the elasticity is 135 . In all the cases simulated, when the labour supply curve 
becomes flatter, the optimal tax rate decrease, but the efficiency gains increase. 
Along the same column of Table 6-5, the elasticity of labour supply is fixed. The 
differences of optimal tax rates and efficiency gains are due to the impact of the 
different growth rates of GDP per capita. For instance, for the case when wage elasticity 
of labour supply is 1, the optimal tax rate is 34.8% when GDP per capita grows at 6% 
per year, 33.2% when it grows at 4.5%/year, and 30.3% when it grows at 3%/year. 
Since the growth rate of employment is fixed at 1.39%/year, the number of retirees is 
34 See details of the simulation methods in Appendix A6.3. 
35 When the wage elasticity of labour supply increases, parameter ht rises while at decreases. In the 
simulations, A also increases. However, it can be seen from equation (A6.2-24) in Appendix A6.2 that 
whether the optimal tax rate rises or drops is undetermined. 
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not affected by the growth rate of GDP per capita. However, the higher the growth rate 
of GDP per capita, the higher the growth rate of average pensions (to maintain the 
constant replacement rate). Again, the analytical solution does not indicate whether the 
optimal tax rate would increase or decrease. In these simulations, the optimal tax rate 
rises when GDP per capita grows at a higher rate, for all the three cases of elasticity of 
labour supply is 1, 0.5 and 0.1. 
Tables 6-6 to 6-9 summarise simulation results for some of the key variables in the case 
when optimal tax rate is imposed. Tables 6-6 and 6-8 compare these variables across 
different wage elasticity of labour supply when GDP per capita grows at 6% and 3%, 
respectively. Tables 6-7 and 6-9 compare these variables across difference GDP growth 
rate when wage elasticity of labour supply in 2000 is chosen to be 1 and 0.5, 
respectively. It can be seen from these tables that the impact of the wage elasticity of 
labour supply chosen for 2000 and the growth rate of GDP per capita assumed has 
impact on the ( constant) optimal tax rate. For the base scenario when urban population 
aging is as fast that in villages, the optimal tax rate that smoothes out the rising payroll 
tax over the 50-year period is between 30% and 37%. 
6.5.2.2 An Inefficient but Improving Taxation System 
To examine the impact of an inefficient taxation system on the simulation results, the 
first simulation examines the extreme case of an inefficient taxation system: it is 
assumed that the taxation system in China is inefficient and its efficiency is not 
improved during the 50-year period. The inefficiency coefficient, a, as defined 
previously, is the percentage of taxation revenues wasted. In other words, for every 
yuan of taxation revenues, only (1-0.0la) yuan can be used to pay public pension 
liabilities. As explained in Appendix 6.3, a in 2000 is estimated to be 7 .5%. With this 
assumption, the simulations for the base scenario? urban population aging is as fast as 
that in rural areas? are carried out for the three cases of different growth rate of GDP 
per capita (as shown in Table 6-4), and for different values of wage elasticity of labour 
supply. The results are presented in Figure 6-16 and in Table 6-10. 
Since the taxation system is inefficient, it is necessary to collect more tax revenues for 
any given public pension liabilities, ceteris paribus. Therefore, it is expected that both 
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the PA YGO year-by-year tax rate and the optimal tax rate is higher, ceteris paribus, 
compared with that when the coefficient is zero. Since the inefficiency coefficient of 
the taxation system is assumed to be constant overtime, the optimal tax rate is also 
constant. These are clear in Figure 6-16. When GDP per capita grows at 6% per year 
and wage elasticity of labour supply is 1, the PAYGO year-by-year tax rate increases 
from 14.2% in 2001 to 63.8% in 2050, while the optimal tax rate is 39.9%. Compared 
with the case when the taxation system is efficient (Figure 6-12), the PA YGO year-by-
year tax rate is only about 1 percentage point higher in 2001, but more than 10 
percentage points higher in 2050, while the constant optimal tax rate is increased by 
about 5 percentage points. The results show that the inefficiency of the taxation system 
exacerbates the financial burden of an aging population, especially when the 
retiree/worker ratio is high. This 1s because taxation revenues do not increase 
proportionally with tax rate. Instead, the taxation revenue is a quadratic function of the 
tax rate: at the left-hand side of the Laffer curve where taxation revenues increase with 
tax rate, the slope of the curve is positive but declines. This indicates that the ratio of 
the % increase of tax revenues to the % increase of tax rate declines when the tax rate 
rises. In the simulations, this Laffer curve effect is clearly the result of endogens wage 
rate and labour supply. When a higher payroll tax rate is imposed, it reduces net wages, 
employment and thus the taxation base. As a result, taxation revenues increase at a 
declining rate when the tax rate is higher36 . 
Table 6-10 compares the optimal tax rate and the efficiency gains when the taxation 
system is inefficient with that when the system is efficient. The case that this table 
summarises is the base scenario of population aging and GDP per capita grows at 
6%/year. Due to the inefficiency of the taxation system, the optimal tax rate is expected 
to be higher. When the taxation system is inefficient, both the PAYGO year-by-year tax 
rate and the optimal tax rate are higher, ceteris paribus. The change of efficiency gains, 
which is the percentage reduction of deadweight losses by following the optimal tax 
rate instead of the PA YGO year-by-year tax rate, depends upon individual cases. As 
shown in Table 6-10, the optimal tax rate is about 5 percentage points higher when the 
taxation system is inefficient, compared with the case when it is efficient, for all three 
values chosen for the wage elasticity of labour supply in 2000. In these three cases, it 
36 Of course, the tax revenues eventually decline with the tax rate when the tax rate is too high. In the 
simulations, cautions are taken to make sure that the tax rate is at the left-hand side of the Laffer curve. 
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turns out that the efficiency gains are higher when the taxation system is inefficient. The 
extra efficiency gains range from 0.2 to 2 percentage points when the elasticity chosen 
varies from 0.1 to 1. 
Further simulations are conducted to examine the impact of improved efficiency of the 
taxation system on the optimal tax rates as well as the efficiency gains by following the 
optimal tax rate. To focus on this factor, the simulations are conducted for the base 
scenario, where urban population aging is as fast as that in rural areas, the wage 
elasticity of labour supply in 2000 is chosen to be 1, and GDP per capita in cities grows 
at 6% per year. 
When the initial inefficient coefficient of the taxation system, denoted as a, is estimated 
to be 7 .5% in 2000, how fast the taxation system become more efficient affects the 
optimal tax rates as well as the efficiency gains. The faster the system becomes more 
efficient, the less waste of taxation revenues, and the lower the required tax rate, ceteris 
paribus. Three cases are simulated: 1) a declines slower than the growth rate of GDP 
per capita, at 3% per year; 2) a declines at the same rate as the growth of GDP per 
capita, at 6% per year; 3) a declines faster than the growth rate of GDP per capita, at 
9% per year. Both the PA YGO year-by-year tax rate and the optimal tax rate are lower. 
The simulation results for these three cases of the PAYGO year-by-year tax rates and 
the optimal tax rates are presented in Figures 6-17 to 6-19, respectively. 
In these figures, the optimal tax rate nses, although very slightly, due to the 
improvement of the taxation system over time. In the first case when a declines at the 
rate of 3%/year, the optimal tax rate is 36.3% in 2001 and rises to 38.2% in 2050. In the 
second case when a declines at the rate of 6%/year, the optimal tax rate is 35.1 % in 
2001 and rises to 37.4% in 2050. It rises from 34.7% in 2001 to 36.9% in 2001 in the 
third case when a declines at the rate of 9%/year. In all the three cases as shown in 
Figures 6-17 to 6-19, the PA YGO year-by-year tax rate is far below the optimal tax rate 
during the early years of the 50-year period when the population aging is relatively low, 
but well above the optimal rate when the retiree-worker ratio becomes high. In the first 
case when a declines at the rate of 3%/year, the PAYGO year-by-year tax rate is 14.2% 
in 2001 and rises to 58.3% in 2050. In the second case when a declines at the rate of 
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6%/year, the PAYGO year-by-year tax rate is 14.1 % in 2001 and rises to 57.3% in 
2050. It rises from 14.1 % in 2001 to 57.0% in 2001 in the third case when a declines at 
the rate of 9%/year. 
The impact of the efficiency of the taxation system on the tax rates and efficiency gains 
is summarised in Table 6-11, where the PAYGO year-by-year and the optimal tax rates 
as well as efficiency gains for the inefficient taxation system (inefficiency coefficient is 
fixed at 7 .5% ), the improving efficiency taxation system and the efficient taxation 
system (the inefficiency coefficient is zero) are listed. For the purpose of comparison, in 
all the relevant cases in Table 6-11, GDP per capita is assumed to grow at 6%/year, the 
wage elasticity of labour supply is assume to be 1. Obviously, the more efficient the 
taxation system, the lower the tax rate, for both the PA YGO year-by-year financing and 
the optimal taxation financing. The efficiency gains are the highest at 14.3%, when the 
taxation system is inefficient and remains to be so. They are the lowest when the 
taxation system is inefficient and its efficiency does not improve very fast. The lowest 
efficiency gains are about 12.2%. 
Finally, some other simulations are conducted for the scenarios when urban population 
aging is faster or slower than that in rural areas. A faster population aging in cities could 
be the result of the following situation: the household registration system remains 
effective, the one-child policy is more effective in cities than in villages, and the 
pension scheme only covers people with urban household registration. The case 
simulated for this scenario is that the retiree/worker ratio in cities is assumed to be 10% 
higher than the base scenario, when the urban population aging is as fast as that in rural 
areas. On the other hand, a slower urban population aging than that in rural area is 
possible, for instance, in the situation when the household registration system is relaxed, 
and a large number of rural migrants, mainly young workers, come to cities to work and 
they are covered by the pension scheme. The case simulated for this scenario is that the 
retiree/worker ratio in cities is 10% lower than the base scenario, when the urban 
population aging is as fast as the rural areas. The simulation results for these two 
scenarios are presented in Table 6-12, for the case when GDP per capita grows at 
6%/year and the wage elasticity of labour supply in 2000 is chosen to be 1. The results 
for the base scenario are also listed in the table for comparisons. 
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The results in Tables 6-12 show that: 1) the faster the speed of population aging, the 
higher the optimal and PA YGO year-by-year tax rates, ceteris paribus; For instance, 
compared with the PA YGO year-by-year tax rate of 57 .3 % in the base scenario in 2050, 
it is 49.5% if the population aging in cities is 10% slower, but it is as high as 65.8% if 
the population aging is 10% faster. Compare with the optimal tax rate of 37.4% in 2050, 
it is only 32.8% if the population aging in urban China is 10% slower, but as high as 
42.2% if the population aging is 10% faster. 2) The speed of population aging also 
affects efficiency gains of following the optimal tax rate. In this particular case of 
simulation, the efficiency gains are the highest, 12. 9%, when the urban population aging 
is faster than the base scenario. They are the lowest, 11.6%, when the urban population 
aging is slower than the base scenario. 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter is the first of the two chapters that focus on future policy options for public 
pension scheme in China. It examines public pension liabilities and their financing over 
a period of time, when the population is aging. In particular, it looks at the economic 
efficiency implications of alternative approaches in financing a defined-benefit public 
pension scheme in China during the next 50 years or so. A basic model of optimal 
taxation, based upon Barro's (1979) framework, to finance public pension liabilities is 
set up and solved. It is then modified to incorporate a feature of economic transition-
inefficient taxation system. The solution for the basic and the modified models are used 
for simulations to examine the possible impact of population aging on Chinese 
government public pension liabilities, and the potential efficiency impact on the 
economy, by using alternative approaches to finance these pre-determined pension 
liabilities. 
The trend of population aging 1n China during the next 50 years or so is clearly 
indicated by studies from various sources. These population projections show that the 
old-age dependency ratio of the Chinese population is expected to rise sharply. This is 
mainly due to the low fertility rate as the result of the government one-child policy 
since the late 1970s. However, there are factors that need to be considered when 
examining the burden of public pension liabilities in China, which currently only covers 
urban residents who have urban household registration. These factors include possible 
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relaxation of the one-child policy and the relaxation on rural-urban migration. Both 
factors may slow down the speed of population aging in cities, but how big these 
impacts may be needs careful studies, which has not been explored in this chapter. 
The impact of population aging on public pension liabilities is discussed for two 
alternative schemes: a PA YGO scheme and a funded scheme. In both the case of a 
defined-benefit scheme and a defined-contribution scheme, population aging has no 
direct impact on the funded scheme. However, it generates financial pressure on the 
PA YGO scheme: an aging population requires increasing contribution rates in the 
defined-benefit scheme, or declining pension benefits in the defined-contribution 
scheme. If a government wishes to reform a PA YGO public pension scheme into a 
funded one, the previous implicit public debt of pension liabilities become explicit, and 
the government must finance them over time. 
This chapter then analyses a fundamental issue in financing public pension liabilities: 
the economic efficiency of collecting sufficient tax revenues to pay pensions for an 
aging population covered by a defined-benefit public pension scheme. A theoretical 
model, based on Barro's (1979) framework of optimal debt issue, has been set up. The 
model assumes that the government's problem is to minimize the deadweight loss of 
financing an exogenously given stream of government expenditures, including pension 
payments37 . In the basic model where the labour demand and labour supply function is 
linear, it is shown that Barro's result of a constant optimal tax rate holds, so long as his 
basic assumptions are satisfied. To satisfy these assumptions, while the parameters of 
the functions change to allow for the growth of employment and wages, they must 
change in a particular fashion. With these assumptions hold, the basic model has been 
solved to find the constant optimal tax rate. It is then used to include a feature of the 
taxation system in a transition economy such as China. The taxation system is assumed 
to be inefficient in the sense that parts of tax revenues are wasted and the net tax 
revenues is the difference between the gross revenues and the waste. However, the 
taxation system is expected to improve its efficiency over time. The solution of the 
model with this feature suggests that the optimal tax rate increases when the taxation 
system becomes more efficient. 
37 The simulations in this chapter assume the payroll tax is only used to finance the public pension 
liabilities. The payroll tax, of course, can be used to finance other government expenditures as well. 
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The solutions of the model are then used to simulate the possible impact of population 
aging on pension burden on the economy, firstly when the taxation system is assumed 
to be efficient, and secondly when it is inefficient. Some sensitivity tests are also 
conducted to examine the impact of the speed of population aging, the growth rate of 
GDP per capita, and the wage elasticity of labour supply on simulation results. In these 
simulations, the emphasis is also on the efficiency gains by following the optimal 
taxation path instead of the PAYGO year-by-year tax rate. 
The results confirm that population aging in China-as predicted by the UN (2001 )-is 
expected to generate sharply rising taxation burden on workers to finance the public 
pension scheme on the PA YGO year-by-year base. For example, in the base case 
scenario38, the PAYGO year-by-year tax rate rises from 13.1 % to 52.9%, when the 
taxation system is assumed to be efficient. The tax rate is even higher if the inefficiency 
of the taxation system is considered (see table 6-11). Even a relatively slower 
population aging in cities, compared with that in villages, does not make the problem 
disappear. The worst case is when urban population aging is faster than that in rural 
areas. Neither the wage elasticity nor the growth rate of GDP per capita changes this 
conclusion, although they have some impact on the tax rates. 
The simulation results suggest that there are potentially large efficiency gains by 
following the optimal tax rate instead of the PAYGO year-by-year tax rate. While the 
PA YGO year-by-year tax rate rises sharply due to fast population aging, the optimal tax 
rate smoothes out the taxation burden of pension liabilities: it is constant when the 
taxation system is efficient or the inefficiency coefficient remains unchanged, and rises 
slightly ~hen the taxation system becomes more efficient over time. These efficiency 
gains are significant in all simulations, although they vary when factors such as wage 
elasticity of labour supply, the speed of population aging and the growth rate of GDP 
per capita change. 
Despite the large efficiency gains by following the optimal tax rate instead of the 
PA YGO year-by-year rate, the tax burden of population aging alone on workers is still 
38 In this scenario, the urban population aging is assumed to be as fast as that in rural areas, the wage 
elasticity of labour supply is 1 in 2000, and the growth rate of GDP per capita is 6%/year. See Table 6-11 . 
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very heavy. In most of the cases simulated, the optimal tax rate required is over 30%, 
which is very high and not feasible. 
The results of this chapter raise the following points: (1) using payroll taxes to finance 
the old, defined-benefit PA YGO public pension liabilities in China on a year-by-year 
base in the near future is too costly and is not feasible; (2) the alternative-optimal tax 
rate approach that accumulates funds while the population is relatively young to finance 
the defined-benefit scheme-is not likely to be feasible either. The results strongly 
suggest that either the Chinese government need to consider using other sources to 
finance its public pension liabilities of the define-benefit PA YGO scheme, or undertake 
pension reforms. The next chapter will examine .reform options using individual 
accounts to accumulate pension funds. It will examine the taxation impact of the current 
partially funded pension scheme in China versus a fully funded pension scheme with 
individual accounts. 
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Figure 6-1. Expenditure of Major Social Security Programs in 
China (1999) 
medical care 
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Source: Expenditures of old age pension, medical care, unemployment insurance, occupational injury and 
maternity insurance are from SSB (2000a); Figure for minimum living security program is from Shi (ed.) 
(2000). 
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Figure 6-2. Population Age Structure in China (Forecasts for Selected Years) 
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Source: author's construction based on figures on UN (1999). 
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Figure 6-3. Population Aging in the World 
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b. the less developed regions include all regions in Africa, Asia ( except Japan), Latin America and the 
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Source: Author's construction based on UN (2001). 
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Figure 6-4. The Old Dependency Ratio and the Total Dependency Ratio in 
China 
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Figure 6-5. Comparison of Age Structure in China (Male), 1999 
m ~ 
' 
f !;: 
I 
I 
I I 
"' I ~= 
' I ;fr 
0-4 5--9 10-- 15- 20- 25-- 30- 35- 40- 45-- 50- 55-- 60- 65-- 70-- 75- 80-- 85- 90+ 
14 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84 89 
Age group 
\ lilll city II Town • County I 
Source: author's construction based on figures of the Population Change Survey in SSB (2000). 
12.0% 
10.0% 
8.0% 
~ 0 6.0% 
4.0% 
2.0% 
0.0% 
Figure 6-6. Comparison of Age Structure in China (Female), 
1999 
0-4 5-9 10- 15- 20-- 25- 30-- 35- 40-- 45- 50-- 55- 60- 65- 70- 75- 80- 85- 90+ 
14 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84 89 
Age group 
\ i1 City • Town • County I 
Source: author's construction based on figures of the Population Change Survey in SSB (2000). 
228 
0 
... 
ns 
'-
1.20 
1.00 
0.80 
0.60 
0.40 
0.20 
~-
0.00 
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Figure 6-8. Share of Budget Revenue in GDP in China 
45 
40 
35 
30 
-~ 25 .. 
-Q) 
'-ns 20 
.c: 
en 
15 
10 
5 
0 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*~ 
...._Q5 ...._Q5 ...._Q5 ...._Q5 ...._q; ...._q; ...._q; ...._q; ...._q; ...._C>.> ...._C>.> ...._C>.> ...._C>.> ...._C>.> "Qi "Qi "Qi "Qi "Qi ...._qs ...._qs ...._qs ...._qs ...._qs 
Year 
Source: author's construction based on table 2-1 in Lou (2000: 59-60). 
229 
-';fl. 
-Q) 
I,.. 
('Q 
.c 
en 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
Figure 6-9. The Share of Non-tax Revenues Colected from 
Enterprises and Share of Tax in Total Governemnt Budget 
Revenue in China 
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Figure 6-10. Dead Weight Loss of the Payroll Tax 
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Figure 6-11. The UN (2001) Projected Old-age Dependency 
Ratio and the Year-by-year, PAYGO Tax Rate 
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Figure 6-12. The Optimla Tax Rate and the PAYGO Tax 
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Figure 6-13. Urban Employment in the Optiaml and the PAYGO Cases 
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Figure 6-14 Net Wages in the Optimal and the PAYGO, year-by-year 
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Figure 6-15. Pre-tax Wages in the Optimal and the PAYGO, Year-by-
year Cases 
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Figure 6-17.The Optimal Tax Rate and the PAYGO, Year-by-year Tax Rate when the 
Inefficient Taxation System Becomes more Efficient 
(GDP per capita grows at 6%/yr, e=1, inefficiency coefficient declines at 
3%/yr) 
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Figure 6-18. The Optimal Tax Rate and the PAYGO year-by-year Tax 
Rate when the Inefficient Taxation System Becomes More 
Efficient (GDP per capita grows at 6%/yr, e=1, inefficiency 
coefficient declines at 6%/yr) 
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Figure 6-19. The Optimal Tax Rate and the PAYGO, Year-by-year 
Tax Rate when the llnefficient Taxation System Becoems More 
Efficient (GDP per capita grows at 6%/yr, e=1, the inefficiency 
coefficient declines at 9%/year) 
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Table 6-1. Population Aging between 1950 and 2000 in China (Census results) 
Census year 1953 1964 1982 1990 2000 
Median age (years) 22.7 20.2 22.9 25.2 Nia 
Share of population aged 60 and over (%) 7.3 6.1 7.6 8.6 Nia 
Share of population aged 65 and over (% t 4.4 3.6 4.9 5.6 7.0 
Share of population aged 14 and less (%) 38.2 41.1 33.4 27.7 22.9 
Total dependency ratio A (%) ( 60+ & 14- 76.5 83.8 66.9 54.4 Nia 
115-59) 
Total dependency ratio B (%) (65+ & 14- 71.7 89.4 62.6 49.9 42.6 
l15-64t 
O1-age dependency ratio(%) (60+115-59) 13.01 11.41 13.01 13.52 Nia 
Note: a. These figures are listed for the convenience for comparison with other studies. 
Source: 1. figures are from Wu (1991: 29) 
2. this figure is for 1987 from Wu (1991: 29), 
3. Figures in this column are from SSB (2001b). 
All other figures are from Hussain and Zhu (1996). 
Table 6-2. Population Aging in China: Some Projection Results 
Year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 Source 
Median age 27.6 30.0 32.4 34.5 35.9 37.3 38.9 40.8 43.0 43.7 UN (years) 
Share of people 10.2 11.8 15.2 20.4 22.1 21.4 Wu, - - - -aged 60 or over 1991 (%) 9.4 10.1 10.8 12.3 14.7 16.7 19.5 23.3 27.3 29.9 UN 
The 
9.6 10.1 10.6 11.7 14.0 15.6 18.2 21.5 - 26.5 World 
Bank 
Total Wu, 
dependency ratio 1991 (%) 55.8 53.7 48.4 48.1 52.0 55.7 61.0 68.4 77.4 85.9 UN (60+ & 14-/ 15- The 59) 55.9 55.8 50.4 49.4 52.4 56.3 62.2 70.2 - 81.1 World 
Bank 
Old-age 
Wu, dependency ratio 
(%) 1991 
60+/15-59 
14.6 15.5 16.1 18.1 22.4 26.0 31.5 39.2 48.4 55.6 UN 
The 
14.9 15.7 15.9 17.5 21.3 24.4 29 .5 36.6 - 46.9 World 
Bank 
Source: Author's calculation/construction based on data from UN (1999), Bos and Vu ( et al. 1994), Wu (1991). '-' figures are not available. 
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Table 6-3. Comparison of the Impact of Population Aging on Pension Schemes 
The Scheme 
The balanced 
finance equation 
PAYGO Fully Funded 
(6-3) (6-5) 
Defined benefits To keep BP /WR , average pension/ average To keep BP /WR , average pension/ 
Defined 
contribution 
wage of retiree, constant: 
A higher N R / N w requires a higher t 
(population aging factor) 
A lower WR /W w requires a lower t 
(growth factor) 
When t, payroll tax rate, is constant: 
A higher N R / N w leads to a lower BP /WR 
(population aging factor) 
A lower WR /W w leads to a higher BP /WR 
(growth factor) 
average wage of retiree, constant: 
Population aging factor has no impact on 
't; 
A lower 1/1 + r reqmres a lower 1 
(growth factor) 
When contribution rate, 1, is constant: 
Population aging factor has no impact on 
BP/WR; 
A lower 1/1 + r leads to a higher 
BP /WR (growth factor) 
Table 6-4. The Three Scenarios of Economic Growth a Used in the Simulations for 
Urban China during 2001 and 2050 
Case 16(high 
growth) 
Case 2 (low growth 
rate) 
Case 3 (medium 
growth rate) 
Growth rate 
of 
employment 
(%/year) 
1.39 
1.39 
1.39 
Growth rate 
of net wages 
to workers 
(%/year) 
6 
4.5 
3 
Growth rate 
of GDP 
(%/year) 
7.5 
6.0 
4.4 
Growth rate of 
GDP per capita 
(%/year) 
6 
4.5 
3 
Note: a. The growth rates in the table are approximated values. They change slightly when the tax rate 
changes over time. 
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Table 6-5. Optimal Tax Rates and Efficiency Gains by Following the Optimal 
Taxation Path (the base scenario) 
Wage elasticity of labour supply Growth rate of 
GDP per capita 0.1 0.5 1 (%/yr) 
Optimal tax 37.4 35.5 34.8 6 
rate(%) 34.7 33.7 33.2 4.5 
31.4 30.6 30.3 3 
Efficiency 10.2 11.6 12.3 6 
gainsa (%) 12.2 14.6 16.1 4.5 
14.0 16.6 18.2 3 
Note: a. The efficiency gains (EG) are defined as follows: EG = 1 00*[DWLp-DWLo/DWLp ], where 
DWLp is the sum of the present values of deadweight losses following the PA YGO YEAR-BY-YEAR 
tax rates in each year between 2001 and 2050; and DWL0 is the sum of the present values of deadweight 
losses of following the optimal taxation path in each year between 2001 and 2050. 
b. This is the wage elasticity of labour supply chosen for estimating labour supply curve in 2000. 
Source: Author's simulation results. 
Table 6-6 Selected Simulation Results for Key Variables of the Base Scenario: the 
sensitivity test of wage elasticity of labour supply (GDP per capita grows at 
6%/year) 
Wage elasticity of labour 
supply 
0 f It 1p 1ma t ax ra e 
Employment 2001 
(million workers) 2025 
2050 
Net wages to 2001 
workers 2025 (thousand yuan) 
2050 
Pre-tax wages 2001 
(thousand yuan) 2025 
2050 
Tax revenues 2001 
(million yuan) 2025 
2050 
Source: Author's simulation results 
0.1 
37 4 • 
212.8 
296.3 
418.4 
9.1 
36.9 
158.0 
12.5 
50.6 
217.1 
723.3 
4079.0 
24721.5 
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0.5 1 
35 5 • 34 8 . 
208.1 206.3 
289.9 287.3 
408.4 405.7 
9.8 10.1 
39.6 40.8 
170.1 175 .0 
13 .3 13.6 
53.7 55.0 
230.5 235.9 
723.3 723 .3 
4079.0 4079.0 
24721.5 24721.5 
Table 6-7 Selected Simulation Results for Key Variables of the Base Scenario: the 
impact of growth rate of GDP per capita 
(wage elasticity of labour supply in 2000=1) 
Growth rate of GDP per 3 4.5 6 
capita (%/year) 
0 ti I t t 30 3 33 2 34 8 'P ma ax ra e . • • 
Employment 2001 205.9 204.2 206.3 
(million workers) 2025 286.7 284.4 287.3 
2050 404.9 401.6 405.7 
Net wages to 2001 9.8 9.8 10.1 
workers 2025 19.8 28.3 40.8 (thousand yuan) 
2050 41.6 84.9 175.0 
Pre-tax wages 2001 12.7 13.1 13.6 
(thousand yuan) 2025 25.8 37.6 55.0 
2050 54.1 113.1 235.9 
Tax revenues 2001 608.1 666.2 723.3 
(million yuan) 2025 1721.6 2668.4 4079.0 
2050 5090.2 11324.7 24721.5 
Source: Author's simulation results. 
Table 6-8 Selected Simulation Results for Key Variables of the Base Scenario: the 
sensitivity test of wage elasticity of labour supply (GDP per capita grows at 
3%/year) 
Wage elasticity of labour 
supply 
0 f It 1p 1ma t ax ra e 
Employment 2001 
(million workers) 2025 
2050 
Net wages to 2001 
workers 2025 (thousand yuan) 
2050 
Pre-tax wages 2001 
(thousand yuan) 2025 
2050 
Tax revenues 2001 
(million yuan) 2025 
2050 
Source: Author's simulation results 
0.1 
314 . 
213.3 
297.0 
419.4 
9.1 
18.4 
38.6 
11.9 
24.2 
50.7 
608.1 
1721.6 
5090.2 
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0.5 1 
30 6 . 30 3 . 
208.3 205.9 
290.2 286.7 
409.8 404.9 
9.5 9.8 
19.4 19.8 
40.6 41.6 
12.5 12.7 
25.3 25.8 
53.0 54.1 
608.1 608.1 
1721.6 1721.6 
5090.2 5090.2 
Table 6-9 Selected Simulation Results for Key Variables of the Base Scenario: the 
impact of growth rate of GDP per capita 
(wage elasticity of labour supply iil 2000=0.5) 
Growth rate of GDP per 3 4.5 6 
capita (%/year) 
0 f l t t 30 6 33 7 35 5 'P 1ma ax ra e . . . 
Employment 2001 208.3 207.1 208 .1 
(million workers) 2025 290.2 288.4 289.9 
2050 409.8 407.3 408.4 
Net wages to 2001 9.5 9.6 9.8 
workers 2025 19.4 27.5 39.6 (thousand yuan) 
2050 40.6 82.5 170.1 
Pre-tax wages 2001 12.5 12.8 13.3 
(thousand yuan) 2025 25.3 36.7 53 .7 
2050 53.0 110.4 230_5 · 
Tax revenues 2001 608.1 666.2 723.3 
(million yuan) 2025 1721.6 2668.4 4079.0 
2050 5090.2 11324.7 24721.5 
Source: Author's simulation results 
Table 6-10. Comparison of the Optimal Tax Rate and Efficiency Gains when the 
Taxation System is Efficient and when it is Inefficient 
(GDP per capita grows at 6%/year) 
Wage elasticity of labour supplyh 
I I 
Optimal tax 37.4 35.5 34.8 
rate(%) 42.3 40.6 39.9 
Efficiency 10.2 11.6 12.3 
gainsa (%) 10.4 12.8 14.3 
Notes: a and b. See notes for Table 6-5 . 
The taxation 
system 
Efficient 
Inefficient 
Efficient 
Inefficient 
c. The inefficiency coefficient of the taxation system is constant and it is 7 .5% of total tax 
revenues. 
Sources: Author's simulation results. 
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Table 6-11. The Impact of the Efficiency of the Taxation System on the PAYGO 
year-by-year and Optimal Tax Rate and the Efficiency Gains of Following the 
Optimal Tax Rate 
(GDP grows at 6%/yr, wage elasticity of labour supply=l) 
The taxation Inefficient taxation The declining rate of the Efficient 
system system inefficiency coefficient taxation 
(inefficiency (%/year) system · 
coefficient= 7.5%) 
3 6 9 
Efficiency 14.3 12.2 12.2 12.5 12.3 gainsa (%) 
,,-..,_ 
Year '2>-
....._,, 
(]) 
+,> 
2001 14.2 14.2 14.1 14.1 13.1 cj H 
r>< 
cj 
+,> 2010 17.9 17.5 17.2 17.0 16.4 
H 
cj 
(].) 
>. 2020 26.3 25.2 24.7 24.4 23 .6 I >. 
,..D 
I 
H 2030 42.6 40.1 39.1 28.8 37.0 cj (].) 
>. 
0 2040 52.6 48.8 47.7 47.4 44.7 c., 
~ 
--< 2050 63.8 58.3 57.3 57.0 52.9 ~ 
Year 
,,-..,_ 2001 39.9 36.3 35.1 34.7 34.8 
'2>-
....._,, 
(].) 2010 39.9 36.9 36.1 36.0 34.8 +,> 
cj 
H 
r>< 2020 39.9 37.4 36.8 36.6 34.8 cj +,> 
~ 
cj 
s 20230 39.9 37.8 37.1 36.8 34.8 ..... +,> 
~ 
0 
2040 39.9 38.0 37.3 36.9 34.8 
2050 39.9 38.2 37.4 36.9 34.8 
Note: a. see notes following Table 6-5. 
Source: Author's simulation results. 
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6-12. The Impact of the Speed of Population Aging on the P AYGO year-by-year 
and the Optimal Tax Rate as well as on Efficiency Gains 
(GDP per capita grows at 6%/year, wage elasticity of labour supply=l, cr-7.5% in 
2000, the decreasing rate of~ is 6%/yr) 
Scenario 
Efficiency gains 
(%) 
PAYGO 
year-by-year 
tax rate(%) 
Optimal Tax 
rate(%) 
Year 
2001 
2010 
2020 
2030 
2040 
2050 
Year 
2001 
2010 
2020 
2030 
2040 
2050 
Source: author's simulation results. 
Base 
12.2 
14.1 
17.2 
24.7 
39.1 
47.7 
57.3 
35.1 
36.1 
36.8 
37.1 
37.3 
37.4 
Faster population 
aging in cities 
( 10% higher than 
the base case) 
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12.9 
15.7 
19.1 
27.6 
44.2 
54.4 
65.8 
39.7 
40.8 
41.5 
41.9 
42.1 
42.2 
Slower population 
aging in cities 
10% lower than the 
base case) 
11.6 
12.6 
15.3 
21.8 
34.3 
41.5 
49.5 
30.8 
31.7 
32.3 
32.6 
32.7 
32.8 
Appendix 6.1 Barro's (1979) Optimal Public Debt Model and Barro's 
Assumption to have a Constant Optimal Tax Rate 
This Appendix briefly explains Barro's (1979) optimal public debt model and then 
examines Barro's key assumptions that lead to his result-a time invariant optimal tax 
rate. 
A6.1.1 Barre's (1979) Model 
In Barro's (1979) optimal public debt model, the government is assumed to have only 
two methods of financing public expenditures: collecting taxes and issuing bonds. Real 
government expenditure for period t is denoted by Gt, which does not include interest 
payments on public debt, and is assumed to be exogenously given. The real tax revenue 
collected by the government in each period t is denoted by -rt; and aggregate real 
income, which is also exogenously given, is denoted as Yt, The real stock of public debt 
outstanding at the end of period t is denoted as gt 1, which is assumed to take the form of 
one-period, single-coupon bonds that are issued at par. It is also assumed that the price 
level is constant and is expected to be so; and the real and nominal rate of return on 
public and private debt, r, is constant too. 
The government faces the following overall budget constraint, 
00 00 
L[G1!(l+r) 1 ]+ g 0 = L[rt /(l+rYJ (A6.1-1) 
t=l t=l 
This equation holds with the condition that rules out perpetual debt financing ( excluding 
interest payments). 
Barro assumes that taxation involves some collection costs and/or indirect misallocation 
costs that are imposed on the private economy. The latter are the so-called 'deadweight 
loss' or 'excess burdens' of taxation. For a given present value of taxation, shown by the 
left hand side of equation (A6. l-1) ( excluding interest payments), the costs of imposing 
1 The real stock of public debt outstanding at the beginning of the government-planning period is denoted 
as g0 in equation (A6.1-l ). 
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taxes are assumed to depend upon the distribution of taxes by type and timing. This 
model focuses on the timing of taxes only. 
The real per period costs of taxation, denoted as Zt, is assumed to depend positively, 
with a positive second derivative, on the total net tax collected during period t, 'Ct, and 
negatively on the contemporaneous real income, Yt, but not on the values of taxes or 
incomes in other periods. Further, it is assumed that the cost function is homogeneous 
and can be written as follows, 
(A6.1-2) 
where f' > 0, and the function f is assumed to be invariant over time. The present 
value of taxation costs is then given by, 
Z= f r,f(r, / Y,) 
t=I (1 + rf (A6.l-3) 
The government's objective is to minimize the taxation costs, Z, at the present time 
( date 1 ), given the net present value of tax revenues specified in equation (A6.1-1 ). In 
other words, the government needs to choose -c1, -c2 , '!3 ... , to minimize Z, subject to the 
overall budget constraint of equation (A6.1-1 ). 
Following the usual optimisation procedure, the Lagrange function is set as in equation 
(A6.1-4): 
£ = f r,f ( r , /Y,) + A[ R - I r , ] 
t=l (1 + r Y (1 + r Y (A6.1-4) 
where R is the present value of all government liabilities, which equals to the left-hand 
side of equation (A6.1-1). 
The general formula of the first-order condition for the solution of equation (A6.1-4) is 
given by: 
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of= f(rt / ~) +5-.f'(rt / ~) _ A =O 
art (l + r Y ~ (1 + r Y (1 + r Y for all t (A6.1-5) 
From equation (A6.1-5), the optimal 'ttNt is solved as follows: 
(A6.1-6) 
The solution as expressed in equation (A6.1-7) shows that in this economy, the optimal 
taxation rule must be such that the ratio 'ttNt in each period is given by equation (A6.1-
6), and it is the same equation for all t. Denote rt/~ = 0, then according to equation 
(A6.1-6), 
0 = J- f(0) f'(0) (A6.1-7) 
This shows that the optimal timing of taxation requires that 8 is equal in all periods. 
Following this optimal condition, the tax revenue in each period is then determined 
from the given values of Y, G, r and b0. These values of taxes in tum imply values of 
government deficit for each period, which has to be financed by debt issue. 
A6.1.2 Examine Barro's Assumptions for the Time Invariant Optimal Tax Rate 
The result of Barro's (1979) model indicates that when certain assumptions are satisfied, 
the optimal tax rate is time invariant. This section examines this result and the key 
assumption that leads to this result. 
Define the following variables for period t: 
Yt is a kind of "economic scale' parameter, which is exogenous in Barro's model. For 
instance, population is one of these scale shifters. 
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~t is a vector of shift parameters that are exogenously given. For example, the ratio of 
net to gross tax revenues would be part of ~t and changes of this ratio would make ~t 
time dependent. 
Bt is the tax base, which is endogenous; 
Zt is the taxation costs, or the deadweight losses in our applications; 
7ft is the tax rate; 
bt = BtfYt is the tax base for an economy of 'unit' size. 
Zt = ZtMt is the taxation costs for an economy of 'unit 'size. 
For example, in our application for the Chinese case, Yt would be thought of as 
population/workers and bt as labour earnings per person/worker, so that Bt becomes 
total labour earnings. 
Following Barro's notation, Tt is the tax revenue. By definition: 
Again by definition: 
(A6.1-8) 
(A6.1-9) 
(A6.1-10) 
With these definitions, the government problem In the Barro's (1979) model IS as 
follows: 
T Z 
MinL 1 
1=1 c1 + rY (A6.1-11) 
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subject to the budget constraint: 
T T G 
L-T_t -=go+L t 
t=I (1 + r) t t=I (1 + r) 1 (A6.1-12) 
where Gt is the real government expenditure in period t, r is the discount rate. Here the 
government-planning horizon is assumed to be finite between period 1 and T. The other 
assumptions are the same as the Barro's (1979) model discussed in A6.1.1. 
Again, the standard Lagrange method is applied to solve this optimisation problem. The 
solution is in equation (A6.1-13): 
O'Z¼ -b ore t 
t re=----
' ob1 / 
/ oret 
for all t (A6.1-13) 
Since bt and Zt are functions of 1ft and ~t only, when ~t is constant, the solution for the 
optimal tax rate is the same for all t. So in this economy, as long as the shift parameters 
are time independent, the optimal tax rate is constant. 
From equation (A6.1-8) and (A6.1-9), we have: 
(A6.1-14) 
where Bt is a function of the tax rate 1ft only, when ~t is constant. So this equation 
indicates that in Barro's (1979) model, when ){ is a constant, the tax rate, 71i, must 
also be a constant. 
Now examine the key assumption ofBarro's (1979) model. We have: 
zt - ~zt (ret' ¢i) - zt (ret' ¢,) 
r 1 ~b, (re" ¢1 )re1 01 (re 1 ) 
(A6.l-15) 
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Barro's assumption of the cost function (A6.1-2) can be written as follows: 
(A6.l-16) 
This can be interpreted as an assumption that the ratio of the taxation cost to the tax 
revenue is only a function of 'ttNt, or 0t, Based on (A6.1-15), this is true if~ is constant. 
So in Barro's (1979) model, the key assumption for a constant optimal tax rate over time 
is his cost function. In other words, when Ztf Tt is constant, 'ttJ Yt, or 0t is a constant. 
However, based on equation (A6.1-15), Ztf Tt is a constant when ~t is fixed. 
248 
Appendix 6.2 The Government Optimal Taxation Model for Pension 
Liabilities and Its Solutions 
In this Appendix, our basic model, which can be regarded as an application of Barro's 
(1979) framework, is set up. This model explicitly uses labour demand and supply 
curves to demonstrate the economy. It uses payroll tax to collect taxation revenues and 
the deadweight losses (DWL) as the taxation costs. Obviously, the DWL is a function of 
the tax rate as well as parameters of the labour demand and supply curves. The setting 
of the model allows explicit growth of employment, wages and GDP, etc. This 
Appendix firstly sets up the model. It then gives the solutions of the basic model and 
adds in the economic transition factor-the inefficiency coefficient2 of the taxation 
system-into the model. Finally the conditions to satisfy Barro's key assumption for a 
time invariant optimal tax rate in the basic model are examined, and the solutions with 
these conditions hold are discussed. 
A6.2.1 The Model 
Suppose in a transitional economy where the population is aging, so that the public 
pension liabilities needed to be financed by the government rise over time. The 
government collects all revenues from one type of tax-payroll tax. It can also borrow 
by issuing bonds to finance its expenditures3. The government's problem is to choose 
the optimal taxation path, such that the associated deadweight losses to finance its 
expenditures are minimized. 
For the conveniences of the modelling exercise, we need a production function that 
gives a linear labour demand function, when (real) wages are set to be equal to the 
marginal product of labour. In the production function, the Hick-Neutral technical 
change is chosen, since this is an aggregate production function for the urban economy. 
The labour supply function that suits the purpose of the simulation is also a linear 
function. As explained in Appendix 6.3, the values of individual parameters of these 
2 As explained in the main text, the inefficiency coefficient indicates the % of tax revenue that is wasted. 
As a result, only (I-inefficiency coefficient) of tax revenue is used to pay public pension liabilities. 3 We focus on the public pension liabilities here, but the model can be used for the optimal time path to 
finance general government expenditures. 
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functions are not important and will not be calibrated. Instead, only the slope and the 
intercept of the linear supply and demand function are calibrated. 
The production function is assumed as follows 4: 
Y = A (L - __!__ ~ L2 ) 
t t t 2 K t t 
(A6.2-1) 
where Yt is output, Lt is employment, Kt is capital stock, and At is the total factor 
productivity (TFP) of the economy, all in period t; a0 is a positive coefficient. This 
economy has constant returns to scale. The growth of the economy depends on the 
growth of factor inputs-labor, capital, and technology-the TFP. 
Assuming profit maximisation behaviour of firms, the labour demand function can be 
derived from the production function by setting wages equal to the marginal product of 
labour: 
w( = A, (1- ~ L,) 
t 
where w{ is labour demand price-the wage rate paid by employers. 
Supply of labor is assumed to be given by the following function: 
(A6.2-2) 
(A6.2-3) 
where Lt is labor supply, Pt can be regarded as a parameter to captures the 
population/labour force factor, w: is labour supply price--the wage rate perceived by 
workers5, and Ct is a factor that captures the elasticity of labour supply. All variables are 
in period t. 
4 Here 'L' is used to refer labor, which corresponds to payroll tax that is usually collected for pension 
payments. In general, L can be regarded as the taxable factor in the economy, and the tax as a general tax 
on the private economy. 
5 This wage rate is discussed more in Section 6.5.1. 
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The setting up of the basic model ensures an analytical solution for the deadweight loss 
(DWL) of taxation. As shown in Figure 6-10 in the main text, the objective function of 
the government is given by equation ( 6-6) in the main text, which is reproduced as 
equation (A6.2-4) here: 
DWL= f DWL, 
t=l (1 + rY (A6.2-4) 
As explained in the main text, when a payroll tax (n)---expressed as a ratio(%) of the 
net wages to workers (Ws)--is collected, it drives a wedge between wages paid by 
employers, Ws(l +x)=Wct, and those received by employees, ws. The DWL is 
represented by the usual triangle in Figure 6-10. 
The government's objective is to choose 7tt for each period so as to raise a given amount 
of revenues (in terms of its present values), denoted as 'rt, such that the present value of 
the deadweight loss, as expressed in equation (A6.2-4), associated with the payroll tax 
is minimized, 
where DWLt is the deadweight loss of taxation in period t, r is the discount rate. T 
represents the last year of the planning horizon of the government. 
The choice of the tax rate must satisfy the following budget constraint to finance 
government's expenditures, which are its pension liabilities in our case. That is, the 
present value of taxation revenues In each period_, 'rt, must be equal to that of 
government (pension) expenditures In each period, Bt, which is assumed to be 
exogenously given, 
T B T L t = L rt 
t=l (1 + r )1 t=l (1 + r )1 (A6.2-5) 
A6.2.2 the Solutions of the Model 
The usual optimisation solution requires that the following condition hold for each 
period between 0 and T, 
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ant - ') art 
-- -A,--
ant ant (A6.2-6) 
where A is the ratio of the marginal deadweight losses of the payroll tax to the marginal 
revenue of the payroll tax. It is a constant at the optimum. 
Dt and Rt, are functions of the tax rate, nt. For any given tax rate at period t, nt, Dt is 
simply the area of the triangle as shown in Figure 6-10, 
(A6.2-7) 
where W/ , Lr and L* are solved as follows, 
(A6.2-8) 
Substitute these solutions into equation (A6.2-7) to get equation (A6.2-9): 
(A6.2-9) 
For period t, given payroll tax rate, n r , the tax revenue, "Ct, is calculated as follows: 
r = t 
A,n,[1-(o/K)P,][A,c,P, + P, (1 + n , )] 
[ A,c,P, (){c,) + (1 + n, )] 2 (A6.2-10) 
Using the above equations, applying the standard Lagrange approach, the solution for 
the government optimisation problem is shown in equation (A6.2-11 ): 
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1r = A[A,c,P, (½~) + 1](1 + A,c,) 
1 
A,c, [1 - P, caJK, )]-A.[2A,c,P, caJK,) + 1-'- A,c,] (A6.2-11) 
This result shows that the optimal payroll tax rate in period t, 1r1 , is a function of the 
parameters of the labor supply and demand curves as well as A. 
Now, it should be quite straightforward to add in the economic transition factor, the 
inefficiency coefficient, as discussed in the main text, into this model. Suppose a 
proportion, 0 < a,1 < 1, of the taxation revenues are wasted in the sense it can not be 
used to pay pension liabilities, the revenue function of taxation, (A6.2-1 ), becomes: 
(A6.2-12) 
The optimal solution for the tax rate, accordingly becomes equation (A6.2-13): 
(){_a, )[A,c,P, c¼,) + 1](1 + A,c,) 
Jr=---------------------
' A,c, [1- P, (aJK, )]- C){ _ a , )[2A,c,P, (aJK, ) + 1- A,c, ] (A6.2-13) 
In particular, equation (A6.2-13) shows that there is a negative relationship between the 
optimal tax rate, 1rt , and the inefficiency coefficient, a 1 , which is shown in equation 
(A6.2-14): 
(A6.2-14) 
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The derivative is negative, since all parameters (including A) are positive by definition, 
and 1- P, (aJK,) > 0 is the condition for a positive equilibrium wage rate ( see equation 
A6.2-8). 
In our simulations, the inefficiency coefficient, at , is assumed to be exogenously given, 
and declines over time. This represents the expectation that the taxation system 
becomes more efficient during economic transition: a declining amount of each yuan of 
tax revenue collected is used to finance the administrative costs. As a result, equation 
(A6.2-13) suggests that, for the transition economy, if the optimal payroll tax rate to 
finance government pension expenditures when a t= 0 is constant, then it rises with 
time when at declines over time. 
A6.2.3 Examining the Conditions for Barro's (1979) Assumption and the 
Solution of the Model when These Conditions Hold 
For the conveniens of exposition, the linear labour demand and supply curves in the 
model are written in the simple forms of the follows: 
L=a+bWs 
L = c-dWd 
(A6.2-15) 
(A6.2-16) 
where L is employment, W 5 is the wage perceived by the workers, or the net wages. ~ 
is the wage paid by the employers, or the pre-tax wages. It is the marginal product of 
labour. By definition, 
(A6.2-17) 
a, b, c, and d are parameters, where b > 0, d > 0. It is assumed that c > a, so that a 
positive equilibrium wage can be achieved. All variables become time-dependent when 
they are treated in the intertemporal context. 
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Following the same procedure in Section A6.2.2, the main variables are solved as 
follows: 
L = be + ad (l + n) 
b+d(l+n) 
ws = __ c_-_a __ 
b+d(l+n) 
wd = (c - a)(l + n) 
b+d(l+n) 
D = _!_n 2 bd(c-a) 2 
2 (b + d)[b + d(l + n)] 2 
n(c- a)[bc + ad(l + n) 
r = ---------[b + d(l + n)] 2 
where the variables are as defined in Section A6.2.2. 
(A6.2-18) 
(A6.2-19) 
(A6.2-20) 
(A6.2-21) 
(A6.2-22) 
Following the standard Lagrange function to minimise the total deadweight loss over 
the pe1iod between O and T, the optimal tax rate is expressed in equation (A6.2-23), 
which is equivalent to equation (A6.2-11) in Section A6.2.2: 
(A6.2-23) 
It can be shown that, when the changes of the parameters over time is neutralised, 
Barro's key assumption for a constant optimal tax rate, 1ft, is satisfied in this model, and 
the optimal tax rate expressed in equation (A6.2-23) is time invariant. 
As discussed in Section A6. l.2, Barro's (1979) key assumption is that the ratio of 
taxation losses to tax revenues is constant. In our model, this is the case when the 
following two conditions hold: 
Condition 1. The slopes of the labour demand and supply curves change at the same 
and a constant rate per period (year); 
Condition 2. The intercepts of the labour demand and supply curves change at the same 
and a constant rate per period (year). 
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The proof is provided by a simply geometric analysis as follows. First, consider the 
special case in Figure A6.2-1 , where labour demand is fully elastic and is represented 
by the horizontal labour demand curve, AJEF. Labour supply curve is upward sloping, 
represented by the curve CGE. Assume the intercept of the labour supply curve is fixed 
at C, but allow the slope of the curve to change. For example, in the diagram, the labour 
supply can rotate around point C from CGE to a new curve, CHF. 
Suppose in period 1, labour supply curve is CGE. The equilibrium wage rate is at A. 
Suppose a payroll tax of AB is imposed on each employee, and the new equilibrium is 
at G. The distance OB is the supply wage, WS, in the model. The distance OA is the 
demand wage, W5(l +n), in the model. The deadweight losses (DWL) are represented by 
the triangle JEG, and the tax revenue ('c) is the rectangular ABGJ. Therefore, 
DWL l JE*JG lJE IJE 1 JG l AB 
--- --------------- (A6.2-24) 
r 2 AJ*JG 2 AJ 2 BG 2 BC 2 BC 
where DWL and -c is deadweight losses and tax revenues, respectively, as defined 
previously in the model. 
Figure A.6.2-1. Sufficient Conditions for a Constant Intertemporal Tax Rate 
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Obviously, in this special case, rotating the labour supply curve has no impact on the 
ratio of DWL/t, as long as the tax rate is constant. In this case, since labour demand is 
fully elastic, the demand wages are constant at OA. Therefore, a constant tax rate leads 
to a constant distance between the supply wages (OB) and the demand wages (OA), that 
is, the distance AB is constant. Suppose the supply curve rotates to CHF, the ratio of 
the deadweight losses and taxation revenues, denoted as DWL'lt', is represented by 
equation (A6.2-25) 
DWL' 
---
r 
l IF* IH 
2 BH* IH 
lIH lAB 
-------------
2BC 
l IF 
2BH 2 BC 
(A6.2-25) 
So in the special case shown in Figure A6.2- l, a constant payroll tax rate leads to a 
constant ratio of the deadweight losses to the taxation revenues, and vice versa. 
Following the same approach, it can be easily proved that this relationship holds for the 
case when the supply curve is fully elastic, but the demand curve can rotates around its 
intercept on the vertical axis. 
In general, when these two special cases are combined together, it is straightforward to 
see that there is the same relationship between the payroll tax rate and the ratio of 
deadweight losses and tax revenues, even when both the labour supply and labour 
demand are elastic, and are allowed to rotate around their intercepts on the vertical axis. 
This is true so long as the rotation of the two curves makes sure that the equilibrium 
wage without payroll tax is constant. 
In fact, even the last condition can be relaxed. Changes of equilibrium wages due to the 
shift of intercepts on the vertical axis do not affect the relationship expressed in 
equations (A6.2-24) and (A6.2-25), if both intercepts shift in the same direction and by 
the same proportion. Such a proportional shift can be regarded as if the horizontal axis 
in Figure A6.2-1 shifts down ( or up), leaving the proportion AB/BC unchanged. As a 
result, equations (A6.2-24) and (A6.2-25) still hold. 
This exercise shows that in fact, Barro's (1979) assumption--a constant ratio of taxation 
costs to taxation revenues-allows for some flexible cases. In our model, as long as 
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conditions 1 and 2 listed previously, with regard to the changes of the parameters in 
labour supply and demand curves, are satisfied, Barro's (1979) assumption is satisfied. 
Now, it should be quite easy to prove when conditions 1 and 2 hold, the optimal 
solution to our basic model is a constant tax rate over time. Assume that parameters a 
and c grow at the same and a constant rate, say, g/year; and that b and d grow at the 
same and a constant rate, say, h/year; and g>h. As a result, in the discreet time case, 
initial values of the parameters in period 0. Substituting these parameters into the 
solution for the optimal tax rate as expressed in equation (A6.2-23), the optimal tax rate 
is not affected by the time index and only depends on the initial values of the 
parameters and the Lagrange multiplier: 
(A6.2-26) 
By the way, with conditions 1 and 2 expressed in this way, the growth rate of wages and 
employment can be solved based on equations (A6.2-18) and (A6.2-19): 
(A6.2-27) 
ws = Co - ao (1 + g )' 
t bo +do(l+n-t) (l+h)' (A6.2-28) 
Based on these two equations, the growth rate of employment and that of net wages are 
constant, when the tax rate is constant: 
(A6.2-29) 
(A6.2-30) 
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When the tax rate does not change over time, the employment grows at g/year, while 
the net wages to workers grow at g-1/i+ h per year, or approximately, g-h/year 
when h is small. 
Similarly, it is straightforward to show that with the growth rates of a, b, c, d are 
(1 + )2 
assumed as above, the growth rate of GDP is at g -1 per year when the tax rate 
l+h 
is constant. GDP per capita ( or per worker) is the same as that of the growth rate of net 
g-h/ 
wages at /l + h per year. 
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Appendix 6.3 Estimation of Parameters for the Base Year and Some 
Details of the Simulation Methods 
This Appendix provides the procedure of how the parameters for the base year, 2000, 
are calibrated from the figures of the urban Chinese economy. It also explains some 
details of the simulation methods, as supplementary materials to the main text. 
A6.3.1. The Economy in the Base Year 
Since the current pension scheme only covers city residents with urban household 
registration. The simulation focuses on the urban economy. Although the rural-urban 
segregation in China still exists as a result of policies such as the household registration 
system, rural-urban migration has becoming an increasingly important phenomenon 
(Section 5.5.2). However, the simulations assume that the rural-urban segregation will 
exist in the 2001-2050 period; at least the public pension scheme will not extend to 
cover residents without the urban household registration. 
The urban economy in the base year-2000 is shown in Figure A6.3-1, which is very 
similar to Figure 6-10. In the diagram, L is urban employment, ws is · the wage 
perceived by employees. It is the supply wage, or the net wage; ws includes wages that 
are regarded as delayed payments for labour, such as employer contributions to workers' 
individual accounts for future pensions. Since income tax is very little in China, it is 
ignored in the simulations. ws is the actual wage rate that determines labour supply. Wd 
is the wage paid by employers, or the pre-tax wage. It is the marginal product of labour. 
Wd includes any employer contribution to pensions, as well as indirect taxes that firms 
have to pay; The labour supply and demand curves are as expressed in equations (A6.2-
15) and (A6.2-16), where b>0, d>0. It is assumed that c>a, so that a positive 
equilibrium wage can be achieved. 
In this diagram, urban GDP is decomposed into three parts: profits, the wage bill and 
the payroll tax revenues. It is based on the figures of these variables that the calibration 
is conducted. Firstly urban GDP is estimated based on national GDP and contributions 
by the agricultural sector and TVEs6 in villages: 
6 Figures for TVEs are from The Editorial Committee (2001 ). 
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Urban GDP= National GDP - GDP by the agricultural sector - GDP by the TVEs. 
Where the TVEs are the township and village enterprises, which mainly engage in 
activities in industrial and the service sectors. The result shows that the urban GDP in 
2000 was about 4803 .6 billion yuan. 
Figure A6.3-1. The Estimation of China's Urban Economy in 2000 
w deadweight loss 
L = a+bW5 
profits 
payroll tax revenues 
L= c-dw1 
the wage bill L 
The wage bill is estimated as follows. According to the official statistics, the annual 
average wages received by urban employees in 2000 was 9 .3 71 thousand yuan (2000 
value) per employee. This was the wage rate paid to employees before the income tax 
and employee contributions to pensions were deducted. ~ince the employers contributed 
another 6% 7 of wage bill into employees' individual accounts in the public pension 
scheme, ws in 2000 is estimated to be 9.93 thousand yuan/employee. The official 
figures for urban employment was 212.74 million8 people, including self-employed and 
workers in private firms. For simplicity, suppose the urban average wages applied to all 
urban workers, including self-employed people, the wage bill is estimated to be 2112. 7 
billion yuan9. It accounts for about 44 per cent of urban GDP in 2000. 
7 See Chapter 4 for more details of the public pension scheme in China in 2000. 
8 The official employment figure does not appear to include rural migrants. Figures in this section are for 
2000, from SSB (2001 ), unless otherwise stated. 
9 The average wages used here are for those employed by registered work units, and are likely to be 
higher than wages of those self-employed and worker in private firms , which accounted for about 50% of 
urban employment. . The employment figure is likely to exclude rural migrants. These two forces 
balanced out to certain extent. So the wage bill should be approximately in the right magnitude. 
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The payroll tax revenues in 2000 are assumed to be the sum of actual pensions paid and 
the 'waste ' of the taxation system due to its inefficiency. As discussed in Section 6.4 in 
the text, this coefficient is the % of tax revenue that is wasted so that only (1-
inefficiency coefficient) of gross tax revenues can be used to pay public pension 
liabilities. It is difficult to find a satisfactory measure of this coefficient. In the 
simulations, the share of wages to employees in all government agencies10 in total 
government expenditures is used as an approximation for this coefficient in 2000. It is 
estimated to be about 7.5% 11 . The total value of the government payroll tax revenues 
(including the 'waste') is therefore estimated as 295 .5 billion yuan. It accounts for about 
6.2 per cent of urban GDP. 
Profits in Figure A6.3-l can now be calculated as the difference between urban GDP 
and the sum of government tax revenues and the wage bill. It is about 2395.3 billion 
yuan, which is 50% of urban GDP. This figure is basically in line with other studies of 
the share of capital in China's GDP. For instance, Wu (2000) uses a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with constant return to scale to estimate a production function for 
the Chinese economy. His study is based on regional (27 out of 30 provinces in China) 
panel data between 1981 and 1995. His result shows that the share of capital 
contribution was 47.3 per cent. 
These basic figures of the urban economy in 2000 allow the calculation of the labour 
demand curve, as specified in equation (A6.3-l ): 
. L=3l9.7-9.5Wd (A6.3-1) 
The estimated urban employment and the supply wages only provide one point of the 
urban labour supply curve. There is no sufficient information to estimate all coefficients 
of the curve. This gives one degree of freedom in choosing the wage elasticity of labour 
supply. For a given wage elasticity, the coefficients of the supply curve can be 
calculated. Some sensitivity tests of various values of the wage elasticity of labour 
supply are conducted and briefly discussed in the main text. When the elasticity of 
10 The figure is from SSB (2001a) . Wages to employees of the taxation system is not available 11 Author's calculation based on SSB (2001a). 
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labour supply is assumed to be unity, the supply curve passes the origine point in Figure 
A6.3-l: 
L = 2l.4Ws (A6.3-2) 
A6.3.2 Some Details of the Simulation Methods 
Once the labour supply and demand functions are estimated for 2000, they can be used 
to simulate the economy for the next 50 years. It is assumed that the government is 
facing the cost minimisation problem of financing its pension liabilities between 2001 
and 2050. It has the choice between a PA YGO year-by-year financing strategy and an 
optimal taxation strategy. In the former strategy, the government simply collects enough 
payroll taxes (net of waste within the taxation system) to pay its pension liabilities for 
each year. It is a yearly-balanced strategy. No bonds are issued. In the latter strategy, 
the government needs to collect just enough payroll tax revenues over this 50-year 
period so that the present values of these revenues (net of waste within the taxation 
system) are equal to the present values of its liabilities over the same period. This is a 
50-year balanced strategy. Since the latter allows the government to smooth out the tax 
burden over a longer period, it generates lower deadweight losses to the economy 
compared with that generated by the former. 
As discussed in Section A6.2, the growth rate of wages, employment and GDP, etc. are 
determined by the growth rates of the parameters of the labour supply and demand 
functions, and when the two conditions of heir growth rates are satisfied, they grow at a 
time invariant rate for any given tax rate 12 . In other words, the growth rates of the key 
economic variables in the simulations can be exogenously chosen by picking the 
appropriate grow rates of these parameters. In addition, since the intercepts of the 
labour demand and supply curves must change at the same rate, and the slope of the two 
curves must change at the same rate, the growth of the economy is essentially 
determined by only two growth rates: one for the intercepts and the other one for the 
slopes. 
12 In the PA YGO financing case, the tax rate varies with time and so the growth rates of these variables 
vary as well. However, they are ignored in the simulation. 
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In the simulations, the urban employment is assumed to grow at 1.3 9% per year based 
on World Bank's (1996) projections (Zhao and Xu 2002). To incorporate the 
population-aging factor into the simulation, the following approach is adopted to 
calculate the expected number of retirees over the 50 years. 
Based on UN's (2001) projected population age structure for Chinese males and females 
at 5-year intervals, the yearly age structure of both sexes is interpolated for each year 
between 2000 and 2050. The current official retirement age in China is 60 years old for 
males and 55 year old for females. People who are aged between 15 and their official 
retirement age are of working age. Denote the national old-age dependency ratio for 
year t as Pt = ¾~. This ratio can be calculated based on the annual age structure 
calculated previously. Here R,N is the number of people of retirement age or older, and 
L~ is the number of people of working age in year t, for the whole country. Denote 
urban employment in year t as LY, and the pensioner/worker ratio in year t as 
p,u =¾~,where R,u is the number of pensioners in urban China in year t. 
By definition, the number of pensioners can be calculated as follows: 
(A6.3-3) 
In the simulations the expected number of urban pensioners is estimated as follows: 
(A6.3-4) 
where R,u is the expected number of urban pensioners in year t; iy is the expected 
number of workers in urban China in year t, and p,u is the expected urban 
pensioner/worker ratio in year t . 
iy can be calculated as follows: 
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(A6.3-5) 
where i';_1 is urban employment in year t-1, and 1J is the exogenously given annual 
growth rate of the urban employment13 . In the basic model when the taxation system is 
assumed to be efficient, the optimal tax rate is constant, and number of urban 
employment is fully exogenous, depending on the employment in 2000 and the given 
growth rate of parameters. The growth rate of urban employment deviates from its 
optimal case in the PA YGO, year-by-year financing cases. 
The expected urban pensioner/worker ratio in year t, p,u, is estimated as follows: 
(A6.3-6) 
where Pt is the expected national pensioner/worker ratio. In the simulations, it is 
approximated by Pt, which is the national old-age dependency ratio based on UN's 
(2001) projection. Here CT is a correction coefficient for using the national old-age 
dependency ratio as the urban pensioner/worker ratio. This correction is necessary since 
the urban age structure may be different from that of the rural areas; or labour 
participation factors deviate the actual number of workers from the number of people of 
working age; and the fact that not all retired urban people receive pensions. CT 1s 
assumed to be fixed over time. It is set such that the calculated number of urban 
pensioners in 2000 is the same as the actual number of pensioners. CT is also useful in 
the sensitivity test simulations. It can be set to allow for faster or slower urban 
population aging compared with the national population aging. 
In 2000, the average pensions were 7 .91 thousand yuan per pensioner. In the simulation, 
the average pensions are set to grow at the same growth rate as that of net wages 14• The 
average pension in period tis calculated as follows: 
13 As mentioned before, when the tax rate changes, the actual growth rate of urban employment is slightly 
different from the exogenously imposed rate. This is ironed at this stage. 
14 Again, the actual growth rate of wages in simulations is also affected by the tax rate. The impact is 
often small and is ignored. 
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~ t ~ = P2000 (1 + r) (A6.3-7) 
Where P2000 is the actual average pensions in 2000, 'Y is the exogenously chosen growth 
rate of net wages. Again, 'Y is the actual growth rate of net wages in the optimal case for 
the basic model where the optimal tax rate is constant. It is not in the PA YGO case. 
Finally, with the expected number of retirees and the expected average pensions, the 
total public pension liabilities are calculated as the product of the number of urban 
pensioners and the average pensions. 
How fast the Chinese urban economy will grow during the next 50 years? The official 
statistics show that between 1980 and 2000, China's real GDP grew at about 9.4% per 
year, while the average population growth rate was about 1.27% per year15 . So, during 
the past two decades, per capita GDP growth rate in China was about 8% per year. It is 
unlikely such a high growth rate will be maintained during the next 50 years or so. 
Various studies predict quite different pictures of future GDP growth in China: with 
average annual growth rate of GDP varies between 4%-10% (Xu 1999). 
In the simulations, the economic growth is measured in per capita GDP ( or GDP per 
worker) growth rate, which is the same as the growth rate of net wages. Based on the 
growth rate of the Chinese economy during the past two decades, and the predictions of 
future growth, it is reasonable to assume the following scenarios of urban economic 
growth (expressed in per capita GDP) for the period of 2001-2050: 1) the rapid 
economic growth of 6% per year; 2) the medium growth of 4.5% per year, and 3) the 
slow economic growth of 3 % per year. These are the cases simulated and they are listed 
in Table 6-4. 
15 Author's calculation based on SSB (2001 b ). 
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Chapter 7. Economic Transition, Population Aging and the 
Study of the Old Age Pension Reform in China: Individual 
incentives and efficiency 
7 .1 Introduction 
The simple model discussed in the previous chapter illustrates the optimal taxation 
principle with regard to financing a defined-benefit public pension system over time. 
The simulation results in that chapter show that given the projected population aging in 
China during the next few decades, using payroll tax to finance the pension scheme will 
have to impose very high tax rates. If the pre-defined pensions are financed on a 
PA YGO year-by-year base, the payroll tax rate will have to rise to well above 50%. 
Even the optimal tax rate, which smoothes out the rising tax burden to minimise the 
deadweight losses, has to be as high as over 30%. This is not likely a feasible payroll 
tax rate. These results suggest that the government either has to use other taxes to 
finance the pension scheme, or to reform the scheme. This chapter focuses on the 
funded pension scheme as an option of pension reform, by examining the taxation 
impacts of an alternative pension schemes-the current, post-reform partially funded 
pension scheme in China. 
While the previous chapter looks at options of the public pension scheme from the view 
point of smoothing the fiscal burden over time, this chapter examines the issue of 
individual incentives and efficiency. In particular, the discussion starts with two fully 
funded pension schemes. One of the schemes has contributions accumulated in 
individual accounts, while the other has all contributions pooled. These two extreme 
options of pension scheme are related to the future options for the Chinese pension 
program, since itis a partially funded scheme following the reform in the 1990s. 
The taxation impact of a public pension scheme also depends upon specific regulations 
of fund management. The management of pension fund reserves not only affects fund 
returns, but also the credibility of relevant rules of fund management and thus the 
'perceived taxation,1 viewed by individual participants. 
1 This refers to the tax that individual participants would regard that is imposed by the pension scheme, 
rather than any explicit legal tax. 
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This chapter is organized in four parts. Part two looks at the economic theory of the 
possible taxation implication of a funded public pension scheme (when labour supply is 
exogenous). Part three analyses pension reforms in China during the 1980s and 1990s. 
It examines the reasons why the partially-funded scheme has been adopted and whether 
this is a good option for China. This part also includes some simple simulations for 
financing the transition costs, or the pension debt, for the pension reform in China. 
Some conclusions are drawn at the end. 
7.2 The Taxation Impact of A Public Pension Scheme-Two Cases 
7.2.1 A Brief Review of the Impact of Taxation and the Size of Deadweight 
Losses 
In consumer theory, a tax is usually analysed as a price change that can be decomposed 
into a substitution and an income effect. Taxation of wages and savings can lead to 
changes of labour supply and savings decisions that affect individual welfare. In theory, 
taxation, as government intervention in a competitive market, often also generates a so-
called 'deadweight loss' to the economy. 
For example, consider an individual who lives for two periods, the current and the 
future period. The individual has an exogenous amount of income, Y, during the current 
period and no exogenous income in the future period. The market return on capital is r. 
The individual faces an intertemperal budget constraint shown as YY(l +r) in Figure 7-
1. Consumption is denoted as cP in the current period and as CF in the future period. 
The individual chooses optimal CP and CF to maximise his utility. This problem is 
demonstrated in Figure 7-1, where the individual's optimal choice is Eo, with 
consumption in the two periods at C{ and c; , respectively. As a result, the individual 
chooses to save So. 
Now suppose that the government imposes an income tax on return of savings, with a 
flat rate -c. From the individual's point of view, the return on savings is no longer r, it is 
r(l--c). Now the individual is facing a flatter budget constraint, YY[l +r(l--c)] , since the 
relative price of future consumption is higher. The substitution effect of this price 
change is for the individual to switch from future to present consumption, indicating 
that savings will fall. The (relative) price change also has an income effect, since the 
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overall income, including return of savings, is lower due to the tax. If both present and 
future consumption are normal goods, then the income effect is to reduce both present 
and future consumption, and to increase savings. The net impact on savings depends on 
the relative size of the substitution and income effect. Figure 7 -1 shows the case when 
the substitution effect is larger than the income effect, and savings fall to S1. The new 
optimal choice for consumption is at point E1. The individual's utility falls from U0 to 
U1. 
The tax on the return on savings not only affects individual welfare, it also generates a 
deadweight loss for the economy as a whole, due to the behaviour change caused by the 
substitution effect. More specifically, the deadweight loss in this case is the loss of 
unrealised potential gains of trade in the loanable funds market. In Figure 7-2, the 
compensated demand curve for loanable funds is D, and the compensated supply curve 
for loanable funds is either S 1 or S2. The two possible supply curves have different 
slopes, indicating the different responsiveness of savings supply to interest rate change. 
S 1 represents a higher interest rate elasticity of savings, compared with S2. When the 
tax on the return on savings, -r, is imposed, it drives a wedge between the interest rate 
paid by borrowers, r1 + r, r2 + r, and that received by lenders, r1 and r2 , respectively. 
The associated deadweight loss can be represented by the triangles ABC and EBD, 
respectively, for S 1 and S2. 
Even though not shown in the figure, obviously, the deadweight loss would be larger 
when the tax rate is higher, ceteris paribus. The size of deadweight loss is also related 
to the price elasticity of demand and supply. In Figure 7-2, comparing the two supply 
curves, S 1 and S2, gives the following two observations for a given demand curve of 
loanable funds: (1) the savers (lenders) bear more tax burden, r2 < r1 , when the savings 
supply is less responsive to interest rate changes, that is, when S2 is steeper than S 1; (2) 
the dead weight loss is higher when the supply curve is flatter, that is, more elastic ( area 
ABC > area EBD). In general, the size of the deadweight loss can be expressed as a 
function the tax rate, the price elasticities of demand and supply: 
1 1 2 
2 1 1 .t .S 
(- + - ) 
(7-1) 
6 1 6 2 
269 
where E1 is the absolute elasticity of supply and E2 is the absolute elasticity of demand; t 
is the tax rate and S is a constant2• The term / 1 / is the reciprocal of the sum of 
lt\+1&2 
the reciprocals of the individual elasticities. In the case in Figure 7-1, it is assumed that 
the demand for savings is infinitely elastic, so that &2 = oo and-
1
- = 0. In this case, the 
&2 
deadweight loss is__!_ .&1 t 
2 
s . 
2 
7.2.2 The Taxation implication of a Fully Funded Public Pension Scheme, with 
Individual Accounts (Exogenous Labour Supply) 
7 .2.2.1 The General Setting of the Model 
Consider an economy where individual employees live for two periods: the present and 
the future period. During the present period, the individual, let us assume she is female, 
works and earns an exogenously given salary. During the future period, the individual 
retires and receives no exogenous income. When there is no public pension scheme, her 
problem is to decide how to divide her labour income into consumption in the two 
periods, in order to maximize lifetime utility. The utility is assumed to be a function of 
her consumption during the two periods. 
When a mandatory public pension scheme is introduced, she might change her prior 
optimal choice. This section looks at the possible outcome of her choices, when the 
public pension scheme is fully funded, and where all contributions are made by the 
employee3 and are accumulated in an individual account owned by the employee. 
Formally, the employee's utility function can be written as U (CP, CF), where CP is 
consumption during the present period, and CF is consumption during the future period. 
The exogenously given labour income during the present period is denoted as Y. Market 
(real) return on savings is denoted as r. The employee is subject to the following budget 
constraint: 
2 Strictly speaking, s depends on the parameters in the supply and demand curves, as well as the tax rate. 
In cases when tax rate is small, Sis approximately a constant. 
3 When Labour supply is assumed to be exogenous, pension contribution bas no impact on labour supply. 
The burden of pension contribution falls on employees. 
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(7-2) 
Or written in the following equation: 
(7-3) 
In the mandatory public pension scheme, employees are required to contribute a flat 
rate, -r, of labour income into an individual account, owned by the employee. Funds in 
the individual account are accumulated and will be paid back to the employee as a 
pension to finance consumption in the future period. The return on funds in the 
individual account is denoted as p. This pension scheme changes the employee's budget 
constraint to: 
CF = [Y(l-r)- CP](l + r) +rY(l + p) (7-4) 
Equation (7-4) can also be written as follows, which makes it easier to compare with the 
original budget constraint (7-3): 
CF= (Y-CP)(l+r)+rY(p-r) (7-5) 
In addition to the above budget constraint, it is assumed that there is a private savings 
constraint as follows: 
Y (1 - r) - C P > 0 (7-6) 
Equation (7-6) assumes that after pension contribution, the representative employee's 
private savings must be non-negative. This assumption can be regarded as the result of a 
liquidity constraint that the employee cannot borrow against future pension income. 
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. 7 .2.2.2 The Impact of a Fully Funded Pension Scheme on Employees' Choices 
The implication of a fully funded pension scheme on employees' choices depends upon 
whether or not the private savings constraint, equation (7-6), is binding or not. In 
practice, only the latter case is interesting because governments generally introduce 
mandatory pension schemes in order to force individuals who otherwise save little to 
save more, but for completeness, both cases are analysed here. The private savings 
constraint will not be binding if an employee saves a lot prior to the public pension 
scheme being introduced, that is, when prior savings are more than pension 
contributions to the pension scheme. The private savings constraint is binding when an 
employee only saves little for retirement prior to the public pension scheme, and 
borrowing against future pension benefits is impossible in the economy. This perhaps is 
not a bad assumption in many economies, but is especially relevant in a developing 
economy, where the financial market is under-developed. 
In Figure 7-3, present consumption (and income), CP, and future consumption (and 
income), CF, is represented by the horizontal and the vertical axis, respectively. 
Assume individuals can lend as much as they wish in the market with a return of r. The 
budget constraint for an employee before the introduction of the public pension scheme 
is the downward sloping line, YY(l +r), with the slope of -(1 +r). 
Now the government imposes a fully funded public pension scheme mandatory for all 
employees. A representative employee faces a new budget constraint as in equation (7-
5). When comparing with the budget constraint before the public pension scheme, 
equation (7-3), equation (7-5) indicates that whether or not the scheme has any impact 
. on an employee's budget constraint depends upon the relative sizes of r and p. The 
relative price of present and future consumption is not affected by the pension scheme, 
but there will be a pure income effect when p * r. In Figure 7-3, the budget constraint 
of one of the cases, p < r, is drawn as the double-dashed line, BCY(l--r) . The initial 
equilibrium when there is no public pension scheme is indicated on the budget line 
YY(l+r). 
For this cases when p < r, the new equilibrium with the public pension scheme depends 
upon whether the private savings constraint, equation (7-6), is binding or not. Both 
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cases are shown in Figure 7-4, where only the new budgetary constraint after the 
pension scheme is drawn. 
The new equilibrium, when the private savings constraint, equation (7-6), is non-
binding, is shown as the left panel in Figure 7-4. It is the result of a pure negative 
income effect of the public pension scheme. When consumption in present and future 
period is normal goods, this income effect reduces consumption in both periods, while 
increases savings. The (absolute value of the) gradient of the tangency is the same as 
that of the budget line BC, that is, (1 +r). The more interesting case, when the private 
savings constraint is binding, is shown as the right panel in Figure 7-4. The new 
equilibrium is at point C, where the lines BC and CY(l--c) meets. Given that the slope 
of BC is -(1 +r), while the slope of CY(l--c) is -oo, the (absolute value of the) gradient of 
the tangency passing point C must be larger than (1 +r). This result shows that even 
though the rate of return on pension contributions is less than that of market return on 
savings, that is p < r , the public pension scheme acts like a subsidy to savings because 
the gradient of the tangency is larger than (1 +r). 
The other cases when p = r and p > r can be analysed in the similar approach as in 
Figures 7-3 and 7-4. The main impact of the public pension scheme is summarised in 
Table 7-1. 
The table shows that when the private savings constraint is binding, the public pension 
-
scheme always acts like an implicit subsidy to savings, regardless of the relative 
magnitude of p and r. This subsidy increases savings compared with the case when 
there is no such a public pension scheme. 
7 .2.3 A Production Possibility Frontier (PPF) Analysis of the Public Pension 
Scheme 
The analysis in the last section shows the impact of the public pension scheme on 
individual participants. A simply extension of the analysis is to examine possible 
impacts of such a scheme on the aggregate level of the economy. In this section, two 
different production possibility frontiers (PPP) are used to compare the outcome of the 
public pension scheme that aims at achieving the same amount of future aggregate 
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consumption. In both cases, it is assumed that the public pension scheme does not 
involve any production inefficiencies, that is, the PPF does not shift after the 
introduction of the pension scheme. 
The results are drawn as Case I and Case II in Figure 7-5. In the left panel (Case I), the 
PPF is a straight line, denoted as AB, while the PPF in the right panel is concave, 
denoted as CD. The only difference between the two cases is the slope of the PPF. The 
slope of PPF represents the marginal rate of transformation between consumption in the 
present and future periods. In case I, the PPF has a constant slope, -(1 +r), where r is the 
domestic interest rate. The assumption here is that domestic savings in the economy has 
no impact on the domestic interest rate. This would be the case when the following 
conditions hold: (1) this is an open economy; (2) this economy is a small part of the 
world capital market; and (3) all goods in the economy are tradable. These conditions 
allow the analysis of a case that is a useful first approximation. In Case II, the PPF is a 
curve that has the usual shape of bowing outwards. This is the case when the above 
three conditions do not hold. In this case, when the public pension scheme increases 
domestic savings, the domestic interest rate falls 4 . 
The trade-off is between consumption in the present (CP) and future period (CF), which 
is similar to that in Figures 7-3 and 7-4. However, here we examine the economy as a 
whole. The PPF describes the maximum possible bundles of aggregate consumption in 
the two periods for the economy. Assume the original equilibrium, before the 
introduction of the public pension scheme, is at point E0 in both cases. As discussed in 
the last section, when the private savings constraint is binding, this pension scheme acts 
like a subsidy to savings and thus increases savings. In both cases, the new equilibrium 
is on the original PPF but to the left of Eo, denoted as E1 in case I, and E2 in Case II, 
respectively. The gradient of the tangency at E1 and E2 is denoted as (l+p1) and (l+p2), 
respectively, while that for E0 is (1 +r). To move the initial equilibrium point from Eo to 
the new position of E1 and E2, the pension scheme has two effects on the economy: an 
income effect through the lump sum tax ( or payroll tax when labour supply is inelastic), 
4In addition, when labour supply is not perfectly inelastic, and the ~ublic pension imposes a tax on 
labour, this will tend to reduce labour supply. A lower labour supply will further drive down the marginal 
product of capital and, therefore, the domestic interest rate, r. This case is not discussed here. 
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and a substitution effect through the subsidy to savings. Since both Eo and E1 are on the 
same PPF, AB, the tax must be equal to the subsidy. This is also the case for Case II. 
Preferences are assumed to be identical in both cases. The comparison between the two 
cases in Figure 7-5 is as follows. The initial equilibrium, E0, is identical for the two 
cases, that is, the consumption is the same for case I and case II, in both periods. 
Assume the government designs the public pension scheme to achieve a given level of 
future consumption in both cases. So, at the new equilibrium, E1 in case I and E2 1n 
case II, future consumption ( CF) is identical. 
The comparison is drawn in the right panel (Case II) in Figure 7-5. For this purpose, the 
PPF (AB) and the new equilibrium (E1) in the left panel are also shown in Case II. The 
introduction of a public pension scheme moves the equilibrium from E0 ( on both AB 
and CD) to the left on the PPF, at E1 and E2, respectively. The figure shows that E2 must 
be to the left of E1. Consider income expansion paths (IEP) drawn through E0, E1 and 
E2• If CP and CF are normal goods, all income expansion paths are upward sloping. 
Therefore, p 2 > p 1 > r. 
This comparison shows that the pure substituting effect in favour of future consumption 
must be larger in Case II than in Case I, if the increase in future consumption is to be 
the same in comparisons between 'pension scheme' and 'no pension scheme'. 
7.2.4 A Public Pension Program with Social Pooling (Inelastic Labour Supply) 
One of the main features of the current Chinese pension program is that it has a social 
pool of pension funds, which collects part of pension contributions. The pooled funds 
are used to provide an elementary pension, as part of the basic pensions (see Chapter 4) 
for participants with at least 15 years of contribution, which equals 20 per cent of the 
provincial average wage. To analyse this element of the current Chinese pension 
system, we consider a pension system in which (unlike the actual Chinese system) all 
contributions are completely pooled and each individual's pension is unrelated to his, or 
her, contributions. 
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Assuming inelastic labour supply, the social pool taxes the rich to subsidize the poor. 
To ensure the social pool is financially sustainable, the subsidy should be equal to or 
less than the tax revenue. The implications of the social pooling are analysed in the two-
period model. Figure 7-6 shows the impact on the 'rich' and the 'poor', where the 'rich' 
is defined as the net contributor to the social pool, while the 'poor' is defined as the net 
gainer from the pool. In other words, the rich lose income while the poor receive higher 
income due to the social pooling. 
For the rich, the intertemporal budget constraint before the pension scheme is AB. 
Distance OB is the ( exogenous) labour income of the rich during the present period, OA 
equals OB(l + r), where r is the market interest rate. Now the rich have to pay 
contribution T = DB in the present period to the social pool, which moves the budget 
constraint to CD. This contribution will in tum pay him/her a fixed pension of P during 
the future period. P<T (1 +r), since the rich is the net contributor to the pool. The new 
budget line of the rich ends up at FG, which is below AB. Obviously, the social pooling 
of pension contributions imposes a lump sum tax ( or payroll tax in this case) on the 
rich. 
The social pooling provides the poor with a subsidy to their lifetime income. As shown 
in the right panel of Figure 7-6, the original intertemporal budget constraint is A'B'. The 
compulsory pension contribution moves the budget line to C'D' when the poor 
contribute T' = D'B'. With the fixed pension benefit, P, the new budget constraint with 
the social pooling is F'G', which is above the original one, A'B'. The poor receive a 
subsidy through the social pooling of pension contributions. 
7.3 Some Comments on Recent Pension Reforms in China 
The discussions in this chapter have provided a general framework to look at the 
taxation implications of a funded public pension system. This section uses this 
framework to examine pension reforms in China during the 1980s and 1990s5, from 
both the short and the long run point of view, with the focus on the current pension 
system. The recent pension reforms are discussed in greater details in Chapter 4. 
5 Details of the pension reforms are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Therefore, they will only be described briefly in the following sections before the 
comments are made. 
7.3.1 The Pooling of Pension Fund among SOEs 
The first of the Chinese pension reforms started in the mid-l 980s, when the old work 
unit-based pension system was facing the problem of unbalanced pension liabilities 
among SOEs (Han and Jiao 1997)6. To help SOEs with financial difficulties to fulfill 
their pension liabilities, the local agent of the Department of Labour (now Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security) in cities stepped in. The agent required all SOEs in the 
region ( county or city) to contribute to a local pool of pension funds, which then paid 
out their pension liabilities. Since the contribution was made at a unified rate of total 
wages, the social pooling levelled the burden of pension liabilities among (local) SO Es. 
To some extent, the social pool of pension funds moved the old pension system away 
from the work unit-based system towards a local social pension system, which was 
supposed to include all local SOEs. Ideally, as long as the local SOE sector could 
afford to pay pensions ( out of current revenue), the old PA YGO system would be 
sustainable. 
From a taxation point of view, this reform unified the tax burden of pension liability 
among local SO Es. If the marginal cost of taxation increases with the tax rate, a unified 
tax burden generates a smaller deadweight loss, for the same amount of tax revenues. 
However, this reform did not address issues of long-term concern, such as the aging 
population and shrinking coverage of the program, which were related at the time. On 
the one hand, the Chinese population was expected to age fairly rapidly from the end of 
the 20th century until the mid of the 21 st century, which meant rising retiree/worker ratio 
of the population. On the other hand, since the old urban PA YGO scheme covered only 
employees in SOEs, population aging was expected to be even quicker and more 
significant for the population covered by the old PA YGO pension scheme than for 
China as a whole. As mentioned in Chapter 4, as long as there was an alternative, young 
employees in the SOE sector had an incentive to move to other sectors to avoid paying 
6 See Chapter 4 for details of the background of this reform. 
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pensions for the current retirees, while the older employees had an incentive to remain, 
in order to get their pension. This incentive mechanism suggested that the old PA YGO 
system would break down fairly soon, unless the universal coverage was imposed by 
government regulations. Since the social pooling of pension funds did not solve these 
problems, the old PA YGO pension scheme was facing a rapidly aging population 
covered by the system, and the pressure to increase the payroll tax rate to finance 
pension payments. 
The social pooling of pension funds among SOEs also had its intrinsic problem in the 
short run, that is, the adverse selection problem. Since the contribution rate was unified, 
SOEs that had higher pension liabilities and therefore higher pension/payroll ratios 
would take part in the pool, while SOEs that had smaller pension liabilities would try 
not to join the social pool. The result would be a social pool with too many SOEs with 
high pension liabilities, which would force the contribution rate to rise. This was 
especially the case when the social pool was not mandatory, and some local SOEs were 
under the administration of a government at a higher level than the local pool. 
7.3.2 The Employee Contribution 
The second maJor step of pension reform occurred in 1986, when the central 
government required employees to contribute to pension funds. This reform was 
intended to add a new source of pension funds to relieve the financial burden of the 
PA YGO pension system (Han and Jiao 1997). 
In 1986, newly employed contract workers of SOEs were required to contribute to 
pension funds. Employee contributions were then extended to all employees of SOEs in 
the early 1990s, at the rate of 3 % of wages. At this stage, employee contributions were 
pooled together with contributions of SOEs to pay pensions for current retirees (Han 
and Jiao 1997). From an employee's point of view, this reform simply imposed a 
payroll tax, since neither the contribution years, nor the actual amount of contributions, 
which also depended on wages, was directly related with expected future pension 
benefits. 
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While the tax rate was increased by the introduction of employee contributions, the long 
run problem of the old PA YGO pension scheme was not solved. As the theoretical 
model in Chapter 6 shows, the optimal payroll tax rate to financing pensions for an 
aging population is to smooth out the tax burden over time. The simulation results in 
Chapter 6 also indicate that for the case of China, even the optimal tax rate is very high 
to be a feasible payroll tax rate. As Table 7-2 shows, even though the revenue of 
pension funds increased from 1989 to 1999, outlays also rose. In 1998, the outlay was 
actually more than revenues for that year. 
In the last column of Table 7-2, the figures show how many months of pensions the 
accumulated fund surplus could pay at the year-end. This figure rose and fell during the 
period. At the end of 1999, the pension fund surplus was the lowest, with only around 5 
months of payment in reserve. From an insurance fund point of view, a seven or eight-
month payment surplus is probably more for an emergency purpose, rather than a 
reserve for future payment at a peak time when the population aging accelerates. 
The reform of introducing employee contributions did not sufficiently increase the 
surplus of pension funds to prepare the old PA YGO system for the aging population 
covered by the scheme, which would become more critical over time with the limited 
coverage of the scheme. As in the case of the first pension reform of pooling pension 
contributions, this reform failed to address other issues, such as the shrinking coverage 
of the public pension scheme. 
7.3.3 A Three-Pillar Pension Scheme with Individual Accounts and the Social 
Pool 
The most recent reforms of the public pension system in China included two major 
changes in 1995 and 1997, respectively, which replaced the old PAYGO system with a 
three-pillar pension system. In the current pension scheme (2002), the first pillar is a 
scaled-down PA YGO system that provides the so-called elementary pensions. The 
second pillar is a compulsory, funded system of individual savings account that 
provides the so-called individual account pensions. The third pillar is a half-voluntary 
enterprise supplementary pension (Han and Jiao 1997; Liu 2000). It is expected that the 
first two pillars will provide a basic income to retirees as the so-called basic pensions, 
which include the elementary pensions and the individual account pensions. Policies 
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and detailed regulations with regard to the third pillar are not formalised by the 
government, so the focus here is on the first two pillars that are mandatory: the scaled-
down PA YGO component and the funded individual accounts. 
7.3.3.1 Lower Replacement Rates of the Basic Pension System 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the old PA YGO pension scheme in China used to provide 
pensions with a high replacement rate. High replacement rates were both necessary and 
possible during the pre-reform period. The necessity was due to low wages determined 
by central planners. A reasonably high replacen1ent rate was then needed to provide a 
basic living during retirement. The possibility was due to: (1) a relatively young labour 
force in cities; (2) a centrally planned economy where the government could collect the 
surplus of various economic activities through price-decisions, in particular could tax 
the agricultural sector to subsidize the industrial sector; (3) relatively low wage rates 
determined by the central planners. 
In the new pension scheme established by reforms in 1995 and 1997, the liability of the 
public pension scheme was reduced by lower replacement rates. Under the new scheme, 
it is expected that the combined replacement rate provided by the elementary pension 
plus the individual account pension is only around 60 percent for individuals with 35 
year of contributions, compared with 80 percent in the old PA YGO scheme (Han and 
Jiao 1997). 
In Table 7-3, replacement rates of the old PA YGO pension scheme, of reform proposals 
in year 1995, and of the major reform in year 1997 are compared, for employees with 
various years of contributions. 
Observations from the table show two distinct features of the new pension schemes 
following the reforms in 199 5 and 1997: 
(1) The replacement rates are much lower in the new scheme than in the old 
PA YGO scheme. This is true for workers with different lengths of 
contribution/employment. For example, following the 1997 reform, for workers 
with a 15-year contribution/employment, the replacement rate is only 36.5 per 
cent, which is roughly half the rate of the old PA YGO pension scheme. The gap 
280 
between replacement rates for 20-year and 35-year contribution/employment is 
35 and 21.5 percentage points, respectively. 
(2) The comparison of replacement rates in the same column shows how much the 
length of employment/contribution affects pension benefits under each system. 
In the old PA YGO scheme, there was only a 5-percentage points penalty for 
workers who worked for 15 rather than 20 years, with the same penalty for 
workers who worked for 20 rather than 35 years. By contrast, in the new 
pension scheme following the 1997 reform, workers will be penalized by 18.5 
percentage points in replacement rate if they contribute for only 20 rather than 
35 years. However, the penalty is only 3.5 percentage points for workers who 
contribute 15 rather than 20 years. 
A lower replacement rate would reduce pension liabilities. More importantly, the 
discussion in Chapter 6 shows that the tax/contribution rate of a public pension scheme 
depends critically on the targeted replacement rate of the scheme. The lower the 
replacement rate, the lower will be the tax/contribution rate associated with the pension 
scheme, ceteris paribus. If pension contributions are collected from payroll taxes, a 
lower tax rate reduces the deadweight loss on the economy, which improves economic 
efficiency. 
In addition, setting a low replacement rate helps to address the population aging 
problem to some extent. By reducing public pension liabilities, it allows the budgetary 
cost of the scheme to be met by only modest increase in taxation even though the 
population is aging. As explicitly stated in the new, three-pillar public pension system 
in China, the government is only committed to providing a 'basic pension', which 
should be supplemented by other voluntary pensions from firms or individuals. 
From an employee's point of view, feature (2) of the new pension scheme as illustrated 
in Table 7-3 indicates that the old PA YGO system had a much higher tax component 
than the current system after the reforms in the 1990s. For example, for workers earning 
the same wages, working an extra 20 years under the old PA YGO system would only 
add 10 percentage points to pension. Under the new system, it adds 22 percentages 
points. 
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It is. worth noting here, though, that the implications of the replacement rate for the old 
PA YGO system and the new three-pillar system are quite different. Under the old 
PA YGO system, wages were determined by the government, and were usually very low 
(see Chapter 3). A minimum pension would require relatively high replacement rates. 
During economic reform, wage rates have been rising sharply (see Chapter 4). 
Accordingly, relatively lower replacements rates in the new basic pension system would 
be able to provide a basic living for retirees. 
The tax/contribution rate of a public old age pension scheme is not only affected by the 
targeted replacement rate, but also by the closeness between the contribution and the 
benefits. Individual savings accounts are an important component of the present pension 
scheme in China. 
7.3.3.2 The Individual Account in the New Pension Scheme 
Individual accounts have been adopted nationwide as a result of the pension reform in 
1995. However, the contributions to individual account varied across cities and 
provinces. The reform in 1997 aimed at unifying all pension schemes within a 
province. Once the current public pension scheme reaches its target, individual accounts 
are composed of the total ( employee and employer) contribution of 11 % of a worker's 
wages. 
The Ownership of Individual Accounts 
These reforms have aimed at establishing an individual worker's ownership of the 
individual account. Individual employees own individual accounts, which are under 
their names. This ownership indicates that employees will receive (individual account) 
pensions from the account. Employees who are not eligible for the unified pensions 
from the social pool due to short period of contributions will get back all funds in their 
individual accounts upon retirement, including both employee and employer 
contributions, as well as interest on the funds. This ownership also allows employees' 
relatives to inherit part of the residual funds in their individual accounts should they die. 
This includes the employee contributions and interest, but not the employer 
contributions. This rule shows some confusions in the current pension scheme about the 
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ownership of individual accounts: are employers contributions in individual accounts 
treated as workers' deferred labour income or not? 
Perhaps more importantly, the ownership of individual accounts establishes a close link 
between pension contributions and future pension benefits. An individual account 
pension is one of the two parts of the basic pension, provided by the public pension 
system. In particular, for workers with long-term contributions, it will be the major 
source of future pensions. Currently, the monthly individual account pension is 
stipulated as 1/120 of total funds in an individual account at retirement. This means the 
more a worker earns during his/her working life, and therefore the higher employer and 
employee pension contributions, the more funds accumulated in the worker's individual 
account, and the higher the expected pension the worker will receive during retirement, 
ceteris paribus. 
Individual accounts in China's public pension scheme aim at establishing a simple but 
clear relationship between pension contributions and pension benefits. This direct link is 
the key to reducing the (perceived) tax rate associated with a public pension scheme. 
However, the rule with regard to inheritance of the residual funds in individual account 
indicates there is inconsistency in the system, that is, whether employer contributions 
are also part of a worker's ( deferred payment of) labour income, or not. 
Rate of Return on Funds in Individual Accounts 
There are other factors affecting the effectiveness of using individual accounts to reduce 
the tax burden of a public pension scheme. One of them is the return on funds in 
individual accounts. The previous discussion in this chapter shows that the taxation 
implications of pension contribution would be smaller, the closer the rate of return on 
funds in individual account is to the market rate of return. 
The current Chinese pension system adopts a so-called 'accounting interest rate' 
approach. Every year, the provincial government determines a rate of return, the 
'accounting interest rate' on funds in individual accounts, with reference to bank deposit 
rates (Han and Jiao 1997; Liu 2000). The interest on funds in individual accounts is 
credited to the account at the end of the year, according to this accounting interest rate. 
Since government bonds are the only legal investment channels for pension funds, 
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except for a small amount of emergency reserves deposited in state-owned banks, the 
central government prefers the interest rate on government bond rather than the rates 
offered by the state-owned banks 7 (Liu 2000). 
One problem with this accounting interest rate approach is that it does not necessarily 
reflect the market return on savings. While the return on government bonds is slightly 
higher than the interest rate offered by the state-owned banks, the latter is still under the 
control of the central government. Since the government controlled interest rate is often 
well below the market interest rate, the accounting interest rate of funds in individual 
accounts tends to be lower than the market return. This implies that employees' labour 
income is taxed by the pension scheme. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that provincial governments have an incentive 
to choose a low interest rate for pension funds. As part of a mandatory public pension 
scheme operated at the province level by the local government, the accounting interest 
rate affects the future liabilities of the local government to owners of individual 
accounts. The higher the interest rate chosen to calculate the return on pension funds, 
the higher the future liabilities of the local government to account owners. 
The relationship between the return on pension funds and the local government liability 
for pension payment, that is, the total funds available at an employee's retirement, can 
be illustrated by equation (7-7). Suppose that an employee's wages rise at a constant 
rate of g per year, and denote the first year wage as Y, the contribution rate for the 
individual account as -c, the number of years of contribution as T, and the annual rate of 
return on pension funds as r. The total fund available to pay pensions at retirement, P, 
is given by the following formula (the discrete time case): 
P = r Y * (I + r) r - (1 + g) r 
r-g 
( y :t=g) (7-7) 
7 As many policies in China, the central government often only sets up the guidelines or frameworks of 
policies for the local governments (provinces), so that the provincial governments have room to adjust the 
details of the policies to their local conditions. 
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The formula indicates that P is sensitive in response to changes of y . For instance, 
suppose workers' real wages rise at a rate of 10% per year, with 30 years of 
contributions at the rate of 11 % of wages, as in the current Chinese pension scheme. 
Upon retirement, these workers would have funds in their individual accounts increased 
by more than 30%, when the accounting interest rate rises from 5% to 7.5% per year. 
Portability of Individual Accounts 
In order to reduce the taxation impact of a public pension system, individual accounts 
should be portable, in the sense that changing jobs has no impact on accumulated 
pension contributions in an individual account. Portability thus removes the possible 
barrier to labour mobility caused by employer contributions into individual accounts. 
According to the current regulations of the pension scheme in China, the individual 
account is only partially portable. The social pooling area is at a province level, and 
pension contributions are managed by the provincial social security agency. Changing 
jobs within a given province does not involve any transferring of funds, but only some 
record changes. In this sense, individual accounts are fully portable. However, if the 
employee moves to a different province he, or she, can transfer all employee 
contributions and employer co.ntributions since 1998, but not earlier employer 
contributions (Liu 2000). In this case, individual accounts are not fully portable. What is 
not portable is the accumulated value of employer contributions before 1998 when an 
employee moves from one province to another8• 
To summarise, using individual accounts as a vehicle to accumulate pension funds for 
individuals could reduce the tax component of pension contributions, providing that the 
account is fully owned by individual workers/contributors, earns a market return, and is 
fully portable. 
The Proportion of Pension Contributions in Individual Accounts 
Creating individual accounts with the features of individual ownership, market return 
and portability would remove the taxation implications of the pension system if all 
contributions were paid into such accounts. However, if only a small proportion of 
8 In general, the amount of employer contribution accumulated in individual accounts depends on the 
local pension reform: when it was started and what was employer contribution rate. 
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contributions are put into such accounts, while most contributions are pooled to pay a 
flat rate pension to every contributor, the tax burden of the pension scheme would be 
much higher. As discussed in part 2 of this chapter, the social pooling of pension 
contributions taxes the labour income of the rich and subsidises the poor. 
In the current Chinese pension system, the social pooling component even imposes tax 
on workers earning the average wages. Among the targeted total ( employer and 
employee) contribution is 28 per cent of wages, which is composed of a 20 per cent 
employer contribution and 8 per cent employee contribution. Among the 28 per cent of 
wages that are contributed, 11 per cent of wages are accumulated in individual 
accounts, which is only about 39 per cent of total contributions. The implication of this 
partially funded pension system can be analyzed by comparing it with a hypothetical 
pension scheme (Scheme H), which has the same contribution rate (28% of wages), but 
with all contributions accumulated in workers' individual accounts. For simplicity, also 
assume that in Scheme H, pensions paid from individual accounts equal to 1/120 of 
funds available at retirement. Table 7-4 compares the replacement rates of the current 
Chinese pension scheme with scheme H. For convenience, results are calculated for 
workers whose real wages are equal to the local (provincial) average wage. It is also 
assumed that the return on funds in individual accounts is the same as the growth rate of 
wages, and that pensions grow at the same rate as wages. The retirement period is 
assumed to be 10 years9. 
The comparison between column A and B shows that with the same contribution rate 
(28% of wages), a worker earning the local average wages receives a higher pension 
( shown as higher replacement rates) in Scheme H than in the current Chinese pension 
scheme, regardless of the length of working/contribution period. In fact, it is clear that 
the longer the contribution, the more significant the difference is 1°. 
9 With this assumption, the formula (for the discrete case) for calculating replacement rate is simplified 
T*-r 
as: B=-, where Bis replacement rate, Tis number of years of contribution, and -r is contribution rate. 
10 
This formula follows the practice in the current Chinese pension scheme that the first year pensions equal 
to 1/10 of funds available in the individual account. 
10 Except for the case with only 10 year of contribution, when the worker does not receive the 20% 
elementary pension from the social pooling fund. 
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This result is due to the fact that in the current Chinese pension scheme, the social pool 
is used to pay pensions of current retirees, who do not contribute to the pool. For 
workers with less than 15 years of contributions, they lose all their contributions to the 
social pool, since they are not qualified for the universal 20 per cent pensions, or the so-
called 'elementary pensions'. Even for workers with 15 or more years of contributions, 
their pensions from the social pool, the 'elementary pensions', are defined benefits, 
which is at the level of 20 per cent of the average provincial wages, regardless of how 
long and how much they actually contribute to the social pool. In other words, the social 
pool in the current Chinese pension scheme does not operate on the actuarially fair base. 
Therefore, even workers who earn the average wages do not get their contributions back 
as pensions. Given the feature of defined-benefits, the longer workers contribute to the 
social pool, the bigger the differences between the current Chinese pension scheme and 
the hypothetical Scheme H. 
Another way to see the difference of the taxation impact between the two pension 
schemes is to look at extra pensions gained with longer years of contribution. While an 
extra 20-years of contribution (from 15 to 35 years) brings an extra 20 percentage points 
of replacement rate for workers in the current Chinese pension scheme, it would bring 
an extra 46 percentage points for the same workers if they were in Scheme H 
( comparing columns A and B). 
In column C in Table 7-4, the figures are the required contribution rate (% of wages) for 
workers with Scheme H, but to achieve the same replacement rate as with the current 
Chinese pension scheme. The firstobservation is that the longer the contribution period, 
the lower the contribution rate required to afford the same replacement rate as in the 
current Chinese pension system 11 . This observation shows that the longer workers stay 
in the current Chinese pension system, the higher the tax burden they bear. This is 
shown in the last column in Table 7-4, where these calculated contribution rates are 
subtracted from the contribution rate of the current Chinese pension scheme, which is 
28%. The results can be regarded as the excess contribution rate of the current Chinese 
pension scheme, compared with Scheme H. In particular, workers who have contributed 
for some years but not long enough to be eligible for the flat rate pension 12 bear the 
11 Except the shortest contribution year of 10 years. 
12 This refers to the elementary pension that equals to 20% of the provincial average wages. 
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highest excess contributions. For example, workers with 10-year contributions would 
only need to contribute 11 % of wages in Scheme H to receive the same pensions they 
would get from the current Chinese pension scheme, where they contribute 28% of 
wages. The excess contribution, 17% of wages, is a payroll tax imposed on these 
workers by the current Chinese pension scheme. For those who are eligible for the flat 
rate pensions 13, the longer the contribution period, the higher the excess contribution, or 
payroll tax, they have to pay, in order to receive the same replacement rate as in Scheme 
H. 
The 'Empty Account 'Problem 
There are concerns with the present Chinese pension scheme with regard to the fact that 
funds in individual accounts are used by local governments to pay pensions for current 
retirees (Li 1998). This leads to the so-called notional individual account, or 'empty ' 
account problem. To analyze this issue, it is important to realize that it is not easy to 
know whether or not an account is 'empty', nor to define what 'empty' means. For 
example, when an individual, A, deposits $100 in a bank account, it is almost certain 
the bank will lend out majority of these funds, say $90, as a bank loan to somebody 
else, leaving A's account largely, or 90%, 'empty'. However, if A comes to ask for the 
$100 from the bank a month later, the bank will give A the $100, perhaps by 'emptying' 
somebody else's account. As such, provided there is not a bank run, the bank can ahvays 
pay back the money when any individual depositor needs it, despite the fact that all 
bank accounts are mostly 'empty', in the sense of not being matched by cash, only by 
loans. 
As for the notional individual account in the current Chinese pension system, the 
similarity with the bank account is that most contributions into individual accounts are 
not kept as cash. Yet people might argue that the situation in the Chinese pension 
system is different, since the bank would use 90% of the money that is not held in cash 
to acquire good quality loans that is very likely to be paid back, with a good return on 
the loans, while the local Chinese government does not necessarily use the cash in 
individual accounts in this fashion. It is found that funds in individual accounts are used 
to pay pensions for present retirees, invested in local infrastructure, real estate, stocks, 
etc (Han and Jiao 1997). Paying pensions to current retirees is to pay government debt 
13 They are workers who have 15 or more years of contribution/working. 
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in pension liabilities, which will mostly be used for consumption. The other investment 
decisions made by the local government could incur a higher risk of not being able to 
get the money back. 
From an employee's point of view, the key issue is neither whether or not their 
individual accounts are 'empty', nor how 'empty' they are; it is whether or not the local 
government, as the management authority of their individual accounts, can pay back the 
money in the account when they retire. As long as they believe their future pension 
from their individual account is secure, they would regard the pension contribution into 
their individual account as part of their deferred payment14, rather than taxes. And 
provided that the government's assets, including its future tax revenues, are sufficient, 
they would be all right. 
The policies of individual accounts in the current Chinese pension system are clear, 
with regard to ownership, as well as the rules for calculating returns on funds. With 
these policies, employees legally own the account; the higher the contribution, the 
higher the future pension an individual will receive. These policies are a type of 
guarantee from the central government to owners of individual accounts for their future 
pensions. If these rules are to be credible, they should also guarantee the repayment of 
any 'borrowing' by the local government from individual accounts. 
The concern about empty accounts is really a concern about the management of pension 
funds. Since the pension reforms, pension funds in China have been managed by the so-
called social security fund agency15, which is an agency of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security (MOLSS). This agency is responsible for collecting contributions and 
for the daily management of pension funds, including funds in individual accounts and 
for paying pensions (Liu 2000). Since pension funds can only be used to buy 
government bonds or deposits in state-owned banks (Han and Jiao 1997), there are no 
private, independent fund managers to manage investment of pension funds. On the one 
hand~ the local MOLSS agency is supposed to manage pension funds under the central 
government's policies. On the other hand, jobs and promotions for people working in 
14 Assuming the return is the same as the market return. 
15 Since 1998, local government treasury also took part in pension fund management, responsible for 
paying out pensions from a special pension funds account into the local agency ofMOLSS . 
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these agencies are usually controlled by the local government. As a result, it appears 
that funds are often used outside the scope prescribed by the central government 
guidelines (Han and Jiao 1997). 
The central issue of the notional account problem in the Chinese pension scheme is 
about management policies for the accounts. While the principle of private ownership 
of individual accounts is clear, other relevant rules of fund management are insufficient 
to protect such ownership. This management problem could lead to a result where 
money 'borrowed' from individual accounts cannot be repaid back when these 
individuals retire. If that time comes, either of two things may happen, or both may 
happen: ( 1) The local government has to raise taxes or reduce expenditures, or the 
central government will have to bail out provincial governments, in order to keep the 
scheme running; or (2) Retirees will receive less than they were promised. In case (1 ), 
the government will have to impose more taxes on the private economy; this would 
change the nature of the supposedly funded scheme to one that is essentially PA YGO, 
but with individual accounts. In case (2), the supposedly individual accounts will tum 
out not to have been genuinely individual accounts. 
7.3.3.3 The Partially Funded System 
The present Chinese pension system is called a 'partially funded' system, which means 
that part of the pension scheme is financed as a PA YGO scheme. The elementary 
pension, which is part of the basic pensions provided by the system, operates under such 
a scheme. 17 per cent of wages are contributed by employers into a social pooling fund, 
at the (targeted) province level, to pay a flat-rate pension, equals to 20% of the local 
average wage, to all retirees with more than 15 years of contribution. The main 
argument for the flat-rate elementary pension is that the public pension scheme should 
provide a basic living for all retirees (Han and Jiao 1997). 
This feature imposes a payroll tax on workers. As discussed in part 2 of this chapter, 
given the flat rate contributions, the social pooling of pension funds tax the rich to 
subsidize the poor. It is easy to see that the social pooling finances a progressive 
redistribution among participants of the scheme, since a pension of a given amount per 
month, that is, the flat rate elementary pension, is a bigger percentage of the income of a 
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poor person than of a rich person. Moreover, as discussed in 7 .3 .3 .2, the social pooling 
even imposes excess taxes in the form of excess contributions on workers who earn the 
local average wages, since the government uses pooling funds to pay its pension 
liabilities accumulated in the old PA YGO scheme. 
The main support for the social pooling is that it provides support for poor retirees. 
However, there are three other issues with regard to this current arrangement. The first 
is whether it is necessary to have a safety net within the public pension scheme, given 
that there is already a social safety net in urban China. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
UMLS program provides a guaranteed minimum income for all city residents, financed 
by general revenues of the city government. It is not clear why there is the need for a 
separate safety net for retirees within the public pension scheme. 
Secondly, there is the question that whether the social pooling is fair. Since only 
employees with at least 15 years of contribution can get the elementary pension, this 
means that workers who contribute for long period but for less than 15 years loss all 
their contributions into the social pool, which is 17 per cent of their wages. In reality, 
people with relatively short periods of contribution may well be the group that most 
need the government's assistance, since their lifetime income may be low, due to short 
periods of employment. The income redistribution through the current social pooling 
misses the group who are more likely to be really poor. 
The third issue is whether the social pooling can deal with the population-aging 
problem in China (Han and Jiao 1997). It is easy to see that the contribution rate, 17%, 
for the social pooling is too high to finance a flat rate pension of 20% of average wages. 
Discussions in Chapter 4 show that in fact, this arrangement can support a very 'old' 
population covered by this PA YGO scheme. The program breaks even when the 
retiree/employee ratio of participants is as high as 85%, which means roughly every five 
employees support four retirees. So, this scaled-down PA YGO program appears to be 
over-prepared for population aging in the long run. In the short run, however, this 
PA YGO program does not provide sufficient funds to pay government's pension debt of 
the old PA YGO scheme. According to official figures, in the first year of the pension 
reform, 1997, when participants of the program were mainly SO Es, funds collected by 
the social pooling were not sufficient to pay pensions that year, since the ratio of 
291 
pensions to payroll for all urban work units was 21 % 16 . This ratio was higher for SO Es, 
but was much lower for work units that were not publicly owned. 
It seems that the government uses the overfunding for the potential long run problem of 
population aging to help financing its problem of pension debts in the short run. The 
outcome of this strategy is that the current pension program includes a very high tax 
component, as discussed in this chapter. In the meantime, due to the shortfall of funds in 
the social pool to pay current pensions, some local governments use funds in individual 
accounts, and the central government has also stood ready to bail out some local 
· governments. 'Between 1997 and 2000, subsidies doubled every year? from over 5 
billion yuan in 1997 to over 10 billion in 1998, over 20 billion in 1999, and over 40 
billion in 2000' (Zhao and Xu 2002: 404). In 2001, the subsidy was again 40 billion 
yuan (Zhao and Xu 2002). 
7.3.4 An Alternative Approach to Finance the Pension Debt of the Chinese 
Pension Reform 
The main reason that the Chinese government chooses to have a scaled-down PA YGO 
component in the post-reform pension scheme is to provide some kind of mechanism to 
help (partially) finance the accumulated pension debt of the old PA YGO scheme (Han 
and Jiao 1997). However, the problems that this component has caused actually 
overweight the benefits it may bring of financing the pension debts 17 • 
For a given economy, transition costs depend upon factors such as the coverage and 
rules of pension benefits in the old PA YGO system, the age structure of the population 
covered, as well as whether the new system is fully or partially funded. The transition 
costs in China are estimated to be relatively low, compared with those in countries such 
as Chile and Argentina, when they reformed their systems (World Bank 1997)18 . 
Indeed, as shown in Table 7-5, for most years between 1985 and 1999, pension 
payments were only about 2 per cent of GDP in China. 
16 The ratio is 19% and 22%, in 1996 and 1998, respectively. Source: Author's calculation based on SSB 
(2000a). 
17 For the explanation of pension debts/transition costs of pension reform, see Chapter 6. 
18 The World Bank estimates that the implicit pension debt in China in 1994 was about 46-69% of GDP 
that year. Compared with 100-200% in most OECD countries, 40-130% in Chile ( depending on the 
discount rate chosen), the implicit pension debt in China is not very high. See the World Bank (1997). 
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Our discussions show that the Chinese government has not dealt with the transition 
costs explicitly. So far, pension reforms have attempted to finance much of this cost 
within the new pension system. For example, the reform increased pension fund 
revenues by adding employee contributions in the early 1990s; and pension entitlements 
have been reduced by promising lower replacement rates. The reform is also aiming at 
expanding the coverage of the scheme to all urban employees, so that the relatively 
young labour force in the non-public sector can reduce the relatively high system 
dependency ratio (the ratio of number of retirees to the number of workers) in the public 
sector (see Chapter 4). More importantly, the reform attempted to reduce the entire 
'transition cost problem' by moving to a partially funded, rather than a fully funded 
system, using the social pooling funds to pay pension debts accumulated in the old 
PAYGO scheme. 
Despite these efforts to reduce public pension liabilities and to increase revenues, there 
are no policies specifying where necessary funds would come from to pay pensions to 
current and future retirees who have contributed in the old PA YGO scheme for the 
whole or part of the period of their employment. The lack of explicit funding for the 
public pension debt has led to various problems in practice, such as those discussed in 
this chapter. 
Financing the transition costs is an issue that the government has to deal with when the 
public pension system is transferred from a PA YGO scheme to a funded one. Due to the 
scale of the debt, the costs are usually expected to be financed over time, perhaps even 
over a few generations. This is not only fair for the first generation of the new funded 
system, but is also an economically efficient approach. As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
cost-minimizing path of financing a given government debt is to spread the tax burden 
over time. A second argument for not financing the transition costs of switching to a 
fully funded scheme out of current tax revenue is that in a transition economy, such as 
China, the tax system is not yet efficient nor well developed. For both these reasons, 
bond financing should be the major option for the transition costs for some period 
ahead. This includes borrowing from accumulated pension funds to pay current 
pensions. As discussed previously, the key issue is not whether funds in individual 
accounts can be used to pay government pension liabilities (transition costs of pension 
reform), but how and on what terms the borrowing occurs. Relevant policies should 
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respect and protect private ownership of individual accounts, as well as be transparent 
and provide good governance for the management of pension funds. If the funds have to 
be managed by local government departments, they should be subject to auditing and 
prudential supervision by the central government. As quickly as possible, the 
management of pension funds should be transferred to credible and independent fund 
managers, who have the incentive to act on behalf of account owners, but also under 
appropriated government supervision. 
In order to examine the burden of the transition costs as well as the most efficient 
taxation path to finance them, some simulations are carried out. They are based on the 
same theoretical and empirical models used for simulations in Chapter 6. In those 
simulations, the problem is that the government needs to collect payroll taxes to finance 
the old, defined-benefit, PA YGO pension scheme during the 2001-2050 period. In those 
cases, the government pension liabilities include both its debt towards those who had 
been contributing to the scheme up until 200019, as well as those that will occur during 
the 2001-2050 period. In the simulations that follow, the problem is, instead, that the 
government only needs to collect payroll taxes to finance the accumulated pension debt 
up until 2000. Obviously the tax rates simulated here to be needed to finance only 
existing pension liabilities are much lower than those simulated in Chapter 6 to be 
needed to finance both existing and future pension liabilities. Here, it is assumed that 
the government plans to repay its implicit pension debt between 2001 and 205020. In 
addition, there are few other assumptions. (1) It is assumed that the fully funded pension 
scheme is financially balanced and all pensions paid to retirees of the new scheme are 
from accumulated contributions, and are not part of government expenditures; (2) It is 
assumed that pension contributions in the new funded scheme are not perceived as taxes 
by workers; (3) As in Chapter 6, it is assumed that no other government expenditures 
are financed by payroll taxes. 
Based on the optimal taxation model in Chapter 6, the most efficient way of financing 
the accumulated pension debt, or the transition costs of pension reforms, is to spread the 
tax burden over time. So in these simulations, the government's problem is to collect 
19 In the old Chinese pension scheme, there was no explicit payroll tax for the pension. However, the 
government had liabilities to pay pensions for all retirees covered by the pension scheme. 
20 This approach repays the pension debt over the 50-year period. The gap between tax revenues and 
pension payments for individual years can be financed by government bods. 
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just enough payroll taxes over the 50-year period, so that their present values (in 2000) 
are equal to the present values (in 2000) of the pension debts. The scale of China's 
pension debt is estimated to be 50% of GDP in 1996 (in 1996 values) by the World 
Bank (1997). We use this estimation as the approximation of the accumulated pension 
debt up until 2000. In the simulations, this pension debt is rescaled into 2000 values. 
Obviously, this approach of simulation means that the discount rate chosen for future 
tax revenues matters. In the simulations, several discount rates are used to examine the 
sensitivity of the results. 
In the first set of simulations, it is assumed that the taxation system is inefficient and the 
inefficiency coefficient21 is fixed at its value in 2000-7.5% of gross tax revenues. 
Since the optimal taxation rule smoothes out tax burden over time, it is expected that the 
optimal tax rate is constant over time. The simulations examine the three cases of 
economy growth during the 50-year period, as shown in Table 6-4 of Chapter 6. When 
the economy grows at a different rate, the taxation bases vary. The higher the growth 
rate of GDP per capita is, the higher the growth rate of wages and therefore the larger 
the taxation base is. So, to finance the given amount of initial government pension debt, 
a lower tax rate is required on payroll. 
The results in Table 7-6 show that the tax rate reduces when the economy grows faster 
in terms of GDP per capita. When the discount rate is 5%, the required tax rate is 3 .8% 
during the 50-year period when GDP per capita grows at 3% per year. The tax rate 
drops to 2.6% and 1. 7%, respectively, when GDP per capita grows at 4.5%/year and 
6%/year. Changes of discount rate do not affect this pattern, although, when the 
discount rate is higher, a higher tax rate is needed to finance the pension debt. For 
instance, when the discount rate is 7%/year, the tax rate required is simulated at 5 .9%, 
4.3% and 3.0%, when GDP per capita grows at 3%/year, 4.5%/year, and 6%/year, 
respectively. As the results show, so long as the economy remains to grow relatively 
fast, say GDP per capita grows at 6%/year, the tax burden for financing pension debt 
remains at a low level of equal or less than 3% per year, for the various values of 
discount rate chosen for the simulations. 
21 This is defined as that in Chapter 6: the coefficient, a, is the proportion of tax revenues wasted and 
therefore can not be used to pay government liabilities. 
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When the taxation system becomes more efficient over time, the optimal tax rate is 
expected to rise, since it reduces the overall deadweight losses if a lower tax rate is 
imposed when the taxation system is less efficient while a higher tax rate is imposed 
when the system is more efficient. The tax burden of financing the pension debts are 
expected to be lower due to less waste of tax revenues. Simulations are carried out for 
the three cases of economic growth and when the discount rate is chosen to be 5%/yr. It 
is now assumed that the inefficiency coefficient of the taxation system declines at the 
same rate as the growth rate of GDP per capita. 
The results are drawn in Figure 7-7. There are three observations from this figure: (1) 
With an increasingly efficient taxation system, the optimal tax rate required to repay 
pension debts is lower, compared with the case when the system remains inefficient. 
For instance, when GDP per capita grows at 6%/year, the optimal tax rate rises from 
1.5% in 2001 to 1.6% in 2050, while it is 1.7% if the taxation system remains as 
inefficient as it was in 2000 (see Table 7-6). (2) It is confirmed that to collect the 
revenues in the most efficient way, the tax rate should increases over time; For instance, 
when GDP per capita grows at 4.5%/year, the optimal tax rate starts from 2.4% in 2001 
and rises to 2.5% in 2050. (3) The faster the economy grows, the lower the tax rate is 
needed to pay the pension debts. This is the same result as in the case when the 
efficiency of the taxation system is not improved (see Table 7-6) . When GDP per 
capita grows at 3%/year, the tax rate starts from 3.5% in 2001 and rises to 3.8% in 
2050; while when GDP per capita grows at 6%/years, the tax rate begins from as low as 
1.5% in 2001 and only rises to 1.6% in 2050. 
The simulation results show that for the pension debts that are of the scale of 50% of 
Chinese GDP in 1996, the payroll tax rate required to finance the debts over the 50-year 
period is quite low and thus affordable. The tax rate is especially low when the taxation 
system in China becomes more efficient over time, and when the urban economy grows 
at a faster rate. Compare with the high tax rates simulated in Chapter 6 for the PA YGO 
scheme, these relatively low tax rates also reflect the feature of the Laffer curve: when 
the tax rate is low, the tax revenue rises fast with the tax rate. When the tax rate is high, 
the tax revenue rises slowly with the tax rate. 
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The simulation results also suggest that it is economically efficient for the Chinese 
government to smooth out the transition costs of the pension reform and to finance them 
over a long period of time: a higher tax rate for financing the pension debts should be 
imposed when the taxation system becomes more efficient. Faster economic growth 
helps to reduce the tax burden of the transition costs. 
7.4 Conclusions 
This chapter is the second of two chapters that examine the options of future pension 
scheme in China in the context of population aging and economic transition. This 
chapter has looked at two major issues. The first is the taxation implications of a funded 
public pension scheme on individual contributors, on the assumption that labour supply 
is inelastic. The focus has been on a fully funded pension scheme that uses individual 
accounts to accumulate funds versus a funded one that uses a social pooling. 
The taxation impact of a fully funded public pension scheme with individual account 
is summarized in Table 7-1. The main result is: when the private savings constraint is 
not binding, the scheme does nothing if the return on pension funds is equal to the 
market return on private savings. However, when the private savings constraint is 
binding, the public pension scheme works as an implicit subsidy to savings. As a result, 
total savings rise. For a funded pension scheme that uses social pooling, the social pool 
simply taxes the rich to subsidize the poor, by redistributing pension contributions. 
A simple extension of the above analysis looks at the aggregate implication of a public 
pension scheme on the economy by using the PPF curves. It is found that, when the 
private savings constraint is binding, a public pension scheme with mandatory savings 
reduces consumption in the present period but increases it in the future period. When 
increasing domestic savings reduces the domestic interest rate, financing the same level 
of consumption for future retirement would require lower consumption during the 
present period than other wise it would be. 
The rest of this chapter comments on the major reforms of the Chinese pension system 
during the 1980s and 1990s, with the focus on why these reform choices were made and 
what are the possible economic implications of these reforms. The analysis shows that 
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using individual accounts to accumulate pension funds has the potential to reduce the 
taxation impact of the scheme. However, there are problems that the current scheme has 
failed to address, and there is room for the system to improve. 
Firstly, this partially-funded scheme has failed to explicitly address the issue of the 
accumulated pension debt of the old PA YGO scheme. It appears that the government 
has mainly tried to finance the cost from within the new system, rather than by dealing 
it separately. This explains the choice of the current partially funded system. The lack 
of funding during the transition period has led to other problems, including the so-called 
notional individual accounts. This chapter recommends using government bonds, rather 
than current tax revenue, as the main source of financing the transition cost, at least in 
the short run. The simulation results show that suppose the government plans to repay 
the pension debt accumulated with the old PA YGO pension scheme up to 2000 within 
the 2001 and 2050 period, the tax burden is quite low. If the scale of the debt is about 
50% of GDP in 1996 as estimated by the World Bank (1997), the urban GDP per capita 
grows at 6%/year, and the taxation system becomes more efficient over time, the tax 
rate required to finance the transition costs starts as low as 0.6% in 2001 and only rises 
to 2.9% in 2050. The improved efficiency of the taxation system reduces the tax burden. 
The most efficient way to collect revenues to pay the pension debt is to impose higher 
taxes when the taxation system becomes more efficient. 
The second issue is regard to the PA YGO component of the current pension scheme. 
The necessity and effectiveness of pooling has also been discussed and questioned. It is 
argued that the social pooling is to help generating funds for the government to pay its 
pension debt. It has a very high taxation component, yet it does not appear to provide 
assistance to those who are more likely to be poor during their retirement. In particular, 
the current social pooling within the PA YGO component imposes two types of taxes on 
workers: the first one is to tax the rich in order to subsidize the poor; the second one is 
due to its feature of defined benefits. As a result, even workers who earn average wages 
are taxed, and the longer they contribute to the fund, the higher the tax burden is. 
The third issue, which is critical for the success of the Chinese pension reforms, is the 
management of individual accounts. While there are rules that clarify the ownership and 
portability of the accounts, it is clear that the current arrangement of fund management 
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hinders the effectiveness of individual accounts in reducing the taxation burden of 
mandatory savings. If the government wants to obtain the benefits of individual 
accounts, employees' ownership of all funds, plus market returns on the funds, must be 
well defined and protected. 
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Figure 7-1. An Income Tax on Returns on Savings 
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Figure 7-3. The Impact of a Fully Funded Public Pension Scheme on Budget 
Constraint 
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Figure 7-4. The New Equilibrium with the Public Pension Scheme 
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te: * As explained in the text, this is the optimal tax rate required to collect just enough revenues (in 2000 
values) to pay the accumulated pension debt of the old defined-benefit PA YGO scheme. 
Source: author's simulation results. 
303 
Table 7-1 Taxation Impacts on Individuals Covered by the Public Pension Scheme 
p=r 
p >r 
p <r 
Private savings constraint non- Private savings constraint 
binding binding 
Nil 
Pure positive income effect 
Pure negative income effect 
Subsidy on savings 
Subsidy on savings 
Subsidy on savings 
Table 7-2. Revenue, Outlay and Surplus of the Old Age Pension Fund in China 
(billion yuan, 1989 valuea) 
Year Revenue6 Outlay Surplus # of months pension payment of the 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
14.7 
17.7 
20.3 
31.7 
37.5 
42.1 
48.5 
55.0 
60.9 
51.5 
91.1 
11.9 
14.7 
16.3 
27.9 
35.1 
39.4 
43.3 
48.4 
56.9 
52.2 
89.3 
( at year end) surplusc 
6.8 6.9 
9.8 8.0 
13.8 10.2 
17.6 7.6 
20.1 6.9 
22.8 6.9 
28.0 7.8 
34.6 8.6 
38.5 8.1 
37.8 8.7 
39.7 5.3 
Notes: a. Urban CPI is used to rescale the nominal value into 1989 constant yuan; 
b. The source does not indicate whether the figures include interest on balance or not. 
c. The number is calculated using the following formula: (surplus at year end* 12)/ outlay 
Source: author's construction based on figures in Table 1-51 and Table 8-26 in SSB (2000a: 66, 475) . 
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Table 7-3. Comparison of Replacement Rate (% )a of Alternative Pension Schemes 
in China 
Scheme PAYGO Method lb of 
1995 ref ormct 
Method 2Bcb of 
1995 reformct 
1997 
reformc 
15 year 
contribution/ service ct 
20 year 
con trib u ti on/ service 
35 year 
contribution/service 
70 
75 
80 
24 
32 
56 
40 36.5 
45 40 
60 58.5 
Note: a. The replacement rate is defined as the ratio of the first monthly pensions at retirement and the 
last monthly salary of employment. It is calculated for workers who earn the average wages. 
b. Method 1 and 2B are explained in Text Box 4.2 in Chapter 4. The former has contributions rate 
of about 16% of wages into individual accounts, while the later has contribution rate of about 10% of 
wages into individual accounts. 
c. These replacement rates are approximations, since they include various percentages of the local 
(municipal or provincial) average wages. In calculating these figures, it is assumed that the interest rate 
used to accrue interests to pension fund is the same as the growth rate of wages. 
d. There was no employee contribution in the old PA YGO system. The replacement rate depended 
upon the length of service; years of contribution for the schemes of 1995 and 1997 include contribution 
years from both the employer and the employee. 
Source: For the PA YGO system, see Chapter 3. Others are from Han and Jiao (1997) and author's 
calculations. 
Table 7-4 Contributions, Employment and Replacement Rate of Pensions 
Years of 
employme 
nt/ contribu 
tion 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
Replacement 
rate a of the 
current Chinese 
pension scheme 
(%) 
(A~ 
11 
36.5c 
42 
47.5 
53 
58.5 
64 
Replacemen 
t ratea of 
scheme H 
(%) 
(B) 
28 
42 
56 
70 
84 
98 
112 
Contribution The excess 
rate required for contribution rate of 
the same the current Chinese 
replacement pension scheme 
rate as (A) (¾)d (percentage points) 
(C) 
11 17 
24.3 3.7 
21 7 
19 9 
17.7 10.3 
16.7 11.3 
16 12 
Note: a. replacement rate is calculated as the ratio of the first month (year) pensions to the last month 
(year) wages of work. 
b. Workers with less than 15 years of contribution are not eligible for the 20% local average wage. 
The number is calculated assuming pensions for the first month of retirement are paid as 1/120 of total 
funds in the individual account. 
c. This and those following replacement rates in column A include 20% of the local average 
wages. 
d. Here, all contributions are accumulated in individual accounts. 
Source: author's calculation. 
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Table 7-5. Public Pension Payments and GDP (billion yuan, current yuan) in China 
Year Pension GDP (1)/(2) Year Pension GDP (1)/(2) 
Paymene (2) Payment (2) 
(l} {l) 
1985 14.6 896.4 0.02 1992 57.9 2663.8 0.02 
1986 17.2 1020.2 0.02 1993 75.9 3463.4 0.02 
1987 20.8 1196.3 0.02 1994 104.4 4675.9 0.02 
1988 27.5 1492.8 0.02 1995 130.6 5847.8 0.02 
1989 31.9 1690.9 0.02 1996 155.2 6788.5 0.02 
1990 39.6 1854.8 0.02 1997 179.1 7446.3 0.02 
1991 46.8 2161.8 0.02 1998 207.4 7834.5 0.03 
1992 57.9 2663.8 0.02 1999 242.1 8191.1 0.03 
Note: Pension payment is the actual payment of pensions to all eligible retirees. It is used to represent the 
pension liabilities of the old PA YGO system. 
Source: author's calculation based on pension and GDP figures in SSB (1999) . 
Table 7-6. Simulation Results for the Optimal Tax Rate Required to Finance the 
Pension Debt in China between 2001 and 2050 
(wage elasticity of labour supply is 1, the inefficiency coefficient of the taxation system 
is 7.5%) 
Discount rate (%/year) 5 7 3 
Growth rate of GDP/capita 3 4.5 6 3 4.5 6 3 4.5 6 (%/year) 
The optimal tax rate for 
pension debts 3.8 2.6 1.7 5.9 4.3 3.0 2.3 1.5 0.9 
(%) 
Source: author's simulation results 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions and Policy Implications for Future 
Reforms of the Chinese Social Security System 
The purpose of this study is to understand the origin and the current situation of the 
social security system in China, so that policy suggestions can be explored for its future 
reforms. The discussion of its origin reveals some main features of a unique social 
security system in the socialist China during the command economy era (1949-1978). 
These features contribute to the necessity for the recent reforms of the system during 
China's economic transition (1979-2002). As this study shows, further reforms of the 
social security system are needed, as part of China's transition towards a market-
oriented economy. 
This thesis intends to put the study of the social security system in a broader context of 
China's social and economic conditions before and after the economic reform started. 
Among many aspects of the system, the focus of this study is on the economic 
efficiency impacts of the system, such as that on labour supply, labour mobility and on 
private savings. This is an important area for study, particularly for China, which is 
undergoing the economic transition from a command economy towards a market-based 
one. The broad review of the pre-reform social security system shows that it had 
disincentive impacts on Chinese workers and farmers. The discussions of the recent 
reforms of the system also demonstrate that the designs of the new programs have 
potential negative impact on labour supply and/or labour mobility, as well as private 
savings. For future reform policy options, this study uses the old-age pension scheme 
as a case study. The choice is due to the significance of this scheme in total government 
expenditures of the social security programs, and the mounting financial pressure 
expected from population aging. It is expected that the careful analysis of one single 
_ program will contribute to further studies of the efficiency aspect of other social 
security programs, as well as relevant policy implications. 
China's economic transition 1s a complex and dynamic process that is far from 
completion. Accordingly, the reform of the social security system is a process of 
learning and improving. Given the space of a thesis, this study does not intend to 
include all relevant issues of social security reform in China. For example, reforms in 
areas such as state-owned-enterprise (SOE), labour market, and rural-urban migration, 
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are treated as background, rather than careful analyses. However, this study is a 
relatively comprehensive research of the Chinese social security system from its origin 
to its recent reform progress that covers most programs of the system 1. Examining 
details of the programs while putting the whole system in the broader economic and 
social context-from a command economy to a transition economy-also puts the study 
of the social security system reform in perspective. 
The main results of this study are summarized in Section 8.1. This is followed in 
Section 8.2 by some policy implications for future reforms, particularly that of the 
pension scheme. 
8.1 Main Conclusions from the Study 
The pressure for social security reform in China comes from the origin of the system as 
well as from recent economic and demographic transitions that will remain for several 
decades ahead. Chapters 2 and 3 review the origin of the social security system in 
communist China. It is shown that the system was composed of two separately 
operated, yet financially linked, systems in rural and urban China. In an economy that 
was centrally planned, and in which resources were allocated by the government instead · 
of by the market, the pursuit of rapid industrialization in an agriculture-dominated 
economy led to large scale off-budget taxation on the agriculture sector to cross 
subsidize the industrial sector. Along with other reasons2, this development strategy led 
to the most important feature of the Chinese social security system during the pre-
reform period: that it was a dual-system that was composed of a fairly primitive, mainly 
community-based system in villages, and a much more generous system in cities . The 
generosity of the latter was at the sacrifice of the former. This dual-system is studied 
separately in Chapter 2 and 3. 
The social security system in rural China before 1978 was formed mainly after the 
Great Famine (1959-1961) . As a result of lessons learned from this tragedy, the system 
emphasised the provision of basic food grain by the lowest level of the People's 
Commune? the production team. The Commune system was established by the central 
1 Programs that are not included are such as free education in cities and the community-based provision 
of primary eduction in villages before the economic reform. 
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government to facilitate its rapid industrialisation development strategy. On the one 
hand, the People's Commune was the lowest level of government that carried out 
government's policies. On the other hand, the Commune was the organizer and manager 
of agricultural production, which was conducted by the production brigades and the 
production teams. The team and the brigade were also responsible for the 
administration and funding of the major social security programs, such as the provision 
of a minimum allocation of food grains to poor members, support for the lone elderly, 
and the provision of a basic medical care system. Since the team was essentially based 
on rural neighbourhood community, while the brigade was based on natural villages, 
these social security programs were essentially community-based. There were some 
social security programs provided by the state, but they were only available when the 
problem was too large to be dealt with within the Commune system. 
Social security programs are often part of income redistribution by the government to 
support people in need of the society. Chapter 2 examines the income distribution 
process in the agricultural sector during the pre-reform period. It is found that firstly, a 
large proportion of agricultural products were explicitly or implicitly taxed by the 
central government. Then funds were allocated for the provision of social security 
programs within the collectives. Finally, the labour income of team members was 
distributed as the residual. Obviously, this sequence of income distribution was in line 
with the rapid industrialisation strategy. That is, the agricultural sector had to be a net 
contributor to the national economy, while providing a minimum subsistence to every 
team members. It is found that taxes on agriculture were so high that collectives often 
struggled to provide subsistence to all their members, let alone to reward hard works of 
individual farmers. As a result, there was a lack of incentives for farmers and 
agricultural production stagnated. 
With the cross-subsidies from the agriculture sector, the urban residents in China could 
enjoy much more generous social security benefits. The core of the urban social 
security system before 1978 was the Labour Insurance Regulations (LIR), which 
applied to employees in SOEs. Similar programs applied to other state-owned work 
units and large collective firms. The LIR was financed and operated at the work unit 
2 Some of the reasons are discussed in the Introduction to this study. 
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level3, but was supported by the central government's general revenues. The LIR 
provided a comprehensive 'cradle to grave' safety net with very generous benefits that 
covered both employees and their families. This safety net covered the majority of 
urban residents4 due to the following reasons: 1) the government adopted the full 
employment policy to provide jobs for all legal urban residents of working age; 2) the 
state-owned work units and the large collective firms dominated the urban economy and 
the employment; and 3) the benefits were extended to employees' family members. 
In addition to the formal programs in the LIR, the state-owned work units provided a 
wide range of fringe benefits and welfare benefits to employees. These benefits were 
often important services and were of great value to employees. Together, the formal 
social welfare programs and these informal benefits guaranteed a (relatively) 
comfortable life for urban employees and their families. 
How could this dual welfare system co-exist in China during the 1949 and 1978 period, 
given the large gap of welfare benefits between cities and villages? This was explored 
as a part of Chapter 3. It is found that government policies, especially the household 
registration system (HRS), the People's Commune system, rationing of consumption 
goods, and restrictions on travel, all contributed to the segregation of the economy 
between villages and cities. They effectively curbed labour mobility, especially between 
rural and urban areas. 
Overall, the review shows that the dual-system of social security programs were the 
outcome of the central government development strategies at the time. The 
administration and funding of these programs were based on the features of the 
economic system of a command economy. The system taxed farmers heavily. It had 
strong disincentive effects on labour supply, especially of farmers, and this contributed 
to the stagnation of agriculture production. Even the urban system that was generous 
towards employees of SOEs had disincentive impact. This was due to the lack of 
linkage between welfare benefits and labour contributions by workers. 
3 This was the case by the time the economic reform started in 1978. Earlier practice of the LIR involved 
some social pooling of funds from individual work units. 
4 These were those who had the urban household registrations. 
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This social security system was bound to encounter lots of problems during China's 
economic transition towards a market economy. In rural China, the old, community-
based social security system collapsed when the collectives were dismantled during the 
early 1980s. Since then, every farmer has had access to land, as well as to the market to 
sell the produce. The government regards the access to land as the social safety net 
provided to farmers (Wen 2000). The impact of the collapse of the primitive rural social 
security provisions on farmers is out of the scope of this study. 
The problems of the old social security system in China were the most acute with its 
urban programs, which only cover residents in cities who have the local urban 
household registration and used to provide very generous benefits. This is because these 
programs were heavily relied on the cross-subsidies from the agricultural sector, 
through the state government revenues. Chapters 4 and 5 examine some of these 
problems and the government's responses to them. Many of the problems appeared to 
involve the financial viability and sustainability of the social security programs 
specified in the LIR. These problems occurred partly due to the fact that the LIR 
programs were based on individual work units, while the reforms had made SOEs more 
independent of the government's budgetary support. More fundamentally, there was also 
the fact that the government had changed its development strategy to increasingly rely 
on market and had given up much of its power of allocating resources. In addition to 
these economic transition factors, China is also facing a demographic transition that 
leads to rapid population aging. The government's response was to deal with the 
immediate financial pressure on the LIR programs and to reform the major programs of 
the LIR. The most dramatic reforms occurred in the public pension scheme. The study 
of the old-age pension scheme in Chapter 4 finds that these reforms appear to be in the 
right direction as they attempt to establish a link between benefits and contributions. 
However, they are piecemeal and incomplete, and therefore further reforms are needed 
to have a fully efficient social security system. 
The other type of problem of the old urban social security system was that it could not 
meet the new demand for social safety in a market-based economy. The government's 
response was to establish two major social security programs to meet these demands: 
the unemployment insurance program (in Chapter 4) and the urban minimum living 
security (UMLS) program (Chapter 5). The study of the former shows that the tax rate 
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to finance the program was made relatively high to collect revenues to help the large 
number of laid-off workers from SOEs. The study also raises concerns with regard to 
the management level of the program, and its possible negative impact on labour 
mobility. The UMLS program was established in late 1990s to provide a minimum 
guaranteed income for all urban residents who have the local urban household 
registration. Due to data limitations, the assessment of this program is at the aggregate 
level and is preliminary. The results show that during the first few years' of operation, 
the program extended its coverage and helped an increasing number of poor people with 
urban registration. The empirical test shows that the UMLS levels varied significantly 
from city to city, but it appeared to reflect differences of local living costs and income 
disparity between cities. The UMLS standard was constrained by government's 
budgetary revenues, although only by a small amount. The major concerns with the 
UMLS program include two issues: 1) the program is distorting, since it imposes a 
marginal tax rate up to 100% on earned income of recipients. This distorting tax rate 
varies depending on the local minimum wage, the availability of part-time jobs as well 
as the level of the UMLS line. It is recommended that more careful empirical studies are 
needed to examine the impact on labour supply, especially in rich cities. This feature 
may become more of a problem with economic growth and the increase of the UMLS 
standard; 2) the limited coverage of this program potentially hinders labour mobility 
and thus poverty reduction. The UMLS program operates at the city level. It excludes 
migrants. Those who are registered as urban residents of other cities have to make their 
claims to municipal government of their household registration. Rural migrants in cities 
-those who do not have the urban registration-are excluded from this safety net, even 
though they are often among the poorest group in cities. Recent studies show that as 
many as 1 in 5 people who now live in Chines cities belong to this migrant group. This 
limited coverage of the program potentially hinders labour mobility: it increases the 
costs of exploring better economic opportunities in other regions, both for urban and 
rural residents. This in tum reduces the chance of poor people lifting themselves out of 
poverty by pursuing better usage of their labour. Due to the limited space of the thesis, 
Chapter 5 does not include a careful analysis of how to deal with these issues. Instead, it 
points to some possible choices for the improvement of the UMLS program. 
The review of recent social security reforms in urban China shows that urban 
people-those with urban household registrations-are the focus of the new system. 
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Consider the significant gap between rural and urban income (Zhao, Li et al. 1999), and 
the restriction of the household registration system on labour mobility, the current social 
security system in China is, still, effectively a system that is biased towards legal urban 
residents, who are often the relatively rich in the society. The efficiency impact of such 
a system is certainly worth studying. However, this thesis, instead, focuses on the urban 
social security program that is facing the most imminent pressure-the old-age pension 
scheme. 
The pension scheme has particular importance in social security reforms in China, not 
only because it is the largest program in terms of expenses, but also because China, as a 
developing county, is facing a massive demographic transition-population aging-that 
is more typical of advanced industrialised nations (Peterson, 1999). Economic transition 
also adds complexity to this issue. 
This thesis studies some policy options for the Chinese pension reform during the next 
50 years or so, from the economic efficiency point of view, in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Chapter 6 examines how to smooth the fiscal burden over time. 
A simple analytical model based on Barro's (1979) framework is established, and the 
optimal taxation path is solved. At the theoretical level, the model retains Barro's result 
that the optimal tax rate is time invariant, so long as Barro's key assumption is satisfied. 
Furthermore, to capture the economic transition feature of the Chinese economy, an 
economic transition factor-the inefficiency coefficient of the taxation system is 
incorporated into the model. The result shows that the optimal tax rate should increase 
over time when the taxation system of the transition economy becomes more efficient. 
At the empirical level, simulations are carried out to examine the impact of population 
aging on a defined-benefit pension scheme in urban China for the 50 years between 
2001 and 2050. The results confirm that population aging, such as that projected by the 
UN (2001 ), would impose a rapidly increasing tax burden on workers if the defined 
benefit, PA YGO scheme were to remain. In the baseline scenario, the year-by-year ( or 
PAYGO) payroll tax rate rises from about 13% in 2001 to 53% in 2050, assuming the 
313 
taxation system is efficient5. The tax burden gets worse if the population aging in cites 
is faster than that in villages, and when the taxation system is inefficient. . The 
simulations then examine the alternative option to finance the pre-determined public 
pension liabilities? the optimal taxation path, which is constant under Barro's 
assumptions but rises if the efficiency of the taxation system rises. This approach of 
smoothing out the rising tax burden over time minimises the deadweight losses of 
financing public pension liabilities during a period of time. From the society's point of 
view, there are significant efficiency gains to follow this optimal tax path instead of the 
PA YGO tax path. These efficiency gains are affected by the growth rate of per capita 
GDP, the elasticity of labour supply, as well as the speed of population aging in cities. 
In the cases where the taxation system becomes more efficient over time, the optimal 
tax rate increases. The efficiency gains, however, may increase or drop, depending on 
the values of parameters. In most of the cases simulated, even the optimal payroll tax 
rate is above 3 0% for the period between 2001 and 205 0. 
These simulation results suggest that with the rapid population aging 1n China, a 
defined-benefit PA YGO pension scheme will have to impose an increasing and 
unrealistically high tax burden on workers. Financed on a year-by-year bases, the 
PAYGO payroll tax rate rises from 13% in 2001 to 53% in 2005, when the taxation 
system is efficient, and the urban population aging is as fast as that in villages. In cases 
when the taxation system is not efficient, and/or the urban population aging is faster 
than that in villages, the tax rate requited to finance the defined-benefits, PA YGO 
pension scheme is even higher. For example, the payroll tax has to increase from 16% 
in 2001 to 66% in 2050, when the taxation system is inefficient (but becomes more 
efficient), and urban population aging is 10% higher than that in villages. 
The alternative optimal tax path approach accumulates funds when the population is 
relatively young. This smoothes out the tax burden and therefore reduces the 
deadweight losses . Despite the efficiency gains, the optimal payroll tax rate to finance 
pension payment would have to be 30% or more. This does not appear to be a feasible 
rate for a payroll tax. 
5 Efficiency is defined in terms of the ratio of collection costs to revenues that are used to finance 
government expenses. In the simulation, an efficient taxation system allows the government to use 100% 
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These results show that either the Chinese government needs to consider sources other 
than payroll tax to finance pension liabilities, or to reform the old pension scheme. The 
question fro Chapter 7 is: is the current, partially funded pension scheme a good choice? 
Details of the impact on individual incentives and efficiency of two funded pension 
schemes-one with funds accumulated in individual accounts and the other one with 
funds pooled-are discussed in Chapter 7. These analytical tools are used to examine the 
reforms of the pension scheme in urban China during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
discussions show that the current scheme has moved away from the old, PA YGO 
scheme to deal with population aging. However, the government attempts to finance the 
accumulated pension debt of the old PA YGO pension scheme within the new pension 
scheme. This has contributed to the decision of retaining a PA YGO component in the 
new scheme. This PA YGO component has the potential to and has indeed generated a 
high tax burden on workers. Our simulations in Chapter 7 show that the estimated 
payroll tax rate during the 2001 and 2050 to finance the accumulated pension debt of 
the old scheme up until 2000 period is between 1.5% and 3.8%, depending on the 
discount rate as well as the growth rate of GDP per capita. These results indicate that if 
the Chinese government chooses to finance the pension debt explicitly, the tax rates 
required are fairly low. This could remove the pressure to retain the PAYGO 
component in the new scheme, which generates high tax burden on workers, especially 
poor workers. Discussions in Chapter 7 also examine the possible disincentive impact 
of the current management of individual accounts. 
8.2 Policy Implications for Future Reforms of the Public Pension Scheme 
in China 
Discussions of the old Chinese social security system and its recent reforms indicate 
that there are many issues that are needed to be explored in order to improve the 
economic efficiency of the current system. For instance, the very high marginal tax rate 
of the UMLS program discourages labour supply, and its restricted coverage can 
potentially hinder labour mobility. However, since this study has focused on the old-age 
pension scheme, more explicit policy implications with regard to the best future pension 
of tax revenues to pay its pension liabilities. See Section 6.4.l in Chapter 6. 
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reform policies emerge from the careful analyses of this program, particularity those in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
First, the key issue of the public pension reform in urban China is the rapid population 
aging. The simulation results show that the projected speed of population aging in 
China is expected to create such a financial pressure on the old, defined-benefit 
PA YGO scheme that the payroll tax has to rise to an unrealistically high level by 2050. 
The high payroll tax rate generates deadweight losses to the economy. Even when the 
optimal tax rate-the tax rate that smoothes out the tax burden over time-is applied, 
the payroll tax rate is still too high to be feasible. In most of the cases simulated, the 
optimal tax rate is about 30%. The problem becomes more acute when the population 
covered by the scheme is aging faster6. 
The clear message from these simulation results is that the old, defined-benefit PA YGO 
scheme in urban China must be reformed. Accumulating funds while the population is 
relatively young by following the optimal tax approach is not feasible either. 
Transferring the PAYGO scheme to a fully funded scheme with individual accounts is 
one of the options that many countries have chosen (Peterson 1999). The Chinese 
government has begun its pension reform in the 1980s and has established a partially 
funded scheme. This reform is inevitable. However, is this partially funded scheme the 
right way to go for China? Results of this thesis show that this is not the best reform 
option for China. 
The major problem of this partially funded scheme is with the social pooling of pension 
funds. The government has retained the social pool as a way to finance the implicit 
pension debt of the old PA YGO scheme, or the so-called 'transition costs' of the pension 
reform. Discussions in Chapter 7 show that in China the social pooling of pension funds 
has a large taxation component on rich employees, as well as on employees with shorter 
period of contributions. These latter employees may well be those who have low 
lifetime incomes and have difficulty in making ends meet during retirement. Therefore, 
the social pooling discourages contribution to pension funds by the rich, and does not 
necessarily help the poor retirees. In addition, since the social pooling was designed ( at 
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least partly) to collect funds to pay pension debts of the old PA YGO scheme, it also 
imposes taxes to workers who earn average wages. In fact, the longer these workers 
contribute to the social pool, the higher the tax burden. In this sense, the social pooling 
should be completely abandoned and the pension scheme should become a fully funded 
one. As for the provision of a minimum pension to participants, the current UMLS 
program provides an adequate safety net for poor retirees. 
The best approach to deal with the implicit pension debt of the old PA YGO system is 
for the government to recognise the debt in its budgetary planning, and explore the most 
efficient way of financing the costs over time. The question is: without using the social 
pooling to contribute to paying the pension debt, will the debt of the old PA YGO 
scheme be too high to pay back? In Chapter 7, some simple simulations are carried out 
to examine the tax burden of financing this pension debt over the 2001 and 2050 period. 
The results indicate that the payroll tax for financing the transition costs is very feasible. 
In the cases that are simulated, the payroll tax on urban workers during this period is not 
higher than 6%, when the discount rate is high and the economic growth rate is low, and 
that the tax system is assumed to be as inefficient as it was in 2000 7. If the taxation 
system becomes more efficient over time8, or the economy grows faster and/or the 
discount rate is lower, the tax rate required is even lower. For example, when the urban 
economy (GDP per capita) grows at 4.5% per year, the wage elasticity of labour supply 
is 1, the discount rate is 5%/year, and the taxation system is becoming more efficient, 
the payroll tax rate required to finance the pension debt rises from as low as 2.4% in 
2001 to 2.5% in 2050. The simulation results also suggest that to improve the economic 
efficiency, the government should consider levying less tax when the taxation system is 
inefficient, and increase the tax when it becomes more efficient. 
Finally, within the current pension scheme, the most urgent reform needed is to 
strengthen rules of the ownership and management of individual accounts. This is 
crucial for the successful transform into a funded pension scheme, and to obtain the full 
potential benefits of such a scheme. 
6 This scenario can become reality when the PA YGO scheme covers only part of urban employees. As a 
result, young employees have the incentive to escape from the scheme to avoid paying pensions to 
retirees (See Chapter 4). 
7 Following the definition as explained in Chapter 6, this means that only 92.5% of tax revenues is used to 
pay the pension debt. 
317 
The analysis in Chapter 7 shows that when labour supply is exogenous, a fully funded 
pension scheme by using individual accounts to accumulate compulsory pension 
savings may or may not have any impact on private saving decisions (See Table 7-1). 
Further discussions argue that the ownership and the return on funds in the individual 
accounts are factors that affect the efficiency impact of pension contributions. In the 
current pension scheme, regulations to clarify and protect employees' ownership of their 
individual accounts need to be improved. Information on employer contributions, the 
amount of funds and the performance of the funds should be easily accessed by 
employees. Policies to ensure that the accounts are fully portable, both within the social 
pooling area ( the province) and between areas need to be made and implemented. 
Equally important is the improvement of the management of funds in individual 
accounts. The key criterion of good management of the funds is that funds are safe, and 
earn the market return. To achieve this goal, fund management should be separated 
from the government department, who also makes decisions on how the fund should be 
managed. Funds should be given to independent fund managers, who have professional 
knowledge of long-term investment. Prudential regulations are essential to supervise the 
performance of these managers to ensure that they behave on behalf of the fund 
owners? the employees. 
Well-defined and protected ownership of individual accounts and professionally 
managed funds with · adequate prudential supervisions will reduce the perceived tax 
component of pension contributions. This generates a public pension scheme that has 
the minium disincentive impact on individual employees. In addition, from the 
government's point of view, well-defined ownership and independent management of 
individual accounts reduces the need for the government to provide pensions. The 
government's role can then be limited to making rules, supervising fund managers, and 
the provision of a safety net for the poorest pensioners. In the long run, the risk of 
running into a large budgetary deficit due to bad fund management by government 
agencies is therefore limited. Of course, if the government stands by to bail out failed 
fund managers, it is still possible that public money will be used to pay pensions. This 
will increase tax burden on the economy. 
8 This is assumed to be the case that the % of tax revenues that is 'wasted' declines at the same rate as the 
growth rate of GDP per capita. See Chapter 7 for details. 
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These policy implications are for the future reforms of the pension scheme in China. It 
is expected that this study more studies will contribute to the research that explores 
reform options of social security programs in China, especially from the viewpoint of 
establishing an economically efficient and socially adequate social security system for 
all Chinese people. 
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